

SECRET  
50E/GS/AF

# Guinea

May 1973

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

SECRET  
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Armed Forces

## NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS

The basic unit of the NIS is the *General Survey*, which is now published in a bound-by-chapter format so that topics of greater perishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters—Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geography, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the *General Survey* coverage may be bound into one volume.

Supplementing the *General Survey* is the *NIS Basic Intelligence Factbook*, a ready reference publication that semiannually updates key statistical data found in the Survey. An unclassified edition of the factbook omits some details on the economy, the defense forces, and the intelligence and security organizations.

Although detailed sections on many topics were part of the NIS Program, production of these sections has been phased out. Those previously produced will continue to be available as long as the major portion of the study is considered valid.

A quarterly listing of all active NIS units is published in the *Inventory of Available NIS Publications*, which is also bound into the concurrent classified Factbook. The Inventory lists all NIS units by area name and number and includes classification and date of issue; it thus facilitates the ordering of NIS units as well as their filing, cataloging, and utilization.

Initial dissemination, additional copies of NIS units, or separate chapters of the *General Surveys* can be obtained directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence Agency.

The *General Survey* is prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency under the general direction of the NIS Committee. It is coordinated, edited, published, and disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency.

### WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of title 18, sections 793 and 794 of the US code as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFIED BY 019641. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORIES 5B 1, 2, 3. DECLASSIFIED ONLY ON APPROVAL OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

**WARNING**

The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be released or shown to representatives of any foreign government or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1.

For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official purposes to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey.

Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification/control designations are:

- (U/OU) . . . Unclassified/For Official Use Only
- (C) . . . . . Confidential
- (S) . . . . . Secret

*This section was prepared for the NIS by the Defense Intelligence Agency. Research was substantially completed by March 1973.*

# Guinea

## CONTENTS

*This General Survey supersedes the one dated July 1969, copies of which should be destroyed.*

<b>A. Defense establishment</b> .....	1
1. Military history .....	2
2. Command structure .....	3
<b>B. Joint activities</b> .....	4
1. Military manpower .....	4
2. Strength trends .....	4
3. Training .....	5
4. Military budget .....	5
5. Logistics .....	5

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

	<i>Page</i>		<i>Page</i>
<b>C. Army</b> .....	<b>6</b>	<b>D. Navy</b> .....	<b>8</b>
1. Organization .....	<b>6</b>	<b>E. Air force</b> .....	<b>9</b>
2. Strength, composition, and disposition .....	<b>7</b>	<b>F. Paramilitary forces</b> .....	<b>10</b>
3. Training .....	<b>8</b>		
4. Logistics .....	<b>8</b>		

#### FIGURES

	<i>Page</i>		<i>Page</i>
Fig. 1 Parading soldiers ( <i>photo</i> ) .....	<b>1</b>	Fig. 4 Armored personnel carrier ( <i>photo</i> ) .....	<b>7</b>
Fig. 2 Guinean defense organization ( <i>chart</i> ) .....	<b>3</b>	Fig. 5 85-mm field gun ( <i>photo</i> ) .....	<b>7</b>
Fig. 3 Army civic action personnel ( <i>photo</i> ) .....	<b>6</b>	Fig. 6 Army personnel training ( <i>photo</i> ) .....	<b>8</b>

# Armed Forces

## A. Defense establishment

The peace-time armed forces of Guinea consist of an army of about 5,000 men, a naval force of about 300 men and 10 operational small craft, and an air force of about 200 men and 36 aircraft.<sup>1</sup> Paramilitary forces, totaling about 9,000 men, consist of the militia and the gendarmerie. Since the November 1970 invasion of Conakry by forces from Portuguese Guinea that included Guinean dissidents, President Touré has placed the country in a state of readiness, and the paramilitary forces have been upgraded and assigned defense responsibilities. In addition, the army-supervised Civic Service Production Battalions, which represent a manpower reserve of about 15,000 personnel, would be available for military duty. (S)

The armed and paramilitary forces have been organized under the central control of a Combined Staff, which is subordinate to the Minister of the People's Army and ultimately to the President. The term "People's Army" has been variously used to describe both the regular army and the conglomerate of forces which have been trained and armed since 1970. It is in the latter context that the President claims Guinea's army totals 30,000 men (Figure 1). (S)

The mission of the armed forces is to insure domestic order and defend the nation's sovereignty. The forces are capable of maintaining internal security and defending against isolated border attacks. Guinea's greatest security concern is another attack from Portuguese Guinea, and weapons and equipment are deployed to meet this contingency. At the same time, the Guinean Government is highly concerned with infiltration of Guinean exile groups from its five other neighboring states, particularly Senegal and the Ivory Coast. For this reason, tight security is also maintained

<sup>1</sup>For regularly updated information on these armed forces, see the current edition of the *Military Intelligence Summary*, published by the Defense Intelligence Agency. The Transportation and Telecommunications chapter in this General Survey provides a summary of the airfields system.



FIGURE 1. Guinean soldiers on parade carrying Soviet 7.62-mm sub-machineguns (U/OU)

along these borders, thus reducing Guinea's focus on Portuguese Guinea. Guinea's forces are equivalent to or surpass those of bordering states with the exception of Portuguese Guinea, where Portugal maintains a force of superior strength and capability. (C)

Offensive capabilities against any of Guinea's neighboring states would be limited to operations in narrow sectors and would be heavily dependent on surprise. Because of poor maintenance of equipment and organizational and logistical deficiencies, the armed forces are not capable of sustained action. Illiteracy and language difficulties, a scarcity of trained officers, and an almost complete absence of technical support units and of a logistical system pose continual difficulties for the development of a strong and effective defense establishment. The armed forces are completely dependent on foreign assistance for both materiel and future development. (S)

Guinea has a mutual defense pact with Sierra Leone which was implemented in March 1971 when an

attempt was made to depose President Siaka Stevens. Some 200 troops were sent from Guinea to counter the coup attempt, and Guinean MiG's buzzed Freetown in a show of support; a Guinean Army contingent remains in Freetown as President Stevens' personal bodyguard. Guinea is a member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which has a moribund defense commission. (C)

#### 1. Military history

After establishing sovereignty over Guinea in 1898, the French accepted large numbers of Guineans in their colonial army. Guineans served creditably in combat under French officers in both World Wars, and many were decorated for valor. Guinea voted against membership in the French Community in a constitutional referendum held in September 1958 and instead chose to become an independent republic. France responded by immediately pulling out its administrative and technical personnel and withdrawing all financial support. The abrupt termination of French aid plunged the Guinean economy into chaos. The departing French Army took with it most of its equipment and destroyed what it was unable to move. Only about 1,000 small arms, discarded by the French forces, remained. Failure of other Western countries to offer any assistance encouraged Guinea's acceptance of substantial help from Communist countries, which were quick to offer arms and economic aid, accompanied by advisers. (C)

The Guinean Army, created at independence in 1958, was formed from Guinean personnel of the French Army serving in Guinea, Algeria, and other parts of Africa who chose to join the Guinean Army. These personnel were transferred with no change in rank and retained seniority status and pension rights. French military traditions were carried over initially, but the near-total reliance on Communist training subsequent to independence and the adoption of the concept of a "People's Army" drastically reduced French influence within the armed forces. The procurement of arms and equipment from Communist nations has further promoted Guinean exposure to Communist military philosophies. Whether Guinea would opt for an armed forces organization inspired by the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China was a problem still unresolved by Guinean leaders in late 1972. (C)

The question of developing a strong military organization, which might someday move against the government, has plagued Guinea during its short independent era. In early 1969 Toure disclosed an

alleged military plot and arrested the Deputy Chief of Staff of the army and the commanders of the air force and navy and numerous lower ranking personnel. The military forces were reorganized following the plot, brought under closer civilian control, and given a larger civic action mission than they had in the past. (C)

In November 1970 a commando force of about 300 men, consisting of Portuguese army and navy regulars and a smaller group of Guinean exiles, was ferried ashore at Conakry from unmarked Portuguese naval vessels clearly visible from the port area. Although the Portuguese and the exiles acted together, each seemed to have different objectives. The Portuguese forces, consisting of black African commandos most likely recruited to combat the African Party for the Independence of Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), struck the PAIGC's headquarters in Conakry. They were unsuccessful in their attempt to kill the rebel leader but did manage to free several Portuguese prisoners being held in a Guinean military camp. The Guinean exiles, however, were out to topple the regime, and they hoped that their presence would spark a popular uprising against President Toure. The Portuguese contingent and the rescued prisoners had withdrawn to the waiting ship less than 24 hours after the landing, but the exile contingent, after waiting in vain for an uprising, was rounded up by Toure's security forces. (S)

Toure strengthened the militia following the raid, crediting that body with driving out the attackers. He was critical of the poor showing by the armed forces and suspected disloyalty and even complicity on their part. In subsequent months the Chief of Staff and the commanders of each service were removed along with many other ranking officers in a nationwide purge. But Toure also realized that the forces had been debilitated by years of diminishing attention, and he initiated action for their rehabilitation through improved training and new equipment. To offset a military buildup which could present a potential threat to the government, the militia was raised to the status of the army, and measures to upgrade its capabilities were undertaken. Gradually the militia has assumed some duties previously performed by the army. (C)

Expecting new attacks, Toure turned to the U.S.S.R. and other Communist states for help, especially military. Sizable shipments of military supplies including additional MiG aircraft, tanks, and new radar-controlled guns, were sent to Guinea with more Soviet technicians. The presence of an almost permanent Soviet naval patrol off the coast of Guinea



since late 1970 has added a new dimension to U.S.S.R.-Guinea relations. The patrol, usually consisting of two or three naval ships and a support vessel, was provided by the Soviets in response to Toure's request for help after the Portuguese attack. The ships have free access to the port of Conakry and have broadened their mission to include visits to other west African countries. (S)

**2. Command structure (C)**

President Toure is the supreme military commander of all military and paramilitary organizations (Figure 2). He also heads the High Command, which was established after the November 1970 invasion to coordinate all political and military affairs. The High Command, composed of most members of the National Political Bureau of the Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG), has a Coordination Committee which probably includes the Minister of the People's Army and the Chief of Staff of the Combined Forces. At the Cabinet level, the President exercises control over the forces through the Minister of the People's Army, who

is within the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister's domain. Directly subordinate to the minister is the Chief of Staff of the Combined Forces, General Namory Keita, who supervises and coordinates the activities of the separate services through their respective chiefs of staff. In the major reorganization following the November 1970 raid, the militia and the gendarmerie were brought within the realm of the Combined Staff and given separate and equal status with the army, navy, and air force. The move was designed to establish central control over all military and paramilitary organizations and to insure a balanced distribution of power among them. In addition to providing a system of controls which minimizes the potential for a coup, the reorganization has enabled the Combined Staff to direct and coordinate the activities of the separate services, which often conduct joint operations in the area bordering Portuguese Guinea.

Information on the makeup of the Combined Staff and its precise relationship to the staffs of the separate services is not available. Formerly, the army staff,




FIGURE 2. Guinean defense organization (C)

which functioned also as a general staff, contained four bureaus—Organization and Personnel (G-1), Intelligence (G-2), Operations and Training (G-3), and Logistics and Transport (G-4). It also included production, engineering, light industries, communications, supply, and medical sections. Presumably this structure has been modified under the present system, in which the army has been subordinated to the Chief of Staff of the Combined Forces and his Deputy Chief of Staff. The chiefs of staff of the army, navy, air force, militia, and gendarmerie apparently maintain separate staffs under the central jurisdiction of the Chief of Staff of the Combined Forces.

**B. Joint activities**

**1. Military manpower (S)**

As of 1 January 1973, Guinea had about 959,000 males in the ages 15-49, of whom about 48% were physically fit for military service. Their distribution by 5-year age groups is as follows:

AGE	TOTAL NUMBER OF MALES	MAXIMUM NUMBER FIT FOR MILITARY SERVICE
15-19	201,000	110,000
20-24	175,000	90,000
25-29	153,000	75,000
30-34	135,000	65,000
35-39	115,000	50,000
40-44	98,000	40,000
45-49	82,000	30,000
<b>Total, 15-49</b>	<b>959,000</b>	<b>460,000</b>

The average number of males reaching military age (18) annually during 1973-77 will total about 11,000.

A conscription law was passed in October 1959 which provides that all able-bodied male citizens between 18 and 49 years of age are liable for military service. The law has had little application, since manpower requirements generally have been met by volunteers. However, a modified version of the law may have been enforced after the invasion of Conakry, when an expansion of the army was announced and ex-military personnel and paramilitary forces were mobilized. Most recruits are inducted into the militia and receive basic military training. Subsequently, some are assigned to the army, while others remain available for later transfer or temporary duty with the army. The militia, which totals about 8,000, serves as a manpower pool for filling both enlisted and officer billets in the army, and it also provides a ready reserve force in an emergency.

The available military manpower lacks the general education and skills required for the maintenance and operation of modern weapons and equipment. Members of the armed services are generally respected by the public, and materially they are relatively better off than the average Guinean.

The rise in the status of the militia has been generally demoralizing to members of the armed forces, who feel the militia has no experience and insufficient training to carry out its duties. Further, a purge of the highest ranking officers in the services between 1969 and 1972 has discouraged any political ambitions among military personnel and also has upset the conventional command structure. The officer corps has expressed its discontent over the selection system for promotions, and the practice of placing militia personnel in command positions has greatly aggravated this situation.

**2. Strength trends (S)**

Since independence, the strength of Guinea's armed forces has gradually increased to the present total of about 5,500 men. Despite the receipt of Soviet and Czechoslovak ground equipment, army strength had been relatively constant between 1964 and 1970, but after the attack on Conakry, the President stated that the army would be expanded to 30,000 men. While the regular army has probably increased by only about 1,000 men since then, there has been a significant increase in the number of paramilitary-type units under army control. The army-supervised Civic Service Production Battalions, totaling about 15,000 men, are under the control of army headquarters. Some personnel are armed and have received limited military training and are referred to as civic service "tactical groups." Also, several companies of the gendarmerie report to army commanders, and militia personnel are often called up to assist in army operations. The situation reflects the government's policy of attempting to maintain a constant state of military readiness, a policy which has been in force since 1970 and is expected to continue as long as Toure believes there is a possible threat to his regime.

The navy and air force strengths remained relatively static for many years prior to 1970, when their respective complements were 150 and 160. The increase to a 300-man navy and a 200-man air force resulted from efforts, following the 1970 raid, to rehabilitate the capabilities of the armed forces. These personnel figures can be expected to rise marginally over the next 3 years as trainees return from courses overseas.

### 3. Training (C)

Prior to independence, all Guinean officers and enlisted men had been trained in French military schools and French colonial units. Since 1958, army personnel have been trained in Guinea, in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and, beginning in 1972, the People's Republic of China. Military engineers and paratroopers have received training in West Germany. Naval and air force personnel are trained at Conakry by Soviet technical assistance teams and by Guinean crews trained in the U.S.S.R. After graduation from the Conakry Military Academy, officers receive naval or pilot training in the U.S.S.R. About 100 Soviet advisers are present in the army, navy, and air force. Cuban military advisers, numbering about 200, work primarily with Guinea's militia and the PAIGC. In 1972, Toure requested Cuban security guards who now provide protection for the President and also train Guineans in security procedures. China was to send a military mission to Guinea in early 1973 to train army and navy personnel. The arrival of the mission was delayed while financial arrangements were being renegotiated and is expected to be rescheduled for later in the year.

### 4. Military budget (C)

Budget requests for each of the small military services are prepared by the respective service chiefs and are submitted to the Minister of the People's Army for review and coordination. The executive budget office then incorporates the defense budget into the total national budget, which is reviewed by the leaders of the PDG. After party confirmation, the budget is ratified by the National Assembly in closed session. Final budget approval is by the President, who exercises strong control over defense appropriations; the National Assembly functions merely as a rubberstamp for executive policy and invariably endorses the budget as submitted.

Because of the government's sensitivity concerning the release of economic data, no military budgetary information has been available since 1970. At that time the country's military budget was US\$6.1 million, about 8% of the total national budget. This was down significantly from previous years, reflecting Guinea's financial problems. For the 1963-68 period, defense budgets averaged 18.6% of the total national budget, a relatively high percentage for a west African country. The military budget has probably risen since 1970 as a result of the country's preoccupation with security following the November 1970 attack.

### 5. Logistics (S)

Guinea's underdeveloped economy has very little capability to support its armed forces. Ineffective economic policies and the lack of investment capital and skilled personnel have inhibited the development and exploitation of the country's resources and frustrated its economic development. Manufacturing is on a small scale and is devoted primarily to the processing of a limited range of consumer goods. Most of the working force is engaged in subsistence agriculture.

Guinea relies on foreign sources for military equipment except for simple quartermaster items. Since independence in 1958, the country has received military materiel from Communist and non-Communist countries valued at about \$22 million. The U.S.S.R., the principal supplier, has provided about \$15 million worth of arms and equipment, including small arms, field and antiaircraft artillery, transport and armored vehicles, naval patrol boats, and fighter, trainer, and transport aircraft. Other suppliers of military equipment include the People's Republic of China, which has provided tanks, trucks, medium weapons, small arms, and ammunition; Cuba, light tanks, arms, and ammunition; West Germany, trucks and telecommunications equipment; and Czechoslovakia, small arms, artillery, and transport aircraft. Shipments of small arms were also received from Egypt, Nigeria, Algeria, and Iraq.

Information is not available on whether or not the Army Bureau of Logistics and Transport still retains responsibility for the entire armed forces logistical system, which has been a major deficiency of the armed forces. Maintenance is below standard, and spare parts, which are generally in short supply, must be obtained from abroad.

There is no known administrative setup for medical care in the armed forces. A military hospital at Boke,<sup>2</sup> staffed by Cuban physicians, is used to support the rebels from Portuguese Guinea. Medical care is provided by civilian facilities, by six small military dispensaries, and by some poorly trained medics attached to tactical units. Assignment of medics at the tactical level is dictated by size and location of unit rather than by any preconceived plan to provide widespread medical support. There are no known storage facilities for military medical supplies other than at the dispensary level.

<sup>2</sup>For diacritics on place names see the list of names on the apron of the Summary Map in the Country Profile chapter and the map itself.

### C. Army

The political conditions and economic stagnancy in Guinea have prevented the army from making much progress in the development of its capabilities. Moreover, following the army coups in Ghana (1966) and Mali (1968), Toure, who has always been wary of the coup potential of the army, took additional steps to subject the army to party discipline and to civic action projects. After an alleged military plot in 1969 and the arrest of high-ranking officers, the army's role was reduced almost exclusively to one of civic action (Figure 3). By the time of the 1970 invasion, the army was a debilitated force, its neglect evident in the deteriorated state of equipment, limited training, and poor morale. Its inability to react quickly and effectively during that attack prompted further reorganizing, this time designed to improve Guinea's defensive capabilities without creating a potential threat to the regime. Much of the obsolete equipment has been replaced, small arms have been received in large quantity, and training, both domestic and foreign, has been intensified. At the same time, however, a political purge has taken place which has severely depleted the officer corps. Many have been replaced by militia officers who are not adequately trained or experienced. The absence of qualified leaders has offset somewhat the progress made in training and reequipping the force. Overall, the army's capabilities have been upgraded, but its effectiveness will continue to be hampered by substandard maintenance and deficiencies in organization, particularly in logistics. (C)



FIGURE 3. Army personnel engaged in civic action project (U/OU)

6

### I. Organization (S)

Information on the latest army reorganization, begun in 1970, is not available. The forecast made then that the army would be increased to 30,000 men through the integration of paramilitary forces and civic service personnel and the recall of ex-military personnel probably will never be attained because of Guinea's faltering economy. Some definite steps have been taken to broaden the base of the army with available resources, but not of the magnitude indicated by the announced expansion. The 30,000-man army is only conceivable if included in this figure are the 15,000-man Civic Service Production Battalions, the militia, and the gendarmerie. The regular army and these groups are often referred to collectively as "militants in arms," or the "People's Army." This aggregation of forces must be distinguished from the regular army, although the army does exercise command over elements of these other organizations in certain circumstances. The Civic Service Production Battalions, which have been associated with the army since it acquired an economic development role, are also referred to as "tactical groups." Army personnel lead these groups and apparently keep them prepared for callup during emergencies. The militia is a separate service, but some of its personnel, both officers and enlisted men, have been integrated into the army. Its duties in some cases are the same as the army's now that they share equal status in the defense organization. Gendarmerie outposts in the area bordering Portuguese Guinea are under the operational control of army regional headquarters, so that this component, too, is considered an element of the People's Army. The Cabinet member who ultimately exercises authority over all these services is known as the Minister of the People's Army, which may indicate that it is not the army that has been expanded so much as the concept of the army.

The regular army is organized along conventional lines under the Army Chief of Staff, whose headquarters is at Conakry. There are four military zones in Guinea which correspond to the country's four geographical regions, each containing the headquarters of one of the army's four infantry battalions. Conakry is an independent military zone. The special battalion is stationed there to defend the capital, and the engineer battalion, the armored battalion, and the recently formed paracommando battalion are also headquartered there. All battalions are under the command of the Army Chief of Staff, except possibly the armored battalion, which in the

past came under the direct control of the President. Detachments of the armored battalion are assigned to each military zone, where they operate in conjunction with the infantry battalions. The artillery batteries are not independent units but are organic to the regional battalions. The battalion headquarters control the civic service "tactical groups" as well as certain gendarmerie outposts.

The army has an industrial complex in Conakry which manufactures clothes and shoes for military and civilian consumers. The factories, which are manned by army personnel, probably come under the control of army headquarters.

**2. Strength, composition, and disposition (S)**

The estimated strength of Guinea's regular army is 5,000, consisting of 150 officers, 500 NCO's, and 4,350 enlisted men. If elements of the militia, the gendarmerie and the civic service "tactical groups" who operate with the army are included, the actual army strength could be increased by about 1,000. The principal tactical units of the army are four infantry battalions, a special battalion, an armored battalion, a paracommando battalion, and an engineer battalion. There are also several transport and service support units and numerous artillery detachments.

The four infantry battalions, which serve as military zone commands, are headquartered as follows: 1st Infantry Battalion, Kankan (Military Zone III); 2d Infantry Battalion, Kindia (Military Zone I); 3d Infantry Battalion, Labe (Military Zone II); 4th Infantry Battalion, Nzerekore, (Military Zone IV). Three infantry companies are standard for each battalion, but there is only one infantry company in the 4th Battalion, and there are four in the 3d. Each battalion has several artillery detachments which are deployed throughout the zones. The 1st and 2d Zones, which border on Portuguese Guinea, contain the heaviest concentration of artillery. It is also in these two zones that gendarmerie outposts, strung along the Portuguese Guinea border, operate under army command. Detachments of the armored battalion are deployed to all four military zones; a paracommando company is probably at Labe, and another is either at Boke in the 1st Zone or in Conakry.

The military zone of Conakry is the defense responsibility of the special battalion, which consists of infantry, transport, armored, security, and artillery elements and, possibly, a paratroop company. One of the battalion's artillery detachments, at Ile Tamara just off the coast of Conakry, has been equipped with Soviet-made radar-controlled guns since 1971.




FIGURE 4. Soviet-built BTR-152 armored personnel carrier (C)

The engineer battalion at Conakry concerns itself primarily with road building and construction work of a civic nature. The three construction companies of the battalion are assigned territorially according to the projects they are involved in, and detachments are frequently widely dispersed.

Arms and equipment are largely World War II types from Communist countries, primarily the Soviet Union. Major items of equipment include T-34 and PT-76 tanks, unidentified Chinese tanks, BTR-152 armored personnel carriers (Figure 4), BTR-40 armored personnel carriers, BRDM armored reconnaissance cars, self-propelled antitank guns, antiaircraft artillery (37-, 85-, and 100-mm), and field artillery (76-, 85-, and 105-mm) (Figure 5). Many of the weapons, as well as armored and transport vehicles




FIGURE 5. Soviet-built 85-mm field guns (C)

delivered prior to 1970, are probably in a poor state of repair or completely inoperable. Materiel of later deliveries, which include some 20 T-31's, two PT-76's, 10 Chinese light tanks, five BTR-40's, four BRDM's, 25 artillery pieces, and enough small arms for over 30,000 men, are believed to be in good condition, with the exception of the used arms provided by Nigeria and Algeria. Many of the small arms have been issued to the militia and the gendarmerie. These elements, plus those civic service "tactical groups" which have received small arms training, represent a substantial reserve force. The militia and gendarmerie, which together total 9,000 men, could be effectively used with the army in a combat role. However, the 15,000 men of the "tactical groups," who have received only minimal training, could make only a slight contribution to the national defense, except for those who have been involved in army operations.

### 3. Training (C)

Basic recruit training is carried out in the units by Guinean officers and noncommissioned officers trained in Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R. (Figure 6). Officer candidates attend a 9-month course at the Guinean Military Academy at Camp Alpha Yaya, near Conakry. Admission through competitive examinations is open to all qualified noncommissioned officers. Successful applicants are given the grade of aspirant officer. The initial class graduated 32 officers in 1962 and the second class, 47 in 1963; no later information is available.

A 2-month advanced staff training course, an NCO school, and specialist training also are conducted at the military academy. Soviet personnel are there as




FIGURE 6. Guinean soldiers training with Czechoslovak 7.62-mm light machinegun (U/OU)

8

instructors and interpreters, and at the army camp near Kankan other Soviets teach familiarization courses in the use and maintenance of Soviet-supplied equipment.

Guinean soldiers have attended military schools in the Soviet Union, China, and Czechoslovakia. Some officers and enlisted men received training in Egypt in 1962. Over 50 army personnel have been trained in West Germany in military engineering, and West German Army engineer teams have instructed in Guinea. In early 1969, a 30-man West German mission conducted on-the-job training in roadbuilding in Guinea. From 1965 to 1967, a U.S. military team assisted a Guinean engineer company in a roadbuilding project.

The preponderance of Soviet-supplied equipment has tied Guinea to the U.S.S.R. for training assistance as well. In recent years, Guinea has made attempts to broaden its sources of training, both to reduce its dependence on the Soviet Union and to enable more personnel to be trained in a shorter period of time. In 1971, Cuban instructors began training army security personnel who are responsible for the President's safety. Cubans previously had provided training only to the militia. Another recent source of training assistance is the People's Republic of China, which has offered over 100 military scholarships to the Guinean Army and has promised to send a training mission during 1973.

### 4. Logistics (S)

The Chief of the Logistics and Transport Bureau (G-4) of the Army Staff is responsible for the supply and logistics organization as well as for transport. Maintenance of vehicles and equipment is carried out at the unit level by technicians who are few in number and poorly trained. This, as well as deficiencies in organizational capabilities, would preclude the army from engaging in sustained actions.

### D. Navy

The missions of the 300-man Guinean Navy are coastal patrol, transport service, and protection of fisheries. It has a minor coastal patrol capability but is ineffective as a combat force. Ships and associated equipment are of foreign origin, and the navy is totally dependent on foreign assistance for development and training. Headquarters and the operating base are at Conakry, and small detachments are believed to be stationed at Kamsar and Benti. Many navy personnel have been trained in the U.S.S.R., and in accordance with navy expansion plans, the government

announced in April 1972 that 150 more were scheduled for courses there ranging from 6 months to 2 years. In the same year, personnel began training in the People's Republic of China in preparation for the delivery of several Chinese patrol boats. A Chinese training mission will accompany the boats to Guinea. Specialized training is given at Conakry by a Soviet technical team and by Guinean crews trained in the U.S.S.R. (S)

Ship inventory consists of four patrol boats (PB), two motor torpedo boats (PT), one motor gunboat (PGM), and two motorboat submarine chasers (PTC) of Soviet origin, and one ex-U.S. mechanized landing craft (LCM). The PB's are *Poluchat*-1 class units armed with two twin 12.7-mm machineguns. The two P-6 class PT's were delivered in August 1972 and are equipped with two torpedo tubes and two twin 25-mm AA guns. The PGM is also a P-6 class, but the torpedo tubes have been removed. The PTC's are MO-VI class boats, each with a displacement of about 66 tons, armed with two twin 25-mm AA guns and fitted with two side-throwing mortars and depth-charge racks for antisubmarine warfare. (S)

Inadequate maintenance of the naval craft contributed to the sinking of two ships since 1967. The rapid deterioration of the others was stemmed by late 1971, when the remaining patrol craft were overhauled in Conakry with the aid of Soviet technicians. All ships are believed to be operational, but they seldom leave the harbor. At least two new patrol boats are scheduled to arrive in Guinea in late 1973. (S)

Guinea has no capability to construct naval ships. A small commercial shipyard, however, in the port of Conakry is capable of making minor repairs to naval vessels. Virtually all engines, spare parts, and other ship components must be imported. (C)

#### E. Air force (S)

The mission of the 200-man air force is to defend Guinean air space and to support the armed forces by providing close air support, light bombing, reconnaissance, border patrol, and general transport and utility services.

The inventory of 36 aircraft includes 17 jet fighters (10 MiG-15 *Fagors* and seven MiG-17 *Frescos*) and one jet trainer (U-MiG-15 *Mtrcor*) which provide significant strength and potential when compared to other west African air forces. In addition, there are 16 piston engine aircraft—nine transports (two An-12 *Cubs*, four An-14 *Clods*, and three An-2 *Colts*) and seven trainers (Yak-18 *Max*)—as well as two light

transport helicopters (Mi-4 *Housos*). Since 1970 the air force has added six Soviet MiGs and two *Cubs*, and has signed a contract for 12 Mi-8 helicopters, which are to be delivered in mid-1973. There has been speculation that Guinea will receive MiG-21's in 1974, but no information is available to confirm this. Despite the presence of MiGs now in the inventory, the air force has little combat capability, as pilots do not fly often enough to maintain proficiency. In a national emergency, the air force could be augmented by *Air Guinee*, which is equipped with Il-18's and AN-24 (*Coke*) aircraft.

Air force headquarters, airbase, and training facilities are all located at Conakry airfield. Since November 1972, Cuban engineers and construction crews have been erecting new buildings and improving military air facilities at Conakry, probably in anticipation of further aircraft deliveries. Work is also being done on several airfields in the interior, including Faranah and Kankan, where MiGs have been known to operate. With the completion of construction it can be expected that the air force will deploy some of its aircraft to the interior for greater countrywide coverage.

Reliable information on the number of pilots and technicians in the air force is not available. Since 1961 at least 50 Guineans have attended flight schools in the U.S.S.R., and these, and others, also have received additional training in Conakry by Soviet advisers. In 1972 about 80 air force personnel were sent to the Soviet Union for a variety of specialty courses. Thirty-five of these were pilot trainees scheduled to attend a 2- to 3-year course after completing a year of Russian-language studies. The percentage of Guineans who are unable to successfully complete such courses is believed to be high because of the low educational level and minimal technical background of the trainees. The actual level of skilled manpower available has been further reduced by occasional political purges. In December 1972, 11 MiG pilots were reported to have been removed from flight status or from the service for suspected coup plotting. These would represent nearly all qualified Guinean MiG pilots, and if they are not reinstated the air force will be forced to rely on newly graduated pilots and Soviet advisers to keep its MiGs flying.

Dependence on the Soviet Union to sustain and improve the Guinean Air Force can be expected to increase with the arrival of new helicopters and possibly more MiG aircraft. In an effort to diversify its sources of assistance Guinea has made appeals to Egypt and Algeria. However, the aid these countries

SECRET

could offer, primarily in the area of training, would not substantially reduce Guinea's reliance on the U.S.S.R.

#### F. Paramilitary forces

Guinea's two paramilitary forces, the militia and the gendarmerie, enjoy equal status with the regular armed forces under the central jurisdiction of the Chief of Staff of the Combined Forces. The chiefs of staff of the militia and gendarmerie, as members of the Combined Staff, coordinate the activities of their services with those of the armed forces, especially the army, to which certain militia and gendarmerie elements are assigned. During the reorganization in early 1971, the missions of both these organizations were expanded to include defense responsibilities. The army also has some responsibilities for border control, particularly along the border with Portuguese Guinea. The move to centralize control of Guinea's security forces was intended to increase the country's military preparedness by using available resources and to prevent the formation of a power base within the army. (C)

The militia, traditionally an arm of the PDG, has important police functions although it is not a regular police force. Administrative control of the militia rests with the Minister of the People's Army. Personnel are drawn from the youth affiliate of the PDG, which is made up of highly spirited, loyal revolutionaries. During the 1970 invasion, these young cadres performed enthusiastically, if rather ineffectually, and won high commendation from the President. Since then, a pronounced effort has been made to upgrade the militia's military capabilities and enable it to assume tasks normally assigned to the army. Largely because of his distrust of the army, Toure has initiated a policy whereby militia officers are appointed to key command posts in the army, and important army functions, such as the defense of the capital, are shared by militia and army units. (S)

There are at least 8,000 Guineans in the militia, but many more are probably in inactive status. The organization of the militia still coincides with the PDG's regional hierarchy of political committees so that militia units are in all localities. Personnel are trained by Cuban advisers in Guinea, and many also are sent to Cuba for 12 to 18 months of training. In mid-1972, Cuba built a militia training camp outside Conakry where Cuban instructors provide military training as well as courses in agriculture and

mechanics. In December 1972 the school, named after Kwame Nkrumah, graduated its first class, comprised of 200 Guineans and 60 students from neighboring Sierra Leone. The trained militiamen serve as a manpower reserve for the army, and many are integrated into the army or assigned to units for short tours of duty. Those who constitute the regular militia man roadblocks, serve as security guards, and secure strategic points in response to Guinea's frequent alerts. The militia is especially important to the regime as an instrument for reporting on the movement and activities of the population. (S)

The gendarmerie's ascendancy in the wake of the 1970 invasion has not been as dramatic as the militia's; however, it is treated by Toure as a separate, select group among the branches of the armed forces. The President's favoritism toward the gendarmerie was indicated in February 1970, when control of Guinea's special-purpose communications network, which serves the army, police, gendarmerie, and regional government officials, was transferred from army to gendarmerie control. The gendarmerie's mission of maintaining order in rural areas and patrolling the country's borders has acquired added significance since the 1970 attack. In addition to manning customs stations along the borders, the gendarmerie seeks out antigovernment subversives and assists the army in countering penetration from Portuguese Guinea. The gendarmerie is headed by a chief of staff who coordinates its activities with other services in the Combined Staff. Coordination with the governor of the region in which units are located is also required. The gendarmerie outposts along the Portuguese Guinea border report directly to army headquarters in their respective regions. (S)

The headquarters of the 1,000-man gendarmerie is in Conakry, where its special squadron is stationed. Detachments of this squadron are located at airports, harbor facilities, and sites of foreign aid projects. There are four additional squadrons with headquarters at Kindia (1st Squadron); Labe (2d Squadron); Kankan (3d Squadron); and Nzerekore (4th Squadron). These units are in turn organized into city brigades, border brigades, or mobile platoons comprised of five to 15 men each whose areas of jurisdiction coincide with the 29 regions in Guinea. (S)

Because the gendarmerie is lightly armed, has limited transportation equipment and is widely dispersed throughout the country, coordinated action would be very difficult. It has, however, a professional bearing, is moderately well trained, and is capable of performing its mission during normal times. (C)