

CIS 6

5/9

Ltr. fm. EDDY, Work in Progress in Morocco and N. Africa.

6/3

Memo, unspecified source, on English-American cooperation, S.O.2. (discontinued)

5/21

Ltr. fm. EDDY,

Att: Resistance Groups in Tunisia (Not in file)

List of Leaders in Tunisia (Not in file)

Meeting vs. Petain & Goering, German source.

ADDITIONS TO TAB C.

3/25/42 ltr fm Eddy with revised list of eq. 1; as needed.

4/10 answer to above ltr by C.W. Horn

SECRET**COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION**

WASHINGTON, D. C.

J
GMEMORANDUM

June 9, 1942

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan
FROM: Lt. Colonel W. A. Eddy
SUBJECT: WORK IN PROGRESS IN MOROCCO AND NORTH AFRICA.

When I left for Tangier, January 6, 1942, I was told that we might expect not more than three months before operations would probably take place by the Axis Powers, if not by the United Nations. Now after nearly six months North Africa is still at peace and the door is still open for us. On the other hand, while no military action has taken place in Morocco or North Africa the Axis is winning slowly and steadily a bloodless cheap diplomatic victory. My instructions were (1) to establish listening posts and sources of intelligence which could be left behind if the Americans should be excluded from the area. And (2) to prepare and to supply groups which would resist the Axis by sabotage, guerilla warfare, and organized armed resistance.

I. INTELLIGENCE

Many valuable sources of information have been cultivated during the past year by our control officers and by reliable friends among the French, Poles, and Spanish Republicans. In accordance with instructions from the State Department and the Chief of Mission in Tangier the Moors have not yet been approached for any undercover work. The network of intelligence centers has been greatly extended by the addition of special agents whose expenses have been paid by my office. These include men in key official positions in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco and range from people of royal birth to Spanish Communists. We are particularly fortunate in Algeria in having the cooperation of men who hold high official positions in the French diplomatic and military services. There is also a well-organized detection squad in Tangier who keep us fully informed. Very little has been done in Spanish Morocco where we have no consular posts and where travel by American officials is not welcomed.

- 2 -

SECRET

The principal enterprise of potential value, in case we are obliged to leave, is the establishment of an American chain of secret radio transmitters. The home receiving station of this chain is my set in Tangier named **MIDWAY** whose full-time operator is in daily contact with London, Gibraltar, Casablanca and Tunis. Other sets which have been placed in the field are as follows:

LINCOLN at Casablanca in daily touch with **MIDWAY**.

COLUMBUS at Tunis in touch with Malta for operational intelligence.

PILGRIM at Tunis in regular contact with Gibraltar and **MIDWAY**.

YANKEE at Algiers and **FRANKLIN** at Oran. These two sets have been unable to establish communication with **MIDWAY** for lack of trained operators.

Three other sets are waiting to be placed out whenever operators can be found.

The successful operation and extension of this infant chain of communications depends entirely upon a trained instructor available to travel from one station to another. The W. T. transmitters are delicate instruments which cannot be worked by an amateur. It is remarkable that Tunis and Casablanca have been able to establish regular communication without technical help. They were fortunate in finding trained telegraphers, but the real credit is due to Mr. Doolittle and Mr. Springs in Tunis and to Vice-Consular Reid in Casablanca who solved the technical and coding problems by their own resourcefulness. Tunis has transmitted valuable intelligence to Malta regarding the departure and course of ships carrying war materials to the Axis in Libya. Casablanca similarly has transmitted to **MIDWAY** and thence to Gibraltar spot news about French naval, merchant ship and airplane movements of immediate interest to operations. The extension of this vital service must await the arrival of an expert instructor, after which we can have at least a dozen listening posts no matter what else happens in this region. Mr. Joseph Raichle, chosen for this assignment which he was to discharge under the cover of a diplomatic courier assigned to North Africa, is marooned in Lisbon. It is very much to be desired that he be detached from Lisbon and assigned as courier in North Africa immediately to be attached preferably to the

SECRET

- 3 -

consulate General, Algiers, where he will be in a central position to instruct our inland operators.

II. OPERATIONS

MOROCCO

Leaders not only friendly to us but organizers of irregular troops at a conservative estimate control five thousand Europeans including some Spanish but mainly mobilized French Army Officers and men. Through native chiefs they control also not less than ten thousand native irregulars and tribesmen, most of whom lack arms. Properly financed and supplied, these fifteen thousand men, most of whom have fighting experience, are in a position to do a great deal to sabotage the Axis should they invade the territory. Key points of communication and transport can be destroyed on short notice according to plans already prepared. Beyond this organization of irregulars lies a great potential of at least two hundred thousand natives.

At the heart of the Moroccan organization are six cells organized by Rey, Gabby and Cheesecake, lead by men who can be thoroughly trusted. These cells vary in strength from ten to forty men. They have no dealings with natives but include only Europeans of courage and of determination to oppose the Axis at all costs. They are prepared to receive and to use arms and demolition materials of which they already have a modest supply. In the meantime, they are active in propaganda particularly at the moment in counteracting in every possible way the increasing activity of the P.F.P., Doriot's Pro-German youth organization. These cells are at Arbaoua, Fort Lyautey, Sok el Arba, Sidi Slimane, Petit Jean, Sidi Yahya, Meknes, Rabat. The Moroccan organization is already capable of seizing and holding for forty-eight hours two small ports. It also has prepared two points on the Coast where supplies can be landed, received, hidden and distributed whenever we receive authority to make these shipments.

ALGERIA

The heart of potential organized resistance to the Axis is in the department of Algeria where, with any assurance of American supply of arms and planes, a successful coup de etat could have been produced almost anytime up to the appointment of Laval. The organization had the finest kind of leadership in a separatists' movement lead by French

-4-

SECRET

Patriotists some of whom were Royalists. The organization and preparation for action was remarkably complete and the local supply of ammunition sufficient for a week or ten days. The leaders financed themselves until bankrupt and secured to their numbers key members of the Staff of General Juin, the Governor of the Province of Oran and many highly placed officers and officials. The control of communications is complete, unlike Morocco where the official communications and transport system are controlled by partisans of Vichy. The Algerian leaders, who shall be nameless since their hopes of assistance have been wrecked, controlled the following disciplined troops; ten thousand Europeans mostly former soldiers, ten thousand native irregulars, and fifteen thousand young Frenchmen in the Camps de Jeunesse, age 18 to 22, who would follow their leaders all of whom were committed to the Separatist Movement. The Jeunesse did not possess arms but the other groups are partly armed and equipped. The native potential of two hundred and fifty thousand men was in Algeria more than a potential since prominent Arab chiefs were definitely committed to cooperation at the zero hour. In addition to communications the frontiers were under the control of this organization which could hold the Province of Oran alone for a week without help from the outside. Unfortunately, the maintenance of an organization of this size so many months without exposure has been very difficult and hazardous and its leaders are already being replaced by Laval henchmen at an alarming rate. A recent threat of a purge may complete the disintegration of what has been the only good prospect of an effective organized uprising against the Axis and against Vichy in North Africa. Unable to secure any war supplies from us the leaders are turning in desperation to conversations with the British in the hope that they may give them what we have refused. Personally, I hope these brave men find somewhere the assistance they need and deserve.

TUNISIA

In Tunisia there is no organized military resistance in prospect. On the other hand, the Province is vital for sabotage and guerilla warfare, full of groups who hate the Axis and particularly the Italians. It is difficult to summarize the many groups organized by the Americans since they are so scattered and varied. I attach herewith a detailed statement from which it will be seen that their fifth column is strong inside the police, railroads, stevedores, post and telegraph, and customs. I am confident

-5-

SECRET

that investment in the expenses and supply of Tunisian guerrillas is well worthwhile.

CONCLUSION

The Americans who are responsible for this work which we finance and promote are first of all Mr. Robert D. Murphy of Algiers whose energetic and intelligent leadership is just as valuable in preparing for direct action as it has been to high diplomacy. Mr. H. A. Doelittle and Mr. Springs have done notable work in Tunis. Messrs. Knox, Rounds and Knight have been invaluable in Algeria. Mr. David W. King at Casablanca is a star at S.O. work and by far the most important single organizer and contact man we have in North Africa. He fought with the Foreign Legion in the last war and understands war, as well as Frenchmen, as no one else in the territory does. With him, Mr. Frederick Culbert and Mr. W. S. Reid are of greatest value to our Moroccan work. There are many others, of course, of equal ability but these men have given generously and successfully of their time and of their security to the program of this office.

VII. GENERAL COMMENT

1. Eighty per cent of the French in North Africa want and repeat vigorous action by the Allies. There is no inconsistency in their repeated statements that they want us both to feed and trade with North Africa and also want us to sink French ships carrying war supplies to the Axis and attack plants producing materials for the Germans even in French territory.

2. It is too late for general literary or radio propaganda about our good intentions or about our future protection. Guns or butter is the only good propaganda today.

3. The quiet in North Africa is not the quiet of peace but of approaching death. Anything would be better than this ominous silence. The purge of our friends and the increasing infiltration of Axis officers will soon make any cooperation with the Allies out of the question on a large scale in which case, we face the prospect of nothing better than a defeatist policy of local sabotage. The star of Doriot is waxing and it is generally expected that he will succeed Laval within the next two months to cede to the Axis those submarine bases and the condominium in Tunis which Laval dares not grant.

SECRET**IV - RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. A large storehouse of American-owned small arms and demolition materials be held at Gibraltar in our base for shipment in small quantities to our guerilla groups in Morocco and Algeria. Most of the transportation and reception from Gibraltar have already been arranged. I recommend also infantry small arms for the 15,000 Jeunesse in Algeria.

2. A vigorous prosecution of economic warfare as soon as possible risking, if necessary, considerable investments in the immediate effort to bring to North Africa a visible measure of nourishment and prosperity clearly labeled "Made in America." I don't have in mind only small supplies under the economic aid plan, but the financing of utilities and services now prostrate by the economic depression in North Africa.

3. Allied blockade of war supplies to the Axis which would be only officially protested but really welcomed by the great mass of Frenchmen. Whether or not French ships, planes and trains carrying military materials or personnel should be attacked anywhere and everywhere. We need not fear an incident. We need fear only the conversation that we are weak and do not intend to fight the war which is what the Axis controlled press and radio tell the publication. Any evidence of our strength and determination and especially any evidence of our interest in North Africa now and after the war will raise our stock and help to keep this promising land out of the hands of the enemy.

W. A. Eddy
W. A. EDDY

WAE/uc

3rd June, 1942

- A. The importance of S.O.2 work such as could be done by my organization and yours is being increasingly recognized by responsible authorities in all war zones and S.O.2 is taking a definite place in allied planning both with Chiefs of Staff and with various commands all over the world. As a result Chiefs of Staff here have recently written to all allied Governments pointing out to them that so far as Great Britain is concerned S.O.2 is the sole department with whom they should deal in regard to subversive activities and organization of resistance in occupied territories, and is the proper channel through which their General Staffs should deal with Chiefs of Staff on these matters.
- B. As the United States is getting under way in regard to S.O.2 work, just as in regard to military operations, the same tie-up and integral rationing of British and American S.O.2 activities seem to be required as is being achieved in regard to more regular operations by a series of military conferences at a very high level which have incessantly been taking place.
- C. You have agreed with me in regard to Cairo and I believe you will agree with me in general that it is essential for us to avoid creation of two field organizations each trying to do the same sort of work among the same sort of people and in the same places, and getting hopelessly tangled up in the process. I hope you will accept the principle that in each area there should be one combined Anglo-American field force. In some cases it will be predominantly

- page 2 -

British in character though including a large minority of American personnel and controlled from London. In other cases it will be predominantly American though with some British personnel and controlled from New York. The set-up in each case must, it seems to me, be decided according to the circumstances bearing largely and particularly on such factors as to whether authorities, particularly military authorities with whom S.O.S. organisation would have to deal, are British or American, whether one or other of us is already in an advanced stage of organisation or enjoys some special advantages for carrying out our work.

- D. Assuming you are in agreement with me so far, it seems to me of the utmost importance we should get down to working out detailed arrangements for each part of the world as soon as possible so as not to be overtaken by events and find ourselves each with local organisations which it would be difficult to amalgamate at a later stage. I, therefore, would like to suggest to you that you should send to London at earliest convenient date somebody fully authorised to work out with me detailed arrangements on the above lines and finally reorganise with me on your behalf. Nothing, of course, could be better than a visit by you yourself to England and I very much hope that you will come. I recognise, however, that work which would involve implementing my suggestions as set out above may be too prolonged and detailed for occasioning you personally to carry through.

- E. I should be most grateful for your views on the above.

PERSONAL
AND
CONFIDENTIAL.

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

WAE/JPH

NAVAL ATTACHE

May 21st, 1942.

Tangier, Morocco.

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
24th and E. Streets, N.W.,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

- 1)- With reference to your telegram #30, I have asked Mr. Murphy to help our Polish friends as you requested. If the most practical help turns out to be getting him to Lisbon, you may be sure I shall help to see him on his way.
- 2)- Mr. Coen at Lisbon, has been released by the State Department to proceed to Tangier but was unable to get on the plane which came this week. I expect him next Tuesday.
- 3)- With reference to my telegram #48, Colonel Solborg has no doubt informed you that the meeting projected for May 20th at Tangier, between a British Staff Officer, the Chief of British S.I.S., Gibraltar, and a representative of Robin Hood, was cancelled. The matter is in Colonel Solborg's hands and will not concern me further. I do wish you, however, to have the enclosed copy of a letter to me from Mr. Murphy, dated May 13th, which is very pertinent.
- 4)- With reference to your telegram #34, I have written to ask Mr. Murphy to send me a copy of Boyd's memorandum to him dated April 10th, reporting conversations with an officer in the French Air Force.
- 5)- In the continued absence of Raichle, we are still struggling with the establishment of our secret W/T chain. The following contacts have been made and are being used for special operational intelligence:

TUNIS-MALTA; TUNIS-TANGIER; CASABLANCA-TANGIER; TANGIER-MALTA; TANGIER-LONDON.

Colonel Donovan.

- 2 -

5/21/42

Our W/T sets at Oren and Algiers have been unsuccessful in contacting us after repeated efforts and may have to wait technical instruction. Four (4) other sets here are ready to be placed out whenever Raichle arrives to tour North Africa as courier. Colonel Solborg is taking this up with Minister Fish.

- 6)- With reference to the securing of local currency to finance future guerilla activities in Tunisia and Algeria, I quote the following from a letter from Mr. Murphy, dated May 11th:

* * * * "I realize your desire to economize on the rate of exchange. I honestly, believe, however, that our sale through the Consulate here of comparatively large sums of Banque de France notes does not look well and is extremely transparent. Do you feel that this economy is necessary? If you need Algerian notes, cannot you afford to buy them at the local rate here which is approximately 115 or 120? All the rest of our business is done on that basis. You can figure out for yourself what the local authorities think when we endeavor to dispose of large quantities of Bank of France notes." * * * * *

In accordance with authority previously received from you to finance subversive work among irregulars and natives, I shall use funds judiciously through the medium of Mr. Murphy and Mr. Declittle. I shall have to buy in the local markets at the best possible rate since the importation of large packages of French francs from Lisbon is obviously exposing our Consulates to serious risks. I think you will agree that it will be well to have on hand as a reserve, two or three million Algerian francs which can be used in Tunisia as well.

- 7)- I enclose further information about resistance groups organized in Tunisia (Enclosure A). The note at the end of this memorandum was prepared before the news had arrived that no war materials are to be delivered to North Africa at the present time, therefore I hope you will not allow this note to disturb you.

- 8)- I enclose list of Leaders in Tunisia (Enclosure B) who are prepared to carry on sabotage even after the possible departure of our officials. I am suggesting a modest month by month subsidy to these Leaders instead of the substantial funds which it is suggested in the memorandum should be now deposited in a lump sum.

Colonel Donovan.

- 3 -

5/21/42

9)- I enclose translation of a report on the meeting between Marshal Petain and Marshal Goering (Enclosure C). While the substance of this report has been general knowledge, especial interest attaches to this text. It is a literal translation of a German memorandum taken from the safe of the German Consulate General in Casablanca, the first week in May. The robbing of this safe was financed by me and carried out by very good friends of ours in Casablanca. Much more important and serious was the discovery in the German safe of verbatim texts of several confidential State Department telegrams, which implies if it does not prove, that the Germans have broken the State Department strip code. Mr. Murphy has been advised and we are investigating so in the meantime please keep this between ourselves.

Respectfully submitted,

W. A. Eddy
W. A. EDDY.

C-0-F-1

THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Personal and Secret

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
Algiers, May 13, 1942.

Dear Bill:

Your telegram of May 11th from Lisbon leaves me with a feeling that before we start shouting that you should make an effort there to discover exactly who it is in SIS who has taken this stand, and why.

What puzzles me is Robin Hood's statement to the effect that some days ago an SIS representative was directly in touch with his people here and a meeting was arranged between a military person from London and one of Robin Hood's people in Tangier on May 20. Do you know anything about that? RH said that some time ago they did not seem to consider him important enough to deal with but that now apparently they are changing their minds. Why?

Does it not seem to you that until we and our friends decide the question who will handle this area that we shall continue to get nowhere? Whose little sphere of influence will this be. At the moment it seems to fall between two stools with the edge going to our friends who want it for themselves, I believe, and probably they should have it, but I frankly believe they cannot - are not able to handle it.

Before telegraphing I shall await the receipt of your letter which the Friday courier will probably bring with him.

Please count on me to go along with you. What you are experiencing in this phase is similar to our experience in the economic field. It doesn't add up and I don't like it but maybe I don't have all the facts.

At the first convenient moment we must get together and that may be possible next week.

With warm regards, believe me

Yours ever,

B.

Copied 5/21/42
JFK

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MEETING BETWEEN MARSHAL PETAIN AND MARSHAL GOERING

The meeting had been arranged by M. de BRINON.

Marshal GOERING asked Marshal PETAIN to show a little more energy in preparing the defence of North Africa and the French colonies; it appears that there was some question of the re-mobilization of the Air Force and the French fleet. Marshal Pétain replied that there was no question of mobilizing the land army in France; that only the army of North Africa could be placed on a war footing, on the condition, he said, "that you give us back our officers, our noncommissioned officers, our men and our material to reconstruct our forces."

Marshal Pétain reminded the other that a similar request had been made by the French Government at the time of the Syrian affair, and that it had been refused by the Reich and by Italy, particularly in regard to the war material taken out of Syria a short time before by the Italians. Marshal Pétain also recalled that he was in agreement as to the principles of collaboration, but that most of the promises made by the Reich had not been realized and that he himself could only stick to the conditions of the armistice as they had been laid down.

"I had understood that collaboration implied a bargain between equals, if it is to be a case of the victor on top and the vanquished beneath, there can be no collaboration, there is what you call a DIKTAT and what we call the law of the strongest."

"France has understood her error in not making a peace of collaboration in 1919, she won the war and lost the peace. You run the risk of making the same mistake as we did."

"You cannot win the war alone, you cannot make the peace alone, and you cannot make peace without France."

"By not making a peace of collaboration, you run the risk of losing the peace."

"Remember what I say to you."

The Marshal read the memorandum of seven pages that he had drawn up himself, and in which he outlined all litigious points. At the end, Marshal Goering exclaimed "Finally, Mr. Marshal, who are the victors, you or we?"

Marshal Pétain said that he never had felt so deeply as during that conference how much France had been beaten. "I have confidence in the destiny of France, in her restoration. As to me personally, know that for a man of my age there is a very easy way of death, that from life to death."

The Marshal continued the conversation on details; then discussed very briefly memoirs of the 1914-18 war and ended on the best of terms.

Marshal Goering went to Paris for two days at the end of this interview; the memorandum was translated into German by the staff of the Embassy. The Ambassador and the General commanding military forces in France read it and on Monday September 8 the General acting as liaison officer between Goering and the Fuhrer went to remit the document to the latter.

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In his memorandum, Marshal Pétain reminded the Chancellor Hitler that following the interview at Montoire and the diplomatic conversations that had preceded or followed it, it had been agreed:

That the prisoners would be freed;
That the frontier between the occupied and non-occupied zones would be suppressed;
That the contributions required by the German Army from France would be reduced;
That in a certain measure, the French Army of the Armistice, particularly in North Africa, would be re-armed.

None of these conditions had been fully realized.

Marshal Goering had observed to Marshal Pétain that the German government was displeased that French agriculture was not producing its maximum. "Give us back, said the Marshal, the 80,000 agriculturists that you are holding."

The re-equipment of France is badly organized.

"Give us back the railroad trucks that France lent to Germany and which were not returned. These trucks represent, it must not be forgotten, one-third of the total rolling stock in France, and according to the terms of the armistice convention, they were only to be lent."

French industry is not producing sufficiently.

"You should supply it with coal and raw materials, we are waiting for them" was the reply of Marshal Pétain.

The Marshal insisted particularly on the question nearest to his heart, the return of the prisoners.

He pointed out that France could not recover unless the 1,500,000 prisoners who for the most part are young and active men were returned to their work.

He protested against the maintenance of the inter-zonal frontier that was, he said "a bleeding wound in the side of France".

Finally he protested against the massive requisitions of foodstuffs by the German Army in France. The numbers of the requisitions have been successively increased from 2,500,000 to 3 millions, then to 1,500,000 and 1,000,000. Actually they have been 1,000,000, 1,500,000, 2,000,000, 2,500,000, 3,000,000, 3,500,000, 4,000,000, 4,500,000, 5,000,000, 5,500,000, 6,000,000, 6,500,000, 7,000,000, 7,500,000, 8,000,000, 8,500,000, 9,000,000, 9,500,000, 10,000,000, 10,500,000, 11,000,000, 11,500,000, 12,000,000, 12,500,000, 13,000,000, 13,500,000, 14,000,000, 14,500,000, 15,000,000, 15,500,000, 16,000,000, 16,500,000, 17,000,000, 17,500,000, 18,000,000, 18,500,000, 19,000,000, 19,500,000, 20,000,000, 20,500,000, 21,000,000, 21,500,000, 22,000,000, 22,500,000, 23,000,000, 23,500,000, 24,000,000, 24,500,000, 25,000,000, 25,500,000, 26,000,000, 26,500,000, 27,000,000, 27,500,000, 28,000,000, 28,500,000, 29,000,000, 29,500,000, 30,000,000, 30,500,000, 31,000,000, 31,500,000, 32,000,000, 32,500,000, 33,000,000, 33,500,000, 34,000,000, 34,500,000, 35,000,000, 35,500,000, 36,000,000, 36,500,000, 37,000,000, 37,500,000, 38,000,000, 38,500,000, 39,000,000, 39,500,000, 40,000,000, 40,500,000, 41,000,000, 41,500,000, 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161,500,000, 162,000,000, 162,500,000, 163,000,000, 163,500,000, 164,000,000, 164,500,000, 165,000,000, 165,500,000, 166,000,000, 166,500,000, 167,000,000, 167,500,000, 168,000,000, 168,500,000, 169,000,000, 169,500,000, 170,000,000, 170,500,000, 171,000,000, 171,500,000, 172,000,000, 172,500,000, 173,000,000, 173,500,000, 174,000,000, 174,500,000, 175,000,000, 175,500,000, 176,000,000, 176,500,000, 177,000,000, 177,500,000, 178,000,000, 178,500,000, 179,000,000, 179,500,000, 180,000,000, 180,500,000, 181,000,000, 181,500,000, 182,000,000, 182,500,000, 183,000,000, 183,500,000, 184,000,000, 184,500,000, 185,000,000, 185,500,000, 186,000,000, 186,500,000, 187,000,000, 187,500,000, 188,000,000, 188,500,000, 189,000,000, 189,500,000, 190,000,000, 190,500,000, 191,000,000, 191,500,000, 192,000,000, 192,500,000, 193,000,000, 193,500,000, 194,000,000, 194,500,000, 195,000,000, 195,500,000, 196,000,000, 196,500,000, 197,000,000, 197,500,000, 198,000,000, 198,500,000, 199,000,000, 199,500,000, 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315,500,000, 316,000,000, 316,500,000, 317,000,000, 317,500,000, 318,000,000, 318,500,000, 319,000,000, 319,500,000, 320,000,000, 320,500,000, 321,000,000, 321,500,000, 322,000,000, 322,500,000, 323,000,000, 323,500,000, 324,000,000, 324,500,000, 325,000,000, 325,500,000, 326,000,000, 326,500,000, 327,000,000, 327,500,000, 328,000,000, 328,500,000, 329,000,000, 329,500,000, 330,000,000, 330,500,000, 331,000,000, 331,500,000, 332,000,000, 332,500,000, 333,000,000, 333,500,000, 334,000,000, 334,500,000, 335,000,000, 335,500,000, 336,000,000, 336,500,000, 337,000,000, 337,500,000, 338,000,000, 338,500,000, 339,000,000, 339,500,000, 340,000,000, 340,500,000, 341,000,000, 341,500,000, 342,000,000, 342,500,000, 343,000,000, 343,500,000, 344,000,000, 344,500,000, 345,000,000, 345,500,000, 346,000,000, 346,500,000, 347,000,000, 347,500,000, 348,000,000, 348,500,000, 349,000,000, 349,500,000, 350,000,000, 350,500,000, 351,000,000, 351,500,000, 352,000,000, 352,500,000, 353,000,000, 353,500,000, 354,000,000, 354,500,000, 355,000,000, 355,500,000, 356,000,000, 356,500,000, 357,000,000, 357,500,000, 358,000,000, 358,500,000, 359,000,000, 359,500,000, 360,000,000, 360,500,000, 361,000,000, 361,500,000, 362,000,000, 362,500,000, 363,000,000, 363,500,000, 364,000,000, 364,500,000, 365,000,000, 365,500,000, 366,000,000, 366,500,000, 367,000,000, 367,500,000, 368,000,000, 368,500,000, 369,000,000, 369,500,000, 370,000,000, 370,500,000, 371,000,000, 371,500,000, 372,000,000, 372,500,000, 373,000,000, 373,500,000, 374,000,000, 374,500,000, 375,000,000, 375,500,000, 376,000,000, 376,500,000, 377,000,000, 377,500,000, 378,000,000, 378,500,000, 379,000,000, 379,500,000, 380,000,000, 380,500,000, 381,000,000, 381,500,000, 382,000,000, 382,500,000, 383,000,000, 383,500,000, 384,000,000, 384,500,000, 385,000,000, 385,500,000, 386,000,000, 386,500,000, 387,000,000, 387,500,000, 388,000,000, 388,500,000, 389,000,000, 389,500,000, 390,000,000, 390,500,000, 391,000,000, 391,500,000, 392,000,000, 392,500,000, 393,000,000, 393,500,000, 394,000,000, 394,500,000, 395,000,000, 395,500,000, 396,000,000, 396,500,000, 397,000,000, 397,500,000, 398,000,000, 398,500,000, 399,000,000, 399,500,000, 400,000,000, 400,500,000, 401,000,000, 401,500,000, 402,000,000, 402,500,000, 403,000,000, 403,500,000, 404,000,000, 404,500,000, 405,000,000, 405,500,000, 406,000,000, 406,500,000, 407,000,000, 407,500,000, 408,000,000, 408,500,000, 409,000,000, 409,500,000, 410,000,000, 410,500,000, 411,000,000, 411,500,000, 412,000,000, 412,500,000, 413,000,000, 413,500,000, 414,000,000, 414,500,000, 415,000,000, 415,500,000, 416,000,000, 416,500,000, 417,000,000, 417,500,000, 418,000,000, 418,500,000, 419,000,000, 419,500,000, 420,000,000, 420,500,000, 421,000,000, 421,500,000, 422,000,000, 422,500,000, 423,000,000, 423,500,000, 424,000,000, 424,500,000, 425,000,000, 425,500,000, 426,000,000, 426,500,000, 427,000,000, 427,500,000, 428,000,000, 428,500,000, 429,000,000, 429,500,000, 430,000,000, 430,500,000, 431,000,000, 431,500,000, 432,000,000, 432,500,000, 433,000,000, 433,500,000, 434,000,000, 434,500,000, 435,000,000, 435,500,000, 436,000,000, 436,500,000, 437,000,000, 437,500,000, 438,000,000, 438,500,000, 439,000,000, 439,500,000, 440,000,000, 440,500,000, 441,000,000, 441,500,000, 44

require not to take one-third of the production of processed meat, fish, and backstuffs of all kinds.

The disproportion is too great, said the Marshal, between this deduction of 1/3 and the 500,000 Germans as compared with 30,000,000 French; it is 1/60 that should be deducted instead of this unjustifiable third.

The Marshal also indicated in his memorandum that the sum paid as compensation for the expenses of the German Army of occupation already exceeded (before any question of fixing a war indemnity could be raised) the sums paid by Germany after her defeat in 1918.


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In describing this interview, Marshal Pétain insisted on making it clear that he had never yielded on the principle of territorial concessions to be made by France to Germany; that he had never yielded, nor made any promise, nor any semblance of a promise in regard to the question of Alsace-Lorraine, which remains entire.

No fundamental discussion took place regarding this subject, but on each occasion the Marshal affirmed his position and his desire to maintain the integrity of French territory.

Moreover, in the course of the interview at St. Florentin he reminded Marshal Goering that the Führer had promised at Montoire that no territorial annexation would be made.

Deering



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NAVAL ATTACHE

May 20th, 1942.

Tangier, Morocco.

From: V. S. Naval Attache, Tangier, Morocco.
To: Director of Naval Intelligence.

Subject: Communication of Operational Intelligence Over Secret Wireless Telegraph Chain to Gibraltar for Action.

1. As the Navy Department is already aware, this Office has established communication by secret wireless telegraph transmitters with Tunis, Algeria and Casablanca, and relays this information by the same means to Gibraltar and London.

2. During the past ten days, when Gibraltar has been very much concerned over prospective movements of the French Fleet and especially of the JEAN BART at Casablanca, we were requested by Spanish emergency services day and night, from Casablanca through our Station, to Gibraltar. This emergency occurred during my absence on duty in Lisbon.

3. For several days during my absence information of the utmost importance was transmitted on an emergency schedule of hourly contact with our Agents in the port of Casablanca, to the Admiralty at Gibraltar. This service is attributed entirely to the efficiency of our radio operators acting under the supervision and direction of my assistant Naval Attache, second Lieutenant Frank P. Holcomb, USNR., and at Casablanca under the direction of Vice Consul W. Stafford Heid. The results were considered so valuable that the following telegram has been received, during my absence, from the Vice Admiral Commanding the North Atlantic Fleet at Gibraltar:

"From: V. S. Naval Attache, Tangier.
From: U.S.C., Tangier.
Date: 14 May, 1942.

Telegram received from U.S.C. (I) Gibraltar.

"Congratulations to all concerned for the excellent working and speed of the Casablanca radio service. It is of the utmost value."

2 7

... was made under considerable difficulties ...
... this is with a view of record upon the ...
... of and ...
... should be advised of the efficient ...
... .. of ...

In view of my frequent and prolonged absence from
the office, during which period my assistant is entrusted
with the full and complete responsibilities of
the and as the representative of the Coordinator
of and since in this connection he is obliged to
deal with matters of considerable importance, I recommend
that he be given the promotion which his responsibilities
demand and which would assist him greatly in dealing
with the activities of several Nations.

W. A. ROBY.

.....

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NAVAL ATTACHÉ

Tangier, Morocco.

30 April, 1942.

Summary - April, 1942.
Coinform Financial Report

	<u>Received</u>	<u>Expended</u>
April		
1 Brought forward	\$60,677.19	
2,800 pesetas at 23 per dollar		\$121.74
200,000 French francs at 209.37533 per dollar		955.22
89,106 Moroccan francs at 93 per dollar		958.13
	<u>\$60,677.19</u>	<u>\$2035.09</u>
April 30 Balance on hand		\$58,642.10
		<u>\$60,677.19</u>

Respectfully submitted,

W. A. Eddy
W. A. EDDY.

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NAVAL ATTACHÉ

Tangier, Morocco.
April 30, 1942

Coinform, 1942
Financial Report - Second Quarter
April 1 - June 30, 1942

April

1	Balance brought forward	\$ 58,677.19	
6	Credited at Legation by State Dept Telegram Nr 64, dated Apr 6, 9 p.m.....	2,000.00	
			<u>Pesetas</u>
6	Paid thru Mr. Childs to Capt Carlos Guerrero, Tetuan		500.00
17	To Spanish Press Attache, Tetuan		2,000.00
20	To Jose Ortiz, Tetuan PTT		300.00
	Total Pesetas paid		<u>2,800.00</u>

French Francs

11	To R:D:Murphy, Algiers, to finance guerilla groups of irregulars, French and natives	200,000.00
	Total French Francs	<u>200,000.00</u>

Moroccan francs

7	Purchase of Swiss ten tube radio for villa	7,100.
7	Payment to agents in Casablanca and P:Lyautey	4,000.
14	To SJC for gelatine ditto machine and supplies	1,900.
20	To equipment and salary of Fr.L:from Tunis	9,000.
	Total carried	<u>22,000:</u>

page two

**LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

NAVAL ATTACHÉ

Coinform Account

Tangier, Morocco.

April 30, 1942

1942

April (continued)

	Moroccan frances
21 Travel and hotel, etc. round trip from Casa by boss of Ajax	<u>890.</u>
22 To W:S:R:Ores for salary Lincoln operator	7,000.00
To Perry, part time Midway April	2,000.00
To Fred Gaston, Civilian equipment and first salary of J:Cryan from Gibraltar	8,780.00
23 Paid "Mr. Thomas" for official "supplies" for presentation in Morocco	5,400.00
25 Contribution to Tullock Hospital	500.00
28 Second ten-tube Swiss radio for my assistant (Checking all broadcasts propaganda) Impossible to rent any, hence purchase	7,200.00
Tracing copies and enlarging photos of SO objectives in Tunisia	1,600.00
30 Share with Tiger of salary of Fr.L.	4,000.00
1-30 Salary of I:C, head of detection chain Tangier, including all his payments	9,600.00
16-30 Salary half month Midway operator	5,436.00
1-30 Total payments April to miscellaneous agents, bribes, etc.	6,700.00
1-30 Rent and upkeep of my Villa for rendezvous	8,000.00
Total this page	<u>67,106.00</u>
Carried from preceding page	22,000.00
Total Moroccan francs	<u>89,106.00</u>

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NAVAL ATTACHE

Tangier, Morocco.

1 April, 1942.

To: Lt-Col William A. Eddy, USMC.
Naval Attache, Tangier, Morocco.

This is to certify that the rate of exchange this date at the Bank of Moses Pariente, Tangier, Morocco is 23 Pesetas to the U.S. Dollar and 93 Moroccan francs to the U.S. Dollar check.



HARRY H. SCHWARTZ.
American Vice Consul,
American Legation,
Tangier, Morocco.

AMERICAN LEGATION
Lisbon
Office of the Naval Attache
2 May, 1942

Completed purchase of two and one-half million Bank
of France Francs (2,500,000.00) at cost of 292,895.00 Portuguese
Escudos for account of Lt. Col. William A. Eddy, USMC, Naval
Attache, Tangier, which have been paid for by him at bank's buying
rate for Legation Bills of Exchange of 24.53 Escudos to \$1.00 —
\$11,940.28.

/s/ Ambrose E. Chambers
Lieutenant, U.S. Naval Reserve
Assistant Naval Attache


CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY.

W. A. Eddy
W. A. Eddy
Lt-Col, U.S.M.C.

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NAVAL ATTACHE

Tangier, Morocco.
April 11, 1942

Received from the Naval Attache, Tangier, the sum of two hundred thousand (200,000.) Banque de France francs, for expenses of Robin Hood's organization.


Algiers, April 20, 1942.

Received from
Col. Eddy the sum
of seven thousand
dollars (7,000.00) for
the account of salary
of LINCOLN operators.

- W. Stetson Reid

April 22, 1942
Tauger

April 23, 1947

Lieut. Colonel William Eddy
United States Legation
Tangier

Dear Colonel Eddy:

This will be handed you by Mr. Phillips. The following is a memorandum which I have received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"At their meeting on April 20 the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed dispatches received by the Coordinator of Information from Lieutenant Colonel Eddy, Assistant Naval Attache at Tangier, recommending the shipment of military material to French Morocco.

"After careful consideration of these dispatches and other pertinent information on the subject, the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff viewed unfavorably the proposal to furnish war materials to French Morocco at this time. They are, however, in accord with the policy of expending funds judiciously for the purpose of initiating and maintaining guerrilla opposition in that area."

You must not be discouraged if the authorities here do not go the full way. You must be prepared to meet these obstacles. If we are right it will

-2-

work out right. In the meantime, you must recognize that I have the fullest confidence in what you are doing and we will back you to our limit.

I hope you are feeling all right. Good luck.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

April 21, 1942.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION:

Subject: Materiel for French Morocco.

At their meeting on April 20th the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed dispatches received by the Coordinator of Information from Lieutenant Colonel Eddy, Assistant Naval Attache at Tangier, recommending the shipment of military materiel to French Morocco.

After careful consideration of these dispatches and other pertinent information on the subject, the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff viewed unfavorably the proposal to furnish war materials to French Morocco at this time. They are, however, in accord with the policy of expending funds judiciously for the purpose of initiating and maintaining guerrilla opposition in that area.



W. B. SMITH,
Secretary.

SECRET

April 20th, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO BRIG. GENERAL WALTER B. SMITH
FROM COLONEL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
SUBJECT: NORTH AFRICA

Colonel Eddy's cable 34 of April 16th indicates an immediate need of 40,000,000 Algerian francs (about \$350,000) and 26,000 anti-tank mines as evidence of our support "to prevent loss of faith in our help".

French sources, in which we have implicit confidence, agree with Eddy that General Juin is pro-American and can be trusted. Colonel Cunningham of G-2 points out that Juin was a prisoner of the Germans and was released. He is, therefore, suspect. Our French source says there is no mystery about Juin's capture. Petain asked for it along with the release of several other Generals.

Eddy has suggested the use of a Portuguese cotton rather than one of other registry. It has been learned that a Portuguese boat can be made available.

The State Department has received word from Algiers that the Nazis have given eight million francs to the Doriot Party (Popular Party) for propaganda purposes.

SECRET

SECRET

Lord Gort sent for Eddy Saturday and offered to
assemble reserve of arms at Gibraltar for emergency shipment.

The following message was received from ALUSNOB,
Tangiers:

Casa Blanca Harbor cleared for action.
Urimauquet, Gloiry and destroyers shifted to permit
clear fire to cover harbor entrance.

Loabaran and Liacere have been moved from outer
jetty. Submarines shifted to facilitate departure.
Empty interned Danish SS shifted inside port tor-
pedo nets of SS Jeanbart to protect her magazines.

Source usually reliable but not yet confirmed
states that General Weygand is in Rabat.

Today at Gibraltar, I saw USS Lang and Madison.
Can one of our warships make courtesy call Casa
Blanca?*

SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington

April 21, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION:

Subject: Materiel for French Morocco.

At their meeting on April 20th the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed dispatches received by the Coordinator of Information from Lieutenant Colonel Esay, Assistant Naval Attache at Tangier, recommending the shipment of military materiel to French Morocco.

After careful consideration of these dispatches and other pertinent information on the subject, the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff viewed unfavorably the proposal to furnish war materials to French Morocco at this time. They are, however, in accord with the policy of expending funds judiciously for the purpose of initiating and maintaining guerrilla opposition in that area.

/s/ F. B. SMITH
Secretary

SECRET

April 14th, 1942

MEMORANDUM - JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
SUBJECT - NORTH AFRICA - EDDY CABLE
FROM - WILLIAM J. DUNOVAN

Two additional cables have been received from Eddy since my memorandum of April 12, 1942 addressed to General Smith. Both are attached.

We are endeavoring to check from other sources the situation in North Africa and have cabled Eddy for more specific information.

Eddy is an experienced officer, a man born in Syria, familiar with Arabic, former Naval Attaché at Cairo, former intelligence officer 6th Regiment Marines and later brigade intelligence officer. He is not one to be easily duped. In fact he may be reflecting the changing conditions in France as indicated by the naming of Laval as vice president of the Council with full portfolios of Foreign Affairs, Propaganda and Information, Interior and National Economy. It would not be surprising if Admiral Leahy is immediately recalled.

SECRET

Handwritten notes:
1. Military Personnel
2. Joint Chiefs of Staff

Memorandum for the President:

The plan to send war supplies to our friends in Africa as proposed by Colonel Eddy has been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The suggestion was made that they may want to send a member of their staff to talk with Colonel Eddy and bring back a recommendation. We shall receive their decision within a few days. Colonel Eddy has sent shipping instructions for materiel -- attached cables.

April 10, 1942

Cable from Eddy - Tangier

✓ #24. German break-through Tunisia with possible simultaneous attack through Spanish Morocco expected by French command. French now are determined to resist and asked today "how soon we can deliver twenty thousand anti-tank mines 15 kilos each at port Lyautey. They will want eight thousand similar mines elsewhere later. Utmost secrecy and speed requested by French. Advise. No. 24 from Eddy repeated to Chief of Staff Gibraltar and to Solberg.

April 12, 1942

#26 from Eddy

I am giving Murphy assurances that you will arrange free dollar credit to Howard J Sachs, 30 Pine Street New York City. This will be for the benefit of Aliab, Deerfield, Connecticut and/or his family. This deal is with the second group separate from the blocked dollar deal with Robinhood. Seventeen thousand five hundred dollars will be the amount. This will be used to purchase immediately two million Algerian Francs in Algeria at the rate of one hundred fifteen francs per free dollar. Exact dollar cost will be sent later. This matter must not be delayed. Please confirm my authority.

April 12, 1942

#27 from Eddy

There is rapidly approaching crisis in military events and French ability to resist. Cannot wait for delayed answers regarding authority to finance resistance and exchange rates. Subject only to the approval of Murphy and Childs, I propose now to use the fifty thousand dollars now credited to me here. This I will use at my discretion to finance Arab and French resistance. I also request immediate credit for a half million dollars for me to use on similar terms as above in an emergency. In this connection see my opnavone 12359 (?). This has been repeated to Solborg.

Cable from Eddy

No. 28. Re my number 24. We are also asked by our French partners how soon we would be able to furnish heavy material to Bathurst, Freetown or Liberia and kept there by Americans secret from knowledge of agents of the Axis and ready for French vessels to pick it up and transport to Morocco or Tunis at H. hour. List in following dispatch in which page references are to "Science te La Nie". December 1941

2
V

Cable from Eddy

No. 29. One thousand motorcycles with postillion seat. Five hundred motorcycles with side cars and 2-wheel drive, fifty 105MM howitzers with trucks and tractors, one hundred fifty 105MM anti-aircraft page 335, three hundred 37MM anti-aircraft page 335, ammunition for all of these guns, four hundred fifty M-2A4 tanks page 338, three hundred M-30FT-6 tanks and one hundred fifty scout cars page 337. One hundred fifty AUTO MITRAILLEUSES (probably jeeps).

Cable from Eddy

No. 31. With reference to your number 21. Other departments naturally have no evidence corroborating Secret Intelligence of well organized French military organization determined to resist the Axis. Only Murphy can confirm and he is urgently requesting me to finance and supply on the modest scale requested in my recent dispatches. French leaders would be arrested on slightest suspicion and shot if exposed. They have no news in advance of Laval government and fear Vichy surrender of North Africa soon. If Malto (Malta?) falls Germans plan to enter Tunisia with or without Spanish zone attack on Morocco. More follows.

#32. Do you wish to maintain and equip the only effective group. Robinhood speaks for Etat Major of General Juin, high officers in Morocco, and thousands of disciplined troops. He urges that I meet him in Casablanca tomorrow. What reply to my messages #22 to #27 can I carry? I must report on OESORNO (on money?). If murphy and I cannot be trusted with a few million francs in an emergency then I should be called back and someone who can be trusted sent. The British SI sources confirm my own with regard to the approaching crisis. We have days before us, not weeks. The Axis grip on North Africa, Tangier included, is growing tighter by the hour. Orders are requested now.

EDDY

S E C R E TJ. I. C. 10APRIL 14, 1942COPY NO. 18JOINT U. S. INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEEEDDY CABLES REGARDING NORTH AFRICANote by the Secretary

The Secretary, Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff, on 13 April 1942, requested orally that the Joint Intelligence Committee evaluate two cables from Lieutenant Colonel Eddy, U.S.M.C., dated Tangier 10 April and 11 April. The attached paper constitutes the Committee's response to that request.

L. L. MONTAGUE,
Joint Secretary.

SECRETEXPOSURE

1. Evidences. There are as yet no specific evidences of an intended German break through Tunisia nor of an attack through Spanish Morocco.
2. Capabilities - Military.
 - a. Axis forces in Tripoli are not adequately equipped for a break through Tunisia.
 - b. Axis forces on the Spanish frontier are not adequate to traverse Spain to attack across the Strait of Gibraltar.
 - c. Adequate Axis forces exist in Italy for transport across the Mediterranean to Tunisia and Algeria. British forces in the Western Mediterranean are not sufficient to prevent this transit.
3. Capabilities - Political.
 - a. The reinstatement of Laval indicates a possible turn-over of North Africa in connection with the development of collaboration.
 - b. Although the loyalty of North African garrisons to Vichy is questionable, their opposition to a political turn-over cannot be counted on.
4. Time involved. May 1 is the earliest date for arrival at port of the material referred to, and May 20 the earliest date for delivery in Africa, assuming priority for material and vessels.
5. Conclusions.
 - a. It is impossible to prevent Axis occupation of North Africa in the event that the Axis is prepared or intends to use military force in the near future.

b. It is probable that, unless some support is given to disaffected elements, a peaceful turn-over will take place.

c. Assuming that Vichy collaboration means eventual Axis control, civil or military, it is possible that a useful strategic and political end would be served by aiding, disaffected elements to initiate and maintain a continuing guerrilla opposition, by taking at this time action to force a military rather than a peaceful occupation.

SECRETJ. I. C. 8th MeetingCOPY NO. 4April 14, 1942JOINT U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

MINUTES of Meeting held in Room 213,
Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
on TUESDAY, 14 April 1942, at 2:30 P.M.

PRESENT

Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence, in the chair.

Major General George V. Strong, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Hon. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State.

Major David Bruce (in behalf of Colonel William J. Donovan, Coordinator of Information).

Mr. Charles B. Rayner, Board of Economic Warfare.

ALSO PRESENT

Colonel Louis J. Fortier, Joint Intelligence Subcommittee.

Commander J. F. Foskett, Joint Intelligence Subcommittee.

Lieutenant Colonel M. Preston Goodfellow, C.O.I.

SECRETARIAT

Lieutenant Colonel Ludwell L. Montague

SECRET

J.I.C. 8th Meeting


1. EDDY CABLES REGARDING NORTH AFRICA.

(Oral request, Secretary, J.C.S., 13 April 1942.)

THE COMMITTEE continued its discussion of this subject, begun in the 7th Meeting. LT. COL. GOODFELLOW appeared briefly to answer questions concerning Lt. Col. Eddy's activities and previous reports.

THE COMMITTEE:

- 1) Dictated an evaluation of the two cables referred to it, and instructed the Secretary to deliver a fair copy to the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, without delay.
- 2) Instructed the Secretary to issue the evaluation as a J.I.C. paper (J.I.C. 10).



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NAVAL ATTACHE

Tangier, Morocco.
April 8, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
24th and E Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Personal and Confidential

Dear Colonel Donovan,

1. I have the honor to transmit enclosure (A) representing the final and revised plans of our Moroccan friends for receiving the "Premiere Commande", or first shipment of communication materials, etc. I instead of being landed secretly on the coast of southern Morocco, they are to be received normally and smuggled through customs at Port Lyautey, consigned to P.T.T. Later consignments will be received at IMSOUSAN BAY, as stated in the concluding paragraphs where the wharfe and kelp factory will not be ready in time for the Premiere Commande.

Our friends are now ready to receive this first shipment whenever it comes. Just let me know.

Please note that no matter whence the shipment originates, it is to be taken off a PORTUGUESE ship near the coast, and accompanied by Portuguese invoices. This will have to be managed in Lisbon.

2. I enclose also (B) which constitutes a further requisition for Morocco requested for delivery after all of the first requisition has been received. It is sent early to permit time to assemble the items listed.

3. Two new long range Mark-3 W/T transmitters have been received and will be placed out immediately. Their names are YANKEE and DIXIE stations. The beginning of effective traffic will be delayed unless RALPH can arrive soon to travel as courier and instruct coders and operators. Only two stations are in contact with me now. The work out here is progressing, waiting to be eaten up, we need now is to be supplied with the personnel to do it.

Respectfully submitted,

W.A. Eddy
W.A. Eddy

Copy to Colonel SOLBORG
Telegrams henceforth always to Colonel SOLBORG who will relay to Washington if necessary.

A

March 4, 1962.

MEMORANDUM

For Mr. [Name] and for Colonel [Name], from Vice Consul King.

Follows the summary of Tweedledum's activities and decisions up to date:

The first problem is the landing of the 72 tons of material in the first order. To simplify matters it might be well to call it Lot A. After considerable investigation and consultation Tweedledum has decided that the simplest way would be to land it more or less openly with the consent of various authorities at Port Lyautey. Accordingly, it has been arranged that these goods shall be landed consigned to the P.T.T. (Office of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones) at Port Lyautey. Customs house men will be instructed to pass these cases without opening them. Trucks belonging to the P.T.T. will pick them up and deliver them to points designated in the interior. The following subterfuges and conditions must be observed:

1) These cases should come here on a Portuguese boat whether they are shipped directly from Portugal or transhipped from another ship at sea - this depends upon facilities and conditions at Lisbon.

2) Manifests, invoices, Bills of lading, etc., should show these goods to be of Portuguese origin. Obviously these documents will have to be faked in Portugal. It might be advisable to keep separate those cases marked UC in red so that they can be shipped or short-shipped at the last moment, depending upon last-minute conditions here. As it is, Tweedledum believes that he can arrange it with the P.T.T. and other authorities so that these cases be handed over to him for his own distribution or disposal.

3) Nevertheless these cases should be entered on the invoices and bills of lading as containing articles designated in the invoice list which I am forwarding by ~~air~~ courier. You will note that certain articles on this list will have UC marked in red crayon on the margin.

Be watch for the first consignment for Port Lyautey.

When Tweedledum came in the other day he had a third list which I am enclosing with this memorandum. This is material desired by the Army over and above those things listed in Lot A and Lot B. They would like to have these goods as soon as possible, with Lot A if possible, otherwise later. The Army is going to pay Tweedledum for the first shipment upon delivery, that is, for all goods bar those marked UC. Tweedledum will keep this money for expenses in connection with landing the larger quantities in the South, i.e. for motor trucks, fishing boats, wharf sheds and landing, etc.

As regards this landing in the South, Tweedledum has decided that he will ship immediately goods and has

-2-

located in a place called Inouan Bay, subject to personal inspection by himself and another contact acquainted with that locality. It is believed that the landing can be arranged here by transshipment from boats lying off the coast and they are now sweating round for suitable small craft.

Smethman seems to have fixed up matters with the Army and they are putting a small plane at his disposal to fly down there and carry out his arrangements.

I will report further as news comes in.

David W. King
David W. King.

L-2

**LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**
NAVAL ATTACHE

Tangier, Morocco.

1 April 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
24th and E Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Personal and Confidential

Dear Colonel Donovan,

My telegram No 19, sent to you this date, will explain the delay in securing the information you requested in your Nr 14 regarding the Watt transmitters and the tele-imprimeurs. The problem of coding facilities is acute in the Foreign Service, and it is rapidly becoming acute in my office, with the secret chain of A/P communications taking shape. I have now received from London two more long range, Mark III sets, which I shall place immediately in Tunisia and Algeria. We are past the experimental stage of establishing contact, with traffic passing over the lines soon daily. I shall need the fulltime assistance of a coding clerk to prepare double transposition messages to all points in the chain, not to mention need of a full time radio operator here at Tangier. Our problem now is not future or past. We have results and are ready to work. I do hope the supply of clerical assistance to me office, stenographic and coding, may be furnished with the least possible delay, either from Lisbon or New York. Other wise we shall be crippled. There is no one who can be employed locally for this very confidential work. It must be a trained citizen, possibly a member of a diplomatic staff being evacuated from an Axis-controlled country. I need altogether (1) stenographer, (1) coding clerk, and (1) radio operator for Tangier.

I had hoped for some help from the Navy, but have just received a cable stating that they have decided not to send into Tangier any more Naval personnel, because to do so might break the back of the Spaniard's impatience with our growing military and naval establishment.

Arrangements for reception on the coast of Morocco are complete and await only your word as to shipment. The main and first plan contemplates reception off the coast just north of AGADIR. We shall have two boats operating there, going up and down the coast to SAFI for phosphates. These boats will meet the incoming shipment, transfer coarboas at night at sea, and landed and transferred to ten trucks (trucks which have been prepared. Secondly, if anything should miscarry in this plan, we have an alternative of bringing the material right into Port Lyautey as a commercial shipment, the local authorities having been fixed up. I think secondly there is always danger of German snooping, so I much prefer the first and basic plan which has been very carefully prepared.

Cells of an entirely different organization are being organized to receive demolition material, and to be prepared to act if the curtain goes down for us in N. Africa. I am hoping demolition material will be included by you in the main shipment to Morocco, but I am also arranging in the meantime for small shipments from Gibraltar, the first of which should be sent in three weeks.

Needless to say, we are also hoping for early word that the small arms requested by Ichia food are being shipped to Gibraltar to be held for emergency delivery to Algeria. Reception plans are complete for all these operations.

Respectfully submitted

Return to J M Edt

*12.75
@ Field*

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NAVAL ATTACHE

Tangier, Morocco.

29th March, 1942.

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Co-ordinator of Information,
24th and East Street, N.W.,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dear Colonel Donovan,



1. Last week I forwarded the second half of a report on the technical operation and equipment of the railways of Tunisia. This report from Mr. Doolittle I marked "Attention of Dr. Langer", who had requested this material. I had understood that the first half of this report (Pages 1 to 14 of typescript) had been delayed in the mail and would reach me soon, but I now find that all the copies of this first part went directly from Tunis to the State Department. Please refer Dr. Langer to the State Department for the complete report.

2. The following is for Mr. Henry Field, and for any others interested in the Arabic broadcasts from the Boston station. We find considerable difficulty in hearing clearly these broadcasts except on the most powerful receiving sets. I tried for several nights to get it with our Navy radio man on the Legation set at 8 p.m. G.M.T. without success. It would appear therefore that irrespective of the merit of the text, we are failing to reach the bulk of radio listeners in Morocco. I would suggest a lower frequency such as the Cincinnati short-wave station, which we hear perfectly, but on the other hand I know nothing about the technical difficulties.

... ..

The lack of good music here would suggest the desirability of combining the propaganda programs to the Moors with music, entertainers in Arabic, comic dialogue or anecdote. The Moors love their native entertainments and humour, while Spanish and French speaking Moors are quite musical. I believe there would be great attention to these programs if carefully planned entertainments were included. For this however, we would need Moroccan Arabic for this region, not Egyptian or Syrian Arabic.

... ..



COI
Form 40

File

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
Official Dispatch

Date March 16, 1942

FROM Donovan
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

TO EDDY

<input type="checkbox"/>	Clear Text
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Code or Cipher
<input type="checkbox"/>	Acknowledge
<input type="checkbox"/>	Priority
<input type="checkbox"/>	Routine

Unless otherwise designated transmit this dispatch as DEFERRED.

COPY TO: Donovan, Kimbel, Bruce, Goodfellow

Outgoing Heading

TRANSMIT

#9 I have received your letter of 3 March. I congratulate you on the intelligence and energy with which you prepared your plan. Your telegraphic request is made clearer by your materiel memorandum. We are working on this, but I wonder if, for ease in shipment, it would be possible to buy these in Lisbon. Make it evident to your friends that we are bearing the expense. I think your manner of talking to the natives is to be admired.

SECRET

Operator's *Secret*

Initials of "Releasing" Officer

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NAVAL ATTACHE

Sheet 2.

Tangier, Morocco.

Colonel William J. Donovan.

The Arabs are greatly impressed by American philanthropy in many parts of the world. I think this should be made the subject of some propaganda on the radio, mention of the American Universities at Istanbul, Beirut and Cairo, of the educational and medical services to the Arab world, of the recently announced mission to Arabia to develop its natural resources. This could be combined with the promise that America would do the same in Morocco and North Africa if invited to do so by the Sultan.

In this connection large numbers of the natives are not aware of America's part in the economic aid given to North Africa. The number of ships, the quantities and types of commodities already sent in should be broadcast widely in Arabia. This failure to give credit is a serious and unnecessary loss, and it might be well in the future to suggest that every item in the cargo, even every tin can of food, should be clearly labelled "Made in the U.S.A." and if necessary, stamped with Stars and Stripes. This material assistance is our best propaganda and we should make the most of it.

Respectfully submitted,

William J. Donovan

P.S. March 30, 1942. Contrary to par I above, I enclose herewith for Dr. Langer the first half of the report on the Tunisian Railroads, which has just come in

April 10, 1948

Colonel W. A. Eddy

Personal and Confidential

Dear Colonel:

There are a number of matters which it is believed that we should advise you in reference to the order for communications equipment for North Africa which you forwarded through to us first by telegram and later by letters. The telegram was badly mutilated but the letters gave us more information. The outstanding point is that the list was evidently prepared by an individual who of course did not know American standards and possibly was not himself a technical man. For this reason we had to use our own judgment as to what type of American apparatus would best fit the requirement although we did not know just how the apparatus was to be used.

As an example, in the case of dry cell batteries, the voltages specified are not American standard and we are therefore substituting American batteries which will give somewhere near the voltage required, in all cases slightly over, because it would take a year to build them to their standard if we could get the permission. Practically all of this equipment is on the highly restricted list and consists of material which is badly needed by the military forces.

Your last letter dated March 25 and addressed to Colonel Donovan included a list of material in which some changes were noted. It was particularly noted that considerable change from the original list was made in the question of "Accumulateurs type Cadmium-nickel". This required that we call for new bids. We are substituting the Edison nickel-iron battery because that is the only one made here of this type. The only difference is that the electrolyte is slightly different from that used in the French batteries but the electrolyte will be shipped along with the batteries so there will be no difficulty there. I note that in the last revised list you forwarded on March 25 the quantity of dry batteries was reduced.

This appears more reasonable to us. I note one change in your list of batteries. It formerly called for 60 volts - 6000 while your latest list designated that as 60 volts - 6000. This makes it the same battery as the list immediately below which was rated at 60 volts - 6000. We have corrected our list so we hope this is not a typographical error.

In the case of the vacuum tubes ordered, we can obtain most of them with the exception of the types 11-C-8, 11-F-6, 11-J-7, and the PH 60 and the so-called 2N types. These latter are absolutely unknown here and we have no way of substituting other tubes because undoubtedly the bases would be different even if we knew the tube characteristics.

The specifications for radio transmitters in some cases is very vague, particularly the 500 watt and the 200 watt transmitters. We wired you for further information but the replies were also somewhat vague although I am taking it for granted that these two types of transmitters will be used for both telephone and telegraph and will be for short waves only. We may have to substitute a 100 watt transmitter for the 200 watt size because it will take months to have such transmitters constructed, even by substitution there is considerable delay in delivery of this type of equipment. In the case of "Ondulateurs" in which you specify Creed, these are not manufactured in the United States and we have been unable to get information from England so we will substitute an American type that performs the same function.

There is some confusion here in the case of "Postes de TSP de campagne émetteurs récepteurs d'une portée de 10 Km. couvrant la gamme des 5 Km". We interpret this to mean that you want a field transmitter-receiver that would cover 10 kilometers on 5 meters. There is no such set in existence but we are substituting something which will do about half that distance on somewhat different wave length. In this item also they ask for 10 sets of spare "lampes". This is unreasonable because the tubes last a long while so we are sending along the usual U.S. Army spare parts which will probably be about 5 tubes.

We are concentrating only on items which are marked "1^o Commande" because this in itself is a tremendous order and will come to about a million dollars in value. The other items can be taken up later and are of

comes duplicates of the first shipment although in larger quantity.

Some of the equipment will not be exactly according to your specifications, either in weight or size, but we have had to make this sacrifice in order to get any equipment at all. It seemed unreasonable to worry about dimensions and weights in standardized equipment which could not be changed in any case to meet such standards, as an example vacuum tubes. Also some apparatus, such as "Teleimprimers" must have motors designed for the power available and those depend upon synchronized operation. You answered my telegram and we will take care of that.

The big problem is in getting deliveries. There is none of this apparatus on the shelf and everything must be built on order and that involves all kinds of priority questions, scarcity of certain materials, bottlenecks in parts, etc. but please feel assured we are using every means at our disposal to obtain the best deliveries possible. Additional information will be forwarded you in this regard.

I thought it best to write this letter so that you could get a picture of how we were working and the problems which came up. In the event of future orders it is very desirable whenever requisitions are made up on technical equipment that an expert in that particular line give all the information possible so that we can find a substitute which will fit the need. As an instance, every voltage and power requirement on the batteries in your list was not American standard. Therefore we had to use our own judgment and unless we have a fair amount of information as to the uses to which this apparatus is to be put we might make serious mistakes. You state in your letter that you have "one long-range set (Mark III here with me)". This means nothing to us unless we know that "Mark III" is U. S. Navy, Army, or perhaps it might even be British or other designation. In every case where we are sending you apparatus it will be equipment that is not experimental, but simple and well proven equipment. This is being done because we realize the rough use it will probably receive.

Sincerely,

G. W. Horn
Technical Advisor

P. S. We are accepting your last list included in the letter of March 25 as the correct list. We noted the changes in the specifications on batteries, both storage and dry cells, as well as the change in quantities. We hope that these changes are not typographical errors and any reference to your order should be based on this last list as being the correct one.

CWE

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NAVAL ATTACHE

Tangier, Morocco
25 March 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
24th Street, NW
Washington, D. C.

Personal and Confidential

Dear Colonel Donovan,

I enclose carefully revised requisition for the delivery to the coast of French Morocco, requisition which was the subject of my telegram Nos. 9-12. If this revision arrives too late to be considered, it will not be fatal as the error does not vitiate the substantial value of the original list. The revision is the result of extended conferences between the Moroccan and the Algerian leaders. Some items have been cut down in quantity, because it was found that Algeria could share some of their communication equipment.

Please note, however, the addition of one page which is entirely new, that is "Annex Nr. 3", which adds to the shipment the small arms requested in my telegram Nr. 16, and which you have said would be rushed. The patrol requested with the shipment is to permit lorries to move the cargo to the inland point of distribution and concealment. The lorries are assured, but there is always the danger at the last minute that German land forces may come down or appropriate all patrol supplies.

It should be carefully noted that "Annex 3" as well as the eight cases marked in red in "Annex 1" (cases de T17) are not to be drafted and marked "U.C." on the outside, when the supplies are unloaded these items marked in red are to be rushed by Uncle George to a separate destination, for a special and separate purpose. All the rest of the requisition will be consigned unmarked to the leaders of the army revolution in Morocco.

So far my comments have been on the list requested by the French. In addition they will be glad to have you include a substantial supply of demolition material for operations in which we are interested, with or without revolt by the army. I make no part of these, as you and Colonel Solborg know better what you want to help in. Anyway, there is an ideal reception party for all purposes concerned. A reception opportunity may be used to the full, and your arrival, if not later than April 15 or 20, will not be a problem. I will give the latitude and longitude of the point of reception, that must be held to the last minute. Suffice it to say that the ship will arrive at the coast will have to come to the reception point. The ship will have to arrive by within a few days of the time, there is no doubt that by your reception party will be organized.

You will be interested to know that General Jinh, as
the chief of staff, has given consent to the reception and
use of the equipment in the arrangements.

From the nature of the requisitions you will observe
that the organization in Algeria needs no communication equipment,
since it controls the official communications. It wants only the
small arms from Gibraltar. In Morocco, a sub-rosa communication
system is needed to insure contact and efficient common action.

2. Reference par 1 (B) of my letter of March 28, cited
requisition of small arms to be ready at Gibraltar. I now note a
typographical error in the last item which should read "five million
pounds" and had "pounds" instead of five million. An extra cipher
was inadvertently added in typing. The figure was given correctly
in my telegram Nr. 16, and I assume no harm is done.

3. Mr. DoLittle's proposal to finance a palace revolt in
Tunisia is laid aside for the time being, because of the serious
illness of the Bey and other political complications. Mr. DoLittle
is sure the move would be unwise just now. I wish to acknowledge
gratefully your authorization, and the credit of fifty thousand
dollars (\$50,000.00), which will just be left on deposit until
needed. In the meantime, and in accordance with authority in your
telegram Nr. 12, I am planning to use part of this deposit, from
two to possibly four thousand dollars a month, to finance a part of
strong Arab Chiefs, directly and through the French (all with French
approval too.)

4. Although we still have only one long-wave set (Mark 1
here with me) three short wave Paracettas have been placed out,
our 15-chain is really taking shape. The stations are as follows:

- Tanger.....NEWAY
- Casablanca.....LINDOLE
- Oran.....FRANKLIN
- Tunis.....COLUMBUS

NEWAY is in regular contact with London and with LINDOLE.
FRANKLIN has only just gone in the mesh, no operator yet.
COLUMBUS has not proceeded yet in contacting Malta, to signal of
action on ships.
We hope for results soon, but the incessant bombing of
Malta may partly explain.

5. Enclosed report on Derlet's organization to deliver
arms to the Axis. I suppose the Allies can act sooner and more
effectively. Time is everything.

Respectfully submitted,

General Nelson, Liaison

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NAVAL ATTACHE

Tangier, Morocco.

3 March, 1942.

The Coordinator of Information.
24th and "E" Streets N.W.
Washington, D.C.

For personal attention of Colonel Donovan.

Urgent.

My Dear Colonel Donovan:

1. Reference my telegrams 9 to 12 inclusive.

These telegrams, as is explained in number 9, refer to a preliminary requisition for delivery in the very near future. I enclose the original text in full. We are encyphering (as rapidly as we can without any coding clerk to help) the column headed "lere commande" which constitutes the first installment for delivery to be followed by as many more shipments as will be needed as indicated by the preceding column "quantités nécessaires". The coding is being done in French which prevents confusion that would result if we attempted here to describe the technical equipment in terms of their American equivalents. Since negotiations with this group of Frenchmen, our most reliable and hopeful prospects, have now reached the point of decision and action it is of utmost importance that you instruct me immediately regarding policy, and regarding date of delivery.

You will note that these French leaders (which include Uncle Charlie and Robin Hood) offer to pay for this first shipment and are prepared even to arrange with friends in the French Navy to bring them in by sea from some ship which they would meet at sea with a French vessel, and transfer the cargo. These are among the evidences of their initiative and determination. I would suggest however that we rely upon other means of delivery to the coast. I am prepared at any time to arrange reception parties for small cargoes which could be met by fishing boats and transferred to sack bags. In any case we ~~can~~ in Morocco can arrange for the reception and distribution of the material at any time that it can be delivered. After hearing from you I should be glad to proceed next to the time, place, and manner of

W. J. ... and the "B" brothers

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NAVAL ATTACHE

Tangier, Morocco.

3 March, 1948.

bringing the goods to the coast. I am off to Casablanca Saturday to meet the leaders and shall at that time promise an early reply from your office. I should add perhaps that these leaders are the principal ones referred to in Mr. Murphy's earlier despatch to the State Department and they have his full confidence as well as my own.

2. I enclose very important letter from Mr. Dooclittle, Consul in Tunis, which I have felt it would be unwise to attempt to condense into a telegram. Please note the far reaching proposal beginning with the last paragraph of page 2 and continuing to the end of his letter. I should like to have immediately your reply by telegram telling me: (a) Whether you approve encouraging this Palace Revolution in Tunisia and, (b) If so, whether the \$20,000. or \$30,000. could be promised if necessary for this undertaking.

Very respectfully yours,

W. G. Eddy
W. G. EDDY

(PERSONAL, CONFIDENTIAL)

Tunis, February 25, 1942

Dear Colonel Eddy:

I have not ceased to regret the shortage of time during which we were able to speak together. I should have liked to have continued our talks all through the two or three days I was in Tangier, and the purpose of this letter is to clarify some of the subjects we touched on so hurriedly.

In the first place, I want to explain my attitude about the work to be done here. If I remember correctly, I stated my belief that the principal work should be not to stop an isolated truck-load of merchandises or a few barrels of gas or even momentarily block a road which would be either rapidly repaired or detoured. This would seem a matter for a period of active hostility, when even momentary disruption of supplies to the enemy would be important.

The main object, I believe, is to stop supplies at the source, and I have a case in point on what we are trying to do in regard to the goods transported by French ships for ultimate shipment across Tunisia to Libya. According to our latest information it appears that our local publicity combined with the BBC broadcast on the subject and the American protest to Vichy has stopped this traffic, as our informer in the port now lets us know that five ships whose arrival had been announced for this week have been cancelled, and a friend in governmental circles has informed us that orders have been received from Vichy to stop it. This of course represents far more than single truck-loads, and in my opinion should be the manner to work as long as we still maintain relations with the French.

Another point on which British cooperation would be indispensable would be the matter of stopping Italian ships carrying goods either from Tunisian ports or directly from Italian ports. We hope within a reasonably short time to have a means of communicating the passage of such ships -- at least those visible from the Tunisian coast -- directly to Malta. After such communications it is of course up to the British forces to "bag" them.

My third point is the matter of enlisting the cooperation of Arab groups. This last matter is of course excessively explosive politically, inasmuch as it is necessarily anti-French as well as possibly anti-Axis. The Arabs, according to conversations which I have had since returning here, are only prepared to cooperate with us for their own purposes. I have explained to them the view of the situation in Libya at the present time, nothing active can be undertaken nor any

promised.

promises given, but that (1) they should continue to organize, (2) that I would endeavor to secure means for them to work with, (3) that as a military force the French army and navy are obviously more valuable on our side than a mere population mass, (4) that I am firmly of the belief that, regardless of whether the French in North Africa actually turn out to help us actively or not, at the end of the war the whole colonial question all over the world will be re-opened, and that their behavior during the struggle would be taken into consideration.

There are, of course, divisions of opinion among the Arabs themselves. To the weaker or more superficial spirits, visible victories are the best propaganda, and these unfortunately the Axis has been able to produce, while we so far have shown only at best a few isolated cases of resistance like that of General MacArthur. Other groups, however, realize that the victories produced by the Japanese and the Axis are not necessarily decisive, that wherever they have gone they have imposed themselves by force alone, and that they could expect no assistance but only vengeance from the populations which they have overrun, that therefore if the tide turns it will be accelerated by the very fact of previous victories.

A number of this latter group with whom I have spoken are convinced that we will ultimately win when we are in a position to take the offensive, that our way of thought and previous record entitles them to expect from us fair treatment, and they are doing what they can to get this view-point over to their correligionaires.

They propose a very interesting and reasonably feasible operation for which I am now about to request your aid. First, let us sketch in the background. The political set-up in Tunisia is headed by the Bey who occupies roughly the same position as the Sultan of Morocco, with the French Resident General as his Counselor and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The laws and decrees are prepared by the Resident General and presented to the Bey for his signature in order to make them operative in all Tunisian territory. The Bey is aged (64 years). His successor is a man of over 70 years of age and the Beylical family consists of some wealthy members and some poor ones, but all completely venal. The Bey's Prime Minister or Grand Vizier, Lakhoua, is an Arab of ordinary family who, however, possesses a great influence over his sovereign and is thoroughly in the hands of the French. The Prime Minister should technically counsel the Bey as to the signature of the laws presented to him, which are usually handed in on a Thursday for promulgation on the following day, thereby allowing practically no consideration. In the group surrounding the Bey there are two or three other persons who also have certain influence over him, notably a young nephew and one of his sons. The Beylical

really as a whole rather sticks together, as it forms a Cabinet clan somewhat separated from the Tunisian one. It is proposed, therefore, through corruption and bribery, if you do not like to mince words, to influence a number of members of the family to unseat the present pro-French Prime Minister by family pressure brought on the old Bey, and to replace him by one who is known to be pro-American and pro-British. If this is successful, as it may be, it is then proposed to demand that at least a week's consideration be availed of by the Bey before signing any decrees and that the Beylical entourage shall influence the old prince either to withhold signature or to introduce changes in the laws to safe-guard the interests of the total population. By this means a great deal of the supplies now going to Libya could be withheld as it would be impossible to source them out of the local Arab producers without the Bey's assent or without undertaking armed operations.

It is estimated that the cost of this palace revolution would be a few million francs judiciously distributed in proper quarters. It might even include gifts in kind such as gasoline for motor-cars, jewels, cloth. This expenditure would not come all at once; it would have to be arranged as a continued affair as it would be necessary not only to purchase the preliminary agreement but also to keep the interest so purchased from lapsing, by continuing favors.

Considering the number of millions we are spending on our war effort, it strikes me that twenty or thirty thousand dollars expended in this way would bring bigger dividends than the same amount expended on a shell which did not hit its objective. It is therefore that I ask whether you would consider supplying the needs of war for such a purpose.

Of course success can not be guaranteed any more than the artilleryman can guarantee that his shell is going to hit the target. However, it appears feasible and might produce results out of all proportion to its cost.

A similar operation might be undertaken in Morocco where I understand the soil is already prepared. At this point I would suggest that you have a serious talk with Vice-Consul Pender who, although he may appear a light-hearted young gentleman, has some rather sound ideas, and is prepared to work along those lines.

I am sending you two copies of this letter in case you wish to send it on, but I am not keeping a copy here. Please let me have your reactions to this matter, and let me know whether it will any time seem be possible for you to pay a visit over here as you could gain much clearer picture by personal observation than I am able to give you by letter even as long as the present one.

Very truly yours,

MATERIEL TELEPHONIQUE

Relevé de Matériel	quantité	lors nécessaire	Commande	Observations
Appareils téléphoniques de campagne.....	1,000		300	Ave 20 jeux de piles de re-charge par poste
Appareils téléphoniques de table à batterie locale, se représentant type français P.T.T.	500		100	do.
Tableaux commutateurs à 4 direct.	500		100	
do. à 8 direct.	200		50	
do. à 12 direct.	100		30	
Standard à 50 directions	50		20	
Cable de campagne lourd	10,000km		--	
Cable téléphonique léger	6,000km		--	
Sacs de monteurs garnis	1,000		400	Contenant: 1 marteau à panne fendue 1 tournevis 1 couteau de montage 1 pince universelle 25 peulies en bois 25 pointes 1 rouleau de chatterton
Chatterton en bâton	1,000kg		250	
Chatterton en ruban	2,000kg		1,000	

MATERIEL RADIOELECTRONIQUE

<u>Designation du materiel</u>	<u>Quantite</u>	<u>Libre</u> <u>disponible</u>	<u>Observations</u>
Postes de T.S.F. de campagne emetteurs-recepteurs d'une portee de 100 kms couvrant la gamme 600 - 800.	500	200	Avec le jeux de lampes
Postes de T.S.F. de campagne emetteurs-recepteurs d'une portee de 40 a 50 kms couvrant la gamme Emission: 120 - 220 Reception: 100 - 250	200	75	do.
Postes de T.S.F. de campagne emetteurs-recepteurs de 100 a 1,000 kms de portee, couvrant la gamme Emission: 30 a 60 m Reception: 25 a 115 m	100	50	do.
Postes radios emetteurs 500 watts	6	2	do.
Postes radios emetteurs 200 watts	10	3	do.
Postes radios Gonios type Adcock ondes longues	7	3	do.
Postes radios Gonios type Adcock ondes courtes	7	3	do.
Postes Recepteurs H.R.O. type standard	50	20	Composent: - 1 recepteur avec 4 selfs couvrant 30 MC a 17 MC; lampes 6V3. - 3 selfs supplementaires. 200 a 2000 KC/s 500 a 1000 KC/s 175 a 400 KC/s - 1 boite d'alimentation type 8406 pour lampes 6V3 fournissant 150 volts, 25 millis avec valves.

Annex 12.2

-2-

MATERIEL RADIOTELEPHONIQUE

<u>Nomenclature du Matériel</u>	<u>Quantité</u> <u>nécessaire</u>	<u>lère</u> <u>Commande</u>	<u>Observations</u>
Postes Emetteurs-Recepteurs en phonie d'une portée de 10 le kms en phonie, pour en- gins blindés	100	30	
Teleimprimeurs complets	50	20	
Ondulateurs "CREED" complets	10	4	

OBSERVATION: Prière instante de joindre a chaque materiel une
notice technique indiquant les schemas de montage.

LAMPES A EMISSION ET DE RECEPTION

<u>Lampes</u> <u>FRANCAISES</u>	<u>CORRESPONDANCE</u> <u>U.S.A.</u>	<u>Quantité</u> <u>Necessaire</u>	<u>lére</u> <u>Commandes</u>	<u>Observations</u>
2-A-5	2-A-5	100	50	
6-A-6	6-A-6	500	100	
2-B-7	2-B-7	100	50	
6-B-7	6-B-7	100	50	
11-C-5	11-C-5	1,000	500	
6-C-5	6-C-5	1,000	500	
6-C-6	6-C-6	100	50	
6-D-6	6-D-6	100	50	
6-E-5	6-E-5	100	50	
6-F-5	6-F-5	100	50	
6-F-6	6-F-6	1,500	500	
11-F-6	11-F-6	1,000	100	
6-H-6	6-H-6	100	50	
6-J-5	6-J-5	100	50	
6-J-7	6-J-7	2,500	800	
11-J-7	11-J-7	1,000	100	
6-K-5	6-K-5	100	50	
6-K-7	6-K-7	500	100	
6-L-6	6-L-6	500	100	
6-L-7	6-L-7	100	50	
6-Q-7	6-Q-7	100	50	
6-R-7	6-R-7	100	50	
6-V-6	6-V-6	100	50	
5-Z-3	5-Z-3	100	50	
5-Z-4	5-Z-4	100	50	
42	42	100	50	
57	57	100	50	
58	58	100	50	
80	80	200	200	
Ph. 60	NEANT	2,500	500	
T.M. 2	"	10,000	5,000	
T.M. 15	"	5,000	2,000	
T.M.B.A.	"	1,000	300	
T.M.E.C.	"	500	100	
T.M. 3.G. 80	"	1,000	300	

Figure No. 1

PILES - ACCUMULATEURS

<u>Type</u>	<u>Tension</u>	<u>Regime Max. de decharge en A.H.</u>	<u>Capa- cite en A.H.</u>	<u>Quantites necessaires</u>	<u>Re Commande</u>	<u>Observations</u>
Piles-batteries						
blocs "tension plaque"						
	150V	0A.020		1,000	500	
	80V	0A.050		2,000	1,000	
	80V	0A.020		2,000	1,000	
	100V	0A.030		3,000	1,500	
	20V	0A.050		2,000	1,000	
	40V	0A.015		2,000	1,000	
Piles-batteries						
blocs "chauffage"						
	6V a- vec prise a 4V,5	0A.200	10	6,000	3,000	
	4V.5	0A.200	8	2,000	1,000	
Accumulateurs type						
Cadmium-nickel						
	6V		96	600	200	Chassis de 5 elements
	20V		96	600	200	3 chassis de 5 elements + 1 chassis de 2 elements
	80V		3	600	200	8 chassis de 8 elements
	4V	0A.800	8	600	200	type monobloc avec sorties par prise de courant polarisee
	5V,5		8	1,200	400	Chassis de 4 elements
Accumulateurs au						
plomb						
	4V	0A.800	10	1,200	400	
	6V		20	600	200	
	12V		20	600	200	

Form No. 1

GROUPES ELECTROGENES ET MOTEURS

<u>Nomenclature du Matériel</u>	<u>Quantité Nécessaire</u>	<u>1ère Demande</u>	<u>Observations</u>
Groupes électrogènes de 30 K.V.A.	2	0	Moteur Diesel verti- cal 1,000 T/M Alternateur 110/120
Groupes électrogènes de 20 K.V.A.	4	0	do.
Groupes électrogènes de 10 K.V.A.	4	2	do.
Groupes électrogènes de 6 K.V.A.	12	8	Moteur à essence, génératrice à courant continu 110
Groupes électrogènes de 2,5 K.V.A.	26	20	do.
Groupes électrogènes de 1000 W.	50	25	Moteur à essence, génératrice à courant continu 32 V
Aeromoteurs de 500 à 1500 Watts	20	10	

OBSERVATION. Compléter cette commande par les recharges diverses
pour réparer 1/3 du matériel moteur.

Annexe No. 5MATERIEL OPTIQUE

<u>Nomenclature du Materiel</u>	<u>Quantité Necessaire</u>	<u>lérys Commande</u>	<u>Observations</u>
Appareils de signalisations optique de campagne portatifs, d'une portée de 10 Kms environ	250	0	

MATERIEL DE LIGNES FIXES

<u>Nomenclature du Materiel</u>	<u>Quantité Nécessaire</u>	<u>libre Commande</u>	<u>Observations</u>
Fil de cuivre 25/10	2,000 kms.	0	
Fil de cuivre 30/10	10,000 kms.	0	

1000 March 1942.

In the occupation North Africa I include Tangier, Spanish Morocco, French Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. Although each in its way has separate problems which must be considered, it is equally in my opinion impossible to separate any one from the other and it is equally fatal to attempt to deal with Tunisia from the North West without reference to what I may call the Western Mediterranean basin.

The position throughout the Western Mediterranean basin has reached the point when it is quite impossible to make progress, which automatically implies going backwards, unless it is known what policy is desired in that particular area.

There undoubtedly are in the Western Mediterranean basin sphere a number of divergent trends, particularly between the Spanish, the French and the Moors. There are also the Jews and the miscellaneous collection of Anti Franco Spaniards, violently pro-Allied Norwegians, Poles and other nations.

I feel that, apart from the possibility of carrying out isolated but important acts destined to deny to the enemy specified assets or supplies, a proper and effective S.O.E. policy can only be formulated in relation to a general combined Policy in North Africa adopted both by the Americans and the British.

We know quite well certain fundamental facts underlying the various trends of French, Spanish, Moorish and miscellaneous opinions in North Africa. Both the U.S.A. and Great Britain from a strategical point of view want to deny North Africa and its products to Germany. Equally we want to keep the Straits open to our shipping which means a neutral Iberian Peninsula.

How can our objects be made to coincide with a state of willingness on the part of the French, Spanish and Moorish peoples to help us. I suggest by action in which the Americans would be the leaders to secure

- (a) A United French Nation in North Africa and thereafter French assistance.
- (b) Special assistance in Spanish Morocco.
- (c) A release by the Moors.

Dealing with each of these in turns-

- (a) A United French Nation in North Africa and thereafter French assistance.

It is equally vital that the French be ready to resist German occupation or

The situation is strictly... A... established... for some reason... the weight... the Secretary General, Secretary First, the... or finally "Steel balls"

Of the whole situation there can be no doubt but that the pro-... will be fitted into one General Canibus. The... and those who depend for... of the Vichy Government, and those... or perhaps by chance of circumstances... state an income exceeding their needs... Many render lip-service... that they may endure less discomfort by being at large... usually they are split into small groups... Any one group may prove... but they will not present... in favour

The steps to be taken seem to me to be-

- (a) To ascertain the anti-Vichy elements.
- (b) To procure a leader.
- (c) To deliver supplies both of arms and food in exchange for the following guarantees:
 - (1) Resistance to Germany.
 - (2) A welcome to the Allies.
 - (3) A measure of evolution in the Government of Morocco by Moroccans themselves.
 - (4) An agreed measure of Spanish expansion in Morocco.

Any bargain on the foregoing lines can only be arranged by the... and only finally arranged when an Expeditionary Force... can be landed in North Africa prior to any German occupation.

(d) Spanish assistance in Spanish Morocco.

If French North Africa is to be occupied by either side and... and aerodromes of Tangier... Can a bargain be made with Spain to help... to increase the area of

(e) A balance by Japan.

Just from aspirations for a measure of self-government the... by a display of force and a

certain individual personalities to be... the

...in the present
...for joint working in

...that Eddy has come out of Tangier as
...the joint supervision of U.S. S.I.S.

...his Raichle stationed in Gibraltar to carry out
...activities from that particular spot.
...from the latest information it appears
...from Gibraltar to the post of
...at Tangier, but
...Algeria and Tunis. It may be mentioned
...Raichle has had a final course of
...and in the use of toys and one of his
...as U.S. pouch carrier will
...in W/T and toys.

Apart from the position of Raichle and as a result of discussions
with Eddy, the set-up for North Africa for the purpose of effecting
the best possible joint venture between the British and the U.S.
has been agreed as follows:-

(a) The centre of all Operations shall be Tangier.

(b) In Tangier, bearing in mind Eddy's U.S. S.I.S. duties,
there has been established a group consisting of:-

Eddy or his representative
Bentley or his representative
Ellis or his representative
Crosland.

It is the intention that the J group shall meet daily, place
into the whirlpool of intelligence everything they know, this will
be followed by a smash-and-grab raid, and anything got out of the
whirlpool by any individual will be disseminated in various directions
direct and without delay.

(c) There will also be established an O. group consisting of:-


S.I.S. or his representative.
S.O.E. or his representative.
Eddy or his representative.

As its title implies, this O. Group which will meet as
frequently as is necessary, will deal solely with Operations.
Operations covers every multitude of sins and comprises, for
example, a Priority Board for the spacing of W/T sets, methods of
collecting and infiltrating toys, methods of infiltrating toys,
methods of carrying out individual Operations, and a discussion of
and to be described as Long Term Policy.

It is obvious that, for the purpose of the efficient fulfilment
of the objectives of the O Group, certain conditions are essential.
Obviously so long as the conditions
are present, they form the most effective
the exclusive services of

the position of Tunis is a peculiar one. From the point of view of the Mediterranean Basin, an association with Malta, which, in turn, has been super-dominated by Cairo. The position of the matter appears to be that it forms a sort of No Man's Land between Cairo and Gibraltar.

If Tunis is regarded as of importance it seems apparent that there must be close contact between Cairo and Gibraltar, and it is equally apparent if time is of any importance that we must pin our faith to the U.S. Consul Devan. The latter expresses his willingness to play a role provided he is in effect the king-pin in Tunis. It should not be difficult to sell him the idea, that he is the king-pin in Tunis, subject to control by the Tangier O. Group, and it seems to me essential that Tunis should in the future be run from the Western part of the Mediterranean and not from the Eastern. The practical method of doing this would appear to me to be this: London repeating to Cairo, communicate with Gibraltar or Tangier who do the needful in Tunis, or Cairo repeating to London, communicate with Malta, Malta communicates with Gibraltar or Tangier, who do the needful. Emphatically I add that, from the point of view of personal complication, if from no other, I should prefer some other arrangement were it possible, since I see great difficulties regarding the temperamental clashing of Khalid, Bentley and Devan, not to mention others.



SECRET

20 February 1942.

From: J. L. Raichle

To : Col. Wm. J. Donovan

Subject: Gibraltar

1. A survey of the Gibraltar situation to date indicates very limited possibilities. While I have established friendly relations and a fairly close liason with both the SOE and SIS groups it does not seem to be productive of any information of value. Both groups are in close touch with Col. Eddy in Tangier and anything I might do would in most instances be a duplication at best. The SOE group in particular apparently feel that since they are in close liason with Tangier it is unnecessary to include a Gibraltar representative in any discussion of their operations. So far as SIS is concerned they are entirely cordial and express a willingness to cooperate in any way. However, their reports which I have read are in the nature of summaries of reports of their various agents and nothing that would appear to be of an immediate nature. I believe the same information could be obtained through London. I am entirely dependent upon their channels of communication. I have asked if they would permit me to send messages in my own code but to date have not received permission to do so because of rigid censorship rules regarding all codes. Since I am located in a British fortress I doubt if they will want me to transmit anything the contents of which is not known to them.

2. Col. Eddy has been here for the past three days and I believe he sees the Gibraltar picture as I do. His contact with Gibraltar is so close that the presence of a Gibraltar representative is of no particular advantage to him. We are agreed that I could better serve by being in Tangier with him free to travel in North Africa to develop and maintain our secret chain of communications. This would necessitate a change of status and my attachment to the legation there in either a civilian capacity or as assistant Naval attache. I believe the law regarding promotion of retired officers has now been amended to permit their temporary promotion. I would also have to have a diplomatic cover as my present passport is a Special one valid for travel only in the British possessions and Spain and Portugal en route.

3. I delivered to His Excellency the Governore General Viscount Gort the letter you furnished me. He was most cordial and I had the pleasure of lunching with him. He was most sincere in asking after you. Captain Holland has been made a Rear Admiral and is no longer here. The present Chief of Staff, Captain Russell R.N. said that he would communicate the contents of your letter addressed to him. I also lunched with Admiral Edward-Collins R.N., the Vice Admiral Commanding North Atlantic. He said he remembered you most pleasantly from your last Mediterranean Trip.

Respectfully



J. L. Raichle

SECRET

**LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

NAVAL ATTACHÉ

Tangier, Morocco.

February 15, 1942.

**The Coordinator of Information,
24th and East Streets, N.W.,
Washington, D. C.**

Dear Sir:

1. I am leaving for Gibraltar tomorrow by a special small boat being sent over to take several persons who have urgent reasons to be in Gibraltar and who have been delayed in Tangier by the suspension of the service of the weekly British ferry boat the RESCUE. Following the explosion of the bomb which killed the British courier from Gibraltar and a number of other persons on February 6th the service of the ferry boat has been suspended indefinitely. At the same time the daily mail boat to and from Algeciras, the CORREO has also been suspended indefinitely. The reason given being economy of fuel. In any case the effect is to cut communications across the Straits. I trust I shall not be stranded in Gibraltar too long as I have much to do here but I am assured by our friends that the same necessity of communication will lead to the sending of the special boat back to Tangier Thursday or Friday of this week, the 19th or 20th of February. The chief of S.O. Tangier is crossing with me tomorrow and we shall arrange conversations at Gibraltar to promote cooperation and to assemble data for his meeting shortly with Colonel Sorberg in Lisbon. I shall also of course arrange for complete communications with Reichle who has arrived at Gibraltar and from whom I received a message yesterday.

2. Conversations here in Tangier indicate that it would be desirable to center in Colonel Bentley's office all records and files regarding Army, Air Corps and general military intelligence. My inability to purchase or secure locally maps and reference material on Morocco

makes

-2-

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NAVAL ATTACHE

SECRET

Tangier, Morocco.

makes it physically impossible to duplicate this general recording work which has been carried on by the Military Attaché for many months. In many cases his maps or tracings are unique. We have no photographic or drafting equipment with which to reproduce them. Furthermore, the urgent obligation on me to develop from the very beginning our S.I. and S.O. enterprises makes it doubly desirable that I do not attempt to cover the usual area assigned to a Naval Attaché. I shall restrict that function to naval intelligence here at nearby ports and at Gibraltar, local shipping news, and, of course, navigation and coastal data. For the time being full files even on heavy coast defenses will be kept and reported by Colonel Bentley who alone has studied the terrain and has the technical knowledge required for verification and evaluation. Close contact here between his office and mine will assure my access to those reports and information touching naval matters. In addition, I hardly need to say that there is also the consideration that Colonel Bentley has established means of communication to him of military intelligence which he has built up and which as my senior in the staff he should continue to operate. I am not including in this statement our S.I. or S.O. with whom I am to be the liaison officer at Tangier in accordance with directions from you and the State Department.

3. I am grateful for your telegram just received authorizing credit for me in dollars through the State Department for use in part in Tunisia and Algeria and in part for the two second-hand automobiles for my colleagues in French Morocco.

Mr. Deolittle, Consul General at Tunis is now here in Tangier for the week-end. I have talked with him and will talk with him further regarding possibilities. The prospects of any successful undertaking such as that which I proposed in telegram No. 2 are not so bright for the immediate future as they were ten days ago. The allied reverses in Libya and the spot light thrown by the BBC and the American Consular Service makes it improbable that we could secure immediate help from certain individuals who a few weeks ago were willing to take considerable risks. This does not mean that nothing can be done, on the contrary Mr. Deolittle informs me confidentially that quantities of the petroleum

being

-3-

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NAVAL ATTACHE

SECRET

Tangier, Morocco.

being shipped into Lybia are being rendered useless by the inclusion of materials in the drums which ruin the gas for use as fuel. In another case, the barrels which were shipped over the border contained water which has been substituted for the gas. Similar undertakings are going forward but I should like to have this considered confidential as my informant would no doubt prefer to make his own report to his own Department at the proper time and I have not secured his permission to make the statements in this paragraph. In agreement with him I am also going to urge at Gibraltar that the R.A.F. demolish certain points and that the Admiralty intercept tankers from France as information is made available.

4. It is much too early for me to express my opinion about the potential assistance which we might receive from the native population. So long as the best hope in Morocco and Algeria is in a separatist movement by the French I shall of course make no effort to establish contact with Moorish leaders except, of course, socially. It is most unfortunate that the really effective organization among the Moors in Tunisia (despatch to the State Department from Doolittle at Tunis No. 180, January 27) is temporarily unavailable. I wish we had such potential allies on the Atlantic coast of Morocco where they might be reached with supplies and reinforcements. Unhappily Tunisia seems inaccessible to such supplies from us in sufficient quantity to insure or prolong a successful revolt. If the British had appeared on the border of Tunisia in force this revolt I am sure would have been an ideal strategy for this winter. I recommend these possibilities and these obstacles to you as a subject of the greatest importance and one on which I should like to have your instructions. I include in this request for instructions the problem for the present of the Moors in Morocco.

I regret that my departure for Gibraltar tomorrow will mean that I shall leave before the pouch arrives and that I shall not be able to send you anything further by the

pouch

SECRET

**LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NAVAL ATTACHE**

Tangier, Morocco.

pouch for Lisbon which will leave February 19th before
my return.

Respectfully submitted,

W. A. Eddy
W. A. Eddy

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NAVAL ATTACHÉ

Tangier, Morocco.

2 March, 1942.

The Coordinator of Information,
24th and "E" Streets, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.

Eddy 4727A

Dear Sir:

1. Would you be good enough to urge upon the Department of State the granting of a visa to André Aron of Casablanca? He will be forced back into the French Navy where he is indispensable unless we can get him out to the U.S. where he will be most useful to our own war effort. I simply enclose biological notes on his case, but wish to emphasize that all who know him are confident that he should be given the visa.

2. Would it be possible to intercept at Lisbon an expert stenographer and, or, a coding clerk from among the staff of the American Consuls being repatriated from Axis territory and have such a clerk detached from the State Department and assigned to me. The work of my office will be doubled in efficiency if we can have such a recruit, man or woman. There is no one in Tangier to whom this confidential work could be given.

3. I enclose further memorandum regarding air fields on the Cape Verde Islands secured from Commander Gábral.

4. I enclose report on supplies going through Tunis to Libya prepared by Vice Consul David W. King of Casablanca, my principal American associate, who has just returned from a trip to Tunis and Algiers.

Respectfully submitted,

W. A. Eddy
W. A. EDDY.

ARON, ANDRE né le 22 Août 1909 à SARRE-UNION
(BAS-RHIN)

Nationalité : Française

Etudes secondaires à Nancy puis à Paris

Elève de l'École Polytechnique (1930-1932)

- A la sortie, nommé dans le corps des Ingénieurs
de l'Artillerie Navale (Navy Ordnance Engineer)

- Ecole d'application de l'Artillerie Navale (1932-1934)

- Stages en escadre, dans les Arsenaux et différentes
usines (1934-1935)

- Nommé en Septembre 1935 à la Fonderie

NATIONALE de la MARINE à RUEZÈE (Charente)

actuellement occupée - à laquelle je n'ai cessé mes
fonctions qu'en juin 1940 - Ai successivement occupé

les fonctions d'Ingénieur dans les services suivants :

Métallurgie (Fours Martin et électriques, Forges,

Laboratoire - Etudes et essais de nouveaux matériaux -

Usinage de culasses et affûts, Montage des matériels)

dirigeais en même temps l'école d'apprentissage -

Entre temps, ai participé à Brest à l'armement

du croiseur de bataille "DUNKERQUE" de

Janvier à mai 1937 et effectué un stage à

l'école des officiers canoniers à bord du "PULSTON"

de former à mai 1938, à la suite duquel j'ai obtenu
le BREVET d'OFFICIER CANONNIER et de D.C.A. de la
Marine.

Envoyé en mission en Afrique du Nord peu
avant l'Armistice ai été détaché de juillet à
Décembre 1940 aux Travaux Publics du Protectorat
au Maroc pour l'installation d'une petite
usine métallurgique de dépannage comprenant
un petit haut fourneau, four électrique, laminoirs.
Ai dû cesser mes fonctions d'Ingénieur de la
Marine en décembre 1940 en application du
statut des Israélites mais ai pu rester aux
Travaux Publics à titre de "collaborateur civil"
jusqu'en octobre 1941, date à laquelle l'usine
métallurgique a commencé à fonctionner et
où j'ai dû cesser mes fonctions pour le même
motif que précédemment.

Grades successifs - Ingénieur de 3^{ème} classe (Sous-lieutenant) 1932-1934
Ingénieur de 2^{ème} classe (Lieutenant) 1934-1937
Ingénieur de 1^{ère} classe (capitaine) ^(depuis octobre) 1937

dit, traduit, parle couramment l'Allemand et
l'écrit et traduit l'Anglais.

Casablanca 9 Janvier 1942

REPONDANTS aux U.S.A. pour M. Andre' ARON

Mr M. HEYMANN Engineer
Calumet 3.511
HOUSTON (TEXAS)

Mr M BRUNSWIG
118-65 METROPOLITAN AVENUE
KEW GARDENS, L.I. NEW-YORK

~~LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NAVAL ATTACHÉ~~

~~Fongier, Morocco.~~

27 February, 1942.

MEMORANDUM:

Subject: Further details on air fields and equipment in the
CAPE VERDE Islands.

Source: Files of the Portuguese Naval Air Corps who in turn
received it from "AIR-FRANCE".

1. Island of S. TIAGO.

In the Cathedra de San Martembo, 8 kilos west of PORT
PRAIA there is a hydroplane station:-

- 1 slipway 4500 sq. meters.
- 1 hangar 35M x 55M x 8M.
- 1 crane of 20 tons.
- 1 radio station "CRCK" with direction finder.
quarters for about 30 people.

2. On the Place d'Achada Grande 1.5 kilos east of PORT
PRAIA there is an aerodrome with one runway SW-NE of 1600 meters,
and another runway N-S of 1 kilometer, with the following
equipment:-

- Markings with painted letter "T" on aerodrome and
runway.
- 1 searchlight.
- 1 TSP station.

3. At TARRAFAL NW of the island 60 kilometers from PORT
PRAIA:-

- 1 landing field.
- 1 hydroplane station.

4. MAIO Island, 20 kilometers east of S. TIAGO.
MORRINHO, west of the island 13 kilometers from PORT
INGLEZ:-

- 1 landing field 1200 meters square, with huts to
keep spares.

5. Island of SAL. At FEIJOAL PARDA, a landing field 700M x
1300M marked with white lines.

~~W. A. EDDY.~~

I - a) Within the last three months the following food has gone to Tripoli to the German and Italian forces:

Wheat	8,000 tons
Olive oil	400
Wine	90,000 hectoliters
Cereals	500 tons

Also meat in unknown quantities. And besides this contraband trading across the border at Gabes and Djerba (an island). All this is transhipped at Tunis and thence shipped by rail and trucks to Benghar-Dans. There is also a 7000 t. Italian cargo ship loading divers provisions for Tripoli.

(b) They have shipped in all 4000 tons of gasoline of which 50% was aviation gas. Part came from Algeria in tank cars and part from Souk-el Arba, Tunisia. Also about 4,800 liters of castor or lubricating oil went through in drums.

The Souk el Arba gas went by motor tank trucks.

Another 1500 tons of gasoline left on six sailing ships (Italian) (see Tunis Consulate telegram February 17, No. 27 to Washington Algiers rush) for Djerba and then to Tripoli.

(c) The German Armistice Commission has taken and despatched the following guns from the Armistice Arsenal and sent them to Libya:

4 155 m/m guns and about
2000 shells for them;

20 105 m/m guns. These guns came from the Armistice Arsenal at Gabes. There have also been various reports of guns, wireless cars, trucks, etc., being sent from Morocco and Algeria. Recently the French steamers "Kabyle", "St. Etienne", "Bougaroni" etc., unloaded some seventy Fiat Diesel army trucks, 5-6 tons. These were loaded with supplies and war material (see below) and volunteer drivers were obtained here from the 68 Artillery Regiment to drive them to the frontier (see back)

II - These supplies, arms, etc., have been sent in three ways or a combination of ways:

(a) By rail over two systems:

(1) Compagnie Ferriere Tunisienne, the main line
from Algiers

-2-

from Algiers to Tunis and then south along the coast to Gabes. They have been unloading the stuff at a town a little north of Gabes as the French protested that the British might bombard Gabes if they used it as a loading base. The name of this town is Acuinat and also Djebel Dissa to the west of Gabes.

(2) There is also a new strategic railway from Tebessa Haidra Kasserine Feriana Melacoul Gafsa Maknassy and then to the important junction at Grabaia and then to Gabes. There are various short lines which are merely feeders for the two main lines.

(b) From rail heads mentioned above supplies are loaded into trucks and take the following highways:

From Acuinat they detour Gabes and join the main road south of Gabes through Medenine and thence to Ben Gardane. When British are bombing they branch off at Medenine to Foun Tetahouine and then go south and cross border at Gadames and then northeast again to Tripoli.

Supplies from Algiers go on the new military road from Tebessa Kasserine Maknassy Gafsa to Gabes and then south.

(c) Shipping hugs the coast from here to Mahdia and giving Kerkennah a wide berth, go to island of Djerba and then to Tripoli or Zouara.

III - The sentiments of the population are as follows:

(a) Italians. These are willing or frightened into giving information or other help to the Italians by threats to take revenge on their people in Italy. The Italian Jews here are anti-Fascist but only in sentiment. They cannot be depended upon for help. There are about 100,000 Italians in all.

(b) The native situation is simple. They hate the French and would welcome any one who could upset present government. Could only be used to create local disturbance at the last moment in case of an invasion.

(c) The attitude of the average Frenchman here is the same as in Morocco. Their sentiments are with us but they want to keep their jobs and hope that the war will not come here. Some of the old veterans are willing to help but one cannot depend on them to start anything. But there is a Corsican element here which might provide some very useful help. Strangely enough they are Royalists, even the railroad men amongst them. If the C & F is lined up on our side it would make a big difference here.

(d)

-3-

(d) There are also about 800 Maltese here, very loyal and with a certain amount of "guts".

(e) Military here are about 75% pro-British but not pro-De Gaulle, but, like all soldiers will not move without their chiefs and were greatly upset when Weygand left.

(f) Navy officers are about 80% anti-British.

Enlisted men are a problem, difficult to say what they would do.

The air force is about 75% pro-British.

In conclusion I believe from what I can gather here, that if certain unpleasant accidents were to occur, those whose sentiments are with us would be pleased and encouraged as many have wondered why nothing has been done before. Those who are against us are against us anyway. But it would undoubtedly have a very salutary effect on laborers, dock workers, etc. and would probably create strikes and a shortage of labor.

IV - (a) The most vulnerable point of the docks in Tunis is the canal. It is only about 21 meters wide and connects the port of La Goulette at the entrance with the Port of Tunis itself. All the cranes, railroad sidings and large piers are in the port of Tunis, so that if a ship were sunk in this canal and the canal itself destroyed, Tunis would be useless as a large-sized port and rail connection, and the Port of Tunis would be practically useless except for such stuff as could be unloaded under ideal weather conditions at the entrance in La Goulette.

(b) Road blocking.

Main coast road. There are no cliffs, bridges or viaducts along this road which, if blown up, would block it for more than 24 hours. At Sousse this road branches and there is an inland road passing through El Djem. The coastal road passes through Menastir Mahdir, both roads come into Sfax. The cliffs might be blown up on the coast road but there would still be the inland route. From Sfax to Gabes is a coast road with no important possible bottlenecks. There is another inland road from Tebessa, Feriana, Gafsa to Gabes. This is a new military road and possible bottlenecks have been avoided. In view of this, any tampering with road traffic would have to be done by destroying trucks or loads en route.

(c) Railroad points where bottlenecks would be destroyed:

-4-

Bridges: The bridge at Kasserine (just before the north end) is over 90 meters high and took over a year to build. It is supported by pillars and if these were blown up the railroad here would be blocked until the bridge could be rebuilt.

Tunnel just before Haidra (North). This is over 2000 meters long and if destroyed would cause a serious block.

There are no important bridges along the coast-line railroad, nor are there any cliffs or tunnels. Here again any destructive methods would have to be confined to individual train-loads or wagons.

(d) Fuel stores are in large tanks within the Arsenal at Souk el Arba, etc., and it is practically impossible to get at them. Therefore any damage done would have to be done to tank cars or trucks.

(e) If there were one or two trucks or tank cars blown up or if a ship or two were sabotaged at the docks or in the canal, I believe the Arabs would go on strike and absent themselves from work through fear alone.

Summary to follow.

D W K

February 20, 1942

(Back)

The 196 cases which a customs man said contained midget tanks were only 176 centimeters long obviously too short even for a 2-man tank.



is the property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.

The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited. It is issued for the personal use of

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

M O S T S E C R E T.

COPY NO. 29

C.O.S. (42) 134 (0).

12th May 1942.

WAR CABINET.

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.

NORTH AFRICA - SUBVERSIVE ACTION.

Note by Secretary.

The attached directive to the S.O.E. on subversive action in North Africa has been approved by the Chiefs of Staff.

2. A copy of the directive has been forwarded to the Joint Staff Mission in Washington.

(Signed) L. C. HOLLIS.

Great George Street, S.W.1.

12th MAY 1942.

✓ Annex.

x C.O.S.(42) 147th Meeting, Minute 6.

help they require. Full economic and financial support will be guaranteed. The provision of military equipment will be subject to guidance by the Chiefs of Staff. It may also be possible and desirable to send British or American naval forces into North Africa. This however cannot be promised.

You should inform the French that once they have indicated their intention to come to a firm agreement, the type and extent of the support to be afforded by the Allies can be immediately arranged; probably through secret military conversations.

It is most important that you should inform the Chiefs of Staff at the earliest opportunity once the French indicate their needs, so that early preparations in this country and U.S.A. can be made.

7. You may assure the French authorities that the most vigorous action would be taken in CYRENAICA to relieve any possible pressure from Axis forces in Tripoli until Allied forces could arrive in Tunis. You should not at present indicate the capture of Tripoli by British forces as an immediate possibility.

8. You may inform the French authorities that, in the event of a secret agreement being reached they will be under no obligation to serve under General de Gaulle or the Free French National Committee.

Preparations for Reception.

9. The maintenance of an Allied force in North Africa will be impracticable without the co-operation of the French authorities and without, at least, the acquiescence of the French forces. No agreement for entry could be concluded unless the French negotiators carry sufficient authority to ensure these conditions.

10. It is particularly important to avoid even local or sporadic resistance at the ports of entry. Although such resistance might be overcome by the Allied forces, the resultant bloodshed would seriously prejudice subsequent co-operation. The probable ports of entry are CASABLANCA, ORAN and possibly ALGIERS.

Resistance to Axis Attack.

11. If French North Africa is invaded by the Axis and the French resist the Allied nations will give all the assistance in their power. You should, however, impress on the French that such assistance is likely to prove too late, if an invitation is made after the Axis attack has begun.

12. You should stress the fact that, for any invitation to have a chance of being effective, it must be given as soon as conditions become threatening and that even then it should be kept secret until Allied forces are ready to land.

13. The object of organized French resistance should be to delay as long as possible Axis seizure of our ports of entry and to sabotage communications and any arrangements you make for Special Forces should have this as their primary object. Operations should only actually be carried out at those points of contact of the communications between them, when

French resistance collapses before Allied assistance can be made effective, it will be essential to deny these facilities to the Axis.

15. Plans should also be made beforehand to secure French, Axis and interned Allied shipping in French North African ports for Allied use. However, in case evacuation should prove impossible when the time comes, alternative arrangements for sabotage should also be made. These arrangements should include French naval units.

16. Signal plans will be devised to ensure that, in the event of an Axis invasion, the British and American Governments are kept fully informed as to the movements, strength and disposition of Axis forces in North Africa, and also as to the activities and attitude of the French authorities, forces and civil population. For this purpose arrangements must be made to leave agents behind in occupied territory.

17. It is possible that, as a result of a successful Allied offensive in CYRENAICA, the Axis forces in North Africa may withdraw into TUNISIA. Accordingly, all possible measures must be taken to persuade the French authorities to resist such an incursion, and in addition, arrangements must be made for extensive demolitions of rail and road communications leading from the LIBYAN frontier.

Resistance to Collaboration with the Axis.

18. Unless and until an agreement is reached with the French authorities, every effort should be made to reduce the value of French North Africa to the Axis. It is essential that such resistance should not be pushed to lengths likely to provoke armed intervention by the Axis except at a time favourable to us. At present, however, resistance can be pushed to great lengths, as during the next few months GERMANY is likely to be heavily committed in RUSSIA and thus effective Axis retaliation against French North Africa is most unlikely.

You should keep yourself informed through M.E.W. as to the relative importance of the economic assets obtained by the Axis from French North Africa.

19. Although every effort should be made to win over the Moorish population to the Allied cause, no promise of independence after the war should be made.

20. You will maintain the closest touch with S.I.S. at all times to ensure that your respective activities do not clash, and that the latter's sources of information are not imperilled.

COST ESTIMATE

1,700,000	Pencils	\$850,000
100,000	Fog Signals	21,666
50,000	Full Switches	20,000
50,000	Pressure Switches	65,000
50,000	Release Switches	50,000
25,000	Limpets (old type)	375,000
50,000	Delays for Limpet	150,000
1,250,000	Pocket Relays	875,000
100,000	M. L. Flares	70,000
100,000	Magnesium Flares (2½) lbs. say	300,000
500,000	No. 3 Detonators	3,275
200,000	Dummy Detonators say	300
200,000	Copper Tube Fuse Igniters	400
50,000	Striker Boards	152
5,000	Fighting Knives with sheaths	150,000
5,000	Spring Cashes say	75,000
5,000	Crimpers say	1,500
25,000	Detonator Magazines	7,500
30,000	Rolls Adhesive Tape	6,000
25,000	Rolls Insulating Tape	3,000
25,000	Large Magnets	17,500
25,000	Spools Booby Trap Wire say	5,000
50,000	Spools Trip Wire say	20,000
250,000	Incendiary Capsules say	5,333
250,000	Cigarettes	17,150
100,000	Pairs of Powders	<u>10,666</u>

\$3,108,942

For your information the following list of supplies
has been arranged for by Colonel Solborg to be
despatched to Gibraltar and stored in a special ware-
house there subject to Colonel Eddy's orders:

500 Tommy guns; 2,000 rounds per gun
2000 revolvers; 10,000 rounds per gun
2000 rifles; 5,000 rounds per gun
10,000 hand grenades
10,000 aprons, cosies
1000 Commando knives
5000 Fighting knives

Limpets (for supply as well as for the one-off operation)

Demolition materials in considerable quantities for
all types of objectives.

31/2/42.

Although at this time of the year landings on the French West African Coast are difficult owing to the state of the sea, the two anchorages marked in red on the attached extract from the "African Pilot" are considered nearly always suitable as the sea there is calm. The extract from the "Pilot" is full, in order to give as much information as possible about the coast on both sides of the anchorages in question.

Figure 1 attached is a copy of the Naval Charts of this stretch of coast.

Figure 2 is a view of the coast. The approximate positions of the two anchorages are marked with a X in red ink on Fig. 2.

Further information about both anchorages, including a photographic air reconnaissance, has been asked for and will be forwarded so soon as available.

Light (Lat. 30°37' N., Long. 0°55' W.) is exhibited, at an elevation of 805 feet (245m), from a white tower, about 78 feet (24m) in height, situated on Cap Ghir.

South-eastward of Cap Ghir the coast is formed of rocky cliffs, and at the mouth of Wadi Tamerakt, about 14 miles from the cape, is the commencement of the Sous territory, which is a mountainous and thickly populated district. See view ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ attached.

From Wadi Tamerakt, which flows through a fertile valley, the coast to Agadir, 6 miles southward, is fringed by a rocky beach. About 15 miles eastward of Cap Ghir is Jebel Tazenart, 4,422 feet (1347m) high, which forms the western end of the Atlas mountains, and about 7 miles south-south-eastward of this mountain is Jebel Oulma, 3,877 feet (1181m) high.

ANCHORAGES. - About 4 miles east-south-eastward of Cap Ghir, anchorage may be obtained about 2.3/4 cables offshore, in front of a conspicuous crevice in the cliff between two grey patches; the sea here is smooth with strong north-westerly winds, but squalls come down from the cliff.

Another anchorage, off a sandy beach about 3 miles south-eastward of the above, is reported to afford better shelter; it is probably the best anchorage off this stretch and the only one affording any shelter in very bad weather.

Chart 1289, plans of Agadir and Agadir roads.

RADE d'AGADIR. - Rade d'Agadir, at the northern end of which stands the town of Agadir, is the southernmost anchorage on the Moroccan coast, which affords shelter from north-easterly and easterly winds.

Pointe Founti, the northern entrance point of the roadstead, is rocky and fringed by a reef which extends about 1/2 cables south-westward, with depths of less than 3 fathoms (5m); at the outer end of the reef is Roche Founti, with a depth of 7 feet (2m).

The northern shore, off Founti, is fringed by reefs, which only partially dry at low water, rendering landing dangerous with the slightest swell. Close eastward of Pointe Founti is a small jetty. Eastward of Founti a sandy beach strewn with rocks extends to Wadi Sous (Sus), which discharges at the southern end of the bay.

Landmarks. - The following are the most conspicuous objects:-

The minaret standing at the southern end of the town, at an elevation of 781 feet (238m); Sidi Abdallah, situated on the shore 3 cables eastward of Pointe Founti; Fort Portugais, about 1/2 cables south-eastward of the minaret; a signal mast, about 2 cables south-eastward of Fort Portugais; and a house surmounted by a small minaret, situated about a mile eastward of Sidi Abdallah.

Light. - A light (Lat. 30°35' N., Long. 0°55' W.) is exhibited, at an elevation of 120 feet (37m), from a white tower, about 18 feet (5m) in height, situated on Pointe Founti, about 1/2 cables

FIG. 1.





FIG. 2.



VIEW, IN TWO PARTS, OF CORST BETWEEN CAP QNIR AND AQDIR.

2.

Aerial firing practice. - Aerial firing practice occasionally takes place in the vicinity of Agadir between the mouth of Wadi Sous and Tifnit. The dangerous area is about 12 miles long and 3 miles wide, lying parallel to the coast about 3 miles offshore. At one hour before the practice commences an aeroplane will fly over the area and fire a red Very's light or show a red smoke, and at the conclusion of the practice will fire a green very's light.

Anchorage. - Good anchorage may be obtained in Rade d'Agadir, in a depth of 6½ fathoms (11m9), south-south-westward of Founti. The anchorage is dangerous with fresh westerly winds.

Should a swell get up, vessels should anchor on the line of the prolongation of the jetty, about 4½ cables from its head, in a depth of about 8 fathoms (14m6) sand. Merchant vessels usually anchor very close to the shore, by day, to facilitate landing, but by night they anchor as directed above.

Sailing vessels, when approaching the bay from Cap Ghir, are recommended to hug the coast till the bay opens, as with northerly winds, which are very frequent, it is difficult to beat up to the anchorage. By night it is inadvisable to approach into depths of less than 100 fathoms (182m9).

The alternation of land and sea breezes is said to cause vessels to overrun their anchors, instead of swinging in the usual way, so resulting in a foul anchor. It is therefore recommended to dig the anchor at regular intervals.

In summer, sea breezes rapidly raise a temporary swell in the bay. In winter, the large Atlantic depressions raise a heavy swell compelling vessels to put to sea, and cause dangerous rollers inshore.

There is a landing place on the eastern side of the jetty.

Buoyage. - A cylindrical light-buoy, the top painted red, exhibiting a red flashing light every three seconds, is moored about a cable southward of the head of the jetty. There are two mooring buoys situated about 2¾ cables south-eastward of the head of the jetty and close southward of them are a number of lighter moorings extending 1½ cables southward.

Communication. - There is regular steamer communication with France, and by air with Dakar, Casablanca and Toulouse.

W/T Station. - There is a W/T Station at Agadir.

Passage. - Wadi Sous (Sus) enters the sea about 3½ miles south-south-westward of Pointe Founti; its entrance is obstructed by a sand bank which partially dries and can only be crossed by vessels not exceeding 5 feet (1m5) draught.

About 9 miles southward of Agadir the coast changes in appearance; red sandstone cliffs alternate with sandhills, and in the background are the high Atlas mountains, which are covered with snow in winter.

Wadi Maasa flows out through a sandy beach of a small bay about 17 miles south-south-westward of Wadi Maasa. The village of Aglou stands on a sandhill about 8 miles south-south-eastward of the mouth of the Wadi Maasa, where there are two small reddish-coloured forts, the northern of which has two tombs near it; southward of the forts there is a small building standing on the top of a hill.

Southward of Wadi Maasa the red sandstone cliffs disappear and are replaced by a high sand dune, and 6 miles southward of that river a fort surrounded by walls stands on the dune; here the coast again changes to red sandstone cliffs but they are higher and steeper than those northward.

Wadi Asaa flows out through a sandy beach of a small bay about 17 miles south-south-westward of Wadi Maasa. The village of Aglou stands on a sandhill about 8 miles south-south-eastward of the mouth of the Wadi Asaa, where there are two small reddish-coloured forts, the northern of which has two tombs near it; southward of the forts there is a small building standing on the top of a hill.

Southward of Wadi Asaa there is a very marked change in the aspect of the coast. Close within the beach are green hills faced by sandstone cliffs, about 100 feet (30m) high. At a considerable distance inland there is a range of mountains, about 4,000 feet (1200m) high, and the country appears wooded, cultivated and well inhabited. The houses, built of red brick or clay, are numerous and some are large and surrounded by farm buildings. About 6 miles southward of Wadi Asaa a deep valley extends to the beach.

Near the mouth of Wadi Sidi bou Nouar, 6 1/2 miles south-westward of Wadi Asaa, the sandy beach is replaced by greyish blue rocks with small promontories forming coves sheltered from north-westward. The mouth of this river and that of Wadi Sidi bou el Fedail, about 1 1/4 miles south-westward, are inconspicuous.

At Cap d'Agrou (Agula), situated about 9 miles south-westward of Wadi Asaa, the character of the country changes. The hills resume their barren aspect and form successive ridges, gradually increasing in height till they join the high mountains in the interior, which are nearly 4000 feet (1219m) high.

Throughout the months of January, February and March the coast between Casablanca and Cap Spartel are difficult as there is generally a heavy swell, breakers and bad weather. This applies less to Point B than to Points A and C.

Point A. Approximately 4 1/2 sea miles South of Fedala lighthouse there is a solitary rock standing 300 to 400 yards offshore, just North of another rock connected to the shore. Immediately opposite the first solitary rock which is not connected with the shore is a small sandy beach which is considered suitable for landings.

Point B. Approximately 3 sea miles South of Rabat there is a large white building. Just to the North of this there is a sandy beach. The sea here is much calmer than at Points A or C.

Point C. Approximately midway between Sali and Mehdiia. Running Northwards from Sali is a high range of cliffs coming right down to the sea's edge, but at this point C the cliff suddenly stops and is replaced by a sandy beach about a mile long. The point where the cliffs are replaced by the sandy beach is Point C.

Point C is considered the most suitable of all three Points A, B and C in months other than January, February and March.

Plans will be prepared showing the exact position of all three points, and further information, probably including photographic reconnaissance, will be obtained if possible.

N. Y. Mtg. 8/21. List Agents.

SECRET

August 31, 1942

Commander J. H. Foskett,
Joint Intelligence Subcommittee,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Commander Foskett:

The enclosed memorandum is sent at your request.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

August 31, 1942

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

Tangier

Lieutenant Colonel W. A. Eddy, USMC, Naval At-
tache.

Dr. Carlton S. Coon, Special Assistant, Ameri-
can Consulate.

Gordon Browne, Vice-Consul.

The following control officers, who are desig-
nated as Vice-Consuls, are under the direction of Colonel
Eddy:

Lelan L. Rounds, at Oran.

Ridgeway B. Knight and John C. Knox at Algiers.

Frederick P. Culbert, David W. King and W. Staf-
ford Reid, at Casablanca.

John L. Utter, at Tunis.

Portugal

O'Brian, Chief Agent at Lisbon; diplomatic cover.

Schubert, Agent, lawyer, travels between Lisbon
and Madrid, works under control of Chief
Agent.

-2-

Spain

Plaza, Chief Agent at Madrid; diplomatic cover.

Dupont, Agent at Madrid, Petroleum Commission cover.

Metro, Agent at Madrid, Petroleum Commission, cover.

Cabot, Agent at Madrid, Petroleum Commission cover.

Elliot, Agent at Madrid, Petroleum Commission cover.

(All above have cars and circulate freely throughout Spain.)

Page, Agent, Catalonia Province, cover is position as Manager of an American business firm.

(There are also a number of local sub-agents operating under control of the Chief Agent. One is in Paris and one is in the Irun area near French border.)

France

Lt. Co., stationed at Vichy; has a diplomatic cover, acts as Chief Agent in unoccupied zone.

Corn, Agent; stationed at Nimes, travels in Southern France; cover is philanthropic activities.

August, Agent; a Frenchman. Now in Vichy but will operate from Paris shortly with communications via unoccupied zone.

-3-

(There are also a number of sub-agents in the Marseilles and Lyon areas who operate under "Corn". They were recruited locally.)

Rene, Sub-agent; based in Switzerland but maintains contact with French underground network in Occupied and Unoccupied zones.

U-2, Sub-agent; cover unknown here; works in Paris area and communicates through the Basque network.

#288, sub-agent; cover unknown here; works in Paris area and communicates through Chief Agent in Madrid.

West Africa

Erwin Watts, in charge of all S. O. operations, with headquarters at Lagos. Under him are six trained men at various points in West Africa.

Also there are certain S. I. men located in West Africa, near Dakar, as follows:

K. S. Roseberry and G. H. Stadslev
(Two representatives in French West Africa with headquarters at Kankan located midway between Senegal and the Ivory Coast, whose mission it is to travel throughout French West Africa. Both these men not only speak French fluently but are familiar with various native African dialects.)

SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SPECIAL ACTIVITIES BRANCH

Agents In the Areas Bordering Mediterranean

Portugal

O'BRIAN Chief agent at Lisbon; diplomatic cover
SCHUBERT Agent; lawyer, travels between Lisbon and Madrid, works under control of Chief agent.

There are also a number of sub-agents who are native Portuguese and who operate under control of the Chief agent; recruited locally, names unknown here.

Spain

PLAZA Chief agent at Madrid; diplomatic cover
DUPONT Agent; Madrid, Petroleum Commission cover
METRO Agent; Madrid, Petroleum Commission cover
CABOT Agent; Madrid, Petroleum Commission cover
ELLIOT Agent; Madrid, Petroleum Commission cover

(All the above have cars and circulate freely throughout Spain.)

PAGE Agent; Catalonia province, cover is position as Manager of an American business firm.

There are also a number of local sub-agents operating under control of the Chief agent. One is in Paris and one is in the Iron area near French border

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Switzerland

DRUM Chief agent at Berne, diplomatic cover
MOFFAT Assistant to Chief agent at Berne, diplomatic cover

There are also a number of local agents operating under the Chief agent; some of these are American business men having commercial interests in Switzerland.

France

LT. C. Stationed at Vichy; has a diplomatic cover; acts as Chief agent in unoccupied zone.
CORN Agent; stationed at Nimes, travels in Southern France; his cover is philanthropic activities
AUGUST Agent; a Frenchman. Now in Vichy but will operate from Paris shortly with communications via unoccupied zone.

There are also a number of sub-agents in the Marseilles and Lyon areas who operate under "CORN". They were recruited locally.

RENE Sub-agent; based in Switzerland but maintains contact with French underground network in Occupied and unoccupied zones. Works under "DRUM" (See Switzerland).
U-2 Sub-agent; cover unknown here; works in Paris area and communicates through the Basque network.
#288 Sub-agent; cover unknown here; works in Paris area and communicates through Chief agent in Madrid

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

French North Africa

(See list submitted by S.O. Branch. The S.I. branch has no men of their own in this area)

Egypt

LT. McB Cairo office; diplomatic status
 LT. COMDR. L Cairo office; diplomatic status

Palestine & Transjordan

LAING Chief agent at Jerusalem; business cover
 HICKS Agent at Jerusalem; Archaeological survey for American institution; travels through Palestine and Transjordan.

Saudi Arabia

KEITH Chief agent at Jiddah, employed by an American Oil Company.
 McVOY Agent at Dahran, employed by an American oil company.

Turkey

L-263 } Agents at Istanbul and Ankara, representatives of an American oil company
 L-265 }
 * SCOTT Agent, travels in Hatay province, archaeologist
 FOSTER Agent at Istanbul, personal business cover

Iraq

CRAIG Chief agent at Basra, represents American oil company
 * DIXON Agent in the Mosul area, official business for Research and Analysis Branch of OSS
 * WILEY Agent, southern and central Iraq; employed by American Dental Association.

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

IRAN

LOWE

Chief agent at Teheran, represents
an American Museum.

* **GRANT**

Agent, southern and central Iran, con-
ducting an architectural survey for
an American institution

* These men have left the U. S. and are enroute to their
ports.

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

*Office, To: West 8132 -
v. Roseberry -
v. Stadsklev*

FRENCH WEST AFRICA

R.S.
**Roseberry
Stadsklev**

These are two American missionaries who have been converted to our service and sent back to French West Africa. They reported by cable about ten days ago their arrival at Kankan which is their mission headquarters, located midway between Senegal and the Ivory Coast.

Roseberry's business will be to visit some thirty mission stations scattered throughout French West Africa, thus providing the necessary freedom to travel widely. Stadsklev, however, is the better observer for reports on military matters since he has had some military experience and is keenly interested in our intelligence objectives. Both men speak French fluently as well as various native African dialects.

I.D. Shapiro
I.D. Shapiro

SECRET

August 31, 1942

S.O. Field Men in Egypt, North and West Africa.

Cairo

Captain Robert Low, Military and Air Observer - In charge of S.O. operations in Egypt and the Near East, pending arrival of Colonel Hoskins.

The following men in the area report to Captain Low:

at Cairo
Benson
Kendall
Melvig

Tangier

Lt. Colonel W. A. Eddy, USMC, Naval Attaché - In charge of all S.O. operations in North Africa.

Dr. Carlton L. Coon, Special Assistant, American Legation
Gordon Browne, Vice Consul

The following control officers, while not actually working for OSS, report to Mr. Robert Murphy, Counsellor of Vichy Embassy, with headquarters at Casablanca (now enroute to the United States), and cooperate closely with Colonel Eddy:

Rounds, at Oran.
Knight and Knox, at Algiers.
Cuibert, King, and Reid, at Casablanca.
Utter, at Tunis.

West Africa

Erwin H. Watts, in charge of all S.O. operations, with headquarters at Lagos.

The following trained S. O. men now at various points in West Africa, report to Mr. Watts:

at Lagos
Violett, Okie, Llerena, Plante, Prichard, Lockwood.

Watts is sick and has been ordered to return to this country.

SECRET

**MEMORANDUM OF MEETING AT THE ST. REGIS HOTEL
NEW YORK CITY, EVENING OF FRIDAY, AUGUST 21,
BETWEEN COLONEL DONOVAN, COLONEL BUXTON AND
LIEUTENANT COLONEL EDDY**

Colonel Buxton stated that he saw General Strong before the arrival of Eddy in London at a luncheon given by Phillips. Phillips left early and General Strong and General McClure talked with Buxton after dinner. General Strong stated that he was interested in what Eddy was going to say, that he hoped that Buxton would see to it that the American Military authorities talked with him before the English and that he only talked with the English after being released by the Americans. Buxton agreed that this would be done. Buxton told Strong that Eddy would arrive that night and would be at General Strong's disposal. Agreed to meet at dinner the next night.

On the next night Colonel Buxton, General Strong General Patton and Colonel Eddy met at the Hotel at 7:45 P.M.

At 10:00 o'clock P.M. General Doolittle joined

-2-

the meeting and the discussions continued until midnight. The gist of the meeting was -- that until satisfied with air superiority, General Strong was withholding his approval of the attack which General Patton is going to make on North Africa within five or six weeks (Colonel Buxton predicts it will not occur before November and Colonel Donovan that it will not occur until April and then will be too late).

General Strong stated that he was very much disturbed and had been for weeks about Colonel Solborg's report; that he had investigated Solborg from the beginning and did not like his record -- that Solborg dramatizes himself, is not reliable and is an egoist. That there are 100,000 American lives hanging on this thing and that so far as he knew no one except Solborg has said that these French Army officers in North Africa are dependable or will cooperate with us. That if Solborg's statement was true it was of profound importance, and if untrue, it would be a catastrophic tragedy. (General Patton served under General Strong in the Cavalry and has great respect for his judgment).

General Strong said he had been asked to put his

-3-

approval on the Africa expedition and that he would not do it on Solborg's report. He told Colonel Eddy that there was a great responsibility on him and that he felt differently about Eddy. Eddy then produced a letter from Murphy in substantiation of Eddy's information. General Strong stated that we cannot afford to assume anything that is not fully substantiated. He asked Eddy his attitude on Solborg's report, and asked whether what Eddy knew was of Eddy's personal knowledge. Eddy said that independently of anything Solborg had done, he, Eddy, entertained the same opinion -- that he had talked with General Charles Mast and with the other French generals concerned. When Eddy finished his story General Patton called in General Doolittle.

The following conclusions were reached:

1. The principal problem of this whole African project was whether or not we could provide air support over a continuous operation, including supply convoys, etc. Where were the air fields and how many? General Strong talked about 21 air fields that Germany could

-4-

use in Spain and Spanish territory and stated that within 21 days Germany could move forces from Finland to the Spanish air field and could probably block some of the convoys coming in. General Doolittle stated that it was impossible to regard Gibraltar as a primary source of air support. That facilities at Gibraltar were so small that they would have trouble using it as a base for even 200 planes. That it was an easy target from the air and, at most, could only be considered as an auxiliary air field. Eddy stated that if the neutrality of Spain could be assured it would be very different.

After Eddy's statement confirming Solborg and Murphy's statement that Americans would get cooperation instead of resistance, General Strong said he still felt that he was unwilling to give a green light to the project unless he could be assured by the air people that they can maintain an umbrella of air protection.

Doolittle was asked if he would stand on the same position, and he said he would. At the end of the meeting

-5-

Strong stated that he would like Colonel Buxton to ask Eddy not to discuss any of these matters with the English and not to talk with them relating to this until released by American authorities; also he would like Eddy to talk to General McClure, G-2, and with General Grunther, G-3. General Strong stated also that he would like to have Colonel Buxton present at any meetings with Eddy in Washington.

The next morning at 11:00 Colonel Buxton and Colonel Eddy saw General McClure for two hours, together with General McClure's predecessor, Colonel Case. At the end of this session Colonel Buxton stated that General Strong had asked him to see that Colonel Eddy talked with General Grunther, G-3. General McClure arranged an appointment for that afternoon at 4:45.

General Grunther was a very thorough questioner. General McClure and Colonel Geunther were also present. At the end of one hour General Grunther asked General Patton to come in. Instead of coming in, General Patton called the parties to his office, where they found about

-6-

12 members of Patton's Staff, including General Truscott and a Naval adviser, and a Lieutenant Colonel Cummings, a Marine officer. There was an Air Corps man and an operations man.

(Colonel Buxton stated that General Patton told him Colonel Black was to be his G-2. Buxton said he knew Black only slightly, but that he knew Colonel Donovan and others had serious questions as to Black's suitability for such an important job. Buxton stated his impression from talking with others was that Black is a man who has a closed mind and is governed by prejudices and preconceptions and was not elastic. Patton stated that he had gotten Black because he knows something about the German mentality, is stubborn and that Patton wanted a G-2 who will fight him and give him reasons why he should not do something. He wanted him as a man who would make objections.)

At the meeting with Patton and his staff the question was where they should land. Eddy had several places he favored. Patton offered objections to various places.

-7-

After that meeting Eddy talked alone with Grunther and with Guenther on the following day. Grunther took Eddy to General Eisenhower at General Eisenhower's request. General Patton asked Buxton to go to his apartment. General Truscott was also present. Buxton stated that he was struck by the thought and apprehension that the planning staff in London was not getting the benefit of all the information on the various essential points that he knew existed in Washington, in the files of OSS, G-2 and ONI. They admitted this, but said they were working on it. Colonel Buxton also said that Colonel Donovan has various people who were experts on that area and who should be consulted. Doclittle stated that it was possible we would have to get air bases south of Dakar, and from there move into Spain and French Morocco. Nobody present seemed to know anything about that country. Buxton suggested Shapiro and Colonel Franck.

General Truscott said they were all very much impressed with Eddy, thought he was a man of intelligence and

-8-

character, and were disposed to rely upon him - and that this was the combined decision in London of the American Staff. He asked that Eddy return via London as soon as possible. Patton agreed that he regarded this as most important and asked Buxton to so inform Colonel Donovan. Buxton stated that the services of Colonel Guenther were desired by the Staff as liaison at Gibraltar for General Patton with Eddy in North Africa. Also they would like to have Colonel Eddy on their staff, either inside or outside. Buxton and Eddy believe it should be inside so that he can start the fire works before or at the time of the invasion.

Colonel Eddy stated that General Eisenhower had given him his release to talk with the British Staff and with General Davison, DMI. The British Chiefs of Staff sent for Eddy and asked many questions as to North Africa, covering both political and military points. Later Colonel Eddy talked with General Eisenhower's staff again, and they were concerned about the problem as to whether

-9-

Torch should take place a month or six weeks before gymnast or whether they should be closer together.

Eddy also talked with S.O.E. people several times. Saw Free French representatives about the problem of getting a man in Tangier. He also saw Admiral Kirk and other Naval officers at a luncheon.

At these various interviews there were several subjects discussed, particularly Solborg's report, the work of Murphy, and the reliability of General Giraud, General Mast and the general at Casablanca and whether they would be counted on. Colonel Eddy said that they could be counted on because the movement had developed entirely independently of whether we are in or not. The Generals are determined to revive France. It is not a scheme being put up to the Americans, but is purely a French movement. That we could take advantage of it for what help it might be. Colonel Eddy stated that two things must not happen -- there must be no British troops and no Free French. The British themselves have always said until recently that it must be purely a Franco-American job. The British now say there are not enough American troops and that they want to send their troops. In

-10-

trying to discover why the British want to participate Eddy believes from evidence he has seen that the British are determined to get and keep Tunisia. Malta has been expensive, they want another base and believe they should have Tunisia. Eddy believes this would be a mistake, since the French are certain that the British would occupy Tunisia permanently. Eddy says that if the British do go into Tunisia, the French must be promised that there will be no permanent occupation and no annexation. Eddy says that the French would probably fight a British landing there vigorously, and the British know the French attitude.

Eddy stated that General Juin is not committing himself but is standing aside, and is not counted on to participate. General Mast said that he himself would assure us that he wants our help and that orders will be given to receive the Americans with open arms.

Colonel Eddy stated that the staff did not need to make their decision on Solborg's report or on Murphy, or on Eddy -- that it was certainly worth sending some staff officer who would be prepared to discuss the

-11-

conditions laid down by the French Generals and make a specific agreement. Eddy stated that possibly the senior military officer in North Africa should have staff talks with the French Generals regarding their general attitude, without mentioning dates or plans. Eddy also said that cooperation would occur no matter where the second front started. He stated that Colonel Johnson, the senior staff officer at Tangier, might be chosen to carry on staff talks, discuss military plans, economic problems, stability of money, supplies, financing of French troops, etc.

Colonel Donovan thinks that we should look at it as if there were not any French help, that there would be some resistance, where would it be and how much. We should determine how many troops would be needed, where they would land and when?

Colonel Buxton said that General Patton believes he will have to bombard before landing; that Eddy was asked what the effect would be and Eddy said if a number of French People were killed it would create a psychological

-12-

hazard and might affect the ultimate reception. Patton still thought it would be necessary to have the bombardment.

Colonel Donovan stated that he thought the staff was looking at the matter only on the basis of reactions and had not developed the plan by considered thought.

Colonel Buxton stated that he saw Suderos in London, who had the Greek Minister to London with him. He wanted to discuss, first a report which had come to him from the United States that someone connected with OSS and said the Greek king had lost his influence with the people of Greece and could not go back there. He wanted us to know that he did not believe this story nor did he believe it had come from OSS. Buxton told him that no responsible person in OSS ever made any such statement. Second Suderos stated that the Turkish Ambassador to London the previous day had said that if Russia collapsed completely the whole Allied situation would collapse in the Near East, including Turkey. That if Russia continued to resist, the Turks would fight if invaded by the Germans

-13-

but that they were too weak in planes and tanks to ever take offensive action outside of their own country. Suderos thought that this was an accurate estimate of the Turkish point of view. Also that he would put the second front in North Africa, first seizing Dakar. Buxton said that he personally had no knowledge of any operation plans.

Colonel Donovan stated that he would begin with the Middle East and set up a staff there making a study of that problem and giving it the best security they could, and the Germans might think we would try something in the Middle East. That we should have a mission in Syria to build up among the students and others cells of resistance for invasion and infiltration. We should move along the Mediterranean, getting a base in Malta and making the enemy constantly look over his shoulder. In North Africa itself we should continue to send ships with food and goods and stop fighting among ourselves, and do the same in West Africa. Let the Germans think we are going to have only an economic effort.

Give food to Spain and to the children of France.

-14-

Let another Staff group consider going to Norway. Encircle the whole area. Do not lay down rules about security but set up deception.

Eddy stated that we would have opposition in North Africa from the French Navy and from the Air forces under control of the Navy. He felt the French submarine crews were more pro-Ally.

Eddy feels that Abdel el Krim should be gotten back to Gibraltar from Reunion Island. He also feels that we could get the Native tribes for about one million dollars in gold. As to the Moors, it was dangerous to rouse them, but we should tell them that we will see that they get a fair deal at the peace table and promise to keep them supplied with food for themselves and for their stock.

Eddy thinks it important that he remain in Tangier when he goes back and not to travel back and forth to London or Washington. That the same applies to Murphy.

Eddy thinks that Patton knew more about African military affairs than the others in London, and that General Truscott knew a great deal.

Colonel Eddy next discussed the landing problems

-15-

and the problem of the Straits. He was much concerned about what is happening on both sides of the Straits. Great security measures are being taken by the Spaniards. Intensive fortifications, setting up restricted areas, etc. With reference to the 21 air fields in Southern Spain, they were prepared for Axis use or possibly to make Spain strong enough to remain neutral. These air fields and the coastal guns could easily prevent the possibility of getting through the Straits and that unless this problem was met, together with the heavy guns on the other shore, the Straits could be blocked very quickly, and although the first convoy might get through, the ones following would not. Eddy thinks that if forces were landed in the two places mentioned that Spanish Morocco would stay out of it. That if the Straits were closed and Spanish Morocco was on the flank, Doolittle would have no place from which to fly land planes within a thousand miles. Bombers could come from England, but with three carriers only about 200 fighter planes could be provided.

Eddy thinks that if we cannot neutralize Spain we

-16-

should go into Spain and take over those air fields. We could then control the Straits. He stated that 70 to 80 percent of the people in Southern Spain are Reds, and if armed would be anxious to fight Franco.

He said that Tunisia is about four days sailing from the Straits. If possible it would be well to start the campaign in Algeria, for political reasons, but that the problem of the straits is serious.

He stated that it was impossible to land heavy material on the beaches of Casablanca because of the heavy swell. He recommends taking small boats and landing them at Fidalah and Port Lyautey. He stated that in Oran some of the petroleum supplies are under the control of our friends.

Eddy stated that he thought the British were trying to dictate the plans for Torch and that the United States would dictate the plans for gymnast. He thinks the details for both should be worked out by the Chiefs of Staff in Washington, at least for the basic plans. He feels that the British Chiefs of Staff are trying to soothe General Eisenhower, make him think he is running

-17-

the show and then get what they want.

The British S.O.E. wanted all details on Eddy's organisation in Tunisia, the location of the groups, supplies, etc. Eddy stated that this was all in Washington and he did not have it. He spoke of the stores the British have promised to put at Gibraltar for him. That in May the British guaranteed that a certain list of stores would be there. That only 350 Sten guns, 37 Tommy guns, 500 pistols and 2000 anti-tank mines were there. He needs about ten thousand of each.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Reports from Morocco: July 23, 1942
Submitted by W. A. Eddy

July 30, 1942
Submitted by Captain P. F. Holcomb.

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NAVAL ATTACHÉ

July 23rd, 1942.

Tangier, Morocco.

Colonel William J. Donovan
Director of Strategic Services
24th And E. Streets, N.W.,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

I have the honor to enclose the following for the information of your Intelligence Section:

- Enclosures (A) - Copy of report to ONI regarding wholesale arrests in French Morocco, omitted by mistake last week.
- (B) - An immediate bombing job for the RAP, from Vice Consul Reid, Casablanca, July 1st.
- (C) - Regional Air Commands, French Air Force, from Vice Consul King, dated July 1st.
- (D) - Copy of recognition signals of French aircraft, Tunisia, already sent to Washington by Consul Doolittle, dated July 6th.
- (E) - Disposition of French Air Force, Morocco, by Vice Consul King, July 1st.
- (F) - Report on the Conference on Minerals in French North Africa, held May 24th-25th, 1942, from British source.
- (G) - Political intelligence from southern Morocco, secured by Vice Consul Pendar, from contacts among French officers.
- (H) - Copy of intelligence report to ONI, concerning recruiting for the Legion Tricolore, by Vice Consul King, dated July 23rd.
- (I) - Copy of questionnaire required of recruits for the SOL, July 21st, 1942.
- (J) - Report of Progress, Organization of Sabotage Groups in French Morocco, June 22nd, 1942.
(not included in this folder)

Colonel Donovan.

7/23/42

- (K) - Report on conditions in France, secured by Vice Consul King, from a French officer from the intelligence service just returned to Morocco, dated June 26th, 1942.
- (L) - New regulations regarding the Spanish national anthem, et cetera, making the Falange hymn and salute obligatory.

Respectfully submitted:

Enclosures:
Twelve (12).

W. A. Eddy
W. A. EDDY,
Lieut. Colonel, USMC (Ret).

WAE: JPH

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NAVAL ATTACHÉ

July 30, 1942.

Tangier, Morocco.

Africa
 x Eddy
 x Hot comb
 x Intelligence
 x Reports

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Director of Strategic Services,
24th and E. Streets, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

I have the honor to enclose the following for the information of your Intelligence Section:

- Enclosures (A) Copy of confidential report in seven pages on the Italian and German Aviation (in French).
- (B) Copy of a report from Mr. H. A. Doolittle, American Consul, regarding code and explanations in French of meteorological broadcasts of North Africa, enclosing two copies of supplementary code for August 1942. (Eight pages) Report dated July 22, 1942.
- (C) Copy of Memorandum sent by David W. King, dated July 23, 1942, regarding the S. O. L. (Service d'Ordre de la Legion) in Rabat.
- (D) Copy of Memorandum received from David W. King, dated July 23, 1942, as regards the increasing activity of the Axis.
- (E) Copy of Memorandum received from Vice Consul King, dated July 23, 1942, concerning the activity at the canning factory SEFAN at Fedala.
- (F) Copy of Memorandum from Vice Consul King, dated July 23, 1942, regarding the latest items of battle order.
- (G) Copy of a short Memorandum from Vice Consul King, dated July 24, 1942, relative to Axis ships loaded with German arms and ammunition which is expected to arrive at Fedala soon.

- 8 -

- Enclosures (H) Copy of a Memorandum received from Vice Consul King, dated July 24, 1942, on the subject of "Fire on board the JEAN BART".
- (I) Copy of Memorandum from Vice Consul King, dated July 24, 1942, concerning a Spanish Royalist movement in Spanish Morocco.
- (J) Additional tables of supplementary code (See H) covering period from July 25 to August 10, 1942. Report consists of seventeen pages.
- FC* (K) Copy of report written by Colonel W. A. Eddy, dated July 27, 1942, on the subject of: Interview with Admiral d'Harcourt, Commanding the French Fleet at Casablanca. (Three pages).
- (L) Copy of Memorandum from Vice Consul King, dated July 29, 1942, on Sentiments of officials in Rabat.

Respectfully submitted:


F. P. Holcomb
Captain, USMCR.

Enclosures:
Twelve (12)

EPH:JPH