As RUSTY became a stronger player in Western Europe, the Central Intelligence Agency needed more, rather than less, information about its personnel and operations.\(^1\) In fact, both the CIA and the CIC in Germany conducted their own separate intelligence-gathering operations against Gehlen throughout the early 1950s.\(^2\) The Agency also kept a close eye on known German intelligence agents and, in one important case, took over a top Gehlen agent to become a CIA source. Gaining one of Gehlen’s agents presented an unusual opportunity for CIA, coming at a time when the CIA had just recently assumed responsibility for ODEUM (CIA’s new operational term for RUSTY). The Agency wanted to curb Gehlen’s appetite for expansion, particularly in Austria. (S)

---

\(^1\) Portions of this chapter appear in condensed form in Ruffner, “Prussian Nobleman, SS Officer, and CIA Agent: The Case of Otto Albert Alfred von Bolschwing,” in *Studies in Intelligence* (1998), pp. 61-77 (now declassified). (U)

\(^2\) The Army’s CIC, in particular, resented the development of RUSTY and the relatively free range that its agents operated in Germany. After the CIA’s assumption of the German service, the CIC launched its own intelligence-gathering project, Operation CAMPUS, against Gehlen. CIA, likewise, launched an intensive data-gathering operation, known as UJDREDGER and later UJVENTURE, to identify German intelligence personnel and methods. The Agency also implemented a telephone and mail intercept program, known as CALLIKAK. ☐
“ODEUM,” case officer Thomas A. Lucid at Pullach wrote in late 1949, “should not be allowed to build, plan, or even desire to extend itself into Austria, whether as a little Austrian ODEUM, with recognition from or penetration into the Austrian government in the least comparable to the recognition and relative position they hope to achieve here in Germany.” ODEUM’s activities in Austria, “if at all, it must be restricted to a low-level, purely operational favor-for-favor horse-trading basis.”

Otto Albrecht Alfred von Bolschwing seemed to offer potential for recruitment by the Americans because he could provide extensive insight into ODEUM’s foreign intelligence activities. Operating in Salzburg, Bolschwing had reestablished his wartime ties to members of the Romanian Iron Guard now scattered throughout southern Europe. Bolschwing had joined RUSTY in 1947, although he had fallen from Gehlen’s favor by 1950 because of his unwillingness to provide Pullach with operational information. Throughout 1949 and 1950, the CIA debated whether to pick up Bolschwing from ODEUM and to use him as an American source. (S)

In a late 1949 memorandum, Thomas A. Lucid, who had just transferred to the CIA from the CIC, discussed US intelligence plans for Austria with Richard Helms.4 Otto von Bolschwing figured prominently in Lucid’s planning. “It would seem,” Lucid

---

3 Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, “ODEUM and Austria,” 12 December 1949, MGL-A-945, (S), in Otto von Bolschwing, DO Records. This same document is also found in DO Records, Box 5, Folder 5, CIA ARC. (S)

4 Thomas A. Lucid joined the CIA in August 1949 after serving with the 430th CIC Detachment in Austria. Born in 1917, Lucid had been an Army captain for five years and served with the 88th CIC Detachment in Italy and Austria. A lawyer by training, Lucid remained in Austria as a civilian employee and CIC section chief in Linz. Lucid spent ten years (1949-1959) at Pullach and later served in South Vietnam and Taiwan. He capped his career as chief of base in Munich and retired in 1972. Lucid died in 1985. Personnel file, Thomas A. Lucid,
declared, "that [it is] a basis for splitting Bolschwing away from ODEUM and at the same time making the action work [to] our advantage. For example, he might conceivably be able to break into the future official Austrian IS, at the same time remaining a collaborator of ours." Lucid did have some reservations about Bolschwing. "The suggestions regarding Bolschwing," he wrote, "should not necessarily be taken as an indication that we regard him as a top-flight operative. As a matter of fact he may be, but if this is the case, he has apparently managed to keep a bushel handy for concealment purposes. Always giving the devil his due," Lucid added, Bolschwing "may indeed have great potentialities which could be nursed along, particularly in the political field."  

Lucid's mixed feelings about Bolschwing echoed earlier sentiments expressed by the Central Intelligence Group. A trace request to Headquarters from Austria in the spring of 1947 brought word that "Otto Albrecht Alfred Bolschwing is shady character."  Security Control in Munich also confirmed that Bolschwing was considered unreliable. Upon receipt of this information, the Security Control chief in Austria responded, "after considering the information on subject provided by Headquarters, together with

---

5 Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, "ODEUM and Austria," 12 December 1949, MGL- A-945, (S), in Bolschwing, DO Records. (S)  
6 Cable, Washington to Vienna, Heidelberg, 27 March 1947, Washington 766, IN 8397, (S), in Bolschwing, DO Records. See also Security Control Division to Commanding Officer, Austria, "Otto Albrecht Alfred von Bolschwing," 25 March 1947, X-9573, (S), in DO Records, Box 6, Folder 128, CIA ARC. A copy of this same memo is found in DO Records, Box 5, Folder 168, CIA ARC. Interestingly, Bolschwing claimed to have known Lt. Rene Grammel, the SI officer in Munich killed in an automobile accident in late 1946. In its trace, Headquarters could find no evidence that Grammel and Bolschwing had any connections. (S)  
7. to AB-51 [Hecksher], "Bolschwing, Otto Albrecht Alfred," 26 March 1947, MSC/Memo/176, (S), in Bolschwing, DO Records. in Munich wrote the reply and noted, "Lt. Grammel, as you know, is dead and many of his casual contacts cannot be now ascertained." believed, however, that any contact between the deceased CIG officer and Bolschwing was of "only a casual noncommittal nature." (S)
Heidelberg’s reply to our inquiry, we have decided not to use subject in any capacity. No approach will be made to him.” SC Austria added, “we will make an effort, however, to be kept informed on his activities, particularly with regard to the CE aspect.”

**Prussian Nobleman, Adventurer, and SS Officer (U)**

Bolschwing’s personal history was, indeed, “not the best.” Born in 1909 in Prussia, the son of a nobleman, he was orphaned when his father was killed in action on the Eastern Front during World War I. As a young man, Bolschwing worked with several trading companies and other businesses in Germany, Great Britain, and elsewhere in Europe. He then struck out to make his fortune in the British Mandate territory of Palestine, where he became embroiled in early Nazi intelligence activities in the Middle East.

Bolschwing’s own “Life History,” (written for the CIA in the fall of 1949) contained a number of fanciful exaggerations about his activities following his return to Germany in the mid-1930s. While he denied his Nazi past and claimed that he always opposed the regime, Bolschwing actually worked for the section of the German RSHA dealing directly with the “Jewish problem.” In 1940, he moved from this work to assume the post of SD representative in Bucharest, Romania, where he supported the Iron Guard.

---

8Security Control Division, Austria to Chief, FBM, “Otto Albrecht Alfred Bolschwing,” 16 April 1947, LSX-645, (S), in Bolschwing, Box 402, [no folder listed], CIA ARC. (S)
9Undated, unsigned, typed note in Bolschwing, Box 402, [no folder listed], CIA ARC. (S)
10A synopsis of Bolschwing’s life and Nazi career is found in Ryan, *Quiet Neighbors*, pp. 218-239. (U)
in a bloody but abortive coup attempt against Marshal Ion Antonescu in January 1941. Bolschwing undertook this action without the approval of his superiors in Berlin, which prompted the German Foreign Ministry to protest the SD’s interference in the Reich's external affairs. Following the suppression of the Iron Guard revolt, Bolschwing spent a “few months” in confinement in Germany. His arrest and imprisonment as well as his subsequent demotion in the SS later bolstered his self-projected image as a resistance fighter— an aspect that the wily German played up by obtaining certificates from US Army units attesting to his underground activities at the end of the war.  

Bolschwing’s statements in 1949 failed to convince the CIA about his trustworthiness. One report noted that “most evaluations of B. . . . run as follows: self-seeking, egotistical, and a man of shifting loyalties. His protests of democracy and, more particularly, feelings of Austrian nationalism seem to contradict his history.” Another observer wrote, “he is an adventurer, a lover of intrigue, and a wire-puller who is fond of power.” Furthermore, Bolschwing claimed that “in his position in Romanian he was able to frustrate many of the evil designs of the Nazi regime, but it should be remembered as a black mark against him rather than a point in his favor that he arranged the escape of [Romanian fascist Horia] Sima and others at a time when these men were at the height of their crimes.” This report added, “if one adds to these objections the difficulties inherent

12 Bolschwing received certificates from various American units in Austria, including the 71st and 410th Infantry Regiments for service in the summer of 1945. He later stated that he worked with the 44th Infantry Division from April through June 1945; the 103rd Infantry Division in July and August 1945; the 84th Infantry Division until December 1945; and finally with Third US Army Intelligence through December 1946. One of the officers who provided Bolschwing with a certificate, Lt. Col. Roy F. Goggin of the 71st Infantry Regiment, later sponsored him as an immigrant. (S)

13 Bolschwing, “Statement on Life History.” (S)

14 Undated, unsigned memorandum, “UNREST (Bolschwing) Files,” (S), in Bolschwing, DO Records. (S)
in Bolschwing’s involvement with political reporting on Austria, it is hard to see how, among all our other commitments, much could be gained by having MOB [Munich Operations Base] take him over as the principal agent for three Romanian projects.”15 (S)

The Romanian projects in question, ODEUM Projects 114, 115, and 116, involved members of the Iron Guard faction under Constantin Papanace. Based in Italy, the group broke away from the main body of the Horia Sima’s Iron Guard movement while quarantined in Germany during the war. Bolschwing’s ODEUM projects claimed to have widespread political and military coverage throughout Romania through his Iron Guard contacts.16 After reviewing Bolschwing’s potential, James Critchfield at Pullach commented, “we are convinced that Bolschwing’s Romanian operations, his connections with the Papanace group, his internal Austrian political and intelligence connections, and last but not least, his knowledge of and probable future on ODEUM’s activities in and through Austria make him a valuable man whom we must control.”17 (S)

CIA’s Man in Austria (U)

By early 1950, CIA decided to take Bolschwing as an agent. Bolschwing met with Gehlen in January and discussed the terms of his departure from ODEUM. Bolschwing then informed US intelligence about this development, and Critchfield spoke

---

15 Undated, unsigned, untitled, report, with letterhead “Central Intelligence Agency Washington 25, DC,” in Bolschwing, DO Records. (S)
16 FDM, Memorandum, “Projects 114, 115, 116 (Bolschwing Romanian Projects),” 9 February 1950, (S), in Bolschwing, DO Records. See also to Samuel B. Bossard, “ODEUM Romanian Projects Controlled by von Bolschwing,” 15 November 1949, (S), in Bolschwing, DO Records. (S)
17 Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, FDM, “ODEUM Situation Austria,” 1 February 1950, MGL-A-1198, (S), in Bolschwing, DO Records. (S)
with Gehlen about Bolschwing. Ironically, Critchfield found that “UTILITY [Gehlen] expressed conviction that the Papanace connection is of great value and should be salvaged” and that he “strongly recommended that the AIS in some way establish connection with Bolschwing and attempt to obtain from him a comprehensive description of these operations.” Consequently, Critchfield directed to contact Bolschwing to learn more about his work with the Romanians. 

soon met with Bolschwing and provided a description of his sources, both Romanian and Austrian. stated that “UNREST [Bolschwing’s CIA codename, issued in February 1950] has risen steadily in the opinion of this case officer and POB [Pullach Operations Base] in the last six months . . . . He is unquestionably an extremely intelligent person, an experienced intelligence operator, a man with an unusually wide and well placed circle of friends, acquaintances, and sources, and a man whose grasp of the political-intelligence field throughout the Balkans, and to a lesser degree in western Europe, is of a high order.” Both and Critchfield were


19Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, FDM, “Interim Solution to the Bolschwing-Austrodeum Problem,” 1 February 1950, MGL-A-1200, (S), in Bolschwing, DO Records. (S)

20 joined CIG in October 1946 and served in Karlsruhe and Berlin before his transfer to what became Pullach Operations Base in May 1949. Born in 1911, remained in Pullach as a part of the Agency’s Positive Intelligence Operations Section (under Thomas A. Lucid) until 1954. He later served until his resignation to take private employment in 1957. (S)

impressed by Bolschwing's preference for working for American intelligence as opposed to staying with Gehlen. "Probably the single ambition of Bolschwing," the chief of POB observed, "which is greater than that of playing a key role in Austrian intelligence is to become an American citizen and work in some capacity in political and intelligence affairs in Europe or in the United States as an American citizen."22 (S)

The First Coverup (U)

CIA's interest in Bolschwing soon extended to covering up his Nazi past. In early 1950, the Austrian Ministry of Interior investigated Bolschwing's presence in that country (Bolschwing was a German citizen) and requested the Americans to provide a copy of his Nazi party records from the Berlin Documents Center. When Pullach received word from the Berlin Base about this request, it immediately asked that his file be withheld. Peter M.F. Sichel agreed to pull Bolschwing's records and hold them separately, warning that Bolschwing was prominently mentioned in the "German Primer."23 In a revealing memorandum to Pullach, Sichel forwarded his recommendations:

1. We would like to draw your attention to some circumstances, which, in my opinion, make it unwise to have a negative file check on such persons as von Bolschwing . . . .

22Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, FDM, "ODEUM Situation Austria," 1 February 1950, MGL-A-1198, (S), in Bolschwing, □, DO Records. (S).
23The German Intelligence Services, two volumes of British Intelligence reports on German Abwehr and SD/SS intelligence personnel, organizations, and operations compiled during World War II. The "German Primer" was used by Allied intelligence during the war and remained in use afterward. □ A copy of the "German Primer" is available in the CIA History Staff files. (S)
2. The files at the Berlin Documents Center as to Nazi membership and SS membership, as well as the SS personnel files, are so complete that it is unlikely that any person checked, who was a member of either of these two organizations would not be found in the files. On top of this the persons you are dealing with are so well known and their background so well publicized in the past that I deem it improbable that you can protect them from their past history.

3. At the end of the war we tried to be very smart and changed the name of several members of the SD and Abwehr in order to protect them from the German authorities and the occupation authorities. In most cases these persons were so well known that the change in name compromised them more than if they were to face a denazification court and face the judgment that would have been meted out to them. In the meanwhile, the developments in Germany and probably also in Austria have been such that membership in the SS, or in the SD, or in the Abwehr no longer is regarded as a strike against any personality. Since I regard it impossible to keep secret such associations, except in cases where a person was a clandestine agent of a given organization, I request you to reassess the advisability of withholding information available in the Berlin Documents Center.

4. For the record I would like to state, however, that we can withhold such information if desired.24 (S)

E J. Bolschwing’s case officer, commented on the Agency’s efforts to obscure the German’s Nazi background:

24Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief of Base, Pullach, “Operational File Checks,” 24 April 1950, MGB-A-5974, (S), in Bolschwing, E . Peter M.F. Sichel served as chief of the CIA’s Berlin Operations Base from 1948 until 1952. A German refugee, Sichel was born in Mainz in 1922 and escaped from the Nazis. He joined the US Army in 1942 and served in France with the Seventh US Army’s OSS Detachment. He remained in Berlin after the war and ran the base’s positive intelligence operations. Gordon M. Stewart, the chief of the German Mission, rated Sichel as the “most experienced, most capable intelligence officer under my control” in 1949. Sichel later served E to return to his family’s wine business. Personnel file, Peter M.F. Sichel, E

☐
UNREST requested us to extract or block files which he believed were in the Berlin Document[s] Center, to prevent their being sent to Austria in case of a request for them. This was done. These files, of which we have a copy, show that UNREST became a member of the NSDAP in 1932 with the number, 984 212. This is mentioned in his personal history. He was a member of the SD Hauptamt and in 1940 was promoted to Obersturmfuehrer, in 1941 to Hauptsturmfuehrer. In February 1945, he was demoted to enlisted man in the SS and thrown out of the organization. UNREST explains in his autobiography that he received in 1935 a pre-dated membership in the party, which made him appear to have been a member since 1932. Subject was arrested by the Gestapo first in the winter of 1937-38, later in 1942 in Greece, and in September 1942 in Vienna when he was sent to Berlin and held in a Gestapo prison until April 1943. No records of these arrests appear in the file from the Berlin Document[s] Center. UNREST’s statement in his personal history, ‘that he held no real SS membership and that his party membership was somehow mysterious’ refers probably to the fact that as an SD man, he automatically became a member of the SS and that he received his party membership in 1935, but ostensibly belonged beginning in 1932. We believe that further explanation of UNREST’s SD, SS, and NSDAP connections are in order and will request that he provide it. We will later explore UNREST’s reasons for keeping these files from the Austrians.25

As C soon learned, Bolschwing’s ostensible reason for having the Americans deny his Nazi record to the Austrian Government centered around his own suspicious business activities in that country. Bolschwing worked in an American-sponsored firm, the Austria Verlags GMBH, but ran into tax problems with the Austrians. As matters developed, the CIA denied Bolschwing’s Berlin Documents Center file not only to the Austrians, but also to the 430th CIC Detachment and the Army’s Criminal Investigations Division (CID). This problem dragged on through 1950, eventually leading the CIA to request the CID’s assistance in stalling any Austrian investigation of

Bolschwing. While both of the Army agencies took no action in Bolschwing's favor, the CID also declined to provide any assistance in the Austrian probe. The Austrian Government apparently dropped the case by the end of 1950 for lack of evidence.

**Poor Performer (U)**

In the midst of Bolschwing's legal problems, CIA also expressed dissatisfaction with his overall performance. Redesignated as USAGE in March 1950, Bolschwing failed to redirect his efforts to expanding coverage in southeastern Europe; rather he preferred to supply "political information, largely overt" about internal Austrian matters. "This," Critchfield noted in August 1950, "is quite contrary to our desires, since our primary interest is in fact in the Balkans and not in Austria." At a meeting with Bolschwing that month, Critchfield told him explicitly:

_USAGE must immediately shift his emphasis not only to clandestine operations into the Balkans, but within this field must get down to the business of reporting defailed operational information and bridle his own tendencies to produce political and sociological studies, interesting from an historical and academic point of view, but not the type of material which will ensure continuance of his salary. The history of the Legionary Movement in Romania, which he has been preparing for from..."
four to six months, will be of interest and possibly add some new information on the subject. However, USAGE must first establish his position with us as a clandestine operator before we are willing to finance the exploitation of his intellectual interest in the Balkan problem.  

Bolschwing reacted with surprise to the American discontent with his “reporting,” and he spoke of “his Austrian coverage and connections as the aircraft carrier from which he can operate into the Balkans.” He promised, however, to expand his contact with Papanace’s Romanian sources as well as activate two projects in Hungary.

Bolschwing, in fact, traveled to Rome with Austrian Iron Guard leader Ion Magarit to consult with Papanace about resurrecting nets throughout Romania and Greece. Bolschwing, using an Army cover as Captain Albert A. Eisner (provided by the CIA), never fully reported the results of his Rome trip and nothing really came out of his collaboration with the Iron Guardists.

What little information Bolschwing provided about his operational activities disappointed CIA. He did provide the identities of the sources in his networks, but the Agency dropped the Papanace connection in early 1951 as too expensive and duplicative of information already obtained in Italy. Pullach also questioned the effectiveness of his ongoing Austrian projects and proposed Hungarian projects. In the summer of 1951,

28 Extract, MGL-A-3208, 29 August 1950 [Notes of Meeting between Critchfield and Bolschwing, 24 August 1950], (S), in Bolschwing, Box 5, Folder 5, CIA ARC. See also Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, “OFFSPRING-Austria,” 29 August 1950, MGL-A-3208, (S), in DO Records, Box 5, Folder 5, CIA ARC. Bolschwing’s codename changed from UNREST to USAGE on 17 March 1950. (S)

29 Chief of Station, Karlsruhe to Chief, FBM, “USAGE/Operational Report,” 12 September 1950, MGL-A-3321, (S), in Bolschwing, Box 5, Folder 5, CIA ARC. (S)

30 The identities of many of Bolschwing’s contacts and Headquarters trace results are located in his 201 file. For an example, the 1952 Personal Record Questionnaire on Dr. Anton Fellner, an Austrian lawyer, is located in the 201 file. Fellner published a Nazi paper, the *Volkischer Beobachter* in Austria before the war. He later commanded a propaganda unit in Russia and became a colonel in the SS. Many of Bolschwing’s contacts and subagents shared similar backgrounds. (S)
Pullach base reevaluated Bolschwing in a report to Headquarters. "It seems apparent," an Agency report summed up, "that while Pullach relations with USAGE have been cordial, and while USAGE has professed to be completely cooperative, Pullach has not been much more successful than ZIPPER [the Gehlen Organization] in terms of overall results." Critchfield added, "there appears to be little hope that he will ever develop into a first class agent."³¹ (S)

A Very Rare Bird (U)

Rather than drop Bolschwing as an unproductive agent, Pullach base transferred him to the Salzburg Operations Base in Austria.³² Bolschwing's new case officer,  , quickly found him to be "reliable, efficient, amenable to direction, and can be increasingly guided into activities directly supplementary to Austrian Station activities."³³  reported to Headquarters that USAGE "is genuinely devoted to the United States; he possesses truly extraordinary energy and efficiency; and he will cheerfully accept and is anxious to receive direction and guidance." He excuses Bolschwing's previous failure by putting the blame on the Pullach base. "It would appear,"  wrote, "that his past sins—which were in any event chiefly the result of

---

³¹"USAGE Status as of 15 June 1951" and "Romania," in Bolschwing,  , DO Records. Donald Huefner at Headquarters demanded that the Pullach Base determine what it planned to do with Bolschwing. Chief, FBM to Chief of Station, Karlsruhe, "USAGE," 31 July 1951, MGK-W-9897, (S), in Bolschwing,  , DO Records. (S)

³²Cable, Washington to Pullach, Salzburg, 22 January 1952, Washington 23751, [no OUT number listed], (S), in DO Records,  Box 14, Folder 5, CIA ARC. See also Chief of Station, Frankfurt to Chief, EE, "Takeover of USAGE by SALZ," 5 February 1952, (S), in Bolschwing,  , DO Records. (S)

³³Chief of Station, Vienna to Chief, EE, "USAGE–Salzburg Base Assessment," 7 May 1952, MAS-A-1618, (S), in Bolschwing,  , DO Records. (S)
lack of thorough direction—may be forgiven.” C considered Bolschwing “one of the most valuable assets of the Austrian Station,” and accepted his story about his Nazi past.34 (S)

Bolschwing now claimed to have several new projects, including penetration operations into Czechoslovakia, intelligence sources on the Soviet zone in Austria, and contacts with Austrian police and political parties.35 For the next two years, Bolschwing (now known as GROSSBAHN after his transfer to Salzburg) provided a vast amount of information on the Soviet zone while also supporting Salzburg’s REDCAP and REDSKIN programs. He worked for the CIA under a loose journalistic or publishing cover with seven subagents. In early 1953, the Agency estimated the total yearly cost for Project GROSSBAHN (including Bolschwing and his sources) at $20,000.36 (S)

Bolschwing’s main activity during this period, however, focused less on intelligence gathering than in winning admittance to the United States. In early September 1952, C agreed with several other CIA officials that Bolschwing should depart Austria for America for security purposes. Noting his “long and faithful service for US intelligence,” C felt that “the granting of citizenship and contract agent clearance to GROSSBAHN would permit him to concentrate his full energies on operations and his own support problems and to integrate his activities directly with

---

34 C, known as C was born in 1915 and served in the US Army in Europe during the war. He joined CIG in late 1946 and served in Frankfurt, Karlsruhe, and Berlin before his assignment to Salzburg as chief of Hungarian operations. Immediately prior to his arrival in Austria, C had worked on the ZIPPER Desk in Washington. C retired from the CIA in 1965 and died ten years later. Personnel file, C

35 Undated, unsigned report of Bolschwing operations at time of takeover by Salzburg Operations Base in Bolschwing, C, DO Records. (S)

36 Acting Chief, Projects Branch to Chief, Plans, “Project GROSSBAHN (Formalization and Renewal),” 16 February 1953, (S), in Bolschwing, C, DO Records. (S)
We are certainly aware of the exceptional measures we are asking in GROSSBAHN's case, but we feel that the action will be most beneficial to the operations of this base. GROSSBAHN is an exceptional individual and offers, we believe, sufficient long range potential to warrant extraordinary measures to get him on the team. He is devoted to United States interests, vitally interested in and capable of long term intelligence work, and has all the earmarks of a professional intelligence operator and executive. Coupled with his demonstrated loyalty and reliability, these qualities make him a very rare bird, and one we should go to considerable pains to exploit.37

To support Bolschwing's immigration, prepared a packet pertaining to his intelligence work. Bolschwing contributed another account of his life, Nazi activities, and work for the resistance. After reciting his story (in a more embellished form than his 1949 account), Bolschwing now exclaimed, "I may also state that I have never been in the pay of SS or the party or the German Government, and I flatter myself that at least in this respect I am an exception."38

37 Chief of Station, Vienna to Chief, EE, "GROSSBAHN - US Citizenship," 29 September 1952, EAS-A-112, (S), in Bolschwing, DO Records. Born in 1921, received his degree in Romance Languages from Ohio State University in 1943. That same year, he was inducted into the US Army and joined OSS in October. He served with X-2 in the European Theater of Operations and remained in Europe after the war. From October 1947 through early 1949, was CIA's liaison officer with the European Command in Frankfurt and Heidelberg. He then became chief of the Karlsruhe Operations Base during 1949-50 before moving to Vienna as the chief of the Hungarian Operations Section until 1952. At that point, he took over the Salzburg Operations Base through 1954 and oversaw Bolschwing's activities. Later served . He retired in 1974 and died in 1978.

Upon the receipt of Bolschwing’s proposed immigration raised several questions. Headquarters asked whether the Austrian Station understood the legal requirements for a foreigner to gain an immigrant visa and obtain US citizenship. The process, it declared, was not as simple as bringing Bolschwing to America for three months and then returning him to Austria. On another note, Washington asked what advantages American citizenship would give Bolschwing as a long-term agent in Austria. Headquarters warned that “in the event that it is finally decided to go through with the proposed course of action, Grossbahn should clearly understand that we do not and cannot assume unlimited responsibility for him.”

The Headquarters communique engendered more discussion in Austria. Bolschwing’s newest American case officer, detailed in a lengthy memorandum in the spring of 1953 why Salzburg Base wanted Bolschwing to move to the United States. C defended the course of action because “we feel GROSSBAHN’s background and experience qualifies him for consideration in a position as closely approximates that of staff status as his citizenship will allow.” After elaborating on several points, C added that “we will do all possible to imprint in his mind that taking the initial steps toward US citizenship will in no way obligate us, morally or otherwise, to assist him in his relocation should the course of events force his severance with KUBARK [CIA].”

---

40Ibid. (S)
After several months of back-and-forth discussions, Headquarters authorized Bolschwing’s move to the United States. The Agency, however, refused to use its special legal procedure and warned that it could take some time for the INS to waive Bolschwing’s Nazi party membership and allow him to enter the United States. Washington also warned that it would terminate its association with Bolschwing upon his immigration “unless much stronger, more specific plan presented for future work upon return to Austria. On basis past performance we are unconvinced future efforts as recruiter will be productive enough to warrant undertaking sponsorship his return. Such sponsorship,” Washington added, “[is] bound to make ultimate disposal much more difficult.”

Bolschwing applied for a regular immigration visa under the German quota at the American Consulate General in Munich in August 1953. The Eastern Europe Division asked the Agency’s Alien Affairs Division to coordinate Bolschwing’s arrival in America with the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The CIA did not conceal Bolschwing’s NSDAP membership or his SD service from the INS. EE, however, did not offer details about his past other than repeating Bolschwing’s own stories. Meanwhile, the CIA in Austria “rechecked” third agency files, notably CIC and USFA, G-2. Two of the

---

42 Bolschwing was not the only member of Gehlen’s staff to enter the United States. For a list of postwar West German intelligence service personnel residing in America, see Chief, EE to Chief of Base, Pullach, “Former ZIPPER/UPSWING Personnel in the US,” 21 December 1956, EGL-W-2995, (S), in DO Records, Box 2, Folder 38, CIA ARC. (S)

43 Cable, DCI to Senior Representative Austria, 28 August 1953, Director 17553, OUT 84658, (S) in Bolschwing, DO Records. (S)

44 Chief, EE to Director of Security, ATTN: Alien Affairs Officer, “Request for Aid in Facilitating US Entry for Agent,” [undated], (S), in Bolschwing, DO Records. See also “Mechanics of Aiding Agent to Obtain US Visa,” 19 May 1953, (S), in Bolschwing, DO Records. A note at the bottom of this page states that the CIA anticipated problems in obtaining visa because of Bolschwing’s Nazi party affiliations. (S)
documents found in this new search (both derived from informants) identified Bolschwing as a member of Adolf Eichmann’s staff.45 (S)

**Significant Reactions (U)**

The CIA responded to this evidence by ordering a third polygraph examination in September 1953.46 The Agency tried on three occasions to ascertain Bolschwing’s bona fides through polygraph testing. After his first exam in April 1952, the examiner concluded Bolschwing was not trying to conceal anything important from the Agency. “It would, of course, be remarkable if the subject had nothing important to hide from us. He several times stated that his life was an open book to us, and we could ask what we like. Sensitivity to the question was not of an order that would indicate this man had something vitally important to conceal from us but that there was at least one thing that he would rather not discuss about his past.”47 (S)

Immediately prior to his departure for the United States, the Agency again interrogated Bolschwing, “a rather poor LCFLUTTER subject,” for a total of 22 hours over three days in September 1953. The examiner determined that “it appeared questions regarding subject’s activities prior to 1945 cause more LCFLUTTER tension and

---

46 Bolschwing’s first polygraph took place in April 1952 and a second test occurred in May 1953 when the CIA learned that one of his agents had been in touch with Wilhelm Hoettl. See Chief, EE to Chief of Base, Salzburg, “Grossbahn–CC-2,” 26 November 1952, EAS-W-82, (S); Chief of Base, Salzburg to Chief, EE, “Grossbahn–CC-2,” 2 February 1953, EAS-A-770, (S); and Chief of Base, Salzburg to Chief, EE, “Grossbahn–General Security,” 6 May 1953, EAS-A-1310, (S), all in Bolschwing, , DO Records. (S)
disturbance than questions regarding his activities subsequent to 1945.” When asked, for example, about his connection to Adolf Eichmann, Bolschwing claimed that he had met him only twice and refused his offer to join the “Eichmann Sonderkommando.” After “detailed discussion” on this point, the examiner concluded that “it does not appear that subject has been withholding any important information regarding Eichman[n], but considering his initial reaction to the question it is some minor fact related to the matter that subject is unwilling to mention.”48 (S)

When asked about any official positions that he had held with the Nazis, Bolschwing “produced significant reactions every time that particular question was asked.” The polygraph operator then compared Bolschwing’s reactions to questions that dealt with his activities both before and after the end of the war. “It is this examiner’s considered opinion that this difference is not due to any deception but rather to the fact that subject is unable to recall all the exact details behind all the activities that he has engaged in prior to the war and during the war, and therefore becomes emotionally disturbed by the thought that he might have forgotten some essential point.”49 (S)

Despite the fact that the CIA had already told the INS about Bolschwing’s NSDAP membership, Agency officials in Austria advised him not to admit this fact after his arrival in the United States.50 The CIA worried that if Bolschwing admitted this at a later date, the INS “would be forced, for appearances sake, to follow the letter of the law”

48\[\text{C to Chief of Operations, Salzburg, “LCFLUTTER Test of GROSSBAHN,” 29 September 1953, SIM/89, (S); and Cable, Senior Representative Austria to DCI, 30 September 1953, Salzburg 1755, IN 22563, (S); C }\[\text{ to Chief, EE, “Resume LCFLUTTER Test of Grossbahn,” 15 October 1953, EAG-A-2210, (S), all in Bolschwing, C }\[\text{ DO Records. (S)\]}

49\[\text{Ibid. (S)\]}

50\[\text{The CIA also informed the State Department about Bolschwing’s immigration and Nazi record. See Cable, Senior Representative Austria to DCI, 20 November 1953, Salzburg 1984, IN 35971, (S), in Bolschwing, C }\[\text{ DO Records. (S)\]}

19
SECRET
and deport the German. The Agency had obtained Bolschwing’s immigration visa over the objections of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Also told Bolschwing not to contact any member of the Central Intelligence Agency in the United States except in case of “dire emergency.” This restriction included the renewal of social contacts or trying to reenter the intelligence business.51

Headquarters quickly responded to the field station’s request for guidance about what Bolschwing should state about his Nazi record. In addition to warning Bolschwing against applying for any sensitive or government jobs, EE elaborated on what approach Bolschwing needed to take in the United States:

Assuming that he has not denied Nazi affiliations on his visa application form, he should definitely not deny his record if the matter comes up in dealings with US authorities and he is forced to give a point-blank answer. Thus, if asked, he should admit membership, but attempt to explain it away on the basis of extenuating circumstances. If he were to make a false statement on a citizenship application or other official paper, he would get into trouble. Actually, GROSSBAHN is not entering the US under false circumstances, as ODURGE [INS] will have information concerning his past record in a secret file. He will enter legally under an ODURGE interpretation of the provisions of the immigration law applicable to his case. (Of course we are asking that they grant such a favorable interpretation.)52

By the end of 1953, Bolschwing had turned over his subagents to his CIA case officers, although Salzburg Base expected his departure to be delayed until January 1954.

This layover required an extension of Bolschwing’s immigrant visa, which expired in

51Chief of Base, Salzburg to Chief, EE, “GROSSBAHN—Termination,” 29 October 1953, EAS-A-2412, (S), in Bolschwing, DO Records. (S)

52Chief, EE to Chief of Base, Salzburg and Chief of Station, Vienna, “GROSSBAHN—Termination, 24 November 1953, EAS-W-576, (S), in Bolschwing, DO Records. (S)
December 1953. The base, meanwhile, tied up loose ends—a chore complicated once again by the fact that Bolschwing had never paid Austrian taxes. The Agency circumvented this dilemma by having Bolschwing and his household baggage leave the country under the identity of Army Capt. Albert D. Eisner—the cover name that Bolschwing had used in his earlier tax battles. (S)

A Permanent Goodbye to Intelligence Activities (U)

In wrapping up affairs with Bolschwing in Austria, his case officer, summarized the course of events that resulted in his immigration. “It was the consensus of opinion (Headquarters, VOB, and SOB) that Agent’s time in Austria had been used up; he was too badly compromised and too well identified as being a KUBARK agent in all circles.” added, “Grossbahn was told that his days of usefulness in Austria were rapidly drawing to a close, and if he were ever to realize his ambition of getting to the States and becoming a US citizen, now is the time to do it.” also advised Bolschwing, “if he did not accept the terms being offered to him at present, no guarantee could be made as to his ultimate future.” (S)

53Chief of Base, Salzburg to Chief, EE, “GROSSBAHN—Progress Report for the Period 1 October to 30 November 1953,” 10 December 1953, EAS-A-2619, (S); and Chief of Base, Salzburg to Chief, EE, “GROSSBAHN—Termination,” 10 December 1953, EASA-2619, (S), both in Bolschwing, , DO Records. (S)
55Ibid. Bolschwing received termination benefits of $400 including a bonus of six months’ pay as well as free transportation on the SS Andrea Doria from Genoa, Italy to New York. Chief, EE to FVPlans, “Termination of Project Grossbahn,” 22 December 1953, (S), in Bolschwing, , DO Records. At the conclusion of the project, the CIA had 55 reels of microfilm of Bolschwing reports with an additional ten reels of indexes dating from 1948. See Memorandum for Record, , Records Integration/Projects Officer, “Grossbahn
As he left Austria for the United States (under the sponsorship of Roy Goggin, who had met Bolschwing at the end of the war), the German agent expressed his pleasure. "I have regarded it an honor to serve the United States and its Government. I feel utmost gratitude that I am admitted to the United States to become a citizen." After an uneventful trip, Bolschwing and his family arrived in America and quickly settled in the new country. Writing from the Henry Hudson Hotel in New York City to his CIA point of contact, Bolschwing admitted, "I do wish to express my thanks for the excellent arrangements with the Immigration Authorities. We were called for on the boat and the Chief Inspector, who was in possession of a Govt. Memorandum signed by Asst. Commissioner Hogan, personally saw to our immediate being passed through all formalities." With a sigh of relief, Headquarters reported the safe arrival of Bolschwing in New York to Agency personnel in Austria. EE Division stated, "it seems difficult to believe that the Grossbahn case is at last at an end, and we sincerely hope that he has said a permanent goodbye to intelligence activities."