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☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Mid career

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Midcareer Meeting with the DCI - 30 November 1977

FROM: [redacted]

STAT

CMO/DDA
7D-02 Hdqrs.

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE 29 November 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. [redacted] 7D-60 Hdqrs.				Paper to be presented to the DCI at 1:30 on Wednesday, 30 November 1977.
2.				
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STAT

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Approved For Release 2009/07/16 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000200660022-7

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Agenda

Midcareer Group Meeting with the DCI

30 November 1977

Problem No. 1	DDO Morale
Problem No. 2	The Selection-Out Process
Problem No. 3	Poor Integration of R & D System Development
Problem No. 4	Improvement of NFAC Intelligence Product
Problem No. 5	The Human Resource Potential
Problem No. 6	Changes in Agency Leadership and Acting Status in Senior Positions
Problem No. 7	Promotion System Above GS-13 and GS-14

Approved For Release 2009/07/16 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000200660022-7

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Problem No. 1: DDO Morale

For a variety of reasons morale within the DDO is at an all time low. Certainly the recent reduction in force has contributed to declining DDO morale and has intensified feelings of disillusionment and distrust among all ranks of DDO officers. The DCI's comments published in a recent issue of NEWSWEEK exacerbated a difficult situation and focused much of the DDO rank and file resentment against him.

Recommendations:

The Group believes that this is an unhealthy state of affairs and that the DCI should make a sustained, personal effort to convince DDO officers that he values the DDO's contribution to the national intelligence effort. The Group recommends that the DCI should:

A. Talk to recently retired DDO officers in an effort to better understand the unique problems facing DDO officers in the field today and to convey to these officers the DCI's personal commitment to maintain the Foreign Intelligence collection mission of the DDO.

B. Make an effort to increase his personal contact with senior GS-14 and GS-15 (working level) DDO officers in an effort to instill in them the DCI's "commitment to excellence" within the DDO. These are key decision-making officers in Headquarters and future Station Chiefs in the field.

C. Drop in unannounced at DDO Division and Staff morning meetings to develop among DDO officers a sense of the DCI's commitment and support of the DDO.

D. Encourage DDO leadership to modify the manner in which the second personnel reduction will be effected, but resist efforts to become personally involved in what is an internal DDO problem.

Approved For Release 2009/07/16 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000200660022-7

Approved For Release 2009/07/16 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000200660022-7

Problem No. 2:

Most, if not all Agency components, possess means to identify and select out those personnel who are evaluated over a period of time as falling into a pre-designated "low percentile." Implementation of the selection-out process, however, is sporadic and inconsistent. Long-term problems are thereby created when persons who ought to have been separated from the Agency (or perhaps transferred to other work within the Agency) are retained.

Recommendations:

The various selection-out processes ought to be reviewed at the Agency level, with appropriate Component input, to determine whether existing standards meet current and projected needs. Overall Agency standards should be established, with Components permitted a certain amount of leeway in implementation to conform with particular situations in given Components. Certain basic principles regarding any selection-out process should include:

A. Obligatory ranking of persons in the lower percentiles, such as the 3 percent and 5 percent, and also the 10 percent and 20 percent for purposes of early identification of individuals who might move into the 5 percent or 3 percent groups.

B. Prompt notification to persons in the three and five percentiles that their future employment with the Agency is in jeopardy, to advise them of remedial actions that could be undertaken and to offer counselling with regard to changing Components or leaving the Agency.

C. Timely notification to employees in the ten and twenty percentiles that their performance is below standard and that they risk moving into the 5 percent and 3 percent groups. These announcements should be coupled with necessary career counselling to assist these persons to improve their performance in the future, or to lead to reassignment elsewhere within or outside the Agency.

Approved For Release 2009/07/16 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000200660022-7

Approved For Release 2009/07/16 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000200660022-7

D. Mandatory selection-out of persons so identified by the established standards. The system should be structured so that during a person's tenure in the lowest percentile, he will have had sufficient counselling and opportunity to upgrade his performance and/or change Components in order to try and prove himself in another area. Thus, the selection-out decision should not come as a surprise nor should the employee have grounds to complain that he was not afforded opportunity to improve his situation.

Problem No. 3:

Poor integration of R & D system development to maximize utility for the users and exploiters of the system.

As evidenced by:

A. Lack of specific user related requirements that are understood and incorporated by the developers.

B. Projects that are pushed because of the expertise of the developers.

C. Detrimental overlap of projects and subsequent infighting between R & D components.

D. Concentration of assets on the development of systems as compared to the exploitation of the system.

E. Biased test and evaluations by developers that result in non-objective positive conclusions.

Recommendations:

A. Have a user on the development team to interface the exploitation requirements.

B. The user should "sign off" at the various stages of the development cycle.

C. Develop an effective R & D review panel that takes a critical look at objectives, budget and resources for both development and exploitation.

Approved For Release 2009/07/16 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000200660022-7

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D. The user should be a prime tester and evaluator of the system.

Problem No. 4: Improvement of NFAC Intelligence Product

Recommendations:

The Agency SAFE program constitutes an essential improvement in the ability to analyze intelligence information. It has a demonstrated capability to overcome in large measure the inefficiencies and unreliability of hard copy dissemination and filing. Unfortunately, the program currently is impeded. In that this system makes possible the effective use of data collected by expensive technical collection systems, it should be pushed with the highest priority. Improvements and additions to the present system should be pursued vigorously, and the full implementation begun as soon as possible. The quality and comprehensiveness of NFAC product is directly dependent on the degree of SAFE implementation.

Encourage a high level of professionalism and give proper recognition to analyst's work and make him personally responsible for it.

A. Analyst's name should be on the publication.

B. Publications should be properly documented.

C. Reverse the trend toward just publishing a terse summary of a paper, and publish analyst's complete paper. Most of the work has already been done by the time the paper is written, and publication takes little additional effort.

Too many time wasters cut into time for good analysis:

A. Too much regurgitating of same information.

1. Republishing same item in different publications requires analyst time but produces no new analysis.

Approved For Release 2009/07/16 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000200660022-7

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2. Ad hoc requests, often poorly stated and with short deadlines, require analyst to drop other activities to respond. Such requests particularly prevalent from NIO's.

B. Too many managers, all wanting analysts' time, without well defined lines of authority (line management, NIO's, NFIB committees, IC Staff, etc)

The NID--great consumer of time, possibly should be a CIA publication.

A. Other agencies contribute very little.

B. Coordination takes much analyst time, generally changes item very little, delays publication.

Analysts need better access to information held by other agencies:

A. Need collected information held tightly by other agencies. NSA product is a prime example.

B. Need better access to State Department information to avoid writing intelligence in a policy vacuum.

Quality control by review at high level in NFAC:

A. De-emphasize "publish or perish" - quality is at least as important as quantity.

B. Need feedback on quality and usefulness of publications from high-level reviewers in NFAC.

1. Assessment must be based upon consultation with consumers--including "market research" on consumer needs.

2. Need to provide both positive feedback on high quality and useful publications and negative feedback on low-quality or useless publications with appropriate incentives or disincentives.

Approved For Release 2009/07/16 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000200660022-7

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Problem No. 5:

The Agency has not taken full advantage of its human resource potential. This has affected efficiency and employee morale.

In the July 1976 Personnel Management Survey, fewer than one third of the surveyed employees expressed confidence in the Agency career management system. Effectiveness of such a system depends upon how well it is perceived as well as program quality. An effective career management program is essential to efficient management of human resources. The Agency's Careers Committee is a potential solution, but it is losing momentum at a time when it is most needed. Implementation of Careers Committee objectives could have placed some of the employees now being selected out and could improve future effectiveness and morale:

1. To provide Agency counselors with a knowledge of the job market in the Agency by offering them information and data pertinent to the career counseling function.

2. To promote a more full or appropriate use of employee talents and qualifications by actively supporting intra-Agency personnel movements of the underemployed or those whose career horizons are limited by circumstances of component affiliation rather than by lack of qualifications or potential.

3. To encourage the development of realistic expectations among Agency employees relative to their Agency careers by periodically informing them of specific facts, policies, and other considerations bearing on employee development or reassignment decision making.

While the objectives and their associated tasks have been carefully written, the committee shows little interest in taking the related action, and top management has not pushed this action.

Approved For Release 2009/07/16 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000200660022-7

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Recommendations:

Top management could give strong encouragement to career management improvement, specifically strengthening the Careers Committee.

-- Through the EAG, encourage full Careers support by each Directorate.

-- Involve operating personnel in Careers Committee, not just Admin. people.

-- Disseminate information about the Careers Committee and encourage all employees to pass comments, ideas, and problems to it; encourage all to participate.

-- Move away from inter-directorate barriers through the all-Agency Careers Committee.

-- Require the Careers Committee to report progress regularly to the DCI.

-- Direct the Careers Committee to take action on objective areas, and guarantee the resources necessary for that action.

Problem No. 6:

The many changes in Agency leadership in the past five years and the current acting status in several senior positions add an element of instability to the Agency.

Recommendations:

In view of the recent reorganization, and the increased emphasis the DCI must place on community matters and external pressures, the appointment of a permanent DDCI has become more imperative. It is recommended that this individual be familiar with the internal structure of the Agency and be provided full authority in order that strong control of the day-to-day operations of the Agency be maintained.

Approved For Release 2009/07/16 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000200660022-7

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It is felt that the fact that the present DDCI is only acting in that capacity has forced the DCI to involve himself in certain internal matters which would not have been necessary had the DDCI been a permanently appointed official. This would also allow for the normalization of the leadership in the DDA.

Problem No. 7:

Individuals who excel in specialized fields, and who desire to be promoted into the supergrades, or often even to GS-14 or GS-15, are usually obliged to become managers. Outstanding specialists of this sort may have poor managerial aptitude, or may simply have no interest in becoming managers. In either instance, both the individual and the Agency suffer under a promotion system which generally requires movement into the manager ranks as a prerequisite to promotion above GS-13 or GS-14.

Recommendation:

The Agency should require establishment in each appropriate Component (such as DDO, NFAC, and DDS&T) of a career track for specialists, whereby the best of them can be promoted into the higher grades. Some attributes of such a program would be:

A. Active utilization of such tracks. Although they exist in principle in various Components, they are sporadically utilized.

B. Proportionate rather than token representation of specialists in each of the higher grades.

C. Flexibility regarding an individual's membership in either the specialist or generalist track. That is, lateral mobility should be allowed when it could be beneficial to both the Agency and the individual. In practice it is likely that such lateral movement at the supergrade level from specialist to manager would be rare, although certainly not unheard of for a senior analyst or case officer to become a senior manager.

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D. Each individual, at the appropriate point in his or her career, should be obliged to consider (via counselling) the alternate directions his career can go, and to make at least a provisional decision regarding which track he desires to move in.

Approved For Release 2009/07/16 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000200660022-7