Iran

May 1973

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS

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(S) . . . . Secret
This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the Defense Intelligence Agency. Research was substantially completed by January 1973.
Iran

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1. Military history

The Iranians are proud of their country's military traditions, dating from the Persian empire of the sixth century B.C. However, since the 18th century military genius and adventurer Nadir Shah freed Iran from the Afghans and Turks and forced Russia to abandon the Caspian provinces. Iranian armies have not been noted for their accomplishments. Reza Shah, father of the reigning monarch, revitalized the armed forces in the 1920's. In 1922 an air arm was added to the ground forces, and in 1929 the navy was founded. These forces were not employed in aggressive national action outside Iran's borders, and they offered no appreciable resistance in World War II when the country was overrun by British and Soviet forces. (U/OU)

In 1943, a U.S. training mission was established to assist in the development of the ground forces and gendarmerie. Since World War II, the armed forces collectively have undergone increases in strength and numerous organizational changes. The military forces have concentrated on defending against external threats, while since 1963 an increasingly effective gendarmerie has assumed greater responsibility for maintaining internal security. (U/OU)

U.S. influence on the Iranian military establishment has increased continually since World War II as a result of the extensive aid programs and training missions. This influence is reflected not only in material on hand but also in organization and training and in tactical and logistic concepts. The U.S. mission continued its advisory functions after World War II, but its operations were not formalized by contract until 1947, when the bilateral advisory agreement was signed. The U.S. Army Mission and Military Assistance Advisory Group (ARMISH-MAAG) was established in 1950 to advise on the use of U.S. military aid. In late 1955 Iran joined the Baghdad Pact (now CENTO), and in 1959 signed a bilateral defense agreement with the United States. The most recent aid program is based on an agreement of 1962, whereby the United States agreed to deliver military equipment to Iran through mid-1967, subject to approval of annual appropriations and the capability of the Iranian forces to absorb the equipment. The agreement of 1962 was revised in 1964 by a memorandum of understanding under which grant aid was extended to include the period U.S. FY67 through FY69. Since that time, United States aid has been confined to military credit sales and training assistance; military credit commitments are provided on an annual basis. Iran also purchases directly from manufacturers through cash sales. (S)
Since 1943, combat experience of the Iranian armed forces has been limited mainly to the requisition of national control over northwestern Iran at the end of World War II, periodic punitive operations against troublesome Iranian tribes, and support of the 1961 United Nations operations in the Congo by an air force contingent of four F-86 fighter aircraft. At the end of November 1971, when Iran occupied the islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs (Jazireh Tomb-i-Bozorg), the only resistance encountered was from the local gendarmerie on the larger of the Tumb islands. Although the occupation was accomplished within a few hours of landing, ground, naval, and air force elements gained valuable experience in deployment, sustained alert, and support operations. (5)

During 1965 the Iranian armed forces were alerted and deployed when fighting between Iraqi government forces and the rebellious Iraqi Kurds spilled over into Iran. Occasional minor skirmishes, mainly artillery and mortar duels, occurred between the Iranian and Iraqi forces when the Iraqis fired on suspected rebel positions within Iranian territory. These incidents were the result of Iraqi suspicions that Iran had provided covert support and operating bases to the Kurdish dissidents of northern Iraq. Iranian armed forces replied in kind to Iraqi provocations. These encounters generally diminished by the end of 1968. In early 1969, the armed forces had the opportunity for large-scale testing of their training and capabilities when ground forces and gendarmerie units were deployed along the border of Iraq, particularly in the vicinity of the Iranian ports of Khormasayr and Abadan, during the recent, and yet unsettled, dispute over ownership of the Shatt al Arab. Air force and navy units were also placed on alert in battle-ready status. The response of the armed forces in this encounter indicated an overall improvement in their capability to respond to external threat. Armed conflict was avoided, but the Iranians stood ready to meet force with force. In the face of a locally superior force and constrained by large troop commitments to the Arab cause in Jordan and Sanaa, and to check the rebellions Kurds, Iraq declined to engage in a military confrontation. Border skirmishes have continued, however, and the Iranian forces have concentrated their primary units along the border with Iraq. The Iranian armed forces also had experience in January 1973, when a battalion was sent to assist the Sultan of Oman in putting down the rebellion in Zafar (Dhofar). (5)

2. Command structure (5)

His Imperial Majesty the Shah (Figure 1) exercises actual control of the Iranian armed forces as Supreme Commander to the extent of arbitrarily commanding himself with detailed day-to-day operations. Operational control is theoretically delegated, through the Chief of the Supreme Commander's Staff (CSS), to the commander of the individual services—ground forces, navy, and air force—none of whom, however, are members of the CSS (a joint staff). The Shah often exercises his command prerogatives through direct contact with many of his senior officers, whether or not they are members of the Supreme Commander's Staff. The position of Chief, Supreme Commander's Staff, has the equivalent of ministerial rank, although the incumbent is not a member of the Cabinet. The Minister of War has equal status with the Chief, Supreme Commander's Staff, and takes his orders directly from the Shah. He is not in the operational chain of command and is responsible primarily for representing the military forces in the Iranian parliament and for supervising legal and budgetary matters. The Minister of Interior is normally responsible for the operations of the gendarmerie and the national police; in time of war or national emergency, however, the gendarmerie is placed under the operational control of the CSS.

The Chief, Supreme Commander's Staff, is assisted by a Vice Chief and a staff consisting of seven sections: J-1 (personnel), J-2 (intelligence), J-3 (operations), J-4 (logistics), J-5 (plans), J-6 (communications), and J-7 (computers). Although the CSS is theoretically responsible for long-range planning and inter-service coordination, it actually exercises direct control and much of the day-to-day direction of the services. The staffs of the service commanders are frequently ignored and their functions usurped by the senior staff.

B. Joint activities

1. Military manpower

As of 1 January 1973 Iran had 7,253,000 males in the age of 15-49, of whom about 30% were physically fit for military service. (1, OL)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>TOTAL NUMBER OF MALES</th>
<th>MAXIMUM NUMBER FIT FOR MILITARY SERVICE</th>
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<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>1,725,000</td>
<td>955,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>1,503,000</td>
<td>925,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>1,128,000</td>
<td>685,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>908,000</td>
<td>475,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>711,000</td>
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<td>40-44</td>
<td>711,000</td>
<td>215,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>466,000</td>
<td>315,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, 15-49</td>
<td>7,253,000</td>
<td>4,290,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The primary sources of manpower to the armed forces are the peasants and tribesmen. These men are accustomed to a hard life in the open, and the majority have lived at a bare subsistence level. While tribesmen are usually able to ride and shoot well, those conscripted from the cities are likely to be less rugged physically and not as willing to put up with the hardships of military life. Illiteracy is high but has decreased with the spread of educational opportunities. Although technical experience is negligible, many conscripts possess mechanical aptitudes that are developed into useful skills while they are in service. All conscripts are required to learn to read and write before being discharged.

Enlisted personnel are provided primarily to conscription, since Iranian law provides for 2 years of active military service for all qualified males between age 19 and 27. Annual requirements of about 65,000 are met from the approximately 130,000 men reaching the military age each year. The gendarmerie is responsible for handling conscription for all the military services. Conscripts are turned over to the services for mental and physical tests and are generally assigned to jobs that communicate with their educational attainments. Secondary school and university graduates drafted into the Literacy Corps, Health Corps, and the Development and Agricultural Extension Corps are gradually taking the quality of the manpower pool available for conscription through the educational and health programs that carry on throughout the country.

The ground forces are composed primarily of conscripts. Noncommissioned officers and volunteers who have completed their basic term of service. The terms of enlistment are 5, 7, or 10 years, and must NCOs continue until retirement at 30 years of service. Conscripts comprise about 80% of naval strength, while only about 15% of air force men are conscripts. The majority of the officers are volunteers; however, there are some 2-year commitment officers selected from highly qualified conscripts.

There is no effective reserve system despite the fact that conscripts are technically in the reserve until they have reached their 27th birthday. Although over 1,000,000 men have been "armed" since 1941, only a small proportion could be readily recalled to active duty because of administrative and logistical limitations. Current plans call for the formation of four reserve infantry divisions to supplement the regular units. Two reserve divisions have been formed in Tabriz and Tehran. The other two, to be operational in 1973, are to be located in Meshed and Shiraz. Mobilization will be limited to personnel increases in existing units until the reserve units are formed. The air force and navy have no plans for a reserve system.

2. Strength trends (S)

Between 1958 and 1972 strength of the armed forces, excluding the gendarmerie, rose from 170,000 to 228,000 (Figure 2). In the intervening years numerous organizational changes have caused significant fluctuations in the armed forces strength. Ground forces strength increased to a peak of 191,000 in 1960 and has subsequently experienced significant fluctuations; a major decrease occurred between 1962 and 1963 when over 21,000 personnel were transferred to support logistics command and joint staff functions and when over 5,000 Border Guard personnel were transferred to the gendarmerie. In 1966 the logistics command was placed under the ground forces, and the latter's strength peaked at 160,000. A major reorganization of tactical units in 1968 resulted in another strength decrease; a further reorganization in 1971 increased the strength to a total of 163,000. The navy increased from 4,000 to 8,600 in 1962 and then decreased, mainly because of a reduction of 500 naval infantry; its strength has subsequently risen to its current level of 15,000. The air force experienced a continuous increase from 1,900 to 50,000 by the end of 1972. The gendarmerie has also experienced a relatively continuous increase from 24,000 to over 76,000. The strength for all the armed services is expected to increase steadily during the next 5 years.

![Figure 2. Iranian Armed Forces Personnel Strength* (S)](image-url)
3. Training (S)

The overall training organization has developed considerably since late 1964, when the first joint military school—the High Command and Joint Staff College—was established and the supporting schools became more systematized. The college, modeled on the U.S. Armed Forces Staff College, and a Command and General Staff College comprised the War University, whose curriculum included subjects translated from those taught in comparable U.S. service schools. In 1966 the War University was divided: the High Command and Joint Staff College (now the National Defense University) was placed under the SCS and the Command and General Staff College under the ground forces.

Selected officers attend staff colleges in the United States, United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Pakistan, Turkey, Italy, and West Germany. Commissioned and enlisted personnel from all services attend schools and courses in the United States, Western Europe, and in CENTO-member countries. The U.S. Military Assistance Program has arranged training for over 10,000 personnel both in the United States and in Iran.

Training exercises involving two or more military services have been conducted with increasing success. In April 1964, ground, navy, and air force elements participated in the Delawar Exercise with U.S. forces; this was of great benefit to the Iranian forces in acquainting them with command and staff procedures for combined operations. The air force has participated in joint training exercises with both the ground forces and the navy; counterinsurgency field exercises in air-ground operations have also included gendarmerie personnel. Some joint exercises involving navy and air force units have been conducted with CENTO forces. All these exercises have continued to develop Iranian capability to carry out coordinated force operations.

4. Military budget (C)

Military budget estimates are prepared by each branch of the armed forces under the supervision and coordination of the Supreme Commander's Staff and the Ministry of War. The military budget is then presented to the Ministry of Finance for review and incorporation into the total national budget. Following approval by the parliament and the Shah, the budget bill is enacted into law. In practice, however, the Shah exercises strong influence over the formulation of the defense budget, and there is little if any opposition to military appropriations. Defense budgets, including appropriations for internal security, have averaged 22½% of the total national budget, which includes both current and development expenditures and the funding of all government organizations. From the Iranian fiscal year (21 March-20 March) 1969/70 through 1972/73, the budgets were as shown, below in millions of U.S. dollars.

5. Logistics (S)

Constructive use of oil revenues has enabled Iran to develop a small but expanding modern industrial sector, which despite its rapid growth is capable of providing only modest support for the armed forces. Although a wider range and larger output of unsophisticated military equipment can be expected in the future, production of heavy and more complex matériel will be restricted by the inadequacy of Iran's industrial base and its shortage of trained manpower. Production in support of the armed forces is limited to relatively small amounts of rifles, light machineguns, ammunition (up to 105-mm), explosive devices, and quartermaster supplies. The output of military items is insufficient and must be supplemented by imports.

From an almost exclusive reliance on the United States for military equipment prior to 1967, Iran has diversified its supply sources considerably. The United States still has provided by far the largest amount of military assistance—about $1.7 billion, some 56% of it on a grant basis. Items provided include many types of aircraft, combat vehicles, infantry weapons, and communications equipment. In 1967 Iran signed its first military assistance agreement with the U.S.S.R. for the procurement of military equipment. Since then it has received substantial quantities of armored personnel carriers, antiaircraft and field artillery, vehicles, spare parts, and ammunition under military agreements with a total estimated value of $480,000,000.
million. Other major suppliers, and the types of materiel ordered, have included the United Kingdom (surface-to-air missiles, destroyers, destroyer escorts, helicopters, and a variety of ground forces equipment, including Chafftanks, valued at over $500 million), Israel (infantry weapons, ammunition, communications equipment, and Soviet vehicle spare parts captured in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, valued at over $87 million), and Italy (mortars, helicopters, and naval cruise missiles also valued at over $70 million).

C. Ground forces (S)

The primary mission of the Imperial Iranian Ground Forces (HGF) is to defend Iran against aggression by any neighboring country and to assist the gendarmerie and the national police in the maintenance of internal security. HGF strengths include good discipline, good physical condition of enlisted personnel, an increasing number of Westem-trained officers, and terrain generally favorable to the conduct of defensive operations. It is hampered by such weaknesses as a low level of general and technical education, some inept leadership, inflexibility of command and logistics, inadequate transportation and communications facilities, inadequate combat intelligence, general lack of combat experience, and poor caliber NCO’s. Many units do not have their full complement of personnel and equipment. Although these shortcomings are known to HGF commanders and action is being taken to overcome them, total elimination of the weaknesses will take several years.

1. Organization

Operational control of the ground forces is nominally exercised by the Commanding General, Imperial Iranian Ground Forces, who has the rank of general. He is assisted by a general staff and a combined technical and special staff. General staff sections include personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, and comptroller. Technical and special staff elements are ordnance, engineer, signal, finance, medical, quartermaster, transportation, veterinary, adjutant general, and military police.

The tactical chain of command passes from the Commanding General, HGF, to the corps commanders, then to the subordinate divisions and independent brigades. The Ground Forces Command exercises direct control over all ground force units which are not assigned to either of the two corps.

Iran is divided into three tactical areas. The northeastern portion of the country is the responsibility of I Corps. The southern portion of the country is the responsibility of II Corps, while the remainder of the country is the direct responsibility of the Ground Forces Command.

2. Strength, composition, and disposition

The strength of the ground forces is about 165,000, of whom about 90% are conscripts. The HGF is overstrength in the number of enlisted men and NCO’s and slightly understrength in the number of officers. Combatant forces consist of three armored divisions, two infantry divisions, an army aviation command, and four separate brigades (two infantry, one airborne infantry, and one special forces). The Infantry Guard Division, which is assigned to security duties in Tehran, is under the direct command of the Supreme Commander’s Staff and is not included in the ground forces order of battle.

In the early part of 1971, the ground forces underwent a major reorganization. The basic infantry division of between 9,000 and 12,000 personnel comprises three brigades of three battalions each, one combat engineer battalion, one signal battalion, one armored cavalry squadron, divisional artillery, and a divisional support command. The armored divisions of between 12,000 and 13,000 are similarly comprised of three brigades of three battalions each. Each brigade of the armored divisions has one tank and two mechanized infantry battalions or two tank and one mechanized infantry battalion. Each armored division also has one signal battalion, one combat engineer battalion, one armored cavalry squadron, divisional artillery, and divisional support command. The independent brigades vary in authorized strength from 1,400 to 4,000 depending on type and composition. The Imperial Iranian Aviation Command which has been upgraded from brigade level will have three direct support aviation brigades, one general support brigade, a command aviation unit, a logistics command, a training center, and a national depot. The reorganization is to be carried out over a 3-year period, after which the aviation command will be completely reformed and equipped.

Major items of equipment on hand in the latter part of 1972 include 2,072 M113 6x6 Chafftanks and 4x4 Chafftanks, 800 mortars and guns (76-mm to 8-inch), 812 antiaircraft artillery weapons (12.7-mm to 37-mm), 1,293 recoilless rifles (37-mm to 106-mm), 273 antitank missiles (SS-10 and SS-11), 2,590 mortars (60-mm to 122-mm), and 35,000
assorted support vehicles. Most of the equipment is of U.S. origin; however, since 1967, many items have been obtained from other countries. The Soviet Union has provided armored personnel carriers (Figure 1), antiaircraft and field artillery, tank transporters, maintenance ships, vehicles, rocket and grenade launchers, and ammunition. Israel has supplied captured Soviet vehicle spare parts, ammunition, small arms, and 120-mm Tampella mortars. Italy has provided helicopters for army aviation.

The majority of troops are concentrated in Iran's border with Iraq. Relatively light strength is encountered in the east opposite the border with Afghanistan. Since Iran is allied with Turkey and Pakistan through the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), borders with these countries are very lightly manned. Similarly, the extensive borders with the Soviet Union are lightly garrisoned.

3. Training

The quality of training has improved considerably in recent years but is not yet comparable to U.S. training activities and standards. The low level of general and technical education makes it difficult for the average soldier to master the complicated techniques of operating and maintaining modern weapons and equipment.

Although field training has increased, it tends to be very formal, lacks realism, and does not challenge the initiative or ingenuity of junior officers. Increased importance has been attached to joint operations with local gendarmerie units and naval and air force elements.

All Iranian training centers are modeled after equivalent U.S. Army installations. Ground Forces Command is responsible for all ground forces training. Five replacement training centers provide a basic training course for all conscripts. These conscripts who lack basic reading and writing skills must attend a 9-week language course before entering basic combat training. Initial training for conscripted NCO's and officers is conducted at the Cadre Training Center located in the eastern part of Tehran. Training consists of a 14-week course in basic combat skills and a 4-week course in general military subjects. ROTC cadets also attend the Cadre Training Center for 3 weeks of summer camp. Conscripted officers and NCO's receive identical instructions with no effort to differentiate between the nature of the duties that each may be expected to perform. The field training and weapons firing portion of the training is conducted at the second garrison camp located at Eshkarak to the northeast of Tehran. Graduates of the basic training course receive 13 to 17 weeks of training at a branch or combat arms school followed by 22 weeks of on-the-job training in an assigned unit. Following completion of branch training, conscript NCO's serve 18 months.

The Imperial Iranian Military Academy in Tehran, the only source of regular officers, offers a 3-year course in military and academic subjects. Graduates are commissioned second lieutenants. Following graduation, regular officers receive a 1-year basic course in the combat arms school or the branch schools designed to prepare them for command of platoon and company units. Infantry and armor centers are located at Shiraz; the Artillery and Mi-sil Center is located at Isfahan. The Combat Support Training Center in Tabriz offers training in the ordnance, transportation, military policy, finance, quartermaster, and administrative fields. Four years after the basic course, regular officers return for a 1-year advanced course designed to prepare them to

FIGURE 4. Soviet-built BTR-60PB shown during Iranian Armed Forces Day, 12 December 1971 (U/OU)
command battalions and to serve as staff officers up to brigade level. Selected officers, captains or higher rank with 15 years of service, attend the Command and General Staff College in Tehran; this instruction prepares them to command and staff functions in tactical units and in ground forces staff departments.

Foreign training for Iranian officers, cadets, and NCOs is provided on a grant aid, purchase, or exchange basis by the United States, United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Belgium, Turkey, and Pakistan. Courses offered vary from basic specialist courses to war college-level instruction. In 1969-70, 56 NCOs were sent to the U.S.S.R. to attend an armored personnel maintenance course; in 1967, a small U.S.S.R. training team provided in-country instruction on the maintenance of newly acquired equipment to a select cadre of Iranian personnel. During 1971, 29 Iranian officers were sent to the Soviet Union to attend armaments courses. In the early part of 1972, 14 officers and men were sent to the Soviet Union for maintenance training on the 122-mm rocket launchers. Most in-country training by foreign personnel has been provided by the United States. However, the United Kingdom has provided technical advisers following the purchase of Chieftain tanks by Iran, and South Korea has assisted with special forces training.

The U.S. Army Mission and Military Assistance Advisory Group is responsible for arrangements to send Iranian officers and NCOs to the United States for training at military educational institutions. More than 3,000 officers have attended U.S. Army service schools since 1950.

Army aviation training has developed with the assistance of the in-country training facilities. Basic fixed-wing instruction is provided by the Civil Air Club, a government-subsidized organization, and helicopter instruction by a civilian contractor. Advanced fixed-wing training is conducted in Iran, while advanced helicopter training is provided in Italy. There are plans to establish an army aviation training center at Esfahan, which would come under the direct control of Headquarters, Imperial Iranian Ground Forces. This school is to have an annual input of 400 pilot trainees each year; the anticipated "wash out" rate is about 50%.

4. Logistics

Ground forces logistics reflect the problems evident throughout the armed forces, including the tendency of field units to stockpile specific items. In the latter part of 1970, the Shah directed a reorganization of the Imperial Iranian Ground Forces under which the three field armies were reorganized into two corps and divested of the requirements for providing their own logistical support. All logistical units, installations, and facilities were placed under the control of the Imperial Iranian Ground Forces. On 21 March 1971, the First and Second Area Support Commands were formed and made directly subordinate to the Logistics Command, HGF. Late in 1971, a third area command was formed to provide logistical support for the two divisions and those other units and facilities directly subordinate to the HGF.

Logistical support for the ground forces aviation command will be provided by an organic logistical command.

5. Army aviation

On 17 April 1972, the Shah approved a new organization for ground forces aviation. The former 45th Army Aviation Brigade has been upgraded and is to be completely reorganized and equipped within 3 years. It is to be composed of one general support brigade and three direct support brigades. Personnel strength will exceed 10,000, of which 1,715 will be pilots and 4,125 will be maintenance personnel. All units within the existing aviation brigade will be upgraded. Each direct support brigade will have 31 utility helicopters, 10 fixed-wing observation aircraft, 35 scout helicopters, and 48 attack helicopters. The general support aviation brigade, which has not been formed yet, will have 16 CH-47 helicopters, 30 utility, 48 attack, and 27 scout helicopters. The Command Aviation Unit which is located at Qaleh Monghul Air Base in Tehran will have four fixed-wing observation aircraft, four fixed-wing command aircraft, 10 utility helicopters, and 10 scout helicopters. The Training Center, located at Esfahan, will be authorized to train 50 aircraft: five fixed-wing observation craft, 20 utility, 10 scout, and 15 attack helicopters. The aviation command has 53 fixed-wing Cessna aircraft, one CH-47, and 62 Agusta Bell 205 and 206 helicopters on hand. In December 1972, the Iranian Government signed contracts with the U.S. Government for the purchase of 480 helicopters. Of this number, 287 will be the "Huey-Plus" Bell Model 214A, and 202 will be the AH-1F Sea Cobra armed helicopters to be built by the Bell Helicopter Division of Textron, Incorporated. The agreement also provides for spare helicopter parts. Pilots will be trained in Iran under a supporting contract with Bell; mechanics will be trained by U.S. technical personnel, both military and civilian, until army personnel have become familiar with the complexities of maintaining the helicopters. Depot
maintenance will probably be run by the Iranian Helicopter Industries, a firm originally set up by Agusta Bell of Italy and totally Italian owned. There is a possibility that additional helicopters, AB 205 and AB 206 models, necessary to the mission of army aviation will be purchased from Agusta Bell. Helicopter deliveries will begin in 1974 and will continue for a period of 3 to 5 years. The expansion of army aviation is an ambitious undertaking, and the HGF will find itself hard pressed to find trainable personnel with the necessary mechanical aptitude to meet these requirements.

D. Navy

The primary mission of the Imperial Iranian Navy (IN) is to defend the coastal areas and offshore islands. With the expansion of the IN, its mission has been extended to provide protection of Iran's sea communications through the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz and to maintain the freedom of gulf waters for international trade. The navy also has the responsibility for assisting CENTO nations or other allies of Iran in defending surrounding water areas against foreign aggression and for supporting Iran's other military forces as needed. (S)

The Imperial Iranian Navy has become the major naval force in the area since the withdrawal of British forces from the Persian Gulf in 1971. The Shah ordered that naval personnel strength be increased from the 1971 level of 11,500 to 20,290 men within the next 5 years. Planned along with the personnel increase is the acquisition of new and sophisticated equipment which will give the navy increased offensive and defensive capabilities. The IN is capable of limited defense of the Persian Gulf coastline and has increased its surveillance capabilities through the establishment of patrols from the Strait of Hormuz into the Gulf of Oman. Coordination with the Imperial Iranian Air Force in the area of logistical support and exchange of intelligence information is becoming a reality. Two Vosper Mk. 5 frigates, equipped with surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, were purchased by Iran from the United Kingdom and arrived in the Persian Gulf in August 1972. (S)

Although Iran is dependent on foreign assistance in training and logistics, the first in-country overhaul effort is currently in progress on two ex-U.S. coastal minesweepers at Khorrarnahshahr and on three ex-U.S. motor gunboats at Bandar Abbas. (S)

There are only a small number of ships maintained in the Caspian Sea. Iran has made no attempt to defend its Caspian Sea coast and could offer only token resistance against an attack by the Soviet Union. (S)

1. Organization (S)

The Commander, Imperial Iranian Navy, currently a rear admiral, is responsible for the naval headquarters organization at Tehran, the shore establishment, and the operating forces. The navy is under the direct control of the Shah, although operational control is, in theory, delegated to the Commander, IN, through the Chief, Supreme Commander's Staff. The Commander is assisted by the Vice Commander, IN (Figure 5); Deputy Commanders for Logistics, Naval Personnel, and Operations and Plans; Directors for Administration, Medicine, Plans and Programs, and Operations Communications and Intelligence; and Commanders, Persian Gulf and Oman Gulf Fleet, Naval Base Bandar Abbas, Naval Base Bandar-e Pahlavi, Naval Base Bushehr, and Commander, Naval Aviation. Persian Gulf Fleet Headquarters is located currently at Khorrarnahshahr, but plans have been made to move the headquarters to Bandar Abbas upon completion of shore facilities. Helicopter/hovercraft bases are located at Khorramshahr and Kharg Island (Jazir-e Khark). Plans also call for helicopter/hovercraft bases at Bushehr and Bandar Abbas, and plans are being actively pursued to develop a naval facility at Chah Bahar. No combatant ships are assigned to the Commander, Bandar-e Pahlavi, whose primary responsibility is that of conducting the naval training program. Command communications between all headquarters, bases, and ships are provided by low- through ultra-high frequency radio operating in code or voice mode.

2. Strength, composition, and disposition (S)

In August 1972, ship strength consisted of one ex-British "Battle" class destroyer (DDCSN), two Vosper Mk. 5 destroyers (DEG) (Figure 6), four ex-U.S. PF 103 class patrol escorts (PCE), three ex-U.S. PGM class 59 motor gunboats (PGM), four 95-foot U.S. Navy PGM 39 class motor gunboats, four coastal minesweepers (MWC), two inshore minesweepers (MSH), four minor amphibious craft, eight SHN-6 Hovercraft (figure 7), two BH-7 Hovercraft, 21 service ships and craft, and two yachts. Major

For current, detailed information, see Military Intelligence Summary—Iran, Naval Forces Intelligence Study—Iran, and Automated Naval Order of Battle (Ship), all published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.
FIGURE 5. Organization of the Imperial Iranian Navy [S]
combatants of the HN are based at Bandar 'Abbas.
The majority of other vessels are at Khorramshahr,
with several ships and craft at Kharg Island and
Abadan. The Shah's yacht, one indigo minesweeper,
and three minor patrol craft are based in the Caspian
Sea at Bandar-e Pahlavi. All ships are maintained in
fair condition mechanically and are generally clean
and well painted. Two additional Vosper MK. S
destroyer escorts have been purchased from the United
Kingdom and are in the final stages of completion,
and four additional BH-7 Hovercraft, two with
surface-to-surface missile capability, are expected in
country. Two small guided missile destroyers (DDCGs)
purchased from the United States will be delivered in
early 1974 and will provide a surface-to-surface missile
capability.

Two cargo/tanker supply ships are under
construction in the Federal Republic of Germany and
are expected to be delivered by late 1973 after the
addition of helicopter hangers on the stern of each
ship. Two amphibious support ships are also under
construction in the United Kingdom with delivery
anticipated during late 1974. These four new
construction ships are expected to alleviate some of the
supplies and support problems for the gulf islands. One
prototype ferro-concrete hull fast patrol boat is being
constructed by a commercial shipbuilder at Busherh.
Also under consideration for purchase are twenty 65-
foot fast patrol boats from the United States, six
guided missile fast patrol boats from the Federal
Republic of Germany, and two additional surplus U. S.
destroyers.

Personnel strength totals 15,000 officers and enlisted
men, of whom 3,000 are naval infantry. There is a
significant shortage of technically trained personnel
which will be compounded as additional ships are
delivered. HN personnel have fair efficiency, are fairly
well trained, and have high morale. As a group, junior
officers compare favorably with those of major
Western countries. The performance of the HN will be
hampered by the strain on manpower and training
imposed by the acquisition of additional ships, but the
long-term prospects for a well-trained, competent
navy are bright.

3. Training

The Naval Training Center at Bandar-e Pahlavi is
the main HN training complex and site of the Officers'
Training School, the Petty Officers' School, and the
Diving School. Some follow-on training is provided at
Khorramshahr. A gunnery and fleet training center is
being established at Busherh. The HN is currently
dependent upon foreign training assistance, provided
by the United States, United Kingdom, Italy,
Pakistan, and Turkey but hopes to reduce this dependence by a major expansion of in-country training facilities. (C)

All enlisted personnel receive 4 months basic military training at the Basic School at Rashid. Volunteer ratings receive an additional 8 months training at Bandar-e Pahlavi. This training is in seamanship, engineering, and electrical specialization. Upon completion of training, ratings are sent to sea. Conscription ratings receive further military training at Rashid and are formed into units before being sent to various naval establishments and posts for security duty. Conscripts who are not assigned to the Naval Security Brigade are sent to sea and serve in unskilled billets. (C)

Petty officers are trained at Bandar-e Pahlavi and in Turkey, Pakistan, and the United States. Courses offered at the Petty Officers School include electronics, electricity, language, music, gunnery, seamanship, and motor mechanics. (C)

Most Iranian naval officers have been trained at the IIN’s military academy or at foreign naval academies. The 1st Officers Training School at Bandar-e Pahlavi currently offers a combination military academy and naval indoctrination course. There are plans to build a naval academy which will have the capability to handle 100 students a year and will offer two courses—one for prospective naval officers and the other for prospective merchant marine officers. Postgraduate naval training is provided in the United States, United Kingdom, and Italy. (C)

The IIN has participated in yearly international exercises in the Persian Gulf, including Exercises KHARGEX and ARYA (Iran and United Kingdom) and Exercise MIDLINK (CENTO). Exercise KHARGEX is a mine-countermeasures and ARYA is a tactical and general-seamanship/gunnery exercise. The forces consist of minesweepers, destroyer escorts, and patrol boats of the British and Iranian navies. With the departure of the British from the Persian Gulf, there is a possibility that Exercises KHARGEX and ARYA will no longer be conducted. (C)

Exercise MIDLINK is devoted to training CENTO maritime forces in antisubmarine warfare, mine countermeasures, and other air/surface operations necessary for the defense of sea lines of communication in the CENTO area. Normally, IIN ships carry out practices with an actual submarine, provided in the past by the United Kingdom, during the annual MIDLINK program. During the remainder of the year, ASW training is confined to programmed problems and simulated attacks against submerged, buoyed targets. (S)

4. Logistics (C)

Procurement, storage, and distribution of supplies and spares have become more efficient; however, logistical support is still far from adequate to support IIN operations. Ships and aircraft are periodically nonoperational as a result of the lack of a few minor parts.

The principal naval supply center is at Khorramshahr, and 90-day supply levels of normal stores and spares and 30-day levels of war ammunition are normally maintained there. The IIN has no fuel oil storage facilities but relies on the National Iranian Oil Company for all petroleum products. The navy has demonstrated an underway refueling capability. A small logistics base is located at the Kharg Island Naval Base, but Bandar ‘Abbas will eventually become the main logistics base for the Persian Gulf Fleet.

Iran has no shipyards capable of constructing sophisticated naval ships. However, in 1967, a landing craft similar to a U.S. LCM was constructed on a small marine railway at Khorramshahr. Most of the ships in the Imperial Iranian Navy were supplied by the United States under the Military Assistance Program (MAP). Since 1966, the United Kingdom has supplied Iran with a destroyer, destroyer escorts, and hovercraft.

Minor hull and engine repairs are made at the Khorramshahr and Bushehr naval bases located on the Persian Gulf. All extensive repair and overhaul of naval ships have been accomplished abroad, primarily in Pakistan, Italy, and at U.S. facilities on Guam. The first naval ship overhauls by the IIN are in progress on two coastal minesweepers at Khorramshahr and on three motor gunboats at Bandar ‘Abbas. A modern ship repair yard is under construction at Bandar ‘Abbas, on the Strait of Hormuz. This new shipyard will provide the IIN with the capability to maintain current ships, as well as destroyer escorts that will be in the inventory by the end of 1973. Long-range plans include the development of another ship repair facility at Chah Bahar on the Gulf of Oman.

5. Naval infantry (C)

There is an Iranian Naval Security Brigade which has no independent headquarters organization; all command and staff functions are integrated with those of the IIN. Logistical support for the 3,000-man brigade is provided by the IGF. All officer personnel are on loan from the IGF but are under the operational control of the senior naval officer in the area to which they are assigned. The mission of the
brigade is to provide physical security for all naval installations and ports and oil installations in the Khormasrah-Al PAS area. Command and underwater demolition training is conducted under the supervision of a British Royal Marine advisor team in an area located northwest of Tehran. Additional training in the use of boats and equipment is conducted at Kharg Island where a permanent team is based.

The Naval Security Brigade obtained its first amphibious experience in the occupation of Abu Musa and the Tumbs. Although the brigade is entirely land-based, an amphibious exercise with the naval infantry operating from HIN Gulf Fleet and U.S. naval units is tentatively planned for the latter part of 1973. There is an interest in acquiring an amphibious assault ship capable of supporting a naval infantry company on board with LCM and helicopters. In addition to security detachments at the naval headquarters, major and secondary naval bases, and oil installations, small garrisons or observation posts are located at Abu Musa, the larger of the Tumbs islands, Jaznieh-ye Laran, and other islands. The amphibious and naval infantry roles of the HIN are receiving more attention from senior military officials as a result of the occupation of the Persian Gulf islands and the requirements to maintain, support, and protect the other Iranian islands in the gulf.

6. Naval air arm (c)

Aviation as an integral part of the HIN is relatively new. Hovercraft and helicopter squadrons with a mission which include counterinsurgency and infiltration, reconnaissance, search and rescue, and amphibious assault, are currently operating in the Persian Gulf area. The hovercraft squadron headquarters is located at Khormasrah; the helicopter squadron headquarters is located at Kharg Island. Hovercraft and helicopters are divided between the two bases. The squadrons are composed of eight SRN-4 hovercraft and two BH-7 hovercraft, five SH-3D helicopters, nine Jet Rangers (AB-206A), and four AB-205 helicopters.

The HIN is expanding its inventory to include fixed wing aircraft in addition to newer model and larger helicopters. Seven additional SH 3D helicopters and 56 twin-engine AB 212 (UH-IH) have been ordered. The first fixed wing aircraft to be added this year with delivery of four Aero Commander twin engine aircraft. Three of these aircraft will be Shrike Commanders and will be used for reconnaissance—search and maritime photography; the fourth will be a turboprop Hawk Commander and will be used for official transportation. Six P-3C aircraft are on order from Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. These maritime patrol craft will be used for surveillance and antiship submarine detection. They will be assigned initially to the HAF until the HIN acquires the capability to fly, maintain, and support these sophisticated aircraft. The HIN is also awaiting delivery of four additional RH-53D helicopters.

E. Air force (S)

The Imperial Iranian Air Force (HAF) is an efficient jet-equipped air force with the primary mission of controlling and defending Iranian airspace against foreign intrusion or attack; secondary missions include tactical support of ground and naval forces, aerial observation and reconnaissance, troop and cargo transport, paratroop operations, liaison and courier service, support of civic action programs, and aid in training of all armed forces units for joint operations. Even though the HAF is relatively small, its efficiency and capability are constantly improving. It is believed capable of defeating individually the air forces of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan and of challenging the air force of Pakistan. The HAF would not offer a serious challenge to the air forces of Turkey or the Soviet Union. It has an air transport capability to support the needs of its own tactical units, to carry out liaison and courier services, and to provide cargo and troop airlift for the ground forces.

There is a fairly effective air defense system that includes a radar network that has covered all Iran since early 1972. Iran is divided into three air defense sectors: northwest, northeast, and south. Central direction of the air control and warning system is exercised by the Air Defense Operations Center in Tehran. Four U.K.-built CENTO radar sites are operational as early warning control and reporting centers, and the U.S.-sponsored Project Spindrift has provided two naval air control and warning radar sites and the Air Defense Operations Center. Project Peace Bulls, also sponsored by the United States, was completed and turned over to the HAF in January 1972. The completion of this project provided additional radar sites in southern Iran.

The air force enjoys a higher morale than the other services because of its higher volunteer rate, better living conditions, and better qualified officers and NCOs. Organization, training, and logistical concepts are similar to those in the U.S. Air Force. Base facilities have developed greatly under an extensive modernization program. Weaknesses include dependence upon foreign sources for equipment, deficiencies in certain
facets of air training required to achieve complete combat readiness, and lack of qualified maintenance personnel.

1. Organization

The Commander of the Imperial Iranian Air Force, a general, is responsible for the headquarters organization at Tehran, the airfields and support establishments, and the operating forces. He is assisted by a deputy commander and a chief of staff, who supervises the activities of the eight air force staff sections—plans and programs, logistics, operations, personnel, intelligence, engineering, comptroller, and coordination—each of which is headed by a deputy chief of staff. The operational forces include tactical fighter bases with a total of 10 tactical fighter squadrons, one reconnaissance, one counterintelligence squadron, one transportation base with three transportation squadrons, and the Air Defense Command. Support and administrative commands include the Air Training Center, Air Depot, Medical Department, and offices for communications and electronics, flight and ground safety, counterintelligence, public relations, inspection, and administrative services.

2. Strength, composition, and disposition

Personnel strength is approximately 50,000, including 461 pilots (310 jet qualified), 56 navigators, 30 flight engineers, and 57 groundmasters. Total aircraft strength was 320 as of December 1972. Tactically assigned aircraft included 146 jet fighters (88 F-4D/E, and 78 F-5A/B), 20 reconnaissance aircraft (13 RF-5A, four RF-4, three RT-5A), 50 transports (30 C-109R/H and 11 F-27), eight T-33 trainers, 12 Cessna 0-2A used in a counterintelligence role, six U-6A aircraft, and 20 transport helicopters.

The 1st Tactical Fighter Base, with two F-4E fighter squadrons, a tactical reconnaissance squadron, and a search and rescue squadron is located at Mehrabad Airfield; the 2nd Tactical Fighter Base, at Tabriz is currently composed of one Cessna 0-2 counterintelligence squadron; the 3rd Tactical Fighter Base, with two F-5 squadrons (Figure 8), is located at Shahsaki Air Base near Hamadan; the 4th Tactical Fighter Base, with two F-5 squadrons, is located at Vahdati Air Base near Dezful; the 6th Tactical Fighter Base, with two F-5 squadrons is located at Bushehr; the 7th Tactical Fighter Base, with two F-4D squadrons, is located at Shiraz; the 1st Transportation Base, with two C-130 squadrons and one F-27 (Figure 9) squadron, is located at Tehran/Mehndad Airfield, along with the 1st Tactical Fighter Base.

The 10 tactical squadrons serve in a dual role of air defense and ground support. Fighter aircraft are equipped with Sidewinder (AIM-9B) air-to-air missiles and 20-mm cannon for air defense operations; the F-4’s are also equipped with Sparrow (AIM-7) air-to-air missiles. Future procurement plans call for the Maverick air-to-ground missile to be utilized on the two F-4D squadrons.

The IAF has a minimal surface-to-air missile (SAM) capability. It has purchased six Scud SAM launchers with 15 missiles each and 26 Tigercrest (mobile version of the Seucat) SAM launchers with 15 missiles each. There is an operational reserve of 125 missiles. The Seucat launchers have been installed in fixed sites with three each at Shahsaki and Vahdati Air Bases. All Tigercrest launchers are in-country, but only 21 are currently operational in the air defense system. In 1970, Iran signed a contract with the British Aircraft Corporation for the purchase of the Rapier surface-to-air missile system (Figure 10). The contract provided for the delivery of approximately 54 firing units and 1,400 missiles for deployment around fixed IAF operating locations. Although delivery has begun, no operational dates are known. Full implementation of the system will probably require 5 years. The IAF has also contracted to purchase six Hawk missile battalions.

The IAF has ordered 105 F-4E aircraft that were originally to have been delivered through 1973. In the spring of 1972, the United States agreed to accelerate delivery of these aircraft and also agreed to sell Iran 105 F-3E aircraft with delivery to begin in 1975. Although no action has yet been taken, Iran has expressed a strong interest in purchasing three squadrons of F-14 and/or F-15 aircraft when they become available. These aircraft purchases are intended to meet the IAF plans for establishing eight squadrons each of F-3E’s and F-4D/E’s and three squadrons of F-14 or F-15’s. In addition, Iran has purchased six KC-135 aircraft to provide mid-air refueling capability to the F-4E aircraft and also six P-3C maritime patrol aircraft. In order to provide facilities for the fighter aircraft currently being delivered, the IAF will expand the number of air bases from which it operates. A 5th Tactical Fighter Base will be activated at Germanshah Airport; an 8th Tactical Fighter Base will become operational at Esfahan; a 9th Tactical Fighter Base at Bandar Abbas Airport; and a Flying Training Base at Tinhah-e Heydariyeh. A base is also under construction at Jask.

\[\text{footnote}{You\text{,} \text{detailed\ information, see \textit{Air Forces Intelligence Study—Iran and Free World Air Order of Battle published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.}}\]

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The HAF operates four military airfields: Tehran/Doshan Tappeh (HAF GHQ, Air Training Center, Air Defense Command, and Air Depot), Vahdati, Shahrekord, and Bushehr. It also has units at joint-use airfields: Tehran/Mehrabad, Shiraz International, and Tabriz. In cooperation with the Ministry of Roads and Communications, the HAF has constructed four emergency landing strips (each 10,000 to 15,000 feet long) in western Iran; these strips have been used by HAF aircraft during dispersed operations. Under the IAF and Department General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) modernization program, many of these airfields are being improved to include new terminal buildings, runways, navigational aids, night lighting, fire-fighting equipment, and landing aids.

The Air Route Traffic Control Center, center of Iranian aviation communications, and the headquarters of the Iranian meteorology system are located at Tehran/Mehrabad airfield.

The Shatt al Arab dispute revealed that the antiaircraft artillery segment of the Air Defense Command was in a poor state of readiness. The IAF Commander and the ADC Commander took action to inject a sense of urgency and efficiency into the organization, and some improvement occurred. The IAF currently possesses 154 Soviet ZU-23 (23-mm, twin, towed) manually controlled AA guns and has contracted to purchase 30 Soviet radar-controlled ZSU-23-4 AA guns. Delivery of 100 radar-controlled twin 35-mm AA guns purchased from Swiss sources has begun. Weapons currently on hand are manned by the IGF but the HAF is gradually assuming control of weapons deployed around air bases.

There is no reserve or mobilization potential. In an emergency, the HAF would have to fight with available active-duty manpower.

3. Training

The Commander, IAF Air Training Center, Tehran/Doshan Tappeh Airfield, has the responsibility for training all HAF personnel; he reports directly to the Commander, IAF. Training is under the direction of the Chief Education Board, who directs four subordinate training boards comprising Basic Military Training, English Language Training, Officer Training, and Specialty Training. These boards train officers, NCOs, and airmen in basic electronics, aircraft maintenance, and support skills. All training is accomplished under the advisory effort of the Air Force Section, ARMY-AF-MAAG. In addition to in-country training, selected personnel receive training in the United States and at USAF bases in Europe; a small number of personnel are trained in the United Kingdom and in Pakistan.

Conscripts, generally those with less than 9 years of education, receive 13 weeks of basic military training.
and are assigned to menial tasks; during the remainder of their 2-year obligated tour they receive no other training. Elementary school graduates who are NCO's receive basic training plus up to 36 weeks of English-language training and fundamental technical or support specialty training depending on the career field to which they are assigned. High school graduates receive similar training except that basic military training is cut to 8 weeks, and specialized training is generally in the fields of aircraft maintenance or communications and electronics. Some highly qualified high school graduates are selected for training as officers in technical and administrative specialties in addition to English-language training. Air cadets receive general officer ground school training, light airplane flying, and language training in Iran but are sent to the United States for pilot training Cadets with the poorest English capability but who are otherwise qualified sometimes receive pilot training in Pakistan. Cadets are not commissioned second lieutenants until they have completed 2 years of service and their flight training. The in-country training system is patterned after similar USAF schools. Besides pilot and aircrew training, selected air force personnel receive out-of-country training which prepares them for positions as instructors in the air force schools system.

Individual aircrew training for personnel in tactical units is patterned after USAF standards. Emphasis is on air-to-air gunnery and navigation techniques on close air support. Instrument refresher training is required on a periodic basis. Increasing emphasis is being placed on field training exercises to improve air-to-ground capabilities.

In August 1968 the HAF implemented a new personnel recruitment program known as Iromu Faran, designed to provide the number of high school graduates needed to meet programmed commitments for technical personnel. These individuals are neither officers nor NCO's but occupy a special position throughout their careers. Graduates of the program have a 10-year active duty commitment and are paid salaries that range from those of captains to general.

4. Logistics

Iran is completely dependent upon foreign sources for aircraft and related equipment. The United States has provided all aircraft, with the exception of the 14 Fokker F-27 medium-range transports built in the Netherlands. The supply support for U.S. aircraft and supporting equipment is achieved through requisition directly into the USAF depot supply system. Radar equipment has been provided by both the United States and the United Kingdom.

The Logistics Command supplies all commodities not specifically designed for air operations; these items are stored and issued by the air depot at Tehran/Doshan Tappeh Airfield. USAF methods are used in the operation of this depot and the handling of supplies. A 90-day stock is usually maintained. Iran refines enough petroleum products to meet the requirements of the armed forces; including an estimated 60-day supply. The Logistics Command is in the process of converting to electronic data processing (EDP) for requisition and stock.

Maintenance is performed primarily by the air depot; however, some depot level maintenance is accomplished by commercial facilities outside the country. The F-85 engine shop, Tehran/Doshan Tappeh Airfield, support the entire HAF F-5 program. The air depot also repair and overhaul C-130 components and has placed considerable emphasis on
developing a repair capability for F-4 components. Field level maintenance has been limited by the lack of some specialized equipment and by a shortage of skilled technicians. A C-130 IRAN (inspect and repair, as needed) facility at the air depot is operational. This maintenance facility is comparable to that of any USAF facility, and all work is performed by HAF personnel with management and technical assistance provided by Lockheed Corporation, Marietta, Georgia, under direct contract with the HAF. Major overhaul of aircraft and engines is being accomplished in-country by the HAF in conjunction with Lockheed Corporation and by Iran Aircraft Industries. The HAF has established an in-country LOGAIR system to provide logistic support to all bases in Iran. In addition, two C-130 flights per month are made to the United States to take components that cannot be repaired in Iran to USAF depots and carry priority equipment/spares on the return mission.

The HAF maintenance program is dependent upon foreign personnel, primarily U.S. military and civilian contract personnel, for its current maintenance capability. Maintenance standards are good, but educational limitations and lack of a mechanical background hinder the training of Iranian personnel.

F. Paramilitary (S)

The Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie (IG) is Iran’s only paramilitary force whose normal mission includes military-type operations. It is a rural police force of about 70,000 organized along traditional infantry lines. It consists of 14 gendarmerie districts which conform to the major political divisions of Iran. Plans underway provide for 35 regiments, 11 independent battalions (eight infantry, one cavalry, one aviation, and one naval), 230 gendarmerie companies, 186 Border Guard Platoons, and a total of 2,064 gendarmerie posts. The gendarmerie is controlled by the Ministry of Interior during peacetime, but in time of war it is available to support the IGF. Gendarmerie personnel receive modified ground force training. Many of the officers are drawn from the regular ground forces, but each year approximately 200 are provided by the Gendarmerie Officers Training Academy.

The gendarmerie is responsible for maintaining internal security in rural and border areas, fulfilling functions of border, customs, and forest guards, enforcing judicial decrees in rural Iran on behalf of the Ministry of Justice, providing early warning and initial resistance to invasion along Iran’s borders, and handling conscription for the Iranian military services. The gendarmerie is also responsible for narcotics control in villages with a population of 5,000 or less. It is the principal force routinely concerned with tribal problems. The gendarmerie is capable of maintaining internal security in rural Iran but not of controlling widespread disobedience or determined tribal disorder. Combat capability is limited by an insufficient stock of weapons and a small aerial resupply capability. Recent incorporation of intelligence training in officer and NCO courses is improving the intelligence capability of the IG.

The IG is equipped principally with small arms and light automatic weapons. It has two M-11 armored cars for highway patrolling. Transport capability has been enhanced by the one-time acquisition of Soviet vehicles and maintenance equipment. There are 52 aircraft which are used for border patrol. Primary equipment of the naval battalion consists of 26 11-foot Bertram patrol boats, eight 20-foot Moppie patrol boats, and 12 16-foot outboard motor boats. The IG has negotiated the purchase of 12 new U.S.-built boats, nine of which will be 21-foot inboard-outboard assigned to the Persian Gulf. The remaining three are 18-foot boats to be assigned to the Caspian Sea.

The Gendarmerie Training Center is located at Tehran. One of the primary activities of the Training Center is the Gendarmerie Officers Training Academy. The school staff is organized along traditional staff lines with an S-1 through S-4 under the overall direction of a Chief of Staff. The faculty is composed of gendarmerie and IGF officers, civilians, and retired military personnel. Students must be physically fit, have a high school diploma, have never served in the armed forces (an exception is active duty IIG NCO’s), be of good moral character, be of Muslim, Christian, or Jewish faith, and be between the ages of 18 and 27. The course at the officers academy is divided into two parts, the initial or basic course lasts 6 months followed by an advanced course of 1 year. There is a heavy emphasis on weapons and weapons firing, infantry tactics, physical training, and communications. There were 300 students enrolled in 1972 in comparison to 278 the previous year. Graduated students are commissioned third lieutenants. Enlisted personnel are predominantly volunteers who have completed ground forces service; however, the gendarmerie has been forced to use conscripts, mainly high school graduates, to meet manpower requirements for skilled technicians. Enlisted personnel receive 3 months’ basic training; personnel with a ninth-grade education are eligible to attend the NCO school’s 1-year course. Branch and specialized training is provided by gendarmerie schools and
appropriate military service schools; in addition, some training is provided by civilian agencies and companies under contract. Increased emphasis has been placed on training in commando and special forces tactics.

The gendarmerie along with the other military services is plagued by a shortage of specialists and technically qualified personnel. In order to attract a higher caliber of personnel, the IIGF has demonstrated great concern for the amenities and welfare of the individual gendarme. The problem will become even more acute as all of the services continue to modernize and require more and more technicians; at the same time demands for this trainable manpower are being generated by the expanding industrial sector of the economy.

Directly subordinate to the gendarmerie is the National Resistance Forces, an indigenous militia force capable of providing village defense and early warning of insurgency or conventional attack. Formation of this force was initiated by the IIGF in 1937, and the first effort was concentrated in the rural areas of the west and northern sections of Iran where these small units were stationed at gendarmerie posts. The success of this initial organization was extremely limited and tarnished by internal corruption. In 1963 this national paramilitary group was reorganized into the National Defense Force. Experimental units were activated and their training was conducted by the IIGF Special Forces. On 71 March 1971, in order to relieve the IIGF of internal responsibilities not directly connected with their combat mission, the National Defense Force was transferred to the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie and renamed the National Resistance Forces. The program envisages a force of between 500,000 and 1,000,000 men by 1974.