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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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ATTACHMENT

February 1, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Next Steps in Lebanon (TS)

The President has approved the attached National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-123). Knowledge of and access to this document must be restricted to the minimum number of people required to implement the actions directed. (TS)

  
Robert C. McFarlane

cc: The Vice President

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CIA TS 840091

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 1, 1984

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION  
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 123


Next Steps in Lebanon

At an NSC meeting held January 26, 1984, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, presented a plan for modifications to the U.S. military role in Lebanon.

The plan provides for possible actions the United States Government could take to assist the Government of Lebanon in responding to the changing threats and military requirements. The GOL faces three significant military problems: the need to increase size and effectiveness of LAF so that the GOL can extend its area of control; the need to deter or counter firing on greater Beirut from Syrian-controlled areas; and the need to improve GOL capability to combat terrorism.

In light of the JCS presentation and attendant analysis, the following actions which strengthen our ability to carry out U.S. policy in Lebanon are approved in principle:

- Improve the LAF capability for counter-battery operations by repositioning the target acquisition radar presently in country, possibly providing additional radar capability, improving the flow of targetting information to the LAF, providing counter-battery training, and providing more modern artillery ammunition.
- To enhance the safety of MNF personnel, authority would be granted for U.S. naval forces to provide naval gunfire and air support against any units in Syrian-controlled territory in Lebanon firing into greater Beirut as well as against any unit conducting a hostile attack directly on MNF or U.S personnel and facilities. Existing authorities for the conduct of self-defense are reaffirmed.



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- Accelerate U.S. equipment deliveries to the LAF and provide increased training. Personnel in support of this effort would include:

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- Continue to provide a military unit for security at the U. S. Embassy in Beirut.
- In conjunction with the foregoing and as soon as possible, commence relief of the USMNF forces at BIA by LAF units. Redeploy the Marine Amphibious Unit from BIA to the Amphibious Ready Group off the coast of Lebanon in phases agreed between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. Maintain readiness for renewed operations ashore, if required.
- Place all military personnel in Lebanon under a single USMNF commander in Beirut who would report through the normal chain of command.

To assure readiness to implement the actions listed above, the following should be undertaken immediately:

- Ambassador Rumsfeld is authorized to consult promptly with the GOL on the concept outlined above. The objective is to encourage President Gemayel to request the type of reorientation described above from the U.S. and other MNF contributors. The results of this consultation should be reported and assessed. Possible modifications to this plan should be proposed, if necessary, prior to consultations with MNF co-contributors.
- The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, JCS, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall develop, for the President's review, a proposed timetable for the phase down of USMNF military personnel ashore and a plan for the continuing U.S. military presence offshore, taking full account of political as well as military considerations. Implementation of these plans will be closely integrated with the actions directed in the NSDD. In accordance with my suggestion on January 26, consideration should be given to quartering at least a portion of the residual force at the BIA.
- The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, should develop a plan for consultation with our MNF co-contributors at both political and military levels. The plan should also address consultations with other allies and friendly countries in that area as well as notification, if appropriate, of Syria and the Soviet Union.

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- The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director, OMB, Secretary of Defense and Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, should develop a financing plan for providing the security assistance required to support the accelerated and increased supply of equipment and training to the LAF. This plan should address both the immediate short-term requirement, as well as the longer-term requirements. Consideration should be given to third country financing of the immediate short-term needs.

- The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, should develop a legislative strategy for achieving Congressional approval of increased funding and acceptance of the force substitution and mission changes proposed in this concept.


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- The Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should prepare new rules of engagement consistent with the above plan for my approval.

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
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- The Secretary of State, using existing public diplomacy resources, should take the lead in developing a domestic and foreign public affairs strategy.

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The diplomatic strategy of NSDD-111 is reaffirmed, and an aggressive pursuit of those objectives should be carried out concurrently with actions described above. The Crisis Pre-Planning Group (CPPG) is charged with monitoring and coordinating operational issues related to U.S. policy in Lebanon. The CPPG will report to the Special Situation Group (SSG) or National Security Planning Group (NSPG), as appropriate, on a periodic basis as well as when policy decisions are required.



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