Soviet Policy and Africa

National Intelligence Council Memorandum
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Memorandum

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Overview

Soviet policy toward Africa represents more than the mere exploitation of opportunities. It is driven by objectives that have remained reasonably stable over the years:

- To offset and undermine Western political, economic, and military influence.

- To expand the Soviet presence on the continent.

- To facilitate the expansion of Soviet influence in North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Indian Ocean littoral.

- To promote specific Soviet military interests.

- To enhance Soviet claims to a global superpower role.

- To gain political support from African countries for Soviet undertakings in international forums.

- To stimulate changes advantageous to the USSR in African regimes.

Soviet success in achieving these aims has been mixed. For a variety of reasons, the Soviets suffered a number of setbacks before 1974: the overthrow of Nkrumah in Ghana (1966); the coup against a pro-Soviet regime in Mali (1968); a decline in Soviet influence in Guinea; the failure of a Communist coup in Sudan (1971); and the expulsion of the USSR from Egypt (1972). More recently, the Soviets have been confronted by:

- The loss of use of the naval and air facilities at Berbera, resulting from the Soviets' decision to pursue what they viewed as greater opportunities and stakes in Ethiopia, although they knew this would put their gains in Somalia at serious risk.

- The transfer of power in Zimbabwe in 1980 to a black majority government controlled by Robert Mugabe's ZANU rather than the Soviet-backed Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU.

- Termination by Guinea in 1977 of the right to stage TU-95 maritime reconnaissance flights from Conakry.
• The refusal by Cape Verde in 1980 to grant the USSR naval access rights.

Since 1974, Moscow has been able to take advantage of a confluence of circumstances that offered new opportunities and tools with which to pursue its aims, particularly in countries experiencing new nationhood—the type of African country in which the Soviets scored gains in the 1960s. Soviet activity from 1974 to date has marked a new phase in Soviet relations with Sub-Saharan Africa, reflecting:

• Major openings presented by the collapse of the Portuguese empire, conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia, the fall of the Haile Selassie regime, and growing black opposition to white rule in southern Africa.

• A Soviet perception that the United States has, until recently, been unwilling or unable effectively to contest the spread of Soviet influence in Africa, and that such expansion would accordingly entail little military risk.

• A Soviet assessment of the enhanced strategic significance of the Horn of Africa—with respect to the promotion of Soviet interests on the Arabian Peninsula and in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean regions generally.

• The need to compensate for the reduction of Soviet influence in the Middle East occasioned by the deterioration of relations with Egypt beginning in 1972 and by the Camp David accords of 1978.

• A greater willingness on the part of some African states as well as insurgent groups to accept Communist military assistance and support, and of Africans to tolerate large-scale and overt combat involvement by Communist states in African affairs.

• The availability of a proxy—Cuba—especially well suited to the military and political requirements of the situations at hand.

• Possible heightened Soviet concerns about future deployment to the Indian Ocean of US strategic systems—both ballistic missile submarines and carrier-based aircraft.

Under these changed circumstances the Soviets managed to achieve major gains and significantly strengthened their position in Africa, although they were not immune to reverses. Since 1974 the Soviets have:
• Used their airlift and sealift capabilities to provide large-scale military assistance, military advisers, and technicians to clients at great distances from the USSR.

• Helped keep in power pro-Soviet regimes in Angola and Ethiopia.

• Signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Mozambique, although so far they have neither gained access to military facilities nor entrenched themselves in the government structure.

• Exercised command and control functions for Ethiopia in its war with Somalia.

• Gained the use of an austere naval facility on Ethiopia’s Dahlak Island in the Red Sea as a support facility for the USSR’s Indian Ocean naval contingent, partly compensating for the loss of better facilities at Berbera in Somalia.

• Used their presence in Ethiopia to conduct reconnaissance flights over the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean from Asmara, continuing activities they formerly staged from Berbera.

• Used Luanda in Angola as a naval facility and staging point for reconnaissance flights over the South Atlantic, compensating for the loss of Conakry.

• Greatly increased military assistance and arms sales to Sub-Saharan Africa: from $715 million in the period 1959-74 to $4.74 billion in 1975-80 (half of which went to Ethiopia).

• Profited from the employment in combat operations of large numbers of Cuban proxy military personnel in Angola and Ethiopia. (In 1980 there were 15,000 to 19,000 Cuban soldiers in Angola and 11,000 to 13,000 in Ethiopia.)

• Encouraged and coordinated the placement of hundreds of East Germans in security, organizational, and propaganda training jobs in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and other countries.

• Channeled arms to insurgents operating in Namibia, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and South Africa.

• Quietly begun to provide technical military assistance and even military advisers to the Libyan forces now in Chad.
The new Soviet activeness in Africa does not signify that the region as a whole has any higher priority in Soviet eyes relative to other regions than it had previously. Sub-Saharan Africa still ranks lower than the United States, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, China, Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East as an area of Soviet foreign policy concern. The USSR has no truly vital security interests at stake in the region that it must defend. Soviet military objectives in the area are—aside from Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf concerns—of a regional rather than global strategic character; peacetime designs are probably more important than those keyed to a general East-West war; and desired political gains are just as salient as purely military ones.

Whether the circumstances that permitted Soviet gains since 1974 will persist in the years ahead is uncertain. There will clearly be continuing opportunities for the USSR and its proxies to fish in troubled waters. The potential openings are many:

- The political, economic, and social weaknesses that will continue to afflict Africa.
- The tendency of African military organizations to acquire as much weaponry as possible regardless of the real level of threat.
- Abiding African suspicions of Europe and the United States.
- The presence of apartheid in South Africa and its impact on the domestic and foreign policies of other countries in Africa. Clearly, the Soviets view support for the African struggle for majority rule in Namibia and South Africa—in all of its political, economic, military, and diplomatic dimensions—as a key element in their approach to Sub-Saharan Africa over the next decade.

Of the many problems Soviet and Soviet proxy actions in Africa may create for the United States in the next several years, the most acute could be:

- Extension of the USSR's influence in Sub-Saharan Africa by providing military assistance—either directly or through the Cubans—to Soviet clients in the event of internal instability in Zaire, Zambia, or Zimbabwe, or by collaborating with the Libyans to exploit instability in Chad or Sudan.
• Soviet provision of significantly larger numbers of advisers and equipment, or more support for the Cubans, in order to prop up Moscow's "own" regimes in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia if they were threatened with internal collapse, whether provoked or not by US assistance to dissident elements.

• Military conflict between a Soviet client regime and a third country—with or without Soviet encouragement. For example, Ethiopian encroachment on Somalia, or—less likely—fighting between Angola and South Africa linked with Namibia.

• Soviet acquisition of a new foothold in West Africa.

• An increased Soviet naval and air presence in the region, if the Soviets were successful in obtaining access to port facilities and airfields in various countries.

We do not believe, however, that Soviet behavior in Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to present a frontal challenge to the West in the areas of access to strategic metals or oil. Even under circumstances favorable to the Soviets they would not be able either to seize Sub-Saharan strategic metals for themselves, or—barring a collapse of political order in South Africa—to impose a prolonged denial of them to the West; nor does Soviet behavior to date suggest that the Soviets themselves are currently pursuing either a seizure or a denial strategy in the near or middle term. Likewise, Soviet naval activities around the Horn and off the coast of East Africa do not signal an active intention of interfering with the flow of oil supplies for the West, given the supremely high risk this would entail and Soviet naval inferiority in the region. Rather, these activities are intended to promote essentially political objectives—as well as enhance the USSR's future strategic capabilities in the area.

Increased Soviet activity in Sub-Saharan Africa will not necessarily assure greatly heightened future Soviet influence. Indeed, during the past year Soviet comment has betrayed a sense of frustration over Moscow's loss of initiative in the region. The Soviets are probably worried by the possibility of a peaceful Western-sponsored Namibian settlement, by their own failure to back the right horse in Zimbabwe, by US success in winning a grant of military facilities from Kenya, by the pro-Western stance of Nigeria, and by the tendency even for clients like Angola and Mozambique to seek greater economic ties with the West.
In the future, as the Soviets encounter new opportunities, they will also face old constraints:

- Foremost among these is the preference of virtually all African regimes, including recipients of Soviet and proxy assistance, to manage their own affairs.

- Virtually all African regimes are suspicious of Soviet motives.

- The Soviets and their proxies are not alone in Africa. Most African countries operate within a Western-oriented international economic order, and receive sizable assistance from the major Western powers and international organizations, which the Soviets cannot match.

- The difficulty of translating military or economic assistance into lasting political influence, a problem the Soviets have always faced in Africa.

But, in addition, there are new factors that could seriously impair the ability of the USSR in the 1980s to extend its gains:

- South African intervention against the MPLA forces in Angola and Somalia violation of the territorial integrity of Ethiopia made it possible for the USSR and Cuba to introduce their military contingents in those countries while remaining on the “right” side of the Africans. Such fortuitous circumstances might not be repeated in the future.

- Africans may be more chary now of superpower involvement than they were in the 1970s.

- The Soviets are encountering difficulties in consolidating their influence in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. Existing frictions may well multiply as Moscow attempts to impose a pattern of institutionalization of power favorable to its own interests, while failing to respond adequately to the economic needs of its clients.

- The Cubans are more than Soviet agents; they have their own policy aims, which have conflicted with Soviet aims in the past and could do so in the future.

Despite the opportunities already mentioned for maneuver in Sub-Saharan Africa which the Soviets may be able to create or exploit, and despite the expanded means at their disposal to do so, the Soviets in the 1980s will nevertheless be vulnerable to Western counteraction, particularly with respect to:
• The Soviet inability to compete with the West in trade and economic development assistance.

• The dissatisfaction of African military forces with the quality of Soviet arms, availability of spare parts, level of maintenance provided, and training.

• The dependence of the Soviets on Cuban proxy military forces. It could force difficult and potentially embarrassing choices on the Soviets if, for whatever reason, the Cubans decided to remove or substantially reduce their troops in Angola or Ethiopia when this was not desired by the host regime.

• The incompleteness so far with which Soviet-style political controls have been institutionalized in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, and the consequent potential for leadership defection from Soviet tutelage and for divergence of the system from the Soviet-preferred model.

• Suspicion among Africans of Soviet intentions, which has been reinforced by Moscow’s arm-twisting attempts to exploit dependency relations for short-term tactical gains, and by African awareness of attempted Soviet subversion.

• The perception widely held by Africans that “Russians” harbor racist attitudes.

• Soviet lack of leverage to encourage the sort of negotiated resolutions of the Namibian and—perhaps eventually—South African problems that many leaders of black African countries would probably prefer to see.
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Soviet Policy and Africa

Soviet Objectives

General Considerations
Soviet policy toward Africa is best understood as the outcome of a set of fairly specific objectives which complement and promote the USSR's broad global purposes. These objectives have remained quite constant; they are rooted in Communist doctrine and the entrenched interests of key Soviet political elite, and they are carried forward with tremendous bureaucratic momentum.

While the Soviets probably think that unsettled conditions in Africa are likely to be especially conducive to achieving their objectives, they also clearly assign the region a lower priority in their scheme of things than the United States, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, China, Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. Apart from the incremental improvement in its capacity to counter US strategic naval forces provided by access to ports and airfields (especially in Ethiopia), the Soviet Union has no truly vital security interests at stake in Sub-Saharan Africa that it must defend. Moscow is, moreover, subject to certain constraints concerning Africa. The USSR has an interest in avoiding:

- Direct military confrontation in the region with the United States or West European powers.
- Actions that would have a high probability of worsening Soviet relations with Western Europe or with valued Third World countries.
- Burdensome economic commitments to the region, which have not paid off in the past and for which resources are unavailable.

Soviet objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa are to:

- Offset and undermine Western political, economic, and military influence.
- Facilitate the expansion of Soviet influence in North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Indian Ocean littoral.
- Expand the Soviet presence on the continent.
- Promote various Soviet military interests.
- Enhance Soviet claims to a global superpower role.
- Gain political support from African countries for Soviet undertakings in international forums.
- Stimulate changes advantageous to the USSR in African regimes.

The Soviets do not believe that these objectives can be quickly realized; and they are well aware of reverses they have suffered in the past: the overthrow of Nkrumah in Ghana (1966); the coup against Keita in Mali (1968); the failure of a Communist coup in Sudan (1971), which was blamed on the Soviets (although they in fact did not instigate it); the expulsion of the USSR from Egypt (1972); termination by Guinea in 1977 of permission to stage TU-95 maritime reconnaissance flights from Conakry; the forced choice between Ethiopia and Somalia, leading to the loss of Berbera (1977); and the victory of Robert Mugabe's ZANU over the Soviet-backed Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU in Zimbabwe (1980). Nevertheless, the Soviets pursued most of these objectives vigorously in the 1970s; overall, the effort expended represented a quickened impulse in Soviet policy toward Africa. Why did the Soviets seek to realize their aims more aggressively at this juncture? First, local opportunities beckoned:

- Somali irredentist ambitions.
- The collapse of Portuguese power in Mozambique and Angola.

1 Current Soviet involvement in Africa is summarized by country in annex A.
The overthrow of Haile Selassie and radical turn in Ethiopian politics.

The black insurgency in Rhodesia.

Second, there were new strategic considerations:

- The need to compensate for the reduction in Soviet influence in the Middle East occasioned by the deterioration of relations with Egypt beginning in 1972, and the USSR's later exclusion from participation in the process of settlement of the Israeli-Arab dispute with the Camp David accords of 1978.

- US development in the mid-1970s of new naval and air facilities at Diego Garcia, which may have heightened Soviet concerns about future deployment to the Indian Ocean of US strategic systems—both ballistic missile submarines and carrier-based aircraft.

- The radical shift of world economic power to the Middle Eastern oil-producing states and the vulnerability of the West displayed in the 1973 OPEC oil embargo, which made the Persian Gulf region an even greater object of Soviet interest than it had been previously.

Finally, the possibilities of bringing Soviet military power to bear in Africa were improved:

- The Soviets perceived prospects for diminished competition in Africa from the United States in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate, and reduced resolve to counter Soviet military initiatives.

- Acquisition by the USSR in the late 1960s of access to Aden as a naval and air staging point increased the capacity of the Soviets to deliver military assistance into the Horn of Africa.

- A proxy—Cuba—was available through which Soviet interests could be pursued.

Most of the Soviet objectives noted above are clear cut, but several points require further discussion.

Some Specific Aims

Military Interests. Soviet military objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa serve both defensive and offensive aims. These include:

- Gaining access to facilities in Africa (see accompanying map) from which the USSR can conduct reconnaissance and targeting missions—in particular the monitoring of US and Western naval activities in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, especially US submarines and aircraft carriers.

- Securing Soviet sea lines of communication between the European USSR and the Soviet Far East.

- Denying Western access to military bases or facilities.

- Protecting Soviet fishing and merchant marine fleets on both sides of Africa.

- Securing access or transit for Soviet military forces being deployed to various locations worldwide.

- Gaining permission to stockpile limited amounts of materiel and fuel in Africa mainly for Soviet use.

- Providing military assistance—particularly arms and advisers—to protect revolutionary changes and favored insurgents or client regimes against Western counteractions.

- Establishing bases from which subversion or insurgency potentially could be supported either in the Arabian Peninsula (for example, North Yemen) or in adjoining African states (such as Zaire).

These Soviet military objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa are oriented less toward global than toward regional strategic concerns—including those in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. "Peacetime" designs are probably more important than those keyed to a general East-West war, and political gains are just as salient as purely military ones.
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Africa and Persian Gulf Oil. Soviet military moves in the Horn and along the east coast of Africa are partly related to Moscow's interest in expanding its influence with respect to Persian Gulf oil, but the connection at present is almost certainly more political than military. The Soviets' attempts to establish a presence along the east coast of Africa are not in doubt; but this does not signal an intention to interfere with the flow of oil supplies to the West. They lack the forces to do so, and are aware that to employ even inadequate forces for this purpose could lead to the most serious possible confrontation with the West. More importantly, however, it is unclear why the Soviets would opt for this uncertain means if they wanted to cut off oil to the West (with all that entailed as to the danger of major conflict with the United States and Western Europe) when it would be much easier for them either to close down Persian Gulf oil facilities or to interdict passage through the Strait of Hormuz. To the extent that these moves to establish a military presence in the region are related to oil, the aim is probably to parlay their psychological impact into increasing acceptance of the Soviet Union's claim to recognition as a "security guarantor" of Persian Gulf oil, and into greater Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf region and along the northern littoral of the Indian Ocean.

Stimulating Change in African Regimes. In reaching decisions related to political action, Moscow divides African regimes into two categories: "capitalist" regimes, and regimes of a "socialist orientation." 2 The Soviets are uncertain how rapidly the former can be altered in a "progressive" direction, but their strategy for fostering this objective is straightforward: encouragement of structural changes in the economy, society, and foreign relations of a country that are compatible with "national capitalism" but which undercut the influence of pro-Western and moderate elements in the population, thus laying the groundwork—the Soviets hope—for more "progressive" changes later on.

The Soviet attitude toward the leftist, self-designated "socialist" or even "Marxist-Leninist" regimes (including Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia) is extremely cautious. The Soviets look at these regimes in the light of what they have learned through bitter experience in Egypt and Somalia, and judge them still highly vulnerable to defection from a solidly pro-Moscow orientation. They see the possibility either of creeping capitalism or the "treason" of new Sadats.

Moscow's aim, which Soviet commentators make no bones about, is to prod and assist the leaders in these countries to institutionalize the revolution: to build disciplined parties, organize reliable internal security systems, purge the armies of politically unreliable elements, and form mass organizations to circumscribe and channel the activity of key social groups in the population at large. In the economic sphere, Soviet strategy is to encourage a gradual elimination of private enterprise and an even more gradual shift of trade toward the Soviet bloc, avoiding radical measures that could totally isolate a regime from its own population or confront the USSR with undefeatable demands for massive continuing Soviet economic support. Progress in achieving these aims has been very slow.

Access To and Control Over Strategic Metals. The three countries besides South Africa that produce substantial quantities of any of the four strategic metals found in Africa (cobalt, chrome, platinum-group metals, and manganese) are Zaire (cobalt), Zambia (cobalt), and Zimbabwe (chrome). Of these metals, the Soviets are self-sufficient in all but cobalt. We believe that, barring radical changes in South Africa, the Soviets under the most favorable conditions (including revolutions of the Angolan type) would be unable to achieve more than a moderate degree of concessionary access themselves to strategic African metals (some cobalt from Zaire or Zambia is all that they need for their own purposes, and only until the mid-1980s), and a limited measure of influence over sales of cobalt to the West by these two countries or of chrome by Zimbabwe. The Soviets would not be able to corner the international market in these metals, although they might attempt to engage in collusive price setting with African producers. They could, however, work to promote disorder in these three countries that might—at least for a while—shut down production and prevent exports. Such a turn of events would have painful but

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1 Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Benin, Cape Verde, Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Tanzania, and Sao Tome and Principe.
not disastrous consequences for the West. If Zaire or Zambia were the targets, collapse of exports would also damage Soviet economic interests; until the second half of the 1980s, when it will become an exporter of cobalt, the USSR will probably depend on imports from these two countries to meet a significant share of its own cobalt requirements. Direct evidence of how the Soviets themselves size up the strategic metals problem is very thin, precluding a confident judgment that their assessment is the same as ours. Soviet behavior to date that is immediately related to African strategic metals does not display a very active intention to exploit Western vulnerability, although Soviet spokesmen frequently call attention to this vulnerability. Our best judgment is that the metals consideration is a longer term, background element that combines with other, more immediate aims shaping Soviet behavior toward Sub-Saharan Africa.1

Exploitable Vulnerabilities in Africa

The capacity of the USSR to realize its objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa depends in the first place on the opportunities that are available. The extent and limits of current Soviet involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa, and prospects for future Soviet gains, are significantly conditioned in the first place by African perceptions of the Soviet Union.

Most Africans are wary about Moscow. They are sensitive to the international competition between the Soviet Union and the United States, and regard that competition as providing opportunities to further their own interests—but also risks of entanglement. Even those governments that rely on assistance from Moscow to prop them up exhibit a large degree of independence, and many of those that are strongly anti-Soviet applaud Moscow’s support on African problems.

Most Africans welcome the support Moscow has given to national liberation groups in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa. When possible, they prefer to have military assistance to those groups funneled through the Organization of African Unity (OAU)—which Moscow, however, is generally unwilling to do. They

regard such assistance as crucial in allowing liberation groups to exert the pressure necessary to force their adversaries to accept a settlement. They draw back, however, from purely military solutions—largely because of the Angola experience and a realistic appreciation of African military inadequacies—and prefer to work for Zimbabwe-type negotiated settlements.

Many African states look to the Soviet Union for arms that they cannot obtain from the West, although they do so with mixed feelings. Although the USSR provides virtually no arms on a grant basis (even Ethiopia is required to repay, primarily in hard currency), Moscow still pressures clients to adopt pro-Soviet positions. Some countries, such as Nigeria and Zambia, pay for their arms with hard currency or minerals in an attempt to avoid any question of political indebtedness to Moscow. Even those countries that do not pay in cash, such as Tanzania, Uganda, Congo, and Guinea, do not slavishly adopt pro-Soviet positions.

Moderate states, such as Zambia, fear that Soviet involvement in domestic politics would accompany any large Soviet military presence associated with arms agreements, and have tried to limit the number of Soviet technicians and advisers in country or arrange for training to be carried out in the Soviet Union. Other states, fearing an external threat from Western powers or exile opposition elements, are happy to have a Soviet presence. Such was the case with Guinea in 1970 when President Sekou Toure, facing Portuguese retaliation for his support of the insurgents in Portuguese Guinea, gave the Soviets access to air and naval facilities in exchange for arms and a Soviet naval presence in the area. Although Guinea now is putting distance between itself and Moscow by curtailing Soviet access and by accepting Western aid, it still regards Moscow as its key arms supplier.

African political systems are built on single parties and often these parties are poorly organized, are ill disciplined, and lack a broad popular base. Weak organization and discipline are also often characteristic of African intelligence and security services. Generally, African leaders admire the effectiveness and discipline of Soviet and East European Communist parties and

1 The reasoning behind our position is presented in annex B.
security organizations even while depleting the Soviet political system. Because of a basic fear of Soviet involvement or penetration, or a desire not to show themselves as tools of Moscow, they are inclined to turn to the East Germans or the Cubans for training in the fields of political organizing and security.

Most African states are willing to establish trade and aid relations with Moscow. Such agreements seldom work to the advantage of the Africans, however, and often lead to protracted and acrimonious disputes over terms. Such has been the case with Moscow’s development of a bauxite mining project in Guinea. Africans have found Soviet conduct in other development projects (for example, the projected large Nigerian steel mill) to be inept as well as heavyhanded. Even countries which tilt toward Moscow have resented Soviet exploitation of so-called joint ventures, in such areas as fishing. Guinea-Bissau has forced Moscow to accept various revisions in the original fishing agreement, and Angola recently concluded a joint agreement with Spain following a longstanding dispute with the Soviets over the division of the catch and Moscow’s refusal to improve Angola’s own fishing fleet.

African states are dissatisfied with the meager economic aid Moscow provides. This dissatisfaction is particularly strong on the part of countries that claim to be “scientifically socialist” or “Marxist-Leninist,” such as Congo, Benin, and even Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. Such countries will remain dependent on the Soviet Union for military assistance but are seeking economic assistance in the West and from China.

The Soviets themselves, while unhappy over certain political developments of the past year or so (such as the defeat of Joshua Nkomo, whom they supported, by Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe), nevertheless foresee an intensification of longer term processes of social change in Africa that will provide good opportunities to enhance the influence of the USSR. And in this assumption they are probably correct. Africa is going through what is likely to be a protracted period of instability, and we expect the 1980s to be a decade of intensified economic difficulty, social dislocation, and civil disorder in this part of the globe.

**Soviet Capabilities**

In the sphere of economic relations, the Soviets discovered between 1959 and 1969 how difficult it would be for them to compete with the West for influence in Sub-Saharan Africa through economic aid. Between 1970 and 1974, new Soviet aid overtures ground to a virtual halt. Between 1975 and 1980, Soviet economic aid commitments to the region were about $500 million (when credits for a large steel mill project in Nigeria are excluded). During the same period, military sales escalated steeply to $4.4 billion. Clearly, arms supply and military assistance have become the primary vehicle by means of which the Soviets have attempted to establish their influence in the region. While their successes in so doing have been substantial, their dependence on this single instrumentality leaves Soviet relationships with client countries potentially vulnerable to erosion.

Moscow has a significant military power projection capability, which it has twice already brought to bear on Sub-Saharan Africa. The USSR’s Military Transport Aviation (VTA) can mount a major, unopposed airlift in a short time and sustain it. And the Soviets have developed airborne and amphibious units which—in addition to their conventional forces—can be used for intervention in distant areas. Nevertheless, the Soviets would encounter serious difficulties in

* For a more detailed discussion of Soviet capabilities, see annex C.
delivering substantial numbers of airborne troops or amphibious forces to many African locations, particularly if such movements were opposed. From the Soviet standpoint, proxy activity makes a great deal of sense; it has permitted effective—and perhaps critical—military support of Soviet clients when the only alternative to their collapse or severe setback might have been the unprecedented direct involvement of Soviet ground forces; it has reduced the chances of US political and military counteraction; it has permitted military actions on the ground in Africa to be presented in a Third World/“national liberation” context rather than as a manifestation of superpower conflict; and it has effectively exploited the African belief that other Communist regimes are less threatening than the USSR.

The Cubans
Cuban military activity in Sub-Saharan Africa did not begin with the massive troop buildup in Angola in 1975; Cuban military instructors and technicians had already been dispatched previously to a number of African countries as one manifestation of Cuban interest in the region—an interest that preceded the 1969 reconciliation between Castro and the Kremlin. And it is clear that Cuba was pursuing its own objectives in intervening in Angola, rather than responding reluctantly to Soviet commands. Whether or not there were initial Soviet reservations about putting the Cubans in Angola (analysts differ on this issue), the Soviets obviously firmly decided at some point that Cuban troops were desirable, and the operation proceeded with close Cuban-Soviet cooperation.

In the case of Ethiopia, Cuban interest was less pronounced than it was toward Angola. Here there may have been a much more clear-cut display of willingness on the Cubans’ part to serve as Soviet Gurkhas. Cuban combat forces were introduced by the Cubans primarily to serve Soviet rather than Cuban objectives. Large numbers of Cuban troops remain in both Ethiopia and Angola, and there is little chance that many of them will be brought home in the next year or two unless external reasons are compelling. The Castro regime maintains that a sizable Cuban military presence is required in both countries so long as a significant external threat exists. This is virtually an admis-

The Role of Proxies

Proxies and the Reasons for Them
In assessing the Soviet use of proxies in Africa, it is important for us to emphasize that “proxies” are not synonymous with “puppets.” The large-scale Cuban military forces and substantial East German political-security training presence in Sub-Saharan Africa serve Soviet objectives. But the Cubans and East Germans are there because the Cuban and East German leaders decided that this would serve the interests of their own regimes. In short, the proxy relationship is based on mutual interests.

The relationship is fairly described by the term “proxy,” however, because the Cubans and East Germans are performing tasks which the Soviets would—in some cases—have been unwilling to perform for themselves because of their high political costs. From the Soviet standpoint, proxy activity makes a great deal of sense; it has permitted effective—and perhaps critical—military support of Soviet clients when the only alternative to their collapse or severe setback might have been the unprecedented direct involvement of Soviet ground forces; it has reduced the chances of US political and military counteraction; it has permitted military actions on the ground in Africa to be presented in a Third World/“national liberation” context rather than as a manifestation of superpower conflict; and it has effectively exploited the African belief that other Communist regimes are less threatening than the USSR.

The Cubans
Cuban military activity in Sub-Saharan Africa did not begin with the massive troop buildup in Angola in 1975; Cuban military instructors and technicians had already been dispatched previously to a number of African countries as one manifestation of Cuban interest in the region—an interest that preceded the 1969 reconciliation between Castro and the Kremlin. And it is clear that Cuba was pursuing its own objectives in intervening in Angola, rather than responding reluctantly to Soviet commands. Whether or not there were initial Soviet reservations about putting the Cubans in Angola (analysts differ on this issue), the Soviets obviously firmly decided at some point that Cuban troops were desirable, and the operation proceeded with close Cuban-Soviet cooperation.

In the case of Ethiopia, Cuban interest was less pronounced than it was toward Angola. Here there may have been a much more clear-cut display of willingness on the Cubans’ part to serve as Soviet Gurkhas. Cuban combat forces were introduced by the Cubans primarily to serve Soviet rather than Cuban objectives. Large numbers of Cuban troops remain in both Ethiopia and Angola, and there is little chance that many of them will be brought home in the next year or two unless external reasons are compelling. The Castro regime maintains that a sizable Cuban military presence is required in both countries so long as a significant external threat exists. This is virtually an admis-
sion that Cuban leaders see no likelihood in the near term that the Ethiopian or Angolan armed forces will be able to assume full responsibility for national defense—although Cuban ground forces are doing little fighting today in either country; apart from training, their presence serves basically deterrent and political psychological functions. Small Cuban military detachments of advisers and technicians are in a number of other African countries, and Havana shows no signs of reversing its policy on this type of support activity so long as political benefits can be gained from it.

Also significant is the Cuban civilian presence in Africa, particularly in the fields of public health, construction, education, and agriculture. In some cases, Cuban personnel are supplied because of the political benefit that accrues to Havana in bilateral relations and in multilateral forums. In many cases, however, the Castro regime is simply exporting surplus labor in exchange for desperately needed hard currency. Cuban leaders openly acknowledge the rising trend in their exportation of labor and claim that by 1985, in the construction field alone, Cuba will have more than 25,000 people working abroad, many of them in Africa.

It is clear that the Cuban leadership sees its foreign assistance programs as effective means of achieving foreign policy goals. By aiding actual and prospective allies in a tangible way, Cuba satisfies its ideological need to promote internationalism, gains prestige as a benefactor ostensibly driven by altruistic ideals, and provides sustenance to Fidel Castro’s ego by creating the impression that Cuba is a major actor on the world stage.

Of key importance, of course, is Havana’s relationship with Moscow and Cuba’s need to guarantee continued massive Soviet support. The Cubans may fear that Moscow will be willing to underline the Castro regime only as long as Cuba can provide vital services in return. Castro will temper neither his basic antipathy toward the United States nor his determination to become a pivotal figure in world politics and he is thus compelled to ally himself with the only superpower that can give him what he needs to maneuver successfully within these self-imposed confines. There are circumstances in which he can act relatively independently or can fend off Soviet pressure to act in a certain fashion; but in the final analysis his policy decisions are conceived with the realization that they must be salable in Moscow if the flow of Soviet aid (including virtually all of Cuba’s oil) so vital to his continuation in power is to be maintained.

The possibility of Cuba’s becoming involved in yet another major military undertaking in Africa, therefore, is very real. If, for example, Mozambique were to require an infusion of Cuban combat units to prevent the overthrow of the Machel government by South African–supported rebels, Havana almost certainly would respond favorably if it were convinced that the United States would not intervene militarily, that Moscow would approve and provide the necessary material support, and that the Cuban forces could successfully turn the tide. But it is also possible that concern over US intentions toward Cuba might induce Havana to return some of its forces to Cuba.

The East Europeans

The East European states—some in close cooperation with the Soviets—are seeking to increase their influence in Africa. The East Europeans see a great advantage in selling arms for cash and developing potential sources of key raw materials and, over the past several years, have become increasingly involved in providing technical assistance.

Among the Communist states, East Germany has specialized in assisting newly established regimes in Africa—especially Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia—to reinforce their political control by developing security and intelligence organizations. This assistance—most likely coordinated with the Soviets and on occasion directly urged by them—extends to establishing an orthodox party organization, training a political cadre, and organizing mass media. The East Germans have long sought to establish a “presence” in African—and other Third World—countries and have offered such assistance as a means to gain entry into those states. They have achieved success only in the
Past several years East German activity will probably continue to increase as new opportunities develop. From the Soviet standpoint, East Germany is useful because of its lower profile, loyalty, and technical proficiency. For the East Germans, a motivation as strong as pleasing Moscow is to bolster the insecure East German state's drive for international prestige and political influence in order to compete with West Germany.

Implications for the United States

Soviet Perceptions of the Future

Whether the circumstances that permitted Soviet gains since 1975 will persist in the years ahead is uncertain; existing constraints on Soviet progress—the preference of virtually all African regimes to manage their own affairs, the general suspicion of Soviet motives, and the involvement of African countries in the Western international economic system—may be reinforced by new obstacles.

The Soviets themselves are prepared for the long haul in Africa. While they are constantly attempting to position themselves to exploit opportunities that may arise, they basically do not anticipate any quick breakthroughs and are conscious that setbacks will probably occur. Indeed, over the past year Soviet comment has revealed a sense of frustration over Moscow's loss of initiative in Africa. The Soviets are probably worried by the possibility of a peaceful Western-sponsored Namibian settlement, their own failure to back the right horse in Zimbabwe, US success in winning a grant of military facilities from Kenya, the pro-Western stance of Nigeria, and the tendency even for clients like Angola and Mozambique to pull in the direction of economic ties with the West. The Soviets are also confronted with a delicate situation in their relations with France: while France plays a key role in Soviet attempts to maintain detente with Western Europe and split Europe from the United States, France itself has been on the cutting edge of opposition to developments in Sub-Saharan Africa that would advance Soviet interests—in West Africa, Shaba Province of Zaire, Cape Verde, and now Chad.

Nevertheless, the Soviets are optimistic now that over the long term the tide in Africa is in their favor: from their standpoint the establishment of pro-Soviet leftist regimes in Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia represents a big step forward; internal conditions for revolutionary changes in "capitalist" African countries are maturing; and in their view the eventual collapse of white power and radicalization of politics in South Africa are not in doubt.

The precise strategy that the Soviets will adopt in the 1980s to promote their objectives through political action will, of course, be heavily influenced by the opportunities that arise. Clearly, the Soviets view support for the African struggle for majority rule in Namibia and South Africa—in all of its political, economic, military, and diplomatic dimensions—as a central element in their approach to Sub-Saharan Africa over the next decade. Beyond this point, however, there are probably differences of opinion in Soviet policymaking circles over where the key opportunities are likely to arise and how they can best be exploited.

Key Areas of Current and Potential East-West Competition

The Horn of Africa. So far, the fighting between Ethiopia and Somalia has been contained to the Ogaden, although occasional Ethiopian forays into Somalia have taken place. Diplomatically, the Soviets have benefited from being on the side of the Ethiopians, whose argument that they are fighting to maintain Ethiopia's territorial integrity commands great support in Africa. The situation would change, however, if Ethiopia staged a major invasion of Somalia, as some Ethiopian military leaders would like. Logistic weaknesses, however, probably preclude any such large-scale military operations. Moreover, the Soviets probably fear that any such military action could lead the USSR into a confrontation with the United States, particularly if it occurs after the US-Somali access agreement has taken hold, and reportedly have sought to discourage it. Moscow probably is not adverse, however, to limited Ethiopian-Somali conflict and tensions. It may reason that such actions promote Eth-
opian dependence and create uncertainties in the United States about the desirability of a close link with Mogadishu.

The potential for East-West competition in the Horn is further complicated by the fact that Moscow has only limited leverage with Addis Ababa:

- Ethiopian leader Mengistu has procrastinated in establishing a Marxist vanguard party, despite constant Soviet prodding.

- He has refused to entertain the notion of a political settlement with Somalia or Soviet suggestions that he seek a solution to the Eritrean conflict through negotiation.

- He has resisted Soviet pressures for a naval base at a major port like Massawa.

- But he could change that position if he sees no hope of driving a wedge between the United States and Somalia.

President Siad will not give up Somalia’s claim to the Ogaden despite the political costs this policy has incurred in Africa. Moreover, he may try to use weapons from the United States in future attempts to take the Ogaden; and any future moves of his into the Ogaden could well be viewed by Africans as having at least tacit US support.

It is not inconceivable that strains which have emerged between Addis Ababa and Moscow will worsen during the coming year. Ethiopia has accumulated a debt of well over $1 billion, some of which already has been rescheduled. Addis Ababa also probably signed a large new arms agreement in early 1981, substantially adding to its debt. Moreover, Soviet guarantees to meet Ethiopia’s oil needs run only through this year, in contrast to Ethiopia’s desire for a five-year guarantee period. A failure on Moscow’s part to grant further financial concessions or to extend oil guarantees will perhaps accelerate Mengistu’s ongoing campaign to find economic support elsewhere.

Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. The area of greatest potential for increased East-West competition in southern Africa is Namibia. At present, the Africans, particularly the Frontline States, are encouraged by the success of the settlement effort that led to Zimbabwe’s independence and are willing to work for a similar settlement in Namibia. They realize, of course, that South Africa is far less vulnerable to the international diplomatic, economic, and military pressures that were brought to bear against the white minority regime in Rhodesia, and they see a conflict of interest between the West’s support for black majority rule in Namibia (and, by extension, ultimately in South Africa itself) and the West’s economic interests in South Africa.

Over the short term, the leaders of the South-West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO)—the principal Namibian insurgent group—and their African and foreign supporters (non-Communist as well as Communist) face a dilemma:

- The failure of the Geneva Conference on Namibia in early January has prompted the Frontline States and the Soviets to indicate their support for an escalation of guerrilla operations in Namibia.

- That would lead to stepped-up South African retaliation against SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia and perhaps against host-country targets as well.

- It would also encourage Pretoria unilaterally to grant Namibia independence under a government dominated by pro-South African political parties inside Namibia.

Thus, the Africans will attempt to keep their political options alive through Western-backed diplomacy and international pressures while supporting a “credible” military effort on the part of SWAPO. They may also

5 The Frontline States are Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
seek UN sanctions against South Africa, but more as a means of saving face than in the belief of the efficacy of sanctions.

The potential for civil unrest is still high in Zimbabwe. Frictions between the rival former guerrilla organizations there have already led to several bloody clashes, either of which could have sparked countrywide fighting except for Prime Minister Mugabe's adroit handling of the crises. Moscow has cut formal ties with Mugabe's primary opponent, Joshua Nkomo, as the price for Salisbury's agreement to establish diplomatic relations, but is undoubtedly maintaining clandestine contacts and might be able to capitalize on any breakdown in internal stability.

With respect to South Africa itself, East-West competition will be directed toward the Frontline States. Those states will continue to support black majority rule in South Africa. Frontline leaders realize, however, that they are vulnerable to military and economic retaliation from Pretoria and that South African liberation movements are a long way from being strong enough to apply sufficient pressure on Pretoria to force it to yield to black majority rule. Thus, they will not act rashly. The Soviets will continue to support the African National Congress and to train and equip South African guerrillas; but in self-interest the Frontline States will seek to limit the extent of Soviet involvement. Pretoria will attempt to keep its black neighbors off balance through a combination of economic measures and preemptive military strikes against guerrilla facilities, particularly in Mozambique. South African military actions could, of course, compel Frontline States to seek Soviet assistance and a greater Soviet presence.

**Other Countries.** A number of countries in central and southern Africa are experiencing domestic political and economic strains that raise the potential for serious instability in the future. Steadily deteriorating economic situations in Zambia and Tanzania have led to sporadic popular unrest and unprecedented criticism of Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere, both of whom may be serving their final terms as leaders of their countries. Neither leader has adequately prepared for a changeover in leadership. The changeover periods, when they come, could produce a political situation that Moscow would be able to exploit. Moscow is providing arms and equipment to Zambia under 1979-80 agreements valued at more than $200 million. Although Zambia earlier turned down a Soviet offer to fully reequip and reorganize the Zambian military, Moscow now has 50 to 100 military advisers and technicians in that country and thus has a good base on which to build in the future.

The Soviets hope to be able to work closely with the new government of Uganda; they had good relations with President Obote during his pre-Amin rule. Obote has not consolidated his authority and may request Soviet military assistance to suppress antigovernment insurgents if more aid from Tanzania is not forthcoming.

In Zaire, economic pressures are building, although President Mobutu so far has escaped the organized criticism leveled at Kaunda and Nyerere. Labor unrest and popular resentment against the central government and the Zairian military could spark another wave of violence in the Shaba region either precipitated or exploited by dissidents of the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo, which is based in Angola and Zambia and has received Soviet-manufactured arms and some Cuban training. The National Front appears determined to launch a third incursion into Shaba that would attempt to capitalize on disillusionment in the region.

There is growing evidence that Soviet advisers are giving some technical assistance to Libyan forces in Chad. Whatever the degree of Soviet involvement and despite Moscow's misgivings about some of Qadhafi's actions (such as his proclamation of unity with Chad), Moscow has been pleased by the loss of French influence and establishment of a potentially pro-Soviet regime in Chad. In contrast to Soviet support for legitimate regimes in Angola and Ethiopia, however,
the Soviet military presence in Chad along with Libyan forces will be critical by the OAU and presumably by a majority of OAU member states. Even if there is no collaboration between Moscow and Tripoli in Western and central Africa, there are important factors that could be working to Moscow’s benefit in the region: Libya’s military strength; the anti-Western and Islamic zeal of its unpredictable leader; and, perhaps most important, Libya’s wealth. If Moscow were able to establish a foothold in Chad, it might consider more actively supporting subversion against President Nimeiri in Sudan—probably collaborating to some extent with Libya.

In the Indian Ocean island states of Madagascar and Seychelles mutual suspensions and fears of coups by Western mercenaries have led to increased Soviet attempts to exert influence. The conservative government of Mauritius remains staunchly pro-Western, however, because of Soviet support for its principal opposition group.

**Threatening Collapse of Client Regimes.** Another type of situation that could lead to US-Soviet confrontation would be a threat of collapse of one of Moscow’s “own” regimes in the region, with US involvement taking the form either of assistance to internal enemies of the Soviet clients, or of participation in the external playing out of the crisis. The scenarios here might include an increasingly successful challenge by UNITA forces to MPLA power in Angola; serious pressure by the NRM guerrillas against the current regime in Mozambique; continuing separatist activities in Ethiopia; or growing dissidence among the military or internal schisms within the political elite of a regime leading to a major opening toward the West. The context in which US-Soviet conflict might occur would be Soviet supply of larger numbers of advisers and equipment, support—perhaps—for proxy military involvement, but probably not dispatch of Soviet combat forces.

**Soviet Risk-Taking**
In the past, the Soviets have tended to move cautiously in settings that could lead to military confrontation with the United States. This pattern of behavior was confirmed by Soviet actions in Angola and Ethiopia. Before they made their final decisions to intervene in force, Soviet policymakers first convinced themselves that the risk of US military counteraction was negligible. Probably the Soviets would, by their own lights, be equally cautious in seizing future opportunities in the areas of potential confrontation with the West noted above. The point at issue, however, is whether they would correctly assess the risks. Three factors might lead them to miscalculate such risks: a conviction that the world “correlation of forces” was moving sufficiently in the USSR’s favor to discourage US counteraction; a judgment that domestic political factors in the United States once again would minimize the likelihood of an American military reaction; or an assessment that Soviet actions would have sufficient African support as to preclude US counteraction.

**Soviet Vulnerabilities**
Moscow has suffered major setbacks in the past in Africa, and this could happen again; there is nothing inexorable about its future prospects in the region. Indeed, the Soviets suffer from a number of important vulnerabilities:

The overwhelming reliance by the Soviets on military might—whether arms transfers or direct military assistance—to extend their influence in the region reflects their weakness in other dimensions of power. In particular, the Soviets are unable to compete with the West in trade and economic development assistance. The Soviets have not met the economic needs of preferred client regimes such as those in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, and these regimes increasingly see the necessity of closer ties with the West in order to survive economically.

Even Soviet military assistance to African countries is not without its difficulties. African military forces are often dissatisfied with the attitudes and behavior of Soviet advisers, the quality of arms, the availability of spare parts, and the level of maintenance.
these countries for leadership defection from the Soviet
line and for divergence of the entire social-economic-
political system from the Soviet-preferred model.

Africans distrust Soviet political intentions. They have
experienced Moscow’s arm-twisting attempts to ex-
plot dependency relations (usually in the military
field) for short-term tactical gains. And they have also
witnessed Soviet subversion. Some African leaders
now suspect that Moscow may be encouraging Libya’s
Qadafi to destabilize their governments.

The Soviets lack leverage to encourage the sort of
negotiated resolutions of the Namibian and—perhaps
eventually—South African problems that many lead-
ers of black African countries would probably prefer to
see.

Finally, at the personal level the “Russians” are widely
perceived to harbor racist attitudes toward Africans.

Soviet-style political controls have not yet been fully
institutionalized in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethi-
opia. There is consequently a significant potential in
Annex A

Current Soviet Involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa

The USSR's major current African involvements are with those countries with which it has concluded Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation: Angola (1976), Mozambique (1977), and Ethiopia (1978). These treaties serve to delineate the economic-political-military parameters of the bilateral relationship, and to symbolize the concrete nature of that relationship. But they do not serve as mutual defense pacts, although they commit the concerned parties to abstain from alliances directed at one another—and call for mutual consultation in the event of a dangerous situation.

Major Relationships

Angola

Soviet, Cuban, and East European support has been essential to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA): to ensure its grip on political power and to support its battle with insurgents of the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) and its defense against potential South African incursions. Soviet advisers are present in several important civilian government ministries, including mining; but the Angolans have kept the Soviets out of Angolan oil production and sales. Angolan civilian as well as military officials are being trained in the USSR, East European countries, and Cuba in a broad range of subjects, both professional and ideological. The Soviets have also continued to foster relations between the MPLA in Luanda and the Portuguese Communist Party.

Moscow's economic assistance to Angola is negligible, and Angola has made overtures to the West for economic aid and investment. The Angolan economy is moribund, largely because of the lack of technical expertise, the cost of maintaining the Cubans (who are paid in hard currency), and the continued fighting with UNITA.

Pervasive weaknesses hindering the development of the Angolan armed forces will prolong heavy Angolan dependence on Cuban and Soviet military assistance for the foreseeable future. The inability of government forces to subdue insurgents of UNITA and adequately counter South African military incursions into southern Angola continues to generate insecurity in Luanda and promises to ensure important military roles in Angola for the Cubans and Soviets despite Angolan dissatisfaction with the level of their assistance.

Although the presence of Cuban troops in Angola and their involvement in combat operations have both declined, Cuban military personnel continue to provide extensive support to the Angolan armed forces. Since 1978, Cuban troops have rarely participated in counterinsurgency warfare—the predominant mission of government forces—while Angolan responsibility for antiguerrilla operations has increased substantially. A moderate withdrawal from Angola of Cuban combat troops in 1979 and 1980 underscored the reduction in combat assistance and lowered the total number of Cuban military personnel in Angola to between 15,000 and 19,000. These personnel, consisting of a large complement of military technicians and advisers in addition to combat troops, are heavily involved in the support and operations of Angolan Air and Air Defense Forces, play key roles in the command of ground forces, plan and execute logistic operations for all branches of service, and provide the bulk of military training for government forces.

The Soviet military mission to Angola, numbering an estimated 1,000 personnel, maintains a lower profile than its Cuban counterpart but provides essential direction and operational support to Angolan military forces. Soviet personnel assist in the high-level planning of counterinsurgency strategy and operations and...
probably are involved in the regional command of Angolan ground forces. The Soviets furnish important technical assistance to the Air and Air Defense Forces and also advise, train, and coordinate logistic support for ground forces. Angolan-Soviet relations, like those between the Cubans and Angolans, are often strained. The Angolans consider the Soviets to be parsimonious in their supply of spare parts and technical training to Angolan military forces. The Angolan Government's discontent with Soviet military assistance, however, probably will not impede the Soviets' access to naval facilities in Luanda or their privilege to base long-range naval reconnaissance aircraft there.

**Mozambique**

Mozambique has a growing number of Cubans—365 military personnel in 1981 and 800 civilians—although it is somewhat less dependent on Moscow than Ethiopia or Angola for its political viability. Nonetheless, increased guerrilla activity by the South African-backed National Resistance Movement (NRM) has led to a growing reliance on the Soviets, who not only provide arms, training, and pilots but also play a key role in planning counterinsurgency operations. (A group of 150 Cuban counterinsurgency specialists also reportedly arrived in early 1981.) Moscow has not made military use of Mozambican facilities:

The issue of economic assistance has complicated Soviet-Mozambican relations. Moscow is apparently uneasy over Maputo's efforts to attract Western aid and investment for revitalizing the stagnant economy. Nevertheless, Mozambique has been unable to win Soviet bloc backing for membership in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA), and Moscow thus far has not given Maputo the degree of economic support it is seeking:

The Machel regime is almost totally dependent on the Soviets for military assistance. Thus far, Mozambique has signed agreements for some $410 million worth of military equipment from the USSR and other Warsaw Pact states. Nevertheless the conversion of the Mozambican military from an insurgent to a conventional force is proceeding slowly. Mozambique's faltering economy and nearly universal illiteracy have hampered the process. Five years after independence the combat effectiveness of most units, particularly Air Force fighter squadrons, is marginal at best:

Despite several multibrigade government offensives against the NRM insurgent forces, the NRM presence and influence appear to be expanding. The NRM does not pose an immediate threat to the regime's survival, but countering it compels the government to divert resources that would otherwise be used for upgrading overall military capabilities and economic development:

**Ethiopia**

Ethiopia was invited into Ethiopia in 1977 by Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) Chairman Mengistu because of his need for arms to combat the country's numerous insurgencies. Despite his dependence on the Soviets, Mengistu has been a less-than-liable client. While endorsing the Soviet positions on international questions, he nonetheless has resisted Soviet pressure to grant major concessions: he has refused Moscow the major naval base on the mainland it seeks and has moved slowly in responding to Soviet urgings to create a civilian-based Marxist party. In recent months, elements in the Ethiopian military have called for the expulsion of the Soviets and the Cubans. Another source of Soviet-Ethiopian friction is Moscow's minimal amount of economic assistance:

Ethiopia is Moscow's most important client in Sub-Saharan Africa, having received about $2 billion worth of military equipment since 1977. In addition, some 1,500 Soviet advisers and 11,000 to 13,000 Cuban troops are present in Ethiopia. In return for this assistance, the Ethiopians allow the Soviets to stage reconnaissance flights from Asmara and have exclusive use of Dahlak Island for a naval support facility:

The Mengistu regime's dependence on Soviet military assistance, moreover, shows little sign of decreasing, as the Ethiopian armed forces face serious problems. Despite their recent successes in the Ogaden, the Ethiopians are far from subduing their opponents and
consolidating government control throughout the country. Addis Ababa’s military difficulties stem from the necessity of expanding (from 50,000 to 250,000), reequipping, and modernizing its armed forces in the midst of a two-front war. As a result, the Ethiopians are afflicted with heavy casualties, low morale, poor leadership, insufficient training, and an inadequate logistic system. Although the regime remains in control, discontent within the military appears to be growing—as is resentment of the Soviet and Cuban presence. (The Cubans have been relatively inactive militarily since mid-1978.) Meanwhile, because of combat losses, wear and tear of near-constant field operations, and poor equipment maintenance, Soviet military assistance will have to increase simply to maintain current capabilities.

Other Relationships

Benin
Though most military equipment in Benin’s armed forces is of Soviet origin and Soviet naval ships make port calls at Cotonou, Soviet influence is limited by Benin’s ties to neighboring countries, which have been designed to curb the Soviet presence (for example, Benin’s 1979 military assistance and training agreement with Nigeria). Libya is reportedly financing the upgrading of an interior airfield to provide Benin with a second field capable of handling jet aircraft, but the project appears to have been delayed. Libya continues to provide Beninese personnel with military training in Libya and may provide some arms.

Botswana
In a breakthrough for Moscow, Botswana signed a small military assistance agreement in December 1980 calling for Soviet provision of ground and air defense weapons. The Soviets have argued that the Botswana Defense Force needs to be prepared to protect the country against possible South African incursions. Botswana, however, has few other links to the Soviets and will probably be inhibited from extensive dealings with Moscow by the potential for an adverse reaction by South Africa and the West.

Cape Verde
Despite Soviet naval visits in 1979, continued use of Sal Airport for Soviet and Cuban flights to Angola, and offers of greater military assistance (possibly including fighter aircraft), Cape Verde has rejected Soviet attempts to increase access to facilities.

Chad
Libyan troops, currently estimated at 6,500, entered Chad in the fall of 1980, supporting the factions loyal to the Chadian President and equipped primarily with Soviet weaponry. Libyan motives in calling for a merger of Chad and Libya appear to be purely of Libyan inspiration. Nevertheless, the USSR has acquiesced in Tripoli’s use of Soviet equipment in Chad. In fact, evidence increasingly points to some Soviet support of Libyan troops in Chad, perhaps in a technical capacity.

Moscow views the installation of an anti-Western regime in Chad as a favorable development and is trying to discourage French and Egyptian support for dissident leader Habre. However, neighboring countries have experienced fear that Libyan involvement reflects a larger Soviet design on Africa. The condemnation of Libya’s role by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and French unhappiness with the Libyan power play are important constraints on Moscow. But Moscow is likely to offer open material support to the new regime if African opposition to it diminishes.

Congo
Congo has had a longstanding political and military aid relationship with the USSR. But relations of this self-professed “Marxist-Leninist” state on most levels with the Soviet Union are now strained, and President Denis Sasson-Nguesso’s most recent planned visit to Moscow (December 1980) was put off at the last moment. Tensions are due to denial of regular Soviet
military access to the naval facilities at Pointe-Noire and the airfield at Brazzaville (though both have been used occasionally by the Soviets), unwillingness by the Congolese to sign a treaty of friendship and cooperation, and the dearth of substantial economic aid from Moscow. The Congolese have sought economic and military aid from the West and China.

Congo continues to rely on Soviet military equipment, though complaints have been voiced over the quality and quantity. This reliance will prevent any severe rupture in relations, but will not necessarily facilitate Soviet efforts at gaining access to air and naval facilities. Soviet military personnel in Congo number 120 (there are 850 civilian economic technicians), with over 2,000 Cuban soldiers and advisers reported in 1980—but most are on rotation to Cabinda. Cuban personnel have been removed from the President’s personal guard.

Guinea
While Moscow has been Guinea’s main arms supplier since the late 1950s and is likely to remain so in the future, President Sekou Toure has become increasingly disenchanted with the USSR. In 1977, Soviet TU-95 maritime reconnaissance flights staging from Conakry were banned, and AN-22 flights on route to Ethiopia were not permitted to stop in Guinea, though flights to Angola are still granted stopovers. Conakry remains a port facility for the Soviet West African naval contingent, but Guinea has refused several Soviet efforts to construct a major naval facility on Tamara Island. Though Guinea relies on Soviet military equipment, greater access for Soviet aircraft and ships will not readily be available, partly because of frictions over the following issues:

- The expulsion of many Soviet and Cuban military personnel in late 1978, reducing the number in country to some 35 Soviets and 10 Cubans.

- Soviet demand that payments for equipment be made in full and in cash, as opposed to previous methods of partial credits in exchange for bauxite deliveries.

- Guinean complaints over the quality of Soviet equipment, lack of spare parts, and Moscow’s poor maintenance. (Problems with Soviet naval ships delivered in 1979 led to attempts by the Guineans to purchase French naval equipment.)

Liberia
Despite energetic courting with arms and aid offers, Moscow has made little headway with the Doe regime in Liberia but hopes the precarious economic situation and unpredictable nature of the current leadership will open up Soviet possibilities.

Economic problems plague the country, and some elements within the ruling military council and the civilian government are pressuring Doe for more ties with the Soviets and Soviet allies.

Madagascar
Given the country’s major economic woes, Malagasy President Didier Ratsiraka is vulnerable to pressures from the Soviets for use of naval facilities at Diego Suarez and air facilities at nearby Andrakaka military airfield as repayment for the large quantities of military equipment delivered since 1979, including light tanks, armored personnel carriers, antiaircraft guns, radars, and fighter aircraft. A 1979 maritime agreement with Madagascar permits Soviet merchant ships to call at island ports, but military access apparently is still denied. In December 1980, eight Soviets were reported assisting in the upgrading of the Andrakaka airfield, probably for deployment of the MIG-21s which arrived earlier that year. There are now 300 Soviet military advisers and 70 economic technicians in Madagascar. In the event of political instability, Moscow will attempt to capitalize on the ties it has with local Marxist groups.
Mali
Since 1974, large amounts of Soviet military equipment have arrived in Mali, including SA-3 missiles, though deliveries are contingent on transit permission through Guinea (not always promptly given) and, to a lesser degree, Senegal and Ivory Coast. Mali has permitted overflights of Soviet aircraft and occasional stopovers of Soviet flights to Angola, but there is no formal access agreement. Nevertheless, Soviet personnel have upgraded the airfield at Bamako and extended the one at Mopti Barbe, and plans are under way for similar improvements at other Malian airfields.

Seychelles
After the 1977 coup which installed President Rene the Soviets began to establish closer ties with Seychelles, and there were two hectic Soviet cruiser visits in 1979, when the Seychelles Government believed a coup attempt was imminent. Soviet influence has expanded only gradually, because some ministers in the Seychelles Government, who are suspicious of Soviet intentions, have limited naval visits, refused student scholarships, and discussed the Soviet threat more openly with the West. The Soviet presence is currently limited to five economic technicians. Nevertheless, bilateral relations may expand with the signing of merchant marine and scientific/cultural accords, and achievement on a framework accord on air rights. In addition, Foreign Minister Houdou retains his openly pro-Soviet and pro-Cuban outlook and apparently maneuvered Seychelles support of the USSR in the most recent UN vote on Afghanistan. We suspect that Moscow may be attempting to work through its supporters in the Seychelles Government opened an embassy in Victoria, and there currently are small numbers of Cuban medical personnel.

Since April 1979, deliveries of equipment from the Soviet Union have included patrol craft, armored personnel carriers, radars, and air defense weapons, though no Soviet military personnel are known to be on the islands. (Training and support within Seychelles have been provided by Tanzania and Madagascar; eight students from the Seychelles People's Liberation Army are currently training in the Soviet Union, and an additional eight are in Cuba.) Moscow would like to obtain rights to naval facilities.

Nigeria
Although Moscow made a major but unsuccessful bid for influence during the civil war in the 1960s by selling arms to the victorious federal side, Nigeria's civilian government displays an openly pro-Western bias. Nigerian students and labor organizations have been priority targets of Soviet subversive activities. The Soviets are involved in a large steel mill project and have 1,500 economic technicians in the country.

Moscow maintains a small military advisory mission of approximately 10 persons in Nigeria, although the government's desire to protect its nonaligned status and the general dissatisfaction of the Nigerian armed forces with existing Soviet military assistance programs constrain the relationship between Lagos and Moscow. Soviet instructors have provided training to the Nigerians on several types of Soviet equipment now part of the inventories of Nigerian air and ground forces, including jet fighters, tanks, and antiaircraft artillery. The Nigerians, however, are known to be disaffected with Soviet military assistance because of Moscow's lethargy in delivering spare parts, the poor condition of secondhand equipment recently purchased by Nigeria, persistent language problems that hinder training programs, and the heavyhandedness of Soviet advisers toward Nigerian military personnel.

Sao Tome and Principe
Occasional Soviet naval visits along with 400 Angolans and some 40 Cubans support the present government of Sao Tome and Principe, which probably would provide limited port and air facilities should the Soviets require access to them.

Tanzania
Although the USSR is Tanzania's largest arms supplier (some $340 million), Moscow has been unable to exercise any major influence in the country's affairs. Moscow is resentful of Nyerere's condescending manner, ideological pretensions, and suspicion of Soviet motives. The Tanzanians dislike their Soviet advisers.
(about 140 are now present) and resent the lack of Soviet support during the invasion of Uganda in 1979. They have continued to acquire arms from other sources, notably China and Yugoslavia. Moreover, Dar es Salaam's military assistance relationship with the USSR is constrained by the deteriorating Tanzanian economy and the increasing likelihood that it will be unable to pay for future arms deals or even possibly for arms already ordered or delivered.

Zambia

Major arms deals of 1979-80 totaling $215 million have brought a corresponding increase in the Soviet presence in Zambia. President Kaunda, however, remains wary of Soviet intentions. The Zambian military is not entirely happy about Soviet involvement—and often complains about training (there are 50 to 100 Soviet military advisers in Zambia) and Soviet efforts to ensure Zambian dependence on the USSR for the utilization of sophisticated equipment.

The Soviets are demanding the right to control access to the bases where much of the new equipment—particularly MIG-21 fighters and SA-3 surface-to-air missiles—is to be located. The Zambians generally have reacted negatively to these demarches, aware that by consenting they would be granting the Soviets effective control of key weapon systems and military facilities. Some Zambians have also questioned the cost of the Soviet weaponry ordered, in view of the country’s parlous economic state and the fact that even when fully operational the arms will not prevent South African incursions.

Zaire

Despite the rapprochement between Angola and Zaire, the Front for the Liberation of the Congo (FLNC)—the ex-Katangan gendarmes—still hopes to “liberate” Shaba Province from Zaire. Both Soviets and East Germans are reported to have visited the FLNC camps to check on the state of the military preparedness of the FLNC.

At the same time, the Soviets are trying to upgrade relations with Zaire, although their openings are limited. (They have only 10 technicians in Kinshasa.) President Mobutu remains generally suspicious of Soviet activities in Zaire, but for personal political reasons swings back and forth in his public position toward the Soviets. The Soviets are known to have dealings with dissidents both in Zaire and abroad and to keep in close contact with Zairian students. Mobutu is particularly suspicious of Soviet support, direct or indirect, for the FLNC.
Black Nationalist Movements

The Soviet Union and its proxies give varying degrees of military support to major black nationalist movements in Sub-Saharan Africa:

- The South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), which continues to conduct frequent cross-border guerrilla raids into Namibia from sanctuaries in southern Angola, receives almost all of its arms from the USSR, and the Soviets provide advanced training for some SWAPO guerrillas. Some Soviet advisers may also participate with Cuban and East German instructors in providing basic training for SWAPO cadres at Angolan camps. As a result of their patron role, the Soviets have gained significant, but not dominant political influence in SWAPO. Moscow continues to press for implementation of the UN resolution calling for the transfer of power to SWAPO. Following the recent failure of the UN conference, the Soviets reaffirmed their commitment to SWAPO leader Nujoma, promising "all that is necessary" to liberate Namibia 25X1

- Mozambique-based insurgents of the African National Congress (ANC)—the predominant black nationalist movement in South Africa—reportedly receive a regular flow of Soviet military equipment from Angola, where Soviet and Cuban personnel provide training to guerrilla forces. ANC cadres have also been trained in the USSR, Eastern Europe, and Cuba. 25X1

- The Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC), as noted above, has received Soviet-manufactured arms and has been in contact with the Soviets, East Germans, and Cubans. 25X1
Annex B

The Soviets and Sub-Saharan Strategic Metals

The US dependence on politically unstable countries in central and southern Africa for manganese, chromium, cobalt, and platinum-group metals—essential military and industrial materials—leaves the United States potentially vulnerable to sudden supply disruptions. This vulnerability is heightened by the USSR's role as the only other significant exporter of two of these metals and its heavy involvement in the trade in all four critical metals.

The USSR is the world's largest producer of metals and a leading source of the four critical metals. Near total self-sufficiency in metals provides Moscow with a far greater security of supply than that experienced by developed Western countries. This self-sufficiency, combined with its importance as an exporter of critical materials, underlies the frequent speculation by Western observers as to Soviet motives in metal market dealings. In particular, developed-country dependence on the USSR for over half of its platinum-group metal supplies causes concern. The importance of the USSR as supplier of other critical metals has generally diminished over the past decade as alternative suppliers have emerged and as changing technologies have lessened the metals' importance. These trends are expected to continue during the 1980s.

Obviously, the problem of Western vulnerability to Soviet action in the strategic metals area is one that calls for very concrete analysis. We can assume that it would be highly desirable from the point of view of the Soviets to be able to control the allocation of African strategic metals. What is in question is the price they might be prepared to pay in attempting to gain such control, and their possibilities of realizing such a goal in practice.

African Strategic Metals

Of the four main producers of strategic metals in Africa—Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa—only South Africa is a source of all of the strategic metals; and South Africa is the only producer in this group of manganese (some manganese is also produced in Gabon). Zaire and Zambia together produce most of the continent's 60-percent share of world cobalt output (see the accompanying chart), with Zaire accounting for by far the largest fraction. And Zimbabwe is the major source, following South Africa, of Africa's 36 percent of world chromium output. Thus, leaving South Africa aside, the geographical locus of our analysis is highly circumscribed: Zaire and Zambia for cobalt and Zimbabwe for chrome.

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Soviet and Central/Southern African Share of World Production of Selected Critical Materials, 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Platinum-Group Metals</th>
<th>Chromite</th>
<th>Cobalt</th>
<th>Manganese</th>
</tr>
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<td>L3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CIA

25X1
At present, the strategic metals markets favor buyers. Barring major political disruptions in southern Africa, we believe that for the next several years there will be a glut in the markets with downward pressure on prices. Strategic metals such as chromium, cobalt, manganese, vanadium, and platinum currently are in oversupply with high user inventories and stable or falling prices. Production increases in the future are expected to add to this glut and lessen Western dependence. Expansion is highlighted by these programs:

- Zimbabwe plans to expand its ferrochrome capacity by half by 1982. It will then trail only South Africa in output of this essential ingredient in stainless steel.

- South Africa is engaged in the greatest expansion of mining activity in its history. Important new deposits of vanadium, chromium, and platinum are now being developed.

- Both Zaire and Zambia will continue to expand cobalt production rapidly. Zaire's 1985 cobalt production is slated to reach 20,000 metric tons—equal to total cobalt consumption in the non-Communist world in 1980.

On the demand side, slow economic growth, less steel-intensive development (for example, the trend toward smaller automobiles), improved steelmaking technology, and increased recycling will hold demand for strategic metals far below past trends. In addition, users are eliminating substantial amounts of strategic metals by substituting more abundant alloying metals such as nickel.

Soviet Motives

Logically, there could be two conceivable motives lying behind a Soviet design on African strategic metals: (1) to acquire these metals to meet the USSR’s own needs; or (2) to deny or control the flow of them to the West for commercial gain or military advantage (or, of course, both motives together). In reaching judgments about Soviet motives we have information on Soviet metals production; some very limited direct evidence of Soviet perceptions; data on Soviet behavior, mainly economic; and the possibility of making certain estimates of the likely outcomes of possible future strategies.

Soviet Critical Metals Situation

Platinum-Group Metals

The USSR produced about half of the world's platinum-group metals during the 1970s, South Africa nearly 40 percent, and Canada most of the remainder (see the chart). Soviet production in 1979 is estimated at 3.6 million ounces.

The USSR obtains virtually all of its platinum-group metals as a byproduct in the exploitation of copper-nickel ores. Soviet production consists mainly of palladium—three times as much palladium as platinum—whereas South African output is mainly platinum. In the event of disruption in South African supply, major importing countries would have no choice but to turn to the USSR. Soviet offerings of palladium rather than platinum could be increased marginally but in any case at substantially higher prices.

The USSR exports most of its output of platinum-group metals. Total exports to non-Communist countries during 1970-79 amounted to 20.8 million ounces, or about two-thirds of total estimated output during that period. Some additional, although small, amounts probably were exported to other Communist countries. Annual exports reached peak levels during 1972-74, averaging over 2.6 million ounces, but declined to about 1.9 million ounces during 1975-79. During the 1970s, the USSR accounted for 50 to 60 percent of the platinum-group metals annually moving in world trade.

The USSR is assured of substantial increases in production of platinum-group metals in the 1980s as progress is made on a major project to expand production of nickel and copper at Noril'sk in northern Siberia. Soviet production could easily increase to about 4.5 million ounces by the mid-1980s and possibly 5.5-
6.0 million ounces by 1990. As a result, the role of the USSR as a supplier of platinum-group metals to international markets will be greatly strengthened.

**Chromite**

The USSR is the world's second largest producer of chromite after South Africa. Soviet output peaked at about 3.5 million tons in 1975, declined to 3.2 million tons in 1979, but rebounded to 3.4 million tons in 1980. Soviet production in 1980 was about 20 percent short of the original target in the Tenth Five-Year Plan. The stagnation in Soviet production is the result of the depletion of surface deposits in Kazakhstan and lags in commissioning new underground mining capacity. We believe that, at present, mine depletion accounts for about one-half of gross annual commissionings. The available information indicates that there is little chance that the Soviets will be able to boost output dramatically at least until 1985.

The USSR has been a major exporter of chromite for many years. Annual deliveries to non-Communist countries averaged nearly 850,000 tons during 1970-75 but fell to about 388,000 tons per annum during 1976-79. Deliveries to Communist countries amounted to 397,000 tons in 1979, down slightly from the peak of 416,000 tons reached in 1977. Fragmentary information suggests that total Soviet exports slipped to about 700,000 tons in 1980, roughly 10 percent less than the amount posted in 1979. We believe that the fall in Soviet exports is tied directly to declining domestic production and increased Soviet difficulties in fully covering domestic needs.

Another uncertainty is whether the USSR, even with adequate production, will continue to export chromite. The Soviets have given strong indications that they may shift to exports of ferrochrome as others with chromite resources are doing. The Soviets have shown interest in obtaining Western participation in ventures to produce ferrochrome, but, as yet, no arrangements have been made.

**Cobalt**

Soviet cobalt is obtained mainly as a byproduct in nickel production. Soviet production of about 6,000 tons in 1980 ranks second only to Zaire. Although it has exported some cobalt in the past, Soviet production has not increased sufficiently to meet domestic demand and it has been a net importer for the last 10 years. Soviet purchases, mainly from Zaire, were some 400 to 600 tons per annum during most of the 1970s, increasing to about 1,000 tons per annum in 1978-80. The increase in purchases probably is associated with serious delays the Soviets have encountered completing a new nickel/cobalt refinery at Noril'sk. This refinery will account for all of the increase in Soviet production of nickel and cobalt during the 1980s; its projected capacity is equivalent to 40 percent of world output in 1979. But the refinery is already several years behind schedule. According to recent sensitive sources, an explosion of unknown intensity severely damaged part of the refinery. Although the extent of the present damage is unknown, an earlier accident in 1977 pushed back the construction schedule for six months to a year.

Cobalt may remain in tight supply for some years to come but will eventually improve as the Noril'sk project is completed. We believe that, by the mid-1980s, the USSR probably will be self-sufficient and able to export cobalt to non-Communist countries as well.

**Manganese**

The USSR is the world's largest producer of manganese ore. Production amounted to about 10 million
tons in 1979, up almost 50 percent over output in 1970, and roughly double the output of South Africa, the world's second largest producer.

The Soviets have been major exporters of manganese for many years. Total exports averaged about 1.3 million tons per annum during the 1970s. The bulk of these exports go to other Communist countries. Soviet sales to non-Communist countries fell from about 375,000 tons in 1970 to about 100,000 tons in 1979. Japan and Sweden account for most of the Soviet exports to non-Communist countries. Soviet sales to the West probably fell because of increased availability from non-Communist suppliers (most notably South Africa) and possibly because of increased domestic requirements.

If past trends continue, Soviet production could increase to about 12-13 million tons by the mid-1980s. This amount should be more than adequate to meet domestic needs and provide for a growing exportable surplus.

To sum up, it is apparent that the only significant Soviet strategic metals gap that must be covered by imports is cobalt; and this gap will probably be closed by expansion of domestic production capacity within the 1980s.

**Soviet Perceptions**

Direct evidence of Soviet intentions with respect to African strategic metals is extremely sparse. The Soviets are, of course, fully aware of Western dependence on African supply of these metals, and frequently call attention to it in their propaganda. Nor do they ignore the connection between these metals and Western military production requirements. Other things being equal, they would undoubtedly like, for military purposes, to be in a position to clamp off this source of supply to the West when and if they desired to do so. Yet powerful commercial interests have led them so far not to apply the clamp even where it has been in their power to do so—namely to their own strategic metals exports to the West. Decisions were made in June 1978 at the annual session of the Soviet bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance to develop "cooperation" with Third World metals producers. This broad declaration of intention probably has been translated into some project planning. Evidence presented below, however, suggests that, if the idea voiced at the CEMA meeting was to move in on African strategic metals, it has not amounted to much so far.

**Soviet Behavior**

The main case of a noneconomic sort that might conceivably throw light on Soviet intentions is provided by the incursions by the Katangans from Angola into the cobalt-producing Shaba Province of Zaire in 1977 and 1978. While there is conclusive evidence of Cuban involvement in the training of the Katangans and planning of the operation, and allegations of an East German training role, we have no hard evidence of Soviet guidance. Presumably, at the very least the Soviets knew beforehand about these operations and did not try to stop them; it is not unlikely that they gave them their blessing—even though one of the predictable effects of the operations would have been to increase the cost to the USSR of cobalt imports.

In the sphere of economic behavior, there are three areas of possible Soviet action in strategic metals that could affect Western interests: joint ventures, bilateral barter agreements, and market operations. In the first area, there has been no measurable upsurge of Soviet or CEMA involvement with metal extraction in the less developed countries (LDCs). Indeed, a survey of Soviet bloc economic aid to the LDCs reveals no projects anywhere involving such key strategic metals as cobalt, chrome, manganese, and platinum. Within Africa the USSR has only three confirmed compensation agreements involving metals: zinc from Algeria, lead concentrates from the Congo, and bauxite from Guinea in repayment for mineral development assistance. (Guinea supplies about 70 percent of Soviet bauxite imports.)
In the key countries producing strategic metals—Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa—the USSR and its East European clients have virtually no influence or investment in the development of cobalt, chrome, platinum, or manganese.

The possibility of a bilateral deal has so far arisen only with respect to Zambia. It has been reported that the Soviet-Zambian arms pact signed in 1979 calls for Zambia to pay in cobalt for at least part of the arms. Even if it is true, however, the amount reportedly involved—300 tons—is less than 10 percent of Zambian output and only about 1 percent of normal non-Communist world consumption. A transaction of this size would have a negligible effect on the world cobalt market.

In the metals markets, Soviet representatives generally have followed the pragmatic, highly businesslike practices of their Western counterparts. They have, for example, scrupulously adhered to commitments and have not reneged on existing contracts to take advantage of price changes or to respond to altered political relations with the West. Following US imposition of trade sanctions in January 1980, for example, the Soviets continued to make deliveries of strategic metals under prior contracts and indeed elicited additional transactions. Similarly, during the Vietnam conflict, the flow of critical metals from the USSR continued unabated and in some cases increased. Nor is there any evidence that the Soviets have ever intervened in markets intending to deprive the United States or the West of strategic metals. Allegations to the contrary during the cobalt "crisis" of 1978 were unsubstantiable.

The Soviets, nevertheless, have proved to be shrewd traders, highly sensitive to market situations in which they can press for higher prices. In the 1970s, for example, they took advantage of the chrome shortage brought on by UN sanctions against Rhodesia to triple the export price of Soviet chrome ore—an action followed by other exporters. Similarly, the Soviets have used their dominant role in platinum-group metals trade to help maintain high prices by carefully controlling the volume of exports. At no time have they attempted to form a cartel or otherwise involve themselves in formal collusive actions. Where they are marginal metals suppliers, and price takers, the Soviets quickly adjust their prices at or near the prevailing level.

**Future Soviet Options**

Soviet market practices to date cannot be taken as a firm indication of Soviet market actions in the event of major shortfalls in supply brought on by cessation in exports from the principal central and southern African producers. That situation might tempt Moscow to try to disrupt Western industry by depriving it of critically needed metals. Platinum provides the USSR the most leverage among critical metals. The worst case scenario would presuppose advance knowledge on the part of the Soviets of an impending cutoff in supply from South Africa. Under these conditions, the Soviets could:

- Attempt to buy dealer inventories of platinum using multiple brokers in European and US markets to hide Soviet involvement.
- And, more importantly, cancel orders and stop all exports following the cutoff in South African supplies.

As a consequence, the Soviets could theoretically deprive the West of roughly 90 percent of normal supply of platinum imports. Assuming that the West had little advance warning of the supply cutoff, it would have no opportunity to build inventories, invoke meaningful substitution, or expand output in Canada and other small producers. Nevertheless, the United States' and most of the West's essential industries could maintain production through a one-year "crisis," aided by a system of allocations, recourse to available substitutes, and drawdowns of strategic reserves. US stocks are equivalent to one year of normal demand for platinum-group metals. Similar strategic buildups are under way.
in France and are being considered in West Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Needless to say, this scenario depends on taking South Africa out of the picture, which, in the near-to-medium term, is highly problematic.

Economic strategies to cut off cobalt or chrome deliveries to the West from Zaire, Zambia, or Zimbabwe also raise serious questions. It is very unlikely that any of these countries, under any leadership, would—out of rational economic calculations—sign a bilateral agreement to sell all or most of their output to the USSR; and, obviously, political considerations would powerfully reinforce resistance on the part of leaders currently in power. (However, the possibility of a collusive price-setting agreement is not inconceivable.) The opportunity costs to the Soviets of a bilateral purchase scheme—both in terms of scarce hard currency sacrificed and probable economic retaliation from the West—would be high. The same costs would be associated with attempts at preclusive buying on the Western metals markets. Moreover, for a variety of reasons it is highly improbable that an attempt to corner these markets (which do not depend on large stockpiles, deal mainly in future output, and involve commitments to longstanding customers) could succeed—much less be allowed to stand by Western governments.

The crux of noneconomic strategies (political or military) for gaining access to African strategic metals or denying (or controlling) their delivery to the West is that, by definition, they entail curtailment—to a greater or lesser extent—the opportunity of African states to get the highest price they could on the international market in hard currency for what is the lifeblood of their economies. Thus any noneconomic strategy would inevitably confront two problems:

- The natural reluctance of African leaders of almost any ideological persuasion to sacrifice their own national wealth.
- The likely social tensions and ensuing political instability that would arise from the withdrawal of economic resources from the system.

Unless compensated for in some way, both problems would, presumably, tend to increase roughly in proportion to the economic opportunity cost imposed by Soviet action. The greater the sacrifices imposed by Soviet action, the more dependent the African leadership would have to be on Soviet political/military support for it to stay in line, and the more coercion would be required to maintain social equilibrium. Depending on the scenario, noneconomic strategies could also entail political costs to the USSR elsewhere in Africa and the Third World, and possible counterproductive consequences or confrontational encounters with the United States and other Western powers.

The following noneconomic options would theoretically be open to the USSR:

- To interdict the transport of strategic metals out of African countries to Western consumers against the will of the producing countries. It is difficult to visualize how such a blockade could avoid rapidly escalating into an East-West military confrontation.
- To cause production of strategic metals to be interrupted by fomenting civil strife. The model in this instance would be a “Shaba III.” If the cutoff were indefinite, the effect would be denial of cobalt or chromite to the West, with possible large windfall monetary gains to the USSR from price increases for Soviet metal exports (if we are talking about Zimbabwe chromite), or losses (if we are talking about Zairian or Zambian cobalt before the mid-1980s). This approach would be less risky than the first strategy, although still fraught with unpredictable contingencies, and might be attractive to the Soviets. Sooner or later, as order was restored, an attempt would be made to restore production; and at this juncture the Soviets would certainly attempt to supplant Western technical assistance and management with their own, parlaying this aid into concessionary acquisition of metal by the USSR and as much control as possible over allocation of remaining output.
- To exploit political influence in order to gain concessionary acquisition of metal by the USSR and/or control over deliveries to the West. This
strategy could work, up to a point, but its success would hinge on how really dependent an African leader’s personal power was on Soviet support. In Angola, the Soviets have not found it easy—indeed possible—to translate the large joint Cuban-Soviet military presence into acquisition of, or control over, Angolan oil.

- To gain and exercise outright colonial control over Zaire (Shaba), Zambia, or Zimbabwe. If the Soviets were prepared and able to carry out such a strategy, it would obviously give them the greatest control over strategic metals. But this strategy would probably commit the Soviets to a new Afghanistan deep in Africa. It is difficult to imagine the Soviets opting for such a high-risk strategy, with all its obvious political costs, in the absence of the urgent need to do so that could be provided only—perhaps—by a Soviet anticipation of imminent global confrontation with the United States.

Conclusions

The analysis presented above suggests that:

- The key to a truly decisive economic warfare breakthrough by the Soviets on the strategic metals front lies in South Africa, with all the problems attendant thereto from the Soviet standpoint. Obtaining control over South African supplies can be viewed only as a long-range Soviet objective. Other opportunities are limited to cobalt in Zaire and Zambia, and chromite in Zimbabwe.

- The Soviets themselves have a partial and temporary need for only one African metal—cobalt, for which there are no acceptable substitutes.

- Any Soviet African metals strategy would therefore be propelled far less by insistent internal military-production security needs, than by the prospects of achieving desirable but not immediately compelling foreign policy objectives.

- Soviet noneconomic behavior in Africa to date has shown, by even the most generous interpretation, only a slight interest in the immediate and direct attainment of ulterior metals goals.

- In the economic sphere, the Soviets so far have not shown the sort of interest in joint ventures that would be dictated by a concern to gain a foothold in strategic metals production.

- Soviet behavior in the international metals market to date has capitalized on opportunities created by African supply interruptions, but has not revealed an intention to corner the market.

- In the future, Soviet attempts at direct market intervention through exclusive buying would probably not succeed and, if interpreted as a form of economic warfare (as they probably would be), would invite a series of broader, more sustained and much costlier counteractions by the West.

- Noneconomic future strategies, political and military, to a greater or lesser degree would give rise to the twin problems of African leadership resistance to loss of hard currency earnings, and enhanced prospects of depressed standards of living for the population and heightened political instability.

- Probably the strategy that would best balance risks and gains for the Soviets would be neither interdiction of deliveries to the West nor outright seizure of power in metal-producing countries. Rather, it might involve an exchange of military support for a politically dependent African leadership group in return for some concessionary metals deliveries to the USSR and a measure of influence over the allocation of the remaining output to Western countries. One way this situation could be brought into being would be through Soviet involvement in local wars or civil disturbances that could temporarily interrupt the production and export of strategic metals to the world market.
Annex C

Soviet Capabilities in Africa

Clandestine Action

The USSR has a formal diplomatic presence in almost all the African states; the exceptions are the Central African Republic, Chad, Ivory Coast, Malawi, and South Africa. Once having gained diplomatic entree, the Soviets as a general rule have attempted to expand the size of their representation as much as the traffic will bear—and sometimes beyond this limit. Soviet officials in African countries perform all the normal diplomatic, consular, cultural, and intelligence-gathering activities; but they are also engaged in the active promotion of propaganda themes. Playing on residual resentment of colonialism, they seek to influence local governments toward Moscow, or at a minimum, away from a Western orientation. They pursue these ends both directly, through diplomacy and open propaganda, and indirectly, through covert contacts who are influential in the host government and society.
### Table 1

(Million US $)

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* The term commitments (extensions, agreements) refers to a pledge to provide goods or services, either on deferred payment terms or as grants.

* Negligible amount.

* Four-percent, 10-year credits.

In the next five years (1970-74) new Soviet aid overtures ground to a virtual halt, with extensions hovering around $20 million a year. Assistance increased to $100 million in 1975, and was marked by Moscow's largest and final commitment of credits and food grants to Somalia. Since then, the Soviets have expanded their economic aid program only minimally (to about $40 million a year), apart from a large trade credit on near-commercial terms to Nigeria for building a steel mill and $300 million committed to Ethiopia for agricultural development, oil and gas exploration, and oil import subsidies. (See table 1.)

After the initial foray into black Africa, Moscow began to draw on its experience elsewhere in the Third World, using training and arms supply as more effective instruments of access. Thereafter, the Soviets became very unwilling to extend new economic aid; arms and military assistance became the primary vehicle with which they attempted to establish their influence in the region.

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**Economic Aid, Training and Services, and Arms Supply**

**Economic Aid**

After a decade (1959-69) and $755 million in commitments to 17 countries, the early Soviet economic aid program could claim few successes and failed to win the sympathies of the new nations on the continent. The West continued to provide more than 90 percent of total aid committed to Sub-Saharan Africa—on somewhat softer repayment terms than given by the Soviets—and accounted for an even greater share of the aid actually delivered.
Table 2  
(Sub-Saharan Africa: Academic Students in the USSR and the United States, December 1980)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14,370</td>
<td>22,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>1,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>1,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1,180</td>
<td>13,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>410</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,705</td>
<td>810</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Estimates are preliminary.

Table 3  
(Sub-Saharan Africa: Soviet Economic Technicians, 1980)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>USSR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>850</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>350</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>270</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,025</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data are preliminary. Minimum estimates of number present for one month or more. Numbers are rounded to nearest five. In addition, there were 5,560 East Europeans and 10,650 Cubans in Sub-Saharan Africa concentrated in the same countries.

Training and Services
By the mid-1960s, the USSR was already providing extensive training programs in the Soviet Union for black African nationals. At the end of 1980, Moscow had trained almost 32,000 of these students (some 20,000 additional in Eastern Europe) in professions such as medicine, engineering, science, and social science. An additional 4,500 were trained in the USSR (and 3,500 in Eastern Europe) in technical skills. Although far larger numbers have been schooled in the West—there were 22,000 studying in the United States alone in 1980, as compared with 14,000 in the USSR (see table 2)—the 2,000 to 3,000 graduates coming home each year have returned with Russian language capabilities and acquaintance with Soviet institutions and people in their fields of expertise, whether or not their political persuasions have been altered.

From the beginning, the Soviets have provided extensive administrative, health, and teaching services to the black African States. More than 5,000 Soviets were working in these capacities in 1980 (supplemented by more than 16,000 East Europeans and Cubans). (See table 3.) Their numbers have grown especially rapidly in the last few years because of the USSR's new interests in Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique and its growing commercial relations with Nigeria.
### Table 4

**Sub-Saharan Africa:**

**Value of Military Purchases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total From USSR</th>
<th>From Non-Communist Countries</th>
<th>1959-74 From USSR</th>
<th>From Non-Communist Countries</th>
<th>1975-80 From USSR</th>
<th>From Non-Communist Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>1,378</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2,232</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>2,226</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>311</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,003</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>2,772</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>2,075</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Negligible amount.

---

**Arms Supply**

Reduced Soviet interest in black Africa after the initial spurt in the early 1960s meant that the Soviets put relatively little into military assistance before the mid-1970s. For the most part, Moscow provided outdated, reconditioned equipment and basic military instruction. Somalia and Sudan were treated as special cases, each receiving substantial quantities of arms (Somalia $200 million worth and Sudan $100 million) before 1975 largely because of their strategic locations on the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. (See table 4.)

The rapid deterioration of the Portuguese position in the early 1970s invited intensified Soviet efforts. The Soviet decision in 1974 not to let the MPLA faction in Angola collapse for lack of military support apparently was only part of a larger decision to step up military assistance to the region as a whole. Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia all signed record arms contracts with Moscow in 1974, which added together totaled some $335 million, a commitment figure three times as great as that of any previous year.

The success of Soviet/Cuban-backed guerrilla forces in Angola triggered an even sharper escalation in Soviet military assistance to the region between 1975 and 1980. (See table 4.) Moscow campaigned hard throughout the region, signing record arms deals with old and new clients alike that culminated in $2 billion worth of military aid to Ethiopia (more than five times the value furnished to Ethiopia over the previous 20 years by the United States).
Table 5  
(Sub-Saharan Africa: Military Advisers From Selected Communist Countries)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which: Angola</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Minimum number present for one month or more.  
* Includes troops, who account for most of the Cuban presence in Angola and Ethiopia.  
* Includes troops in Cabinda.  
* Not available.

The turnaround in the Soviet arms assistance program and the opportunities provided in Angola, Ethiopia, and the Frontline States allowed Moscow to demonstrate its ability to move large quantities of military hardware quickly over long distances. In the process, the USSR became the largest supplier of arms to the subcontinent, even though its list of major recipients has remained small.  

Moscow’s post-Angolan arms aid also has earned it sizable amounts of cash, especially since the increase in arms prices after 1974. Prices for some big-ticket items (fighters, air defense, and helicopters) have increased as much as 100 percent, and terms have been hardened for quicker paybacks. When it has perceived political or strategic advantage, however, Moscow still accords preferential treatment that is generally not obtainable from Western sources.  

The influx of more Soviet weapons, often of higher technology than available Western models, also brought large increases in the number of Soviet and Cuban military personnel. The Soviet military presence is estimated to have quadrupled since 1974, with more than 4,000 technicians and advisers assigned to African clients in 1980. The number of Cuban troops and advisers in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1980 has dipped only slightly from the 1978 high of 37,275 (35,500 in Angola and Ethiopia alone) to about 30,000. (See table 5.)
Once they have gained a foothold, Soviet personnel have attempted to:

- Extend their activities and influence as widely as possible within the host country’s military organization.

- Use their clients’ indebtedness as a lever for attempting to extract concessions such as access to air and naval facilities, or support for Soviet diplomatic initiatives.

- Employ the threat of delays or cutoffs of arms and spare parts shipments, as well as the withdrawal of advisory and maintenance support, as a means of exerting political influence.

Moscow’s ability to use military assistance as a means to gain influence in Sub-Saharan Africa, however, has its limits. Having observed the Soviets in action, many African military and political leaders are wary of Soviet military aid offers and the strings that are invariably attached to them. When the Soviet presence becomes onerous and particularly when Moscow has imposed or threatened a cutoff of arms or spare parts, a number of African states have moved to acquire arms from other sources. Ultimately, if Moscow’s demands become too objectionable, the client may decide to terminate the military assistance relationship altogether. This drastic course of action becomes more traumatic as the size of a Soviet mission grows. However, the Soviet ouster from Egypt in 1972 and from Somalia in 1977 demonstrates that, even where Moscow has established a redoubtable presence with extensive access to client facilities and made the client almost totally dependent on Soviet assistance, the relationship remains vulnerable to a directive from the host government ordering Soviet personnel to leave. Whether host countries as dependent on Soviet and Cuban propping up as Angola or Ethiopia would ask that their forces be removed, however, is uncertain.

Military Power Projection

The USSR’s Military Transport Aviation (VTA) has undertaken eight major airlifts to Third World countries, including two to Africa. These operations have demonstrated that VTA can mount a major, unopposed airlift in a short time and sustain it. But they have revealed limitations as well. The proficiency displayed has been uneven, and in some cases even relatively low levels of effort have taxed VTA’s capabilities. Obtaining clearance for overflight, landing, and refueling from various countries en route will continue to be crucial to the success of VTA airlifts to the Third World, including Africa.

The USSR has developed forces that could be used for intervention in distant areas and has introduced small elements of them into distant-area combat situations as early as 1971 in Egypt. We believe that Soviet leaders in the future would be more willing to use force for this purpose. Elements of all Soviet conventional forces—ground, air, and naval—are potential resources for use in situations that call for intervention. Although Soviet airborne and amphibious forces have generally been touted by Western observers as the most likely components of any Soviet intervention in the Third World, in practice these forces have not played a role, though Soviet airborne divisions have been placed on alert during several periods of international tension.

The Soviets, nevertheless, would encounter serious difficulties in delivering substantial numbers of airborne troops or amphibious forces to African locations, particularly if such movements were opposed. Air transport to the region would require acquiescence for overflight and permission for refueling stops from a number of countries that might oppose the Soviet effort. Limitations on the numbers of transport aircraft available and inadequate facilities at Third World airfields would make the delivery of an airborne division a lengthy and vulnerable process. Similarly, the sea lanes to the Soviet naval bases from which an amphibious operation would have to be mounted are...
Table 6

Access Privileges for Soviet Military Forces in Sub-Saharan Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Maintenance of Naval Presence</th>
<th>Naval Port Calls</th>
<th>Naval Air Deployments</th>
<th>Stopover Privileges for Transport Aircraft</th>
<th>Overflight Privileges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>*</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* TU-95 reconnaissance flights to Guinea were prohibited beginning in 1977, but naval transport flights continue to land there.
* Two show-the-flag visits by Soviet ships to Cape Verde occurred in 1979.
* Stopovers were permitted in Mali during the Angolan airlift in 1975-76.

Long and pass through narrow straits controlled by states that might be unfriendly. Only one Soviet amphibious ship is capable of carrying more than 200 troops to distant areas, and the Soviets lack the carrier-based aircraft required to provide air cover for an opposed amphibious landing far from the USSR activities such as the 1974 harbor and mine clearing operations in the Suez Canal. By the latter half of the 1970s the number had grown to 18-20 ships. In 1980 the Soviet force expanded to as many as 38 ships at a time in reaction to the rapid increase in US naval forces in the Indian Ocean. Ships of the Indian Ocean Squadron call at a number of littoral states and maintain regular patrols of the Bab el Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz.

Naval and Air Activities

In our view, the Soviet Navy has access to port and air facilities in a number of Third World countries, and may actually enjoy de facto control over some limited facilities such as the Dahlab Island complex in Ethiopia and a small communications station in South Yemen. It does not currently control major military support facilities which we would describe as overseas "bases" in Africa. (See table 6.)

The Horn and East Africa

The Soviets have kept a continuous naval presence in the Indian Ocean since 1968. Initially, this presence consisted of a few ships that were reinforced for special
In peacetime, the primary mission of the Indian Ocean Squadron is to exert Soviet influence in the region. Also, the Soviets have defensive concerns connected with protecting their own sea lines of communication through the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Soviet naval operations in East African waters focus on show-the-flag missions and monitoring Western naval movements. The ships have also been used in direct support of client states—an example being the sealift to support Ethiopia during its war with Somalia. In wartime, Soviet naval forces, as currently constituted, would be significantly at risk because of limited firepower and air defense, inadequate shore facilities, and lengthy supply lines.

The mission of the West African patrol is to support Soviet diplomatic initiatives, to influence regional developments, and to inhibit Western involvement. In January 1981 the Soviets sent a naval task force to the waters off Morocco to protest the seizure of Soviet fishing boats, in a more direct use of the USSR’s naval presence to exert regional influence. Although this small show of force was not a decisive factor in the settlement reached in February, it did serve as a visible sign of Moscow’s displeasure. Beyond these peacetime uses, the West African patrol is of marginal military utility. It is too small to disrupt traffic in the Atlantic Sea lanes and suffers from lengthy supply lines and lack of firepower.