

KA TO KE



SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

17, 535



Kubbe, Sgt. Chas. M.

11 September 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: Discharge of 1st Sgt. Charles M. Kubbe, 35900405

- NOTE:
- (a) Letter from O.S.S. to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, WJH, dated 31 August 1945, enclosing request for discharge
 - (b) Memorandum from J.C.S. to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, WJH, dated 6 September 45,
 - (c) Memorandum from G-1, WJH, to Director, O.S.S. dated 10 September 1945

The enclosures are returned herewith inviting attention to enclosure (c) above.

R. V. Ryan
 RALPH V. RYAN
 Captain, USN (Ret.)
 Assistant Secretary

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
PERSONNEL DIVISION G-1
WASHINGTON

SECRET

10 September 1945

WDGAP 201. Kebbe, Charles M.

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES:
(THRU: Secretary, U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff)

SUBJECT: Discharge of 1st Sergeant Charles M. Kebbe, 32900495

1. In accordance with your request, The Adjutant General has been directed to discharge 1st Sergeant Charles M. Kebbe under the provisions of paragraph 3b, AR 615-305.
2. It is requested that the Office of Strategic Services notify Sergeant Kebbe's local selective service board should he fail to accept or leave the assignment of national interest now contemplated for him.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1:

K. McCLURE
Lt. Col., GSC,
Assistant Executive,
Policy Group, G-1

- Incls
- Memo for AO/S, G-1
fr Sec, Joint C/S
6 Sept 45
 - Memo for AO/S, G-1
fr O Strategic Services
31 Aug 45
 - Memo for AO/S, G-1
fr O Strategic Services
31 Aug 45





THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

6 September 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1, WDGS

SUBJECT: Discharge of 1st Sgt. Charles M. Kebbe

ENCL: Letter from O.S.S. to Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-1, WDGS, dated 31 August 1945, enclosing
request for discharge

The enclosure is forwarded for consideration
and appropriate action.

R. U. Hyatt
RALPH U. HYATT
Captain, USN, (Ret.)
Assistant Secretary

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

31 August 1945

201 Kebbe, Charles M. (Enl.)
SUBJECT: Discharge under Provisions of Para. 3B AR 615-385 (1944)
 (Essential to National Interest)
THROUGH: Secretary, U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, WDCIS

1. It is requested that 1st Sgt. Charles M. Kebbe, ASN 32908485, be discharged under the provisions of Para. 3B AR 615-385 (1944) in order to accept a special overseas assignment of national interest with this agency, as set forth below.

2. Subject enlisted man is assigned to the Office of Strategic Services and occupies a position with the Morale Operations Branch of this organization. Upon being discharged he will be assigned overseas in Western Europe. His duties will include: the collection and analysis of anti-American propaganda; the study of and subversion of periodic reports on the economic, political, and military conditions in that area; the identification of sources and media of enemy propaganda; and the recommendation of counter measures.

3. To effectively perform the above duties it is essential that 1st Sgt. Kebbe have the utmost freedom of action and that he carry on his duties as a resident of the particular country in which he is to be stationed. This freedom of action and effectiveness of operation can only be achieved by his being in civilian status. Authorization to wear civilian clothes in the performance of the above assignment would be inadequate for his military status would be disclosed by his identification papers and travel papers.

4. 1st Sgt. Kebbe's education, background and training ideally qualify him for his proposed assignment. He is 32 years of age, having been born on 15 July 1913 at Hartford, Connecticut. He is a graduate of Lafayette College, Rutherford, New Jersey and Yale University Department of Fine Arts, New Haven, Connecticut. His background and experience for the last ten years are as a public relations specialist. He has unusual qualifications for the study of cultural and psychological conditions in the areas to which he will be assigned. He has a wide acquaintance in diplomatic and business circles in England, both from his pre-war travels in that country and from his work with the Office of Strategic Services during the war. He joined the Army in May 1942 and was transferred to the Office of Strategic Services in October 1942, serving overseas on a joint assignment with the British Intelligence Division of the British Army of the Middle East for ten months. By his work with OCS/IE, he acquired a first-hand

SECRET

-2-

knowledge of propaganda methods and techniques.

5. For the foregoing considerations favorable consideration of the request contained in paragraph 1 is recommended.

William J. Donovan
WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Maj. Gen., USA
Director

SECRET

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

31 August 1945

201 Kebbe, Charles M. (Enl.)
SUBJECT: Discharge under Provisions of Para. 3B AR 615-365 (1944)
(Essential to National Interest)
THROUGH: Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, WDGS

1. It is requested that the undersigned be discharged under the provisions of Para. 3B AR 615-365 (1944) in order to accept a special overseas assignment of national interest with the Office of Strategic Services, as set forth in inclosed memorandum from the Director, OSS.

Charles M. Kebbe
Charles M. Kebbe
1st Sergeant,
ASN 32906485

Incl:

17,461
Karch, W
X Import Co

21 September 1945

Mr. J. W. Karch
Karch Import Company
73 South Main Street
Gloversville, New York

Dear Mr. Karch:

General Donovan has asked me to reply to your letter of 7 September pointing out that OSS is in a most favorable position to import tin, rubber and other scarce commodities.

This agency has been in the process of liquidation for several weeks and will have terminated all operations by 1 October. Therefore, if for no other reason, OSS is not in a position to undertake such activities as those you have suggested.

Sincerely yours,

M. J. Putwell, Jr.
Executive Officer

END

ADDRESS: KARCHIMPORT, GLOVERSVILLE, N.Y.
KARCHIMPORT, NEW YORK

17,461

Karch

X Import Co.

CODES ACME
A.B.C. 5TH ED. IMPROVED
A.B.C. 6TH ED.
BENTLEY'S
LIERBERG IMPROVED
ORIENTAL 3-LETTER
ORIENTAL 5-LETTER IMPROVED
TANNER'S COUNCIL
UNIVERSAL TRADE

*None Plm
Please write to
Karch*

Karch Import Company

RAW MATERIALS

HEAD OFFICE
101 WILLIAM STREET
NEW YORK 7 N.Y.
PHONE CONLAD 7-2044

PHONE 2008
73 SOUTH MAIN STREET
GLOVERSVILLE, N.Y.

September 7th, 1945.

Col. William J. Donovan
OSS
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:-

I read with keen interest the series of newspaper releases on the secret war work of the OSS and I gather that your organization wishes to continue along varied lines during the post war and peace eras.

How about starting an import company for tin, rubber and other scarce articles now needed quickly to furnish jobs in important industries, such as autos? Become a competitor of mine!

Normally another government agency, U.S. Commercial Co., would handle these, but at present I cannot even get a radio message through to my Chinese friends at Bangkok and Hong Kong. Looks like it might take 6 months or more for the usual commercial processes to arrange acceptable currency for payment and to obtain ships to bring goods here.

I think yours is the only agency that can cut across all the obstacles in South Asia, fast. Most of the difficulties are of military nature and you work with both the Army and Navy. USCC could not begin to operate until import business is operating smoothly; a long time off. Besides, you could make a big profit while they set out, under BEW guidance, to deliberately "lose" millions for alleged political expediency.

I think legally the OSS war job is not completed until industries have enough materials to operate 100% and can offer jobs to all veterans. After that, private importers should take over during peace, but young men of your training should be hired by importers for foreign jobs, so they can report along various lines.

Yours very truly

W. J. Donovan

CABLE ADDRESS: KARCHIMCO, GLOVERSVILLE NY
KARCHIMCO, NEW YORK

CORE: ACME
A B C 5TH ED IMPROVED
A B C 6TH ED
BENTLEY'S
LIEBER'S IMPROVED
ORIENTAL 3-LETTER
ORIENTAL 5-LETTER IMPROVED
TANNER'S COUNCIL
UNIVERSAL TRADE

Karch Import Company

RAW MATERIALS

BRANCH OFFICE
181 WILLIAM STREET
NEW YORK 7 N.Y.
PHONE LORTLAND 7-0944

PHONE 2006
73 SOUTH MAIN STREET
GLOVERSVILLE, N. Y.

September 7th, 1945.

Col. William J. Donovan
OSS
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:-

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How about starting an import company for tin, rubber and other scarce articles now needed quickly to furnish jobs in important industries, such as autos? Become a competitor of mine.

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Yours very truly,

17, 397

Kells, Maj Gen

29 August 1945

TO: O. H. Kells, Major General, USA
Commanding General, New York Port of
Embarkation, New York, New York

FROM: Major General William J. Donovan

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

1. This means is taken to convey the appreciation of the Office of Strategic Services to your Command for the efficient and prompt cooperation extended to our personnel while on temporary duty at your installation. Lt. Col. A. F. Richards, of your Marine Repair Shop, deserves particular mention for his efforts in our behalf.

2. Your personnel extended privileges which enabled the OSS to fulfil the desires of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Headquarters Army Air Forces.

3. The splendid action and cooperation of the New York Port of Embarkation resulted in expeditious accomplishment of our mission, which could not have been attained without praiseworthy cooperation so effectively extended by you and your Command.

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Maj. Gen., AUS
Director

cc: Lt. Col. A. F. Richards

17,396
Kane, C.P. Brig. Gen.

29 August 1945

TO: C. P. Kane, Brigadier General, USA,
 Commanding General, Headquarters Atlantic
 Overseas Air Technical Service Command,
 Fort Newark, Newark, 5, New Jersey.

FROM: Major General William J. Donovan

SUBJECT: Letter of Appreciation

1. This means is taken to convey the appreciation of the Office of Strategic Services to your Command for the efficient and prompt cooperation extended to our personnel while on temporary duty at your installation.
2. Your personnel extended privileges which enabled the OSS to fulfil the desires of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Headquarters Army Air Forces.
3. The splendid action and cooperation of the Headquarters Atlantic Overseas Air Technical Service Command resulted in expeditious accomplishment of our mission, which could not have been attained without praiseworthy cooperation so effectively extended by you and your Command.

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
 Maj. Gen., AUS
 Director

16,854

Kaysen, Capt Carl
x McDonald, Brig Gen G. C.

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE (REAR)
Office of the Director of Intelligence

AAF Sta. 390, APO 413,
c/o Postmaster, NW., NY.
4 May 1945.

Major General William J. Donovan,
Office of Strategic Services,
WASHINGTON, D.C.



Dear Bill,

Many thanks for your nice letter of April 23. It was good of you to write me considering the many taxes on your time and the pressure that you were therefore under during your last visit. I do look forward to chatting with you when you return to either England or France.

I have noted what you say about Captain Carl Kaysen and asked my Personnel Section to investigate his status. I find that Kaysen is not assigned to OSS but is an Officer of US Strategic Air Forces in Europe assigned to my Directorate. I also find that he is presently engaged in the preparation of certain extensive reports personally ordered by General Spaatz and that he is the only man that we have qualified to do this work. Therefore I regret exceedingly that I cannot let Kaysen go but must keep him at least until his present assignment has been completed. Evidently Chandler Morse was mis-informed as to Captain Kaysen's status.

I asked Lowell Weicker to go into this question with Captain Lester Armour. He tells me that Lester fully understands Kaysen's situation.

With every warm personal good wish and the best of luck,

Sincerely,

George C. McDonald
GEORGE C. McDONALD,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Director of Intelligence.

16, 854

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE (HEAD)
Office of the Director of Intelligence

AAF Hqs. 390, APO 413,
c/o Postmaster, NH., NY.
4 May 1945.

Major General William J. Donovan,
Office of Strategic Services,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dear Bill,

Many thanks for your nice letter of April 23. It was good of you to write me considering the many boxes on your time and the pressure that you were therefore under during your last visit. I do look forward to chatting with you when you return to either England or France.

I have noted what you say about Captain Carl Kayson and asked my Personnel Section to investigate his status. I find that Kayson is not assigned to ORE but is an officer of US Strategic Air Forces in Europe assigned to my Directorate. I also find that he is presently engaged in the preparation of certain extensive reports personally ordered by General Spaatz and that he is the only man that we have qualified to do this work. Therefore I regret exceedingly that I cannot let Kayson go but must keep him at least until his present assignment has been completed. Evidently Chaudler Morse was mis-informed as to Captain Kayson's status.

I asked Lowell Webster to go into this question with Captain Lester Armour. He tells me that Lester fully understands Kayson's situation.

With every warm personal good wish and the best of luck,

Sincerely,

GEORGE G. McDONALD,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Director of Intelligence.

16620

Kelly, John F.

7 April 1945

Mr. John F. Kelly
7101 Colonial Road
Brooklyn, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Kelly:

General Donovan is presently out of the country. Before leaving he asked that I see you should you come to Washington. My telephone number is Executive 6100, Extension 2081.

Sincerely,

Robert Thrun
Assistant Executive
Officer

B
D
111

16,620
Wally J. F

No. 7101 Colonial Rd.,
Brooklyn, N.Y.

April 3, 1948

MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN,
No. 1647 Thirtieth St.,
Washington, D.C.

My Dear General:-

I am taking the liberty of writing to you, having been a member of your Command the 165th Infantry, Company "D", Captain James Mc Kenna, in 1917. I was wounded at Mercy Farms the same day as yourself and sent to the hospital from there. If I am not mistaken I met you personally thru Mr. Art George of San Diego, Cal.

I am now employed at the ADO Publication Depot, 1926 Broadway, New York City which is now under the Army Service Forces having been transferred to this installation from the New York Port of Embarkation, I am employed in the capacity of Superintendent of the Warehouse. I was connected with the New York Port of Embarkation for about nine years (Civil Service) and when transferred to this installation it was under their command, but was transferred in August to the Army Service Force.

My record with the Government Civil Service has been excellent for thirteen years. Within this past week I was called into the Personnel Office and advised that my position was being abolished and that I was to be given 30 days to find something else.

My reason for writing you is to ask if you will grant me an interview should I make a trip to Washington, as I have some information that may be of interest to your office, and of which I cannot state in writing.

Trusting you will see your way clear to grant me this interview.

Respectfully,

John F. Kelly

*R. T. -
D. J. Kelly*

16.554
Kennedy *JK*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

S E C R E T

TO: Major General William J. Donovan

DATE: 12 April 1945

VIA: Dr. William L. Langer *for RH*

FROM: Charles B. Fahs *CBF*

SUBJECT: George Kennedy

*How for
D. Kennedy
one*

On several occasions in connection with your inquiries regarding our plans for the Far East collection program in Europe, we have mentioned George Kennedy as our candidate to head such collections in Berlin. I should like, therefore, to inform you as to the disposal of our recommendations for his employment.

You will recall that Dr. Kennedy is Professor of Chinese at Yale University, reads both Chinese and Japanese, and is fluent in German, having studied in institutions for Oriental studies in Berlin.

Our action to send Dr. Kennedy overseas was pushed only after we had discussed the case fully with the Security Office, and Dr. Kennedy had already been cleared for work with OSS in Washington. Possible difficulties of clearance with other agencies were also thoroughly discussed.

Dr. Kennedy's shipment was repeatedly delayed, first, by difficulties in securing satisfactory arrangements with Yale University and second, by delays in securing transportation. When he was finally called to port as of 1 April 1945, his passage had to be cancelled because of the State Department's refusal to issue a passport. I was informed on 30 March by Mr. Southgate that no appeal was possible at this time and that while the State Department might change their minds at a later date, there was no assurance that they would do so. We were very much embarrassed by the lateness of this decision by the State Department.

In view of this uncertainty, the impossibility of keeping both Dr. Kennedy and Yale University in suspense indefinitely, and the rapid progress of events in Germany, we have cancelled Mr. Kennedy's appointment.

100 2 24.12

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

*16,557
Kennedy, George*

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General Donovan
FROM : William L. Langer
SUBJECT:

DATE: 30 March 1945



Referring to your request of yesterday regarding Mr. George Kennedy, I find that he is at present on our rolls and that he is slated to leave for ETO about April 1. He is expected to set up the procurement of Far Eastern materials in the European area.

As I told you, strenuous efforts had been made by the State Department to secure Kennedy after we had engaged him. These efforts were made by Dr. Bryn Hovde, the Chief of the Division of Cultural Cooperation in the Department of State.

William L. Langer
William L. Langer
Chief, Research and
Analysis Branch

CONFIDENTIAL

OSS FORM #001a

Date 20 January 45

To: Mr. Cheston

There is attached, for your signature, a proposed reply to Mr. Acheson's letter to the General requesting that Lt. Karasik be detailed to work in the State Department on the Safe Haven investigations. This is satisfactory to R&A.

John W. Auchincloss
John W. Auchincloss
1st Lt., JAGD

Office of the Secretariat

(9199)

248

16,010
Karasik, Monroe
~~x State Dept~~
~~x Safe Haven~~

20 January 1945

The Honorable Dean Acheson
Assistant Secretary
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Reference: FMA

My dear Mr. Acheson:

Since General Donovan is away from Washington, I am writing to answer your letter to him of 4 January about Lt. Karasik.

We appreciate the joint interest which the Department and OSS have in the Safe Haven investigations, and we are glad to detail Lt. Karasik to work on this project in the Department. The arrangement will be a temporary one, and I think we must feel free to ask for his return in case some future development in our program here should make it necessary.

I am sure that Lt. Karasik's assignment will be of benefit both to the Department and to us.

Sincerely yours,

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

JWA:egp

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

16,010
Karasiuk, Miron
x State Dept.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
FMA

January 4, 1946

My dear General Donovan:

As you may know, this Department, in conjunction with certain of the other interested agencies, has for some time been actively engaged in a project for the discovery and immobilization of German assets located outside of Germany, principally in the neutral countries. From time to time various aspects of this project have been discussed with officers of the Office of Strategic Services, and there has been consultation between your Office and various officers of this Department on problems of mutual interest relating to these matters.

In this connection, conversations have been had with Dr. Langer, Chief of the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services, and with other persons in Dr. Langer's Branch. It is believed that it would be of mutual advantage to the Department and to your Office, and would greatly assist the Department in the carrying out of its functions with relation to this project, were it to be possible to detail from the Office of Strategic Services Lt. Monroe Karasik. It is understood that Lt. Karasik has done some work in the Office of Strategic Services which is related rather closely to the project under reference, and that his previous experience in the Office of Alien Property Custodian and in the Department of Justice would particularly fit him for work along these lines.

Should

Major General William J. Donovan,
Office of Strategic Services,
25th and E Streets, N.W.
Washington, D. C.



-2-

Should you deem it possible, the Department would appreciate the detail of Lt. Karasik to the Department for work on this project. It is anticipated that Lt. Karasik would maintain liaison with the Office of Strategic Services on problems within this field which would be of mutual interest to the Department and to your Office.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Dean Johnson".

Assistant Secretary

Sturtevant on Jackson
Chambers
Donovan
William J. Donovan

1312 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON 8, D.C.

15,789

Medical Div.
Chief of Army Medical

November 16, 1944

Dear General Donovan:

I have been unable to find a copy of the curriculum of Mr. Anthony Kenkel but you may find the others of some help. Mr. Kenkel lives in Washington, although his home is in St. Louis, I believe. (Business Address: U.S. Tariff Commission, Washington, D.C.; Home Address: 5401 Tilden Road, North Beltsville, Maryland.)

I do not know personally Captain Blatz or Dr. Marx but both have been recommended highly.

With every good wish, I remain

Very sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan

William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D.C.

15709
Keppler, Gen Georg

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES PLANNING GROUP

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan DATE: 22 November 1944

FROM: Shepard Morgan, Acting Chairman

SUBJECT: Georg Keppler

Please disregard what I told you over the telephone last evening about General Georg Keppler. A memorandum from Paul Schwarz shows that he was talking about a General Wilhelm Keppler. Neither he nor Paul Scheffer had anything substantial about Georg Keppler.

Our own Biographical Records proves to have been the best source. Mrs. Austin of that section gives the following about Georg Keppler. He was born in 1894; was General Lieutenant of Police and became General Lieutenant of the armed SS on January 30, 1942. A year later he was made an SS group leader, corresponding in rank to a general officer. Thereafter, he was made SS Obergruppenfuhrer. In February 1944, a list in the possession of A & A shows that Keppler was commander of the Waffen SS in Moravia and Bohemia. An unverified report states he was killed on October 27, 1944. The date is interesting because on October 24, 1944 a secret report from Bernie stated that General Keppler was opposed to the Nazi atrocity program and had established contact with the anti-Nazi elements in the Wehrmacht. Perhaps the Gestapo heard it first.

S. M.
Shepard Morgan

15,543
Kaufmann and Putzell

28 October 1944

Security Office
E. J. Putzell Jr.
2nd Lt. William F. Kaufmann

I understand that Lt. Kaufmann is being considered by your office for security approval at the request of MO Branch.

I have known Lt. Kaufmann for approximately six years and believe him to be entirely trustworthy and of high character. I have no doubt whatsoever that his loyalty to this government is the best and that he will be a worthy addition to the staff of this organization. I recommend that his security be approved.

E. J. Putzell Jr.
Lieutenant (J.G.), USNR
Assistant Executive Officer

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE 25 JANUARY 1945 REC'D 25 JAN 45 OUT 2000

TO SIGEX, WANDY PRECEDENCE

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES CLASSIFICATION SECRET

CONFIRMATION OICASA

INFORMATION DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, CHIEF OF BUREAU, BUREAU, FIELD SECTION, HQ SET.

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#13731. YORKER TO BERNARD

Karcher
15,470

SECRET

PROMOTION OF KARCHER RE YOUR #13017 (IN 2058) WILL BE RE-SUBMITTED SHORTLY.

SECRET

FILE COPY

TOR: 1810 25 JAN 45 INITIALS: GD JEO'G/R

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT.

OSS FORM 2403

Date 18 January 1946

To: Mr. O'Gara, 221 Adm Bldg

Herewith copy of 1st Ind from TAG
in compliance with your request.

[Signature]
R E OLIVER
Lt Col, CAC
Executive Officer

NOTE
TO: Mr O'Gara
For return to Director's
file since this is being the
copy. - [Signature]
Office of the Commanding Officer,
Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment.
(23143)

OSS Form 69 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH

15,470
Karcher, R.E.

DATE 17 JAN 45

FROM

SIGEX, KANDY

1945 JAN 20 10 16

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

DISTRIBUTION

IN 1557

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

O'GARA

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, HQ., DET.,
FIELD SECTION

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10-37085-1

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#12847. BERNO TO QUINN,

SECRET

PLEASE ADVISE STATUS KARCHER'S PROMOTION AS POSITION AND
WORK HE IS DOING HERE URGENTLY REQUIRES THAT IT BE EXPEDITED.

AGPO-P Karcher, Raymond E. 1st Ind
(13 Dec 44)
WD, AGO, Washington 26, D. C., 20 December 1944.

To: Director, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D. C.

The Secretary of War's Personnel Board does not favorably consider the recommendation for the promotion of Captain Raymond Edward Karcher, 0630158, Army of the United States, to the grade of major, Army of the United States, as the higher grade is not considered appropriate for the position in question.

By order of the Secretary of War:

SECRET

/s/ J. A. Arstenrath
Adjutant General.

TOR 1119 17 JAN 45

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

SECRET

15, 470
 Karcher, Capt Raymond
 Strategic plan

17 October 1944

SUBJECT: Assignment and Travel Orders: Captain Raymond E. Karcher,
 G-660158, AC

TO: Chief, Military Personnel, OSS (Col. Roberts)
 Secretariat (Lt. Pugliese)
 OSS Theater Officer (Col. Richards)

FROM: The Director

1. The officer named above, assigned to this office, is being sent to SEAC Headquarters, Kandy, for the purpose of assisting in the evaluation and solution of various problems relating to the coordination of Air Forces and OSS activities in the Far East, particularly in regard to material and techniques for use in designating front lines and enemy targets in jungle warfare.

2. For the purpose of this mission, it is desirable that Captain Karcher be included among the personnel being assigned to the "Strategic Plan". The necessity of his working with several of the Branches of OSS will preclude assignment to any one of them.

3. In order to expedite this assignment, Captain Karcher shall be authorized to work directly with the various operational headquarters in the field, as well as to communicate directly (through Headquarters, Kandy) with The Secretariat, Director, and Planning Group, as well as Communications, SI, SO, and R&D Branches of OSS Headquarters in Washington, D.C.

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET

k. Request that a November air priority be obtained for the transportation of this officer, with excess baggage allowance for certain minimal requirements in special equipment necessary in this work.

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Director

SECRET

098 Form 1004b

DATE 12 Dec.

TO: Mrs. O'Donnell

For your files. Capt. Karoher
is now overseas but is assigned
to the Director's Office, Wash.

FROM: Col. Quinn

EXT. Chc

OSS Form 2201

15,470
Kerrigan, Capt Raymond
File x information please
CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY OFFICE
Investigation Report

Date: 25 February 1944.

Subject: MARCHER, R. E. (Capt. U.S.A)

Number: 14740

To: Lt. Col. Robert S. Quinn.

- 1. Investigation directed by: CLB.
- 2. Sources of information: AAI.
- 3. Summary of information:

According to information received, Subject is an American born citizen, 25 years old, the son of American born parents.

Subject is said to have an A.B. degree and to have experience as a salesman and buyer.

Nothing of derogatory nature was disclosed regarding the Subject's loyalty and personal character.

CONFIDENTIAL

(20639)

Page 1

CONFIDENTIAL

14,990

Kennedy, Raymond

PROM: i

RESTRICTED
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Shaw

Accession No. 9.62.13.804

Date Rec'd SA ... AUG 9 .. 1944.

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	Fwd'd.		
1. McJannet	4074 2145	7-27-44	7-27-44		<p>11 Aug</p> <p>Ret - Returned</p> <p>Kenwick is letter of J. Howland Shaw re Ray Kennedy and copy of acknowledgment already sent by Mr. Christian.</p> <p>Tom McFarlane</p>
2. Ensign Russell	Administration			ESP	
3.			Bldg.		
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in column 1.

A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.

Officer Designations should be used in the comments.

Each Officer should initial (check mark inefficient) before routing.

Action desired or action taken should be indicated in comments.

Routing sheet should always be returned to registry.

For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

(2500)

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 25

3-81

26213-804 990
B.S.O. Kennedy, Raymond
State Dept



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
DP

AUG 4 1944

My dear General Donovan:

The Department of State is very desirous of having the services of Professor Raymond Kennedy, who is now employed one day a week as Consultant by the Office of Strategic Services.

The loan of Professor Kennedy for one day a week to the Department of State on a non-reimbursable basis, to be effective as soon as possible, will be greatly appreciated. Professor Kennedy would act as Consultant in the Division of Southwestern Pacific Affairs. Because of his background and experience he appears to be well qualified for the work which the Department desires him to perform.

If you approve Professor Kennedy's detail under the conditions set forth above, I shall appreciate being informed. I should also like to know the date it will be possible for Professor Kennedy to begin work with this Department.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

J. Howland Shaw

G. Howland Shaw
Assistant Secretary.

*True State
1945*



Brigadier General William J. Donovan,
Director, Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

C O P Y

9 August 1944

Hon. G. Howland Shaw
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Shaw:

Replying to your letter of 4 August, I am pleased to advise you that arrangements have been made whereby this Office will loan the Department of State the services of Professor Raymond Kennedy for one day a week on a non-reimbursable basis. I understand that Professor Kennedy plans to spend Tuesdays at the Department of State and that he started this schedule yesterday, 8 August.

Sincerely yours,

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

Copies:

Major Roller
Lt. Moradden

Kaliff, M. S., 13,775

SECRET

24 February 1944

MEMORANDUM TO End Lt. Mendel S. Kaliff

SUBJECT: Orders

You are hereby authorized and directed to proceed to the destination indicated in your military orders, where you will report to the Chief, OSS for that theater of operations. You are, thereafter, to act under the instructions of the Chief, OSS for such theater.

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

U.S. SECRET

2877th Regt., OSS, (Prov.),
APO 512, % Postmaster, N.Y., N.Y.

13,729
Katz, William
x Library Dept. PMS

27 January, 1945.

Mr. Charles C. Cheston,
Assistant Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.,
U. S. A.

Dear Charlie,

I saw the General on January 7th, the night before I left for London and Paris. Among other things, we talked about some of the things that might be done toward laying the foundations for a permanent secret intelligence. The General expressed substantial interest in some of the possibilities which I put forward. I told him that I would like very much to be part of the group that was going to take a crack at this, and that I would like to get started on it as soon as the Germans fold up. He indicated that he would be for this.

If the General passes through here on his way home, I hope to have an opportunity to talk to him further about it.

He told me something of the plans which he had laid before the Commander in Chief, and also indicated his conviction that the time to start on all of these things is now. This is right, of course, and I feel confident that you must have made a reasonable decision by this time. I feel sure that it is a subject in which you must be interested, and I hope that you will take a very active part in it. Some of the things which he mentioned are of the nature of the obvious ways by which our governmental representation abroad can help to reestablish relations abroad and prevent the kind of close working relations which have developed as a result of other actions.

I found OSS, ETC a very interesting show. I think some of the new assignments will prove all to the good. They have an extremely tough job ahead of them, and they seem to be digging in vigorously.

Hooper

W. Katz
WILLIAM KATZ,
Lieut. Colonel, USA,
Lieut. Chief, SI, ETC.

U.S. SECRET

13,729

Katz, Milton

8 July 1944

FROM: The Director, Office of Strategic Services
To: The Chief of Naval Personnel

Subject: Lieutenant Commander Milton Katz, D-V(S), USNR,
 Maintenance of temporary promotion in connection with change of duty, Request for

1. Under date of 5 April 1944, the subject officer, having been commissioned in the rank of Lieutenant, D-V(S), USNR, was appointed a Lieutenant Commander in the Naval Reserve, to rank from 17 March 1944, for temporary service with the Office of Strategic Services as Chief, SI, China Theater, such appointment to continue while serving in that assignment.

2. On 28 June, 1944, subject officer completed a course of instruction at the Naval Training Station (I), Princeton, New Jersey, and returned to this station.

3. Within the past two months, the Office of Strategic Services has undertaken to reconstitute its organization in the Mediterranean Theater, to conform to the changing situation in that theater and, in particular, to carry out more effectively certain urgent secret intelligence projects in that theater. For this purpose, the Director, Office of Strategic Services, has decided to transfer certain of his ablest and most experienced officers from other theaters to key posts in the Mediterranean Theater.

4. In this connection, the Director, Office of Strategic Services, has selected the subject officer for assignment to the Mediterranean Theater to supervise all secret intelligence activities based in that theater directed toward the penetration of Central Europe. This post will not only involve responsibility for a number of difficult and delicate secret intelligence projects, but will also require administrative coordination with related activities of the Office of Strategic Services based in other theaters and with comparable activities conducted by the services of allied governments and by resistance groups.

5. The need to fill this post with an officer of the caliber of the subject officer has, within the past two months, become even more acute and immediate than the requirements of the post to which the subject officer had previously been assigned.

- 2 -

6. The subject officer has traveled widely in Europe and Africa. His previous experience included service as the U. S. Executive Officer of the Combined Production and Resources Board, in the course of which he participated in collaboration with allied governments at the highest levels. During a year of service with the Office of Strategic Services, he has consistently demonstrated outstanding ability, resourcefulness, versatility and judgment.

7. Owing to the nature of the new post, the rank of the officers whom the subject officer will command, and the relationships which he will maintain with high ranking officers of allied governments, co-belligerents and resistance groups, it is essential that he continue in a rank not lower than his present rank.

8. It is therefore requested that the temporary promotion of the subject officer to the rank of Lieutenant Commander, E-V(8), USNR be kept in effect during his service as Chief of secret intelligence activities based in the Mediterranean and directed toward the penetration of Central Europe.

William J. Donovan
Brigadier General, AUS

Katz hull 13729 -
CONFIDENTIAL
 x heavy Dept Pers

25 February 1944

FROM: The Director of Strategic Services
TO: The Chief of Naval Personnel
VIA: The Vice Chief of Naval Operations
SUBJECT: Mr. Milton Katz,
 Request for Commissioning of.

1. Mr. Milton Katz has made application for a commission in the U. S. Naval Reserve, at the suggestion of this office, with which he has been working as a civilian since August of 1943.
2. Mr. Katz is thirty-six years of age and by the generally accepted procedure, if commissioned in the Naval Reserve he would probably be entitled to the rank of Lieutenant (junior grade). It is believed, however, that Mr. Katz's position and experience warrant a higher rank.
3. Mr. Katz's background, since his graduation from Harvard University with an AB, and an LLB degree in 1931, stamps him as a man of exceptional ability and shows him to be a man of unusual qualifications. After practicing law privately for about two years, he began a long period of government employment. His first government position, in July 1933, was as Assistant Counsel and Special Assistant to the Administrator of the NFA, Mr. Donald Richberg, at a salary of \$6,000 a year. He left this position in September 1935 to become Executive Assistant to the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Mr. James M. Landis, where he was paid \$7,000 and remained until August 1938. He then left to enter the Department of Justice, where he served as Special Assistant to the Attorney General, Mr. Norman Arnold, at the same salary. In September 1939 he was called to Harvard University to serve as professor of law, at a salary of \$8,000 but, after being there two years, he was given a leave of absence to return to Washington, D. C. to assist in the preliminary negotiations preceding the establishment of the Combined Procurement Administration.

- 2 -

Board, a combined Anglo-American agency established by the President of the United States and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, to develop the combined production program of the two countries in accordance with strategic requirements of the war, as indicated to the Board by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Upon the establishment of the Board, Mr. Katz was appointed its first United States Executive Officer. In this capacity, he served under Messrs. John Lord O'Brian and William L. Batt, as a CAF-15, at a salary of \$8,000. He remained in this position until he transferred to this office, at our request.

4. Since coming to the Office of Strategic Services, Mr. Katz has been serving as Deputy Chief of our Secret Intelligence Branch for the Far East Theater and, in this capacity, has acquired a highly specialized knowledge of our problems in the Far East. It is now my plan to send him to Chungking, to be Chief of all Secret Intelligence activities for this Office in the China Command Area. He will have charge of and exercise command over a number of officers and men of various services. He will be called upon at all times to plan Secret Intelligence operations in that Theater with officers of other Allied forces in the highest echelons.

5. Mr. Katz came to us with the highest possible recommendations and since his employment here, he has fulfilled these recommendations in every task which he has been called upon to perform. For the foregoing reasons and because it is deemed vital that he have sufficient rank to perform his duty for this office in the Far East in an efficient manner at all times, I respectfully request that he be commissioned a Lieutenant (senior grade), and be given a spot promotion to the rank of Lieutenant Commander.

William J. Donovan

Navies, Secrecy 13,622

SECRET

16 February 1944

TO: Mr. Kevan

... hereby authorized and directed to
... England, where you will report
... officer for the European
... are, thereafter, to act
... the Strategic Services
... Theater.

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

APPROVED

Edmund Reiman
S. M. Scribner
Deputy Director, ESO

Sodfish
Sodfish
Chief, MO Branch

John D. Wilson
Ens. John Wilson
European Theater Officer

SECRET

*Kamlin, E. K. 13, 2 88
X USA Division*

5 January 1944

Mr. Howard K. Trovare
Chief, Visa Division
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Trovare:

I shall appreciate your assistance in expediting action on the enclosed application for an exit permit executed by Hajal Kamlin.

This individual is proceeding on a mission directly related to the prosecution of the war, and it is important that he depart at the earliest possible moment.

I am satisfied that the issuance of this exit permit could not in any way prove inconsistent with the national interest.

Sincerely yours,

Charles E. Chaston
Acting Assistant Director

Encs.

SECRET

Kambhu E. 13,288

SECRET

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

29 December 1943

MEMORANDUM

TO: Colonel G. Edward Buxton
FROM: J. M. Scribner
SUBJECT: Ekji Kambhu

You requested my opinion as to whether subject, now connected with SO, should be transferred to SI as requested.

Mary and Kunjara requested subject and another Thai doctor for shipment to the Far East as soon as training was completed. About the middle of November SI requested the services of subject. SO suggested that subject be given SI training, so that he would be qualified for SI work in the field. Some difficulty with security was encountered in carrying out this suggestion.

On the 11th of December Milton Katz requested transfer of subject from SO to SI. Lieutenant Fisher, SO Area Operations Officer for Far East, informed Mr. Katz that he was not in a position to approve of this transfer as the man had been requested by Mary. He did, however, express his willingness to have subject receive SI training before going to the field.

On December 15th, Mr. Katz directed a memorandum, through Mr. Shepardson, to you requesting transfer of subject to SI.

As SO was willing to have subject receive SI training, a course which SI did not put into effect, and as transportation has already been requested for subject, and as subject has been requested by Mary and promised to him, it is recommended that this transfer be disapproved.

[Signature]
J. M. Scribner
Deputy Director, SSO

1
43
Have asked Scribner & Shepardson to confer and give me a joint recommendation. JEB.

Mr Scribner called to say that he had spoken with Mr Shepardson & they have worked it out satisfactorily.
SECRET
[Signature]

SECRET

December 16, 1943

MEMORANDUM

To *Col. Buxton*
Major Mr. Whitney H. Shepardson
 From: Milton Katz *WK*
 Subject: Ekji Kambhu

Attached hereto are three memoranda which are self-explanatory. These are:

- (1) a memorandum of December 9 from Mr. McClure to me,
- (2) a memorandum of December 11 from me to Lieut. Fisher, and
- (3) a memorandum of December 15 from Lieut. Fisher to me.

Briefly, Kambhu is a man who would be most valuable to Major Scholts. He is the brother of an influential man in Thailand, who is a West Point graduate and who formerly worked for Major Scholts in Bangkok. Kambhu at present is part of a group trained for service with Mary, where he will be used as a physician.

Lieut. Fisher states that he is not in a position to transfer the man to us. If we desire a transfer, he feels that only Col. Buxton has authority to effect it.

Under all the circumstances, it seems to me that a request to Col. Buxton that Kambhu be transferred to GI would be justified. May I ask you to do this? I understand that the group is marked for transportation abroad in the very near future.

Col. Buxton

Attachments

Approved MKL. I have inquired, and understand that Lt. Fisher has no objection to our having this before you for decision.

SECRET

13 December 1943

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Milton Katz

FROM: Charles N. Fisher

SUBJECT: Ekjai Khaabu

DEC 13 1943

1. Your memorandum of 11 December 1943 has been received, and I believe has been answered with my telephone conversation with you on 13 December 1943.

2. In this telephone conversation, I advised you that the subject of making this man available for SI training had been discussed by Mr. McClure over three weeks ago, at which time I offered the man's services for any training you desired to give him prior to his departure.

3. I further advised you that Mr. McClure had previously attempted to enlist this man for SI work, but because of lack of complete security approval, had been unable to enroll him in your SI schools.

4. I further advised you that the subject is a trained doctor, and it is planned he will be used as such with the Detachment to which he is being transported.

5. On the basis of all the above information, we agreed that it would be impracticable to accede, at this late date, to the request of Mr. McClure, dated 9 December 1943.

CNF
 CHARLES N. FISHER
 Lieutenant, USNR,
 PE Area Operations Officer

SECRET

December 11, 1948

MEMORANDUM

To: Lieut. Charles Fisher, USNR

From: Milton Katz

Subject: Ekji Kambhu

1. Attached hereto is a memorandum to me from Mr. McClure concerning Ekji Kambhu. The memorandum is self-explanatory.
2. From our telephone conversation of this morning, I understand that you are not yet in a position to say whether you can transfer this man to SI for service under Major Scholtz in the theater.
3. I also understand that you will advise Ekji Kambhu informally that you have him in mind for special work which will require special training. After he finishes his communications training, I understand that you will make him available for SI training here. I also understand that, to the extent that you may feel authorized to do so after the situation is clarified, you are prepared to transfer Ekji Kambhu to service under Major Scholtz in the theater.
4. Is the foregoing a correct statement of the situation?

Attachment

MK:jk

COPY

December 9, 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO: Milton Katz
FROM: E. L. McClure
SUBJECT: Ekji Kambhu

Ekji Kambhu is a free Thai subject and one of the SO group now in the United States in training, preparing for active duty in the field.

It is important that the subject be transferred to Project FE 25 for SI duty at Kunming.

We understand that some arrangement has been made whereby the subject cannot be transferred to us in the United States but transfer can be made in the field.

In view of the fact that we would like to give this man some SI training, it would be appreciated if he could be transferred to us as soon as possible to enter the OSS school.

The subject is a brother of an influential man in Thailand who is a West Point graduate, and who formerly worked for Mr. Scholtz in Bangkok.

May we suggest that you arrange to have the subject transferred to us with as little delay as possible.

This man is important to us for making certain valuable contacts in Thailand.

SECRET

Kelly Project 13478
✓ Macmillan
✓ William S. Harpold
SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES



DATE: 5 January 1944

TO: Colonel Buxton
FROM: Secretariat
SUBJECT:

The attached memorandum from Mr. Scribner to you proposes that you approve the "Kelly Project". This involves the recruiting by SSO, presumably under the direction of Lt. Comdr. Shaheen, of a unit of the Italian Navy, together with equipment, to make use of the "human Torpedo" developed in Italy. The proposal names only two theaters as being areas in which the equipment and personnel can be used, the Pacific and Southeast Asia. Mr. Scribner points out that even though the group and the equipment could not be used by OSS in the Pacific Theater, it is conceivable that the South East Asia Command could use it and he therefore suggests that the plan be approved. Mr. Scribner adds that it would be possible to cable Colonel Heppner but that he wonders whether a cable could clearly set forth the proposal in such a way as to make Colonel Heppner's opinion worthwhile.

The Secretariat believes that the Pacific Theater should be eliminated from consideration at the present time in connection with the project in view of our lack of approval for operations in that theater. It also seems to us that no steps should be taken to implement the project for South East Asia until Colonel Heppner's views have been obtained. This would have to be done at some time in any case, particularly since all such activities would have to be cleared by Colonel Heppner with the "P" Division of SEAC, and it would seem advisable that these steps be taken before and not after men and materials have been procured.

We believe that it is possible to draft a cable to Colonel Heppner which would clearly explain what was contemplated. We attach a proposed draft for your consideration, together with our recommendation that the cable be dispatched and an answer awaited before any action is taken.

C. A. Bane
C. A. Bane
Lieut. (jg) USNR

(c) Mr. Bane, 12/16/44
Attachments *(c) Mr. Bane*
(1/1/45)

SECRET

SECRET

13, 15 '8'
Kelly Project
Mermaid
x Heppner's proposal

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON D. C.**

4 January 1944

MEMORANDUM

TO: Colonel G. Edward Buxton
FROM: J. M. Scribner
SUBJECT: Attached Memorandum "Kelly Project"

Subject attachment is self-explanatory. It seems logical to me to undertake the attached proposal, even though we are not authorized to operate in the Pacific Theater, and regardless of the fact that it has not been cleared with Mountbatten.

My reason for this opinion is that it seems inconceivable SEAC-Maritime could not make use of the Mermaid plus trained operators, and even if we do not ultimately succeed in penetrating the Pacific Theater we can run the risk that our operations in SEAC will include the use of the foregoing, provided we are able to procure it.

Of course, it might be possible to cable Heppner, but I wonder whether a cable might clearly set forth the project so that his opinion would be worth very much.

In other words, if you approve, I will go ahead with the attached very brief plan.



J. M. Scribner
Deputy Director, SSO

Attachment
JMS/mmp

cc. Lt. Col. Baker
Lt. Roberts

SECRET

SECRETKELLY PROJECT

MISSION: To secure the attachment to OSS of a complete unit (battalion) of men and equipment to operate the "Mermaid".

SITUATION: The Mermaid (sometimes called the "Human Torpedo") is one of three Maritime sabotage devices developed by the Italian Navy. It consists of a torpedo-shaped device composed of a driving mechanism and a detachable war head holding approximately 580 lbs of explosive. The device is ridden and guided, after its launching from the deck of a submerged submarine, by two men equipped with diving masks.

The Tenth Flotilla M.A.S., under the command of Admiral the Duke of Aosta appears to have been the unit of the Italian Navy charged with the responsibility of training personnel and of operating Mermaid. This unit was under the active direction of Commander Junio Valerio Borghese and headquarters were at the Balipodio Ronca, Viareggio, though most of the training and exercises were carried out at La Spezia. Lieutenants Catalano and Amedeo Vesco are also known to have belonged to the group.

The following men are known to have returned safely from a successful operation at Gibraltar in August, 1943: Lieut. Commander Ernesto Notari, Armament Midshipman Vittorio Cella, Engineer Midshipman Danilo Taddini and Diver Ratings Montalenti and Macera.

The submarine "Ambra" appears to be the only remaining one of those equipped to transport and launch Mermaid. Others were the "Murena", "Gronzo" and the "Malaohite". All of the latter are believed sunk. The whereabouts of the "Ambra" is not known.

PLAN: Captain Ziroli, USN, and, through him, Admiral Hewitt are to be contacted and a request made of Admiral Hewitt to seek and procure equipment and the qualified personnel of an entire unit of the Italian Navy to work with OSS in using Mermaid against Axis shipping, especially in the Pacific. Captain Ziroli is United States liaison with the Italian Navy in Brindisi.

Italian personnel will be used as instructors and operators; Italian equipment will be used for training, operations and as models for the construction of American equipment.

OSS already has plans for the use of this equipment and personnel in the Pacific and SACO Theaters when and if they are procured. Projects already being planned in the execution of orders from SACO PAC can be materially assisted by the use of Mermaid.

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D C

29 October 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO: General Donovan

FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson

Attached is an account of John Hughes' dealings with the man chiefly involved in the Kangaroo Project.

It seems to me that J.H. has handled this matter excellently, and fully in accord with the understanding reached at our lunch.

If you will indicate approval and return the attached, I will carry out the further steps.

WHS
W.H.S.

*I think John
has handled the
situation admirably*

SECRET

SECRET

October 27, 1943

To Mr Whitney Shepardson

From John C Hughes

Subject: Kangaroo Project

As a result of our luncheon conversation yesterday with General Donovan, I got in touch with Jara and had a lengthy conversation with him this morning. He is leaving for Mexico tomorrow night to be there until November 8th on which date he will depart for Chile.

I explained to Jara that it was not possible for De Vries to return to New York within the next two weeks and stated that I wanted to explore the situation with him before his departure, in an effort to make arrangements whereby he might keep in touch with us and work out some method of carrying out the main features of the original plan after he had had an opportunity to explore the situation in Santiago.

In the course of our conversation I discussed with him the suggestions made by De Vries in his number 2201, copy of which Mayer forwarded to me from Washington. To this memorandum I attach a copy of 2201 and herein refer to the five different items suggested by De Vries in that message.

In reply to 1: Jara states that he is not certain just what freedom of action he will have until he knows more about the job which he has been ordered back to undertake.

Regarding 2: He is quite willing to attempt to set up the suggested network provided the situation has not changed too much since he last talked with De Vries. He states that he will be able to determine this more definitely after his arrival there.

Regarding 3: Jara states that it will be impossible for him personally to go to London or to Lisbon but that he will look about for some likely person in whom he can trust to do this later on; this also applies to De Vries's suggestion number 4.

Regarding 5: He will communicate with De Vries after his return giving as much information as he can.

SECRET

To WS from JCH - 2

October 27, 1943

In view of the above discussion I have made the following arrangements with Jara in order to keep this project alive until both Jara and De Vries can explore the situation further after they know just what the possibilities of the set-up in Santiago are:

a. I have delivered to Jara this morning \$2,000 in cash which he will deposit to the credit of his account in the 51st Street branch of the National City Bank, New York City. He will use all or any part of this money for his work in connection with the Kangaroo Project if he finds that there is a possibility of developing a worthwhile network. I have arranged that if the matter looks promising and additional funds can be used to advantage in the future further deposits can be made to his account here in cash.

b. As soon as possible after his return to Chile, Jara will write De Vries in London sending his communication by pouch through the London Embassy in care of Manuel Bianchi.

c. He will also write to Luis E. Felli of the Chilean Legation in Lisbon, who already knows about De Vries, and will tell him that subsequently De Vries may come to Lisbon to establish contact between him and some other person (one of our people there) for the purpose of handling future letters and information.

d. It is understood that because of the personalities involved in the Embassy at Washington Jara will not attempt to communicate with us direct through that means and will expect De Vries to keep us informed as to developments by transmitting to us from London, and perhaps later from Lisbon, information which Jara sends him.

e. If De Vries wishes to write him he can send his communications via the Chilean Embassy in London to Jara in Santiago.

f. On his arrival in Chile, Jara will communicate with me by letter through a name and address which I have given him, indicating the date of his arrival and the fact that he thinks the chances of starting to work are promising, in such a way that there will be no danger of censorship or interception.

SECRET

T. WI from JCH - 3

October 27, 1943

f. If for any reason it would seem wise for us to communicate with him direct on quick notice he has given me the following address: A. Jara L., Casilla 1044, Santiago, Chile. Any letters so sent would have to be carefully worded and could be signed by the name "Mellugh" which I have given him.

Jara and I are both agreed that until he can explore the situation further it would be unwise to attempt to develop more definite arrangements. In regard to funds, he was of the opinion that the \$2,000 which I have given him would be ample for any expenses he might be put to until more concrete suggestions can be worked out. Frankly, he was loath to accept a larger sum now saying that he did not know what he could promise in the way of results and could give no estimate at the present time as to just what a proper network would cost if it could be set up.

I am sending you herewith two copies of this memorandum. You may care to send one copy to De Vries as an outline of just how the situation stands now. The other copy you may care to give to Mayer who has been following this matter. I have not written General Donovan regarding the same and presume that you will apprise him of these latest arrangements if you think it advisable.

JCH

PS I will be able to talk with Jara again before he leaves but if you have any further suggestions or wish additional messages sent to him he can be reached up to November 8th through the Embassy in Mexico City.

SECRET

#201 Following just received from London:

Presuming you are in agreement with our #211, recommend that Matyr be directed as below: (1) To establish himself in such a way which in his opinion will permit liberty of action to draw on all sources of information in his country. (2) To set up network such as he and I talked about, using remainder of money I left with him. (3) As soon as possible, after his home position is established, arrange to come here or, better still, Lisbon to develop networks operating into Germany through such representatives as Nitrate and others. An official mission related to his recent appointment should be used as cover for the trip. (4) Alternative action would be to dispatch Nymph or similar type for organizational mission through Argus. (5) To keep me informed about what he is able to accomplish by pouch letters, mentioning development of plans for his newspaper. Do not forget how important it is to be extremely cautious when arranging finances as his political situation will be very delicate.

KENT SHERMAN 1275

(25)

9 October 1943

SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO SHERMAN KENT

SUBJECT: ORDERS

1. You are authorized and directed to proceed to Algiers, where you will report to Colonel William A. Eddy, USMC, Strategic Services Officer, North African Theater of Operations, for temporary assignment to Colonel Ellery C. Huntington, Jr., AUS. Upon completion of your temporary assignment for Colonel Huntington, you will again report to Colonel Eddy in Algiers, and while you remain there will act under his instructions.
2. When you have completed your assignment in Algiers to the satisfaction of Colonel Eddy, you are authorized and directed, subject to and in accordance with instructions from Dr. William L. Langer, Director, Research and Analysis Branch, to proceed to Cairo and from there to London.
3. Upon arrival at Cairo you will report to Colonel Gustave Guenther, USA, Strategic Services Officer, Middle East Theater of Operations. While there, you will act under his instructions.
4. Upon arrival at London you will report to Colonel David K. F. Bruce, A. C., AUS, Strategic Services Officer, European Theater of Operations. While there, you will act under his instructions.

G. Edward Buxton
Assistant Director

SECRET

12.7.7
Kalk 291

Copy to RFA

CONFIDENTIAL

24 January 1945

Dr. George Kates
American Publication Service
c/o U.S. Embassy
APO 879

Dear Dr. Kates:

This will confirm my talk with you of yesterday in which we agreed that the date of termination of your services would be the 1st of March. I appreciate your cooperation in staying with us long enough to get Lt. Gyles started, and, if you can accomplish this before 1 March, it is perfectly agreeable with me for you to leave at the earlier time.

I am very grateful for all you have done. I wish you every success.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Director

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

Handwritten notes:
Kates, George

10 June 1944

Mr. G.P. Allen
Chief Disbursing Officer
Division of Disbursements
Treasury Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Allen:

Under separate cover there has been forwarded to your office for approval and recording, an Agent-Cashier interim bond issued on behalf of the Maryland Casualty Company as surety, and George N. Kates, Chungking, China, as principal. The interim bond has been executed in order that Agent-Cashier funds might be made available to Mr. Kates in Chungking pending the execution of a regular Agent-Cashier bond.

It is requested that there be made available to Mr. George N. Kates, the sum of \$8,000 through the facilities of your disbursing agent in Chungking, China. Funds available to Office of Strategic Services which have been previously transferred to that location are to be utilized for this purpose. Inasmuch as Mr. Gustav G. Paton who is now an Agent-Cashier at that location will be returning to this country within the next few days, there is an urgent need for these funds to be made available to Mr. Kates at the earliest practicable date, and accordingly your assistance in expediting the handling of this transaction will be appreciated.

The regular Agent-Cashier bond will be forwarded to your office as soon as it has been received from Mr. Kates and approved by the Maryland Casualty Company.

Very truly yours,

KRW:ja
cc: Ensign Kilgore
Woodring (4)
Secretariat
Gen. Donovan

G. Edward Ruxton

RESTRICTED

Kates, George N. - 12, 757
 X IDC

~~22 & N Street, N. W.~~
 (23)

19 October 1943

Mr. George N. Kates
 114 Fifth Street, N. E.
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Kates:

You are hereby authorized, subject to instructions already given you, or which you may in the future receive, to coordinate and exercise the necessary responsibility in fiscal, organizational, and administrative functions for the Interdepartmental Committee for the Acquisition of Foreign Publications in Chungking, China.

This authority includes authorization to serve as certifying officer on purchase vouchers, pay rolls, and other vouchers and official documents, and to enter into necessary contracts for supplies, space, and services since you have been bonded under the provisions of Public Law No. 389 of 29 December 1941.

You are also authorized to appoint or employ such personnel as may be required, subject to my approval.

You will be in charge of the functions of the Interdepartmental Committee for the Acquisition of Foreign Publications in Chungking, China, and will be functionally responsible to such Committee until this authority is revoked in writing by me. It is also understood that you will be a Special Assistant to the American Embassy in Chungking and that you will not act as the Representative in China of the Library of Congress.

You are instructed to report frequently and fully to this office on matters pertaining to the Interdepartmental Committee and to cooperate with the United States Ambassador in Chungking. It is expected that he will assist you in the transaction of your official business by aiding with such services as the transmission of mail and telegrams.

Yours very truly,

William J. Donovan
 Director

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Kennedy, Proj. Mem. 12,381
x Studies x Air
x Intelligence

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Brig. General William J. Donovan
 FROM: Kennett W. Hinks, Lt. Comdr. - ~~USAF~~
 SUBJECT: Low-level Bombing -- Target Marking

DATE: 9 May 1944

1. Lt. Col. William Kennedy came to our staff recently from the Air Forces Board at Orlando, Florida, where, as a projects officer, he developed plans and methods for more effective bombing.
2. He is particularly interested in the use of undercover personnel for target identification in low-level bombing. He recently made a trip to the Air Forces Board at Orlando. You might be interested in the attached report of his trip and some parts of the report of his work as projects officer of the Air Forces Board.
3. I shall keep you informed of anything which develops out of Col. Kennedy's studies of the use of undercover personnel in low-level bombing.

Attachments

LT. COL. WILLIAM D. KENNEDY, AUS

Born: 4 Sept. 1944

Formerly: Projects officer, U.S. Army Air Forces Board, since 1941
Consultant in Visual Presentation, Office of Coordinator of Information, April 1 to May 1, 1942.

Assistant Executive, J.Walter Thompson Company, 1929-42

Assistant to Business Manager, Time Magazine, 1928-29

Assistant Auditor of Univ; Asst. Dean, Business School, Harvard University, 1921-28.

2nd Lieutenant in World War I, 1918-19

Languages: Slight German and French

Education: Asheville School, Asheville, N.C. 1910-12

Williams College, Williamstown, Mass., BA, 1912-16

Harvard Business School, MBA, 1916-17

Foreign travel Served in France with Army 1918-19

and Residence: Pleasure trip to England 1933

SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. 3006
Date Rec'd. PWS MAY 8 1944

Kennedy

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	Fwd'd.		
1. <i>Heink</i>					
2.					
3.					
4.					
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10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in *To* column.
 A line should be drawn across sheet under each document.
 Officer Designations should be used in *To* column.
 Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
 Action desired or action taken should be indicated in *Comments* column.
 Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
 For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

(9889)

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Lt. Comdr. Kennett W. Hinks, USNR
 FROM: William D. Kennedy, Lt. Col., Air Corps
 SUBJECT: Report of Trip to Army Air Forces Board at Orlando,
 Florida, 24 to April 29

3006
 William D. Kennedy
 X Studies & De-
 X T. Agency

SECRET

DATE: 8 May 1944

1. Purpose of Trip

There were three main purposes of the trip to Orlando, as follows:

a. To check on the latest developments in blind bombing at minimum altitudes by use of Rebecca-Eureka equipment and to consider ways in which OSS might participate in the employment of this new technique.

b. To observe demonstrations of new ground-air and air-ground visual signaling devices in view of their possible application to OSS field activities.

c. To review active Air Forces Board Projects to discover if any might affect future OSS operations.

2. Results in briefa. Bombing.

The new bombing technique employing Rebecca-Eureka equipment shows promise of possible valuable OSS contributions to Air Force operations (see discussion hereafter).

b. Signaling.

New pyrotechnic devices are unsuccessful for ground communication with high performance aircraft by day, but revealed possibilities for use at night and with slower liaison planes. The new XO-2 signal lamp shows promise but requires more development. New light reflecting ground signal panels are excellent for their purpose.

c. Other Projects.

A forthcoming Air Forces Board Report on vertical warfare doctrine was discussed and preliminary draft brought back from Orlando. In general the Air Forces

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Lt. Comdr. Hinks

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8 May 1944

are tending toward large operations involving not less than an Airborne Division, as it is felt that an Airborne movement in force requires a very high order of planning talent and organization on the part of Air Force operations officers, which is justified only in a crucial and large scale tactical operation. Such a doctrine might well pave the way for OSS to take over more of the planning and execution of special vertical operations.

3. Discussion of Blind Bombing by Rebecca-Eureka

a. The origin of this development was the Jungle Warfare Project on which I served as Project Officer. The original technique is described on page 22, enclosure (2) of the final Report which is attached herewith. In this case we were thinking of stationing the Eureka behind our own lines for skipping large bombs with delay fuses into enemy jungle strong points to blast off the vegetation, thus depriving the defense of the advantage of cover.

b. The question was then raised by combat-experienced intruder pilots if a modified technique could not be used by an operative behind the enemy lines to guide attacks against small, well defended, high priority strategic targets with vertical surfaces suitable for skip bombing, such as power plants, tunnel entrances, rocket emplacements, or enemy headquarters building in a town.

c. In later discussions, mention was also made of enemy mobile reserve units in bivouac which it was thought might be very high priority targets in connection with the invasion.

d. It was agreed that the chief use of such a technique would be in surprise attacks at tree-top altitudes on moonlit nights or into the after-glow or dawn, when obstructions would be silhouetted, but anti-aircraft defenses ineffective.

e. Some of the PPO pilots familiar with "Continental weather" brought up the possibility of using it (with Sensitive Altimeter) in critical day-time support operations under conditions of near-zero visibility when planes would ordinarily be grounded.

f. It was agreed that it would be impractical to equip any large number of planes with Rebecca equipment and a pathfinder technique must be worked out for targets requiring a heavy weight of attack.

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Lt. Comdr. Hinks

- 3 -

8 May 1944

g. During my visit to Orlando, I was able to persuade the authorities to initiate tests using a 1-beacon technique instead of the 2-beacon-in-line previously used, on the supposition that a single operative would do the job alone. A Standard Operating Procedure for this modification has just been received.

h. The proposed type of operation can be briefly described as follows:

An operative with Eureka equipment is dropped by standard Airborne procedure in the vicinity of the target a day or so before, or an agent stationed near by is alerted. He finds cover to set up his Eureka beacon anywhere within 1,500 yards of the target and starts sending at a pre-arranged hour. On contacting the pathfinder plane, he sends the beacon-target bearing by means of his coding button whereupon the plane, after a series of check-turns, approaches on this bearing at a pre-arranged or EOP altitude and ground speed, releasing on Eureka signal.

4. Future Developments

Although the Air Forces Board has not yet received a directive from Washington authorizing further experimentation with Rebecca-Eureka specifically in connection with minimum level bombing, development work is continuing there and could probably be accelerated. It is probable also that joint experiments could be worked out with the Marine Air unit at Quantico. Because of my personal enthusiasm for this new development, based on actual field tests, I would welcome a directive to follow it through, insofar as this activity would not interfere with other duties.

SECRET

Kennedy, Major Wm D 12381

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
INTEROFFICE MEMO

*x Studies
x Aid
x Intelligence*

TO: Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan DATE: 27 August 1943
FROM: Bonner F. Fellers, Brig. General
SUBJECT:

Attached are studies written by Major Kennedy who is an instructor in the Army Staff Force. Major Kennedy, whom I know only casually, has a background which indicates he is a man of considerable attainment. He is interested in intelligence work and its relationship to strategic bombing.

In the next war, strategic bombing will doubtlessly play the "blitz" role that tank operations played in this war. Secret Intelligence gained during peace time will be a necessity if we are to strike the heart of the enemy's industry promptly and effectively.

If it were possible for Major Kennedy to be transferred to Strategic Services, I believe he could make a very valuable contribution by making a thorough investigation of their intelligence and its relationship to strategic bombing. Such an investigation would doubtlessly be valuable in presenting the reasons why Strategic Services must survive the war.

Attachment

Bonner Fellers

25 August 1943

THE PLACE OF AIR INTELLIGENCE
IN THE FUTURE DEFENSE OF AMERICA

For some time after this war, Congress will be inclined to give the Army Air Forces all the four-engine bombers it asks for. Judging by past experience, however, practice bombs and oxygen for high altitude practice missions will come harder. Most difficult of all will be funds to maintain such activities as air intelligence.

Yet we know that a force of 2,000 heavy bombers with crews trained as well as we know how to train them is equal in striking power to 8,000 to 12,000 bombers manned by hastily trained crews. Furthermore, Pearl Harbor is only one of many examples of the importance of surprise in knocking out a superior striking force, no matter how good its planes or how well-trained its crews.

Only one thing can prevent surprise and make quick counter-attack possible. That is an air intelligence establishment which knows what the other fellow is doing and what the best targets are. It is not going to be easy to persuade Congress in a post-war economy mood that our present air intelligence needs to be expanded instead of contracted after the war because we are leaning so heavily on the R.A.F. and R.A.A.F. intelligence in all major theaters.

There may be good reason for not duplicating what the British are doing but we certainly ought to know where we stood, for many reasons besides having a convincing story to tell Congress. There is an urgent need for a study of our air intelligence setup, both army and navy, in relation to post-war security.

Such a study should survey and compare the various air intelligence training centers - the Navy Air Combat Information School at Quonset, the Army Air Intelligence School at Harrisburg, Miami O.C.S. pre-intelligence course, 2nd Air Force School for Intelligence Chiefs at Salt Lake City and the special courses at the School of Applied Tactics, Orlando. Also the 8th Air Force, R.A.F. and R.A.A.F. schools and special schools offering orientation courses in intelligence such as the Air Forces Statistical Officers School at Harvard. Special emphasis should be given to the probable permanency of such training centers - Harrisburg, for example, is extremely vulnerable because of its isolation from any permanent military establishment.

This study should consider also the probable permanency of our air intelligence staffing. Our air intelligence is almost wholly manned by officers from civil life who will presumably seek discharge after the peace; no adequate measures have been taken to attract career officers with combat experience into intelligence work.

Closely allied with this problem is that of keeping intelligence officers busy during peace time. Those involved in target analysis and photographic interpretation can work more effectively in peace than in war. However, specialists in such fields as enemy materiel, intercept, prisoner interrogation, as well as lower echelon officers in squadrons and groups will require frequent large scale air maneuvers.

There is need for a plan for placing agents in key spots in other countries during the disturbed period which will follow the peace. We have not taken full advantage of our opportunity to learn, as allies of the British, how they operate their excellent system of foreign agents.

A comprehensive study of our bombing results should be immediately set up in recaptured territory; a belated attempt to do so might be considered an unfriendly act. Such a study obviously should head up in Washington and not in the theater command.

The above suggests some of the more obvious points to be covered in such a survey. It should be conducted in two phases - a quick over-all study by one man or a small group to serve as a direction-finder, followed by more detailed analyses as indicated.

Major William D. Kennedy,
A2, Bombardment Department,
Army Air Forces School of
Applied Tactics,
Orlando, Florida.

NOTE: The author of the attached is Major William D. Kennedy, for the past year Chief of Intelligence, Bombardment Department, Army Air Forces School of Applied Tactics, Orlando, Florida, previously of the Tactics and Technique Section, Directorate of Bombardment, Headquarters Army Air Forces, Washington.

He has been responsible for setting up "post-graduate" courses in air intelligence which have now been given to the intelligence officers of twenty heavy and medium bombardment groups. He has interviewed at great length the three senior intelligence officers who have returned from combat and has been in constant contact for a year and a half with A2 Headquarters in Washington. He has lectured on Air Intelligence before the Army-Navy Staff College and the Air Staff course in Orlando.

Major Kennedy was an officer in the last war and in civil life has been Assistant Dean of the Harvard Business School, Assistant General Manager of Time Magazine, and for many years advisor to large corporations on competitive sales procedures and public relations. He has engaged in many important field research projects, has been an instructor in Business Reports, and before entering the Army was consultant in Visual Presentation in the Office of the Coordinator of Information, now the Office of Strategic Services.

BOMBARDMENT INTELLIGENCE IN STAFF PLANNING

(Lecture by Major William D. Kennedy,
A-2, Bombardment, AAFSAT, before Staff
Course, 22nd July, 1943.)

Gentlemen, my topic is Bombardment Intelligence in Staff Planning. Inasmuch as many of you are familiar with how Intelligence operates at the squadron and group level, I shall confine my remarks this morning to air intelligence in the higher staff echelons, with particular emphasis on target information.

We might tackle this subject in either one of two ways. We might ask ourselves, "How can bombardment intelligence serve staff planning in the winning of this war?" Or, on the other hand, we might ask, "What is the place of intelligence in the long-range problem of national security through air power?"

Between these two approaches, there is all the difference that there is between a job and a career. The second, long-range approach seems better because it includes most of the subject matter that would be covered in the short-range approach and because at the same time it recognizes that the present war may go through several phases before it ends and it may not end as conclusively as most people expect.

From the short-range view, it might be said that our air intelligence is fifty or sixty or seventy percent effective—pick your own figure. At the same time, it may be only ten percent effective on the long-range

basis of national security. The difference represents our dependence on RAF or RAAF Intelligence for assistance in the European, North African and Pacific areas. This dependence is greater than most of us like to admit, especially if we count the occasions when the RAF has had to pinch-hit for us. An observer from North Africa states that air intelligence in that theater used as a basis for staff planning was 85% air photography. In February, all of our photographic planes were grounded and remained so throughout the Tunisian campaign because we did not have the proper airplanes or equipment to do the job. The RAF took over. Until recent months, Australian Intelligence Officers actually briefed our combat crews in the Southwest Pacific.

There is another reason why heavy bombardment, in particular, should take the long-range view. It is becoming increasingly probable that this war may end leaving strategic bombardment in much the same situation that mechanized land warfare was at the end of the last war. All of the elements that went to make up Hitler's conquest of continental Europe should have been apparent back in 1918. Anyone might have picked them up and placed them together as the German High Command did. During the last war, I was an officer in motorized artillery in France. Yet, I must confess that the modern Blitzkrieg caught me by surprise. Perhaps the reason I feel so strongly about the future of strategic bombardment now is the feeling that only a damn fool makes the same mistake twice. I have one more chance.

Will we have, at the end of this war, clear proof of the decisive power of long-range bombardment in a war between highly industrialized nations?

Strategic bombardment has entered the war on the Continent so late that it can only be considered as one of several contributing factors in the final Military decision. Who will be able to say if the Russian Army or the bombing of the latter really defeated Germany? In any attack on the underbelly of the Fortress Europe few important industrial targets can be reached. Furthermore, by the time we are able to strike with heavy weight against the internal economy of Japan, many other factors inevitably will have entered the picture.

It will be a long time before we can obtain final and conclusive damage assessments of any major strategic bombardment operation. So much wishful thinking has already entered such assessments that we may never be able to arrive at a clear picture.

Finally, the confusion of the public mind on air warfare is revealed by the books which are gobbled up by the reading public. It is quite probable that this confusion will only increase after the war, as popular writers try to defend their previous stands. In view of all these facts, it is doubtful that clear and indisputable popular proof of the decisive nature of strategic bombardment can emerge from this war. This will mean that the democratic countries, which are dependent upon public attitude for the financing of the air force program, will be handicapped as compared with the aggressor nations. The latter can build an offensive plan purely on the military lessons of the present war, lessons the public would not understand if it had access to them.

How would a Hitler in 1953 or 1963 build a platform of air power to knock out an enemy by strategic bombardment? This is no academic

question: It is an essential starting point for building up counter-
intelligence in the interest of national security. And where does bombardment
intelligence come into the picture?

In a program sponsored by strategic bombardment, there would
be at least eight planks. These might be enumerated as follows:

First, there would be a cold-blooded, objective analysis of
the bombing results obtained in all theaters of this war in all their fami-
larity: direct on the primary target; by-product results such as fire
damage to water mains; the recovery co-efficient of proto-
type targets (e.g., camouflage and dispersions, public morale, etc.);
Such research is available for Headquarters Intelligence working in coopera-
tion with civilian scientists in many lines.

The second plank would be the training of bombardment crews
to a degree of performance impossible under combat training conditions. With
the aid of trainers as well as we know how to train them, we can improve
bombing efficiency probably 4 to 10 times. That is to say, a bombardment
of 2,000 planes might possibly equal, in results obtained,
the present force of 10,000 and 20,000 planes. This, obviously, is
a training subject for the intelligence section.

The third plank would be the development of a
bombardment intelligence section, utilizing the knowledge and
experience of the intelligence section. The intelligence section
will be able to determine the results of the bombing
and the intelligence section will be able to determine the
results of the bombing. The intelligence section will be able to
determine the results of the bombing. The intelligence section will
be able to determine the results of the bombing. The intelligence
section will be able to determine the results of the bombing.

in that a nation must know what others are doing to be sure that it is not outstripped in technical progress.

Fourth, a program for the development of bombardment missiles would be set up, going much further than any nation has yet been able to go under the stress of the war in finding improved air projectiles for attack on various prototype targets. Such program would be based on the concept of the bomber not as a flying cannon but as a flying engineer's demolition squad. Intelligence must know what the other fellow is doing along these lines.

The fifth plank would be improved procedures in the manipulation of the bomb dispersion pattern in relation to the typical industrial and transportation target. In the beginning of the war, the planning of bombing attacks was based on the concept of the typical target as a circle or rectangle on a bombing range. As a practical matter, it was found that the typical industrial target was a broken patchwork of building elements, of varying degrees of vulnerability to varying types of destruction (fire, blast, etc.) and further that the priority pattern with respect to incapacitating the plant was extremely complex. As a result, we are beginning to turn away from mathematical means toward graphic methods in our planning procedure. That is to say, in deciding on the number and type of bomb, direction of approach, etc., the actual bomb dispersion pattern based on the past record of the attacking force is utilized. This method is still in its infancy and requires further experimentation.

Sixth, there must be built up and maintained a stand-by intelligence organization in all theaters capable of instantly coordinated action. The difficulty of maintaining such a nucleus in a peace-time air force is tremendous. In the squadron and the group in O.T.U. training

today, as many of you know the Intelligence Officer is often in the uncomfortable position of not having enough to do. His job--which is primarily enemy information--does not really begin until there is an enemy. Meanwhile, Operations must work like a beaver and there is an almost overpowering temptation to give the Intelligence Officer some other chore, such as mess officer, which will swamp him later when combat stage is reached.

The difficulty of maintaining an intelligence nucleus in any air force unit is much more difficult than in a ground force or naval unit, for the reason that the air force unit has an active peace-time enemy--represented by operational losses. The officer who is spinning fairy tales about an imaginary enemy when others are being killed is on the spot. In the higher echelons, such specialist jobs as enemy materiel, prisoner of war, photographic and intercept intelligence seem equally out of place in a peace-time set-up, and yet are essential if a genuine alert is to be maintained.

The difficulty of maintaining an intelligence organization following this war will be greatly accentuated by the fact that nearly all our present air intelligence personnel has been recruited from civil life--to which most of these officers will return at the first opportunity. Until more of the best minds from the ranks of career officers are attracted to this work, there is always danger that Intelligence will be the Achilles heel of our air establishment.

The seventh part of a program for conquest by strategic bombardment would be a step-by-step plan for destroying the war making capacity of a highly industrialized enemy nation. On the soundness of this plan, a large part of the success of an air war would depend, especially if two

adversaries were equally well prepared. Which step should come first -- which target systems should be attacked in what order? The order is very important. Submarine yards might be more important targets than airplane factories. But should they necessarily be attacked first?

The eighth plank would be to achieve surprise in the initial attack. Or to look at it the other way, to avoid surprise attack by a constant state of alertness. Here, Intelligence is of the greatest importance and it is difficult to see how a peaceful democratic nation can avoid such surprise without a world-wide system of air observers and target analysts, with full knowledge of bombardment capabilities and limitations, operating in all highly industrialized nations.

In reality, the Army Air Intelligence must play in a future struggle for air supremacy, which tried not to overdraw the situation. It should be... However, it will be background for describing... What will Army Air Intelligence... planning?

...the best information available for staff... of the following sources:

- (1) Air... (the Target Information Branch of the... Services at Gravelly Point, Washington, D. C.).
- (2) A special Target Information Unit in the Theater Air Force, etc.
- (3) The RAF or the RAAF

There are four basic types of target information: Air Estimates; General Studies and Reports; Objective Folders; and Target Charts. A Summary of Air Objectives is a summary of objective folders for a country

or area, with some Air Estimate Material.

Air Estimates are designed to be used by higher staff echelons in establishing priorities for strategic targets or target systems. They cover such topics as coke ovens, steel, oil, transportation, food, fertilizer, aircraft factories, submarine yards and the like. Special studies and reports are similarly used in staff planning. They cover such topics as fire maps of Japanese cities, radar maps, shipping reports, (strategic bombing areas in relation to the routes of Japanese shipping, for example), etc. Objective folders are primarily intended for use in the briefing of crews for attacks on specific targets although they contain considerable information useful in staff planning. Target charts are prepared for the use of bombardiers. They are to be taken into the air and are intended to assist in the location of the target or check points.

Headquarters Air Estimates, dealing with enemy industries and other target systems, are produced by a staff of about thirty officers and civilians working under the direction of the Committee of Operational Analysts, which is the master strategy board. A large part of this work has, in the past, been done on behalf of the 8th Air Force. It is stated that the 8th Air Force itself has also produced similar studies, but no specimens have yet reached here. Even prior to the outbreak of the war, the British Air Ministry had been pioneering along this line and has continued this work.

There are said to be operational intelligence committees both at the 8th Air Force and the 8th Bomber Command, charged with coordinating target information from various sources. It is difficult, however, to allocate exactly where final authority lies in the establishment of priority for

targets or to trace back the many influences resulting in the selection of a particular target to be attacked on a particular day. The Group has no say in the matter, neither has the Wing. 8th Bomber Command has some discretion, if only through its interpretation of weather reports making one area preferable to another.

Inasmuch as we are operating as guests of the British, and since the weight of RAF bombardment has been, in the past, so much greater than our own, it would seem probable that we have yielded to them somewhat as junior partners in setting up priorities for a coordinated plan of attack. The expressed pleasure of the Royal Navy in our high priority for U-Boat establishments suggest the existence of other influences as well. Those of you who enter this theater and partake in staff planning of missions will find that you are dealing with unusually delicate and complex factors.

The situation in North Africa is described as follows by a member of the Target Information Branch in Washington. "In the main," he states, "the material supplied to the field to date has been of little use because the Military problems confronting our forces in foreign theaters (except in England) have been tactical. The one exception to this is the invasion of North Africa. In this invasion, Target Information's contribution was very real. Now that a foothold has been secured within operational range of Italy and Southern France, Target Information's material is beginning to be of value because it supplies information of strategic factories and supply lines which can be reached. This material is the result of long study by trained analysts working with numerous independent experts in every line of business, a staff which is not available in the theater."

To summarize, Washington has assembled target information of con-

considerable value and some use in staff planning for the European and Mediterranean theaters, and is actively at work on similar material for the Pacific Theater. It is equipped to produce target information on request from any theater.

I have here an Air Estimate which illustrates some interesting features that should be recognized in the use of this material in staff planning. It covers a certain industry which is concentrated on the Continent near England. While the products manufactured are essential to the German war effort, most of them can be substituted for by other industries, a fact which makes this target system seem less important than it otherwise would be. Here, arises one of the most troublesome problems met in connection with establishing of priorities for industrial target systems - possible substitution by another industry. It is the same problem that our business economists stubbed their toes on in the NRA days and which they have met again in connection with price control.

The fact is that nowadays there is a substitute for almost everything. Companies are not only competing among themselves for their share of their industry's business. Their industry is in turn competing with the other industries for the same markets. If our business economists are bewildered by the economic manifestations of our synthetic age, it is quite likely that they find the Military problems equally confusing when they serve as our advisers on target selection. Perhaps a part of the confusion would be dispelled by re-evaluating enemy factories and industries on the basis of a strategic war dollar, considering establishment of priorities merely as a problem in accountancy. For bombardment purposes, crude yard-sticks could be used, whereas in trade agreements or price control, a very fine and delicate balance is required.

This would not solve all of the problems of establishing strategic target priorities but at least it would help us avoid the vicious cycle of saying, "Industry A is not worth bombing because Industry B can produce substitutes for A's products and Industry B is not worth bombing because Industry C can produce substitutes for B's products." Furthermore, this is probably the only practical means of carrying previous bomb damage assessments on the balance sheet.

The plan would be simply to apply to the dollar value of each plant and its equipment a co-efficient to correct for strategic importance. This would recognize, among other factors, that of possible substitution of products.

The same procedure could be applied to give strategic evaluation to the component parts of an airplane factory, for example, which is never a single building but a broken patchwork of target units each varying in importance in the production flow. This weighted plot-plan, used in connection with the actual composite bomb pattern of the attacking bomber force, would give us a workable tool for staff planning, avoiding, on the one hand, complex mathematical computations of probability which only an Einstein could understand and on the other, the cycle of arguing out target priorities by committees and sub-committees and sub-sub-committees.

There is another interesting feature to this particular air estimate, based on the nature of the targets comprising the target system under discussion. 78% of the industry's capacity lies within 500 miles of London. The targets are widely dispersed. There are, in fact, nearly 600 of them. An impossibly large force of heavy bombers would be required to destroy them all.

On the other hand, these targets are very easily distinguishable, especially from low levels and each could be destroyed by a single 500 pound bomb or perhaps by cannon fire. No consideration is given in the estimate to the prospect of attack by fighter-bombers or other types of airplanes. Furthermore, I am told that few studies have yet been made in the Target Information Branch of targets of target systems except from the viewpoint of high altitude attack. Therefore, it must be borne in mind that most of what is done in planning for the employment of special types of bombing attack on strategic objectives must be done in the theater.

Before we leave this topic of target information, I want to show you very briefly a typical objective folder. (Show folder; discuss the three main parts.)

On the display board here, is a complete step-by-step story of the evolution of our target charts which makes a most fascinating story. The latest one from Africa here has not only the vertical approach chart but also various oblique perspectives and an annotated aerial photograph of the target. This comes as close to being the ideal as anything we have.

Before I close, I want to invite you all to visit the Intelligence Room in the Bomber Operations Building. We have developed a number of rather unusual air instruction maps as well as other types of graphic display. Here, you will also find the latest Intelligence Reports covering enemy tactics, a quite unusual selection from all theaters. This is in Building 2030 on the corner of Laurel and 5th. Come in any time you are here in Orlando.

In closing, I wish to express the hope that some of you officers with combat experience, especially those who know something about operations,

will go into Intelligence. Air Intelligence is now largely staffed by men from civilian life who have been through a special Intelligence School at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. When this plan was inaugurated, it was anticipated that, as combat experienced men were available, they would supplement or supplant these officers. That, as I understand it, is what happened in the R.A.F.

So far, however, in our own Air Intelligence, we haven't had the benefit of men with combat experience to any extent. Possibly this Staff Course will furnish the answer. I hope it does, and I hope, especially, that career officers from the regular Army can be attracted into S-2 and A-2 jobs. You could contribute a great deal to the whole Intelligence set-up of the Army Air Forces.

As you may know, a very large part of the Harrisburg course is orientation in Operations and not strictly Intelligence at all. If there were a demand for it, I believe that, with the facilities we have here, we could teach the essentials of combat intelligence to officers with combat experience in a few weeks. At least, we could teach Intelligence at the group and squadron level in that time.

We have enough time for a few questions. Shoot away.

Form 69 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE

22 APRIL 45

FROM

BERN, SWITZERLAND

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
DISTRIBUTION

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

IN-11050

(FOR ACTION)

11/743

Kempner, Fred C

PARIS

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-37488-9

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET
SECRET

- #9877. BERN-PARIS
- #9147. BERN-WASHINGTON
- #1014. BERN-LONDON.

109 AND BLACK FROM 110. INFORMATION; CHESTON.

1. I HAVE KNOWN KEMPNER WELL FOR ABOUT 15 YEARS. BELIEVE HIS FATHER HAS BEEN DEAD FOR YEARS. IN HIS LAW PRACTICE HE HAD MANY IMPORTANT ACCOUNTS, BUT DO NOT BELIEVE THIS DISQUALIFIES HIM AS HIS THOROUGHLY ANTI-NAZI POSITION FOR YEARS IS WELL KNOWN. G-5 SHOULD CERTAINLY BE GIVEN HIS FULL HISTORY FROM WHICH THEY CAN DECIDE IF THEY WANT HIM ON LOAN.

2. PERSONALLY I WOULD HAVE NO HESITANCY IN USING HIM WITH US IF THE RIGHT PLACE IS FOUND, BUT I WOULD NOT HURRY SENDING HIM IN, AS BERLIN IS AREA WHERE HE COULD BEST WORK, AND SITUATION WE WILL FIND THERE IS STILL TOO UNCERTAIN TO JUSTIFY BUILDING LARGE ORGANIZATION BERLIN AREA.

FILE COPY

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

TOR: 0050 23 APR 45

Form 88 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 17 APRIL 45

REC'D 1503 17 APR 45

TO PARIS, FRANCE

OP	PRIORITY
	ROUTINE
	DEFERRED

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OUT-8089

DISTRIBUTION

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

(FOR INFORMATION)

CHESTON

*11/4/45
Kempner, Draper*

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-87489-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#12084. 109 AND 110 FROM CHESTON.

FREDERICK C. M. KEMPNER NOW ON PART TIME WITH BIOGRAPHICAL RECORDS IN NEW YORK HAS ADVISED HUGHES THAT HIS WORK WILL BE COMPLETED IN ONE MONTH AND THAT HE PLANS TO ASSOCIATE HIMSELF WITH ONE OR TWO BUSINESS CONCERNS. GENERAL DRAPER WHO IS TO HEAD UP THE ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION UNDER GENERAL GLAY HAS QUESTIONED ME SEVERAL TIMES ABOUT ADVISABILITY OF TAKING KEMPNER WITH HIM IF HE CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE. IN VIEW HIS BACKGROUND AND FORMER CONNECTIONS LET ME HAVE YOUR OPINION AS TO ADVISABILITY OF DRAPER TAKING HIM INTO GERMANY. IF NOT DO YOU THINK HE WOULD BE AN ASSET IN PARIS? HE WOULD BE LOANED TO DRAPER JUST AS HOOVER IS TO BE.

TOD: 1518 17 APR 45

090

FILE COPY

SECRET

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

SECRET

*11. 743
Kempner, Fred C.*

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Maj. Lee M. Shappat
FROM : A. Cameron
SUBJECT: Frederick Carl Maximilian Kempner

DATE: 12 April 1945

Attached is the result of our inquiries about Frederick Carl Maximilian Kempner.

*File
A.C.*

SECRET

SECRET*14 743
Kempner, Fred. C.***FREDERICK CARL MAXIMILIAN KEMPNER****1. The following sources have been consulted:**

- (a) State Department files
- (b) OSS Security office files
- (c) OSS New York office

All of these sources provided information, none of it derogatory.

2. The report from the State Department states that a report exists in their files from J. Edgar Hoover stating that subject was investigated by the FBI in 1943. A subsequent memorandum from Hoover stated that the investigation had been closed and had disclosed no subversive activity on the part of the subject. Subject was investigated by the Security office of OSS prior to his employment by OSS and his security was cleared on April 29, 1943.

3. Subject is stated to have been one of the foremost corporation lawyers in Germany, consulted by many American and British firms. He was born in Berlin in 1892, immigrated to the United States in March 1938, and according to the State Department report has since become a citizen. He is at present a consultant on part time basis with Biographical Records in New York. He was used by the Standstill Committee (moratorium on short term German debts to American creditors), and is said still to be a consultant for the International General Electric among other companies. Upon his arrival in this country he studied American law and was admitted to the Bar.

SECRET

Kanin, Carson 14,075

SECRET

2 March 1944

MEMORANDUM TO 1ST LT. CARSON KANIN

SUBJECT: ORDERS

1. You are hereby authorized and directed to proceed to the destination indicated in your military orders, where you will report to the Strategic Services Officer, for that Theatre of Operations. You are, thereafter, to act under the instructions of the Strategic Services Officer for such Theatre.

William J. Donovan
Director

APPROVED:

APPROVED:

Merton Bodfish
Deputy Chief, MO

J. M. Noribner
Deputy Director, SSO

Ensign John Wilson, USNR
European Theatre Officer

SECRET

Memorandum 11, 075

3 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR LT. GARSON KANIN

Reference is made to your memorandum for the Director, 25 February 1944, concerning Mr. Barton's and your meeting with him of that date.

General Donovan has indicated that the facts as set forth in the memorandum are correct and asks that you be informed of his concurrence.

Warren J. Tarrant
Secretary

Kanin 110715

*17.5
Nest P.
This is correct
change initial
WAF*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

25 February 1944

TO: Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan
FROM: Lt. Garson Kanin

This is a review of the conference held this morning by you, Mr. Barton, and myself, regarding my assignment to FWB, London.

My understanding is that you had decided to make this assignment on a loan basis in order to facilitate the accomplishment of my mission and enable full OSS support. In this connection you stated that I was to feel free to call upon OSS personnel, materials, and other aid. Organizationally, I am to be transferred to MO Branch (ETO) and then loaned to FWB in accordance with cable #22221. Action on this transfer and on transportation to London has been initiated.

I understand that before leaving I am to cooperate with Captain Burgess Meredith and Captain Peter Cusick in completing their French film project in New York City. You stated that OSS policy on films such as this made for showing in reoccupied France is to indicate that "we are turning to the French for aid against the common enemy" rather than "we are coming to help the French". To this end such films should emphasize the role of the French, and the importance of the French rather than American activities. It is believed that

-2-

SECRET

Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan

25 February 1944

the film now being made by Captain Meredith conforms to this policy. In any case I shall attempt to bring its influence to bear and will show both the script and, if possible, the completed film to you for your consideration and advice.

Three additional film projects were tentatively agreed upon.

1. As a direct illustration of our policy in the military sphere, a film on operations which you observed in Corsica.

2. A series of films on the subject of Lend-Lease, beginning with Lend-Lease: France. It is believed that this film should in fact be (and when shown in France should purport to be) an incentive film for American industrial workers. Thus its message to the French would be that the efforts of the Free French are regarded by the American government as so valuable that they will stimulate American workers to greater efforts.

Mr. Barton pointed out that existing contacts between the Presentation Division and the Office of the Undersecretary of War would probably enable the film to be made as part of the War Department's industrial incentive program. You agreed to this proposal.

3. Additional films for immediate distribution through French underground channels. Mr. Barton has been advised that films already prepared for this purpose by the Presentation Division have been "enthusiastically received".

-3-

SECRET

Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan

25 February 1944

It is my understanding that as the need for films develops in the theatre, I will turn to OSS, OWI Overseas, and other agencies for their production. At your suggestion, Mr. Barton has agreed to make available to me completed films and personnel for the production of new ones. I hope to secure similar agreements from Commander Ford, Robert Riskin of OWI, and others.

We also discussed the advisability of setting up a two-way channel. That is, in addition to calling on OSS for assistance, I will attempt to service you and OSS with material and information from the field.

I am grateful for your expressed confidence and pray that my best will be sufficient.

Marion Kavin
1st Lt. AUS

JAN FEB 58 6 4 38

Kanin, Garson - 11,075

March 30, 1943

Private Garson Kanin
Hotel Washington
Washington, D. C.

My dear Private Kanin:

Thank you very much for your note.
I like the straight and manly way in which you
have handled yourself.

✓
I want to talk with you about your
position in the Army, and I wish you would come
in sometime soon at your convenience.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Karny, Gordon 11, 1975

March 26, 1943.

My dear General Donovan:

Since the end of our meeting last week, it has been my intention to write you. I felt that I would be violating my better instincts if I did not express to you my gratitude and admiration for the way in which you arbitrated a most difficult situation.

I confess that even as I entered your office it was with little hope and with the wish that 'our side' were going to be represented by Donovan, Leisure, Newton, and Lombard. As the conference proceeded, however, and as I recognized the sensitivity, wisdom, and justice of your jurisdiction, I took heart.

It will doubtless please you to learn that these two of your branches are operating now as one -- with warmer friendship, and a greater mutual respect.

The effect of this is not only pleasanter working conditions for all concerned, but higher efficiency to no mean degree. We are all in your debt.

I do hope to see you soon again.

Yours respectfully,

Gordon Karny

Private Gordon Karny
Hotel Washington
Washington, D.C.

Form 57 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 19 January 45

FROM PARIS, FRANCE

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

DISTRIBUTION

IN 1549

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

*Keep
10.532*

SECRETARIAT

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-37483-9

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER **SECRET**

#6324. To Oheston and Van Buren from Morgan and Gumble.

Pool Security office in Paris being ably administered by Comdr. Breckenridge therefor have no need for Major Keeps services.

SECRET

TOR: 1047 19 Jan 45

FILE COPY

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OSS Form 69 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 12 JANUARY 45

FROM

CASERTA, ITALY

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

DISTRIBUTION

IN 1068

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT, VAN BEUREN, FIELD SECTION

Keep Chapman T.S. 10, 832

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-57663-2

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER SECRET

#25454. 106 FROM CROCKETT.

SECRET

109 INSTRUCTED ME BEFORE LEAVING TO ADVISE YOU THAT MAJOR C.T.S. KEEP'S RECORD SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED, AND VAN BEUREN'S FILE ON THIS SUBJECT SHOULD BE CONSULTED. AFTER SITUATION HAS BEEN STUDIED AND ON EVIDENCE PRESENTED HERE, 109 FEELS KEEP SHOULD BE RELEASED FROM ORGANIZATION. I AM FORWARDING FROM HERE ANOTHER COPY OF COMPLETE STORY AS SET FORTH IN THE PARRY AND BRIGGS REPORT TO SECURITY IN WASHINGTON, SUPPLEMENTED BY MY PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THIS AFFAIR. FURTHER RECOMMEND YOU CONSULT GAMBLE ON HIS KNOWLEDGE OF CASE.

SECRET

FOR 0952

12 JAN 45

FILE OUT

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8-13 @ 22000

Form 7 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE NOVEMBER 17, 1944

FROM	PARIS, FRANCE	PRIORITY	
TO	OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES	ROUTINE	
		DEFERRED	
DISTRIBUTION		IN-25948	

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT, ETO, SECURITY, SI

SECRET

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#2174. From Gorman and Gibling. Action: Director and Security only, Washington, with reference to your #2104; Information: Armour only, London (#19744).

1. Security retaining Champollion in ETO especially for future work in Germany. At present Security making his services available to SI on temporary loan basis to which SI Paris has agreed.

2. Michel wishes not to remain Security ETO. She states she wishes to transfer to SI.

3. SI has been consulted and they do not wish her services. No adequate use can be made of her talents in Security Paris or London and retention for future use not believed justified. Therefore please indicate immediately your instructions for disposition of Michel as well as Keep.

How Security

TON: 11/19/44 7:30 a.m.

SECRET

SECRET

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Form 88 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE November 15, 1944

REC'D 11/15/44 5:47 PM

TO PARIS, FRANCE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Q12 22987

DISTRIBUTION

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

(FOR INFORMATION)

VAN BEUREN

Copy to [unclear] 10/8/44

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-8748-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

SECRET

#2134. Actions Gabilan, Paris. From 109 and Van Beuren.
Information: London #1744.

View your #1924 authorize immediate return Major Keen
to Washington.

Van Beuren cabling London regarding other individuals
mentioned.

SECRET

AVB WJD

TO: 11/15/44

8:21

WLF

INITIALS OF "RELEASING OFFICER"

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

Form 88 (Revised)

44 6 233

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH

10, 53

DATE **NOVEMBER 14, 1944**

FROM **PARIS, FRANCE**

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

IN 25590

(DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)

DIRECTOR

(FOR INFORMATION)

SECRETARIAT, VAN BUREN

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER **SECRET**

1904. Action: 109 and Van Buren only, Washington.
Information: Armour only, London #18904. From
Giblin. Re your #1904.

1. In view extreme limitation of number of personnel we are permitted in Paris and because security has no need for them here, we are immediately returning Mrs. Michel and Sgt. Champollion to London to await Van Buren's review Security personnel in BTO. Further for your info the mystery as to how or why they came to Paris from Mediterranean without any orders whatsoever is as yet unsolved.

2. Further with regard to Major Keep. Both Col. Neave, Acting Chief SI, and Lt. Comdr. Cassidy, Chief Operations SI, have given the subject much consideration and have now determined they cannot use his service advantageously. Unfortunately Security has no requirement for him in Paris nor does Gamble want him back at 7th Army. Therefore request you approve our reassigning him to Washington for reassignment or advise us such other position you may wish to make.

3. If at any time Van Buren can make Champollion available, SI branch feels that they could make good use of his qualifications.

Will you tell me of this

TOR: 11/15/44 6:58 AM

SECRET

SECRET

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8-13 8 2200

Form 10 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE November 9, 1944

FROM	PARIS, FRANCE	PRIORITY
		ROUTINE
TO	OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES	DEFERRED
		IN 28137

DISTRIBUTION	
(FOR ACTION)	(FOR INFORMATION)
DIRECTOR	SECRETARIAT, VAN BEUREN, O'GARA

*✓ 10832
H. 20/44*

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER **SECRET**

#1794. From 108 to 109, only. Reference your #1874.

attached
SECRET

1. About a fortnight ago Mocarski asked to have Keep sent up from the 7th Army to assist him with German agents. Upon receiving a request from Shepardson and me, Gamble gave his consent. Mrs. Michel and Champollion were with Keep when he reached here, and all 3 of them are working in SI here. It appears that Mrs. Michel and Champollion have accompanied Keep all the way from Cairo to Paris, via Italy, and the 7th Army. If you and Van Beuren will send me instructions, OSS, WFO, can get along very well without any of them.

2. As soon as things can be arranged Mocarski will go to Switzerland. He was Keep's sponsor; Keep is also reputed to be a friend of Toulmin's. Gamble does not want Keep back, and since he came to Paris he has displeased Cassidy and Neave and other individuals who would cheerfully dispense with his presence. They are willing to let him have another chance, at the urgent request of Mocarski, but if he can be used in any other capacity we will release him at once.

*Carl van Beuren
is all of the kind
he needed and
W.M. T. Lewis*

FOR: 11/9/44 11:38 AM

FILE

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

10, 8-52

Keep, Champion
~~SECRET~~
SECRETWashington, D. C.
23 October 1944.

May we look to you then for a recommendation on one of the alternatives set forth above or for any other suggestion which you may suggest. If you propose to retain Colonel Edward M. Clavin, we will, of course, approve. If you propose to recommend for the Officers Board, Hd. Co., 2677th Regt. OSS, Caserta, Italy

Dear Colonel Clavin:

Sincerely,

The subject of promotion of Terry Keep from Major to Lt. Colonel has come up from several angles. I have just had a talk with Arch van Beuren, Chief of the Security Branch, and I would like to set the case before you.

Last June Colonel Toulmin recommended that Keep be promoted to a Lt. Colonel. His request was denied by the Officers Board here in Washington because they felt that the job as Chief of Security in the Middle East did not rate as much rank as that. It was made quite clear at the time that no reflection of any sort was to be cast on Keep.

General Donovan has now expressed the opinion that Keep has been in grade so long that he either ought to be promoted in his present job, or he ought to be transferred to a job which will carry the rank if his present one won't, or he ought to be allowed to come back here for reassignment. The point is that the General feels that when a deserving individual has been in grade as long as Keep has, he should not be denied a promotion because of his assignment.

Arch van Beuren concurs in this and did everything he could to obtain Terry's promotion when he was in METO. Now, however, a difficult situation might result if Keep outranked Parry, and in a sense Briggs, since both are senior to him as far as Security NA is concerned, and since both are and have been, as far as van Beuren knows, entirely satisfactory to you in their assignments as head of the branch under your command.

Mr. Cheston has agreed to supplying a slot from the Director's reserve for Keep if there is no room for him in your Officers Pool. I have assured him that there isn't any.

file

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

May we look to you then for a recommendation on one of the alternatives set forth above or for any other solution which you can suggest. If you propose to retain him and promote him in the Theater we will, of course, need the usual data for the Officers Board.

Sincerely,

Edward H. Dodd Jr.

SECRET

Keep, Champness T.S. - 10,832
SECRET, *X War Dept. Personnel*

201-Keep, Champness T. S.

18 August 1943

SUBJECT: Orders.

TO: Major Champness T. S. Keep.

1. You are directed to take charge of and deliver to proper destination, Cairo, Egypt, certain secret strategic war materiel being transported via air on the same transport to which you are assigned per competent War Department orders.
2. It is requested that all possible aid be rendered by the armed forces of the United States to Major Keep in facilitating the delivery of the above described materiel.

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Brigadier General
Director

SECRET

Date: 2 Sept. 1973

To: *Memo to [unclear]*
General Donovan *[Signature]*

By virtue of having been involved in getting Major Keep out of Miami, and knowing most of the details, I am constrained to disagree that Mr. Mygatt deserves praise for his "creditable performance."

If ever a matter was mishandled, this was it.

E.J.P.

E.J.P., Jr.

Tell [unclear] Kuntel.
SECRET
What you know of it.
Office of [unclear]
(9150) [unclear] as [unclear] the way of help - D

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

Keeps 10,832
 Standard (12.00)
 SECRET
 U.S. GOVERNMENT

TO: GENERAL DONOVAN
 FROM: WILLIAM A. KIMBEL
 SUBJECT:

DATE: 1 SEPTEMBER 1943

You requested me to report on the Major Keep incident as reported to you by the Secretariat.

This involved a special problem in that we were to arrange to have Major Keep carry with him on a plane approximately 300 pounds of highly essential equipment. This is normally not permitted. I believe it was reported to you that an error was made by this office in not including this excess poundage in Major Keep's orders. This was done deliberately and after consultation with a "friend" in the War Department. Had this extra 300 pounds been included in the military orders, it would have been considered as cargo and treated as such. We were advised to leave it out of the order and that special arrangements would be made to have it treated as excess baggage to travel with Major Keep at all times.

Major Keep has departed without delay from Miami. Practically all overseas personnel traveling by the southern route are obliged to change planes at Miami. Occasionally this causes a jam in that port with consequent delays. Keep and the two men with him got through unusually quickly because of the special deal which we had concluded with OPD.

I emphasize this case as it may be considered as typical of many that have been reported as evidences of negligence. In the recent survey which was made of this office many of these reports were thoroughly investigated by the committee and it was found in most cases that they were written in ignorance of the basic

General Donovan

-2-

1 September 1949

facts, procedures, and the frequent special circumstances which we face in handling such cases through JCS and the War Department. In this particular instance the man who handled this (Mygatt) should have been given credit for having had the initiative and the contacts for working out a complicated problem.

May I suggest that it would save your time if these questions could be investigated in my office before they are reported to you as errors.

WAK
W. A. K.

cc: Colonel Burton
Major Doering
Mr. Cheston
Mr. Howland
Ensign Putsal

To [unclear]



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: 1 SEPTEMBER 1949

TO: HANSON PUTZEL
FROM: WILLIAM A. KIMBEL
SUBJECT:

There have been several instances of this sort. In the interest of efficient procedure, I would appreciate your stopping in to discuss this matter with me at your early convenience.

William A. Kimbel
Special Assistant to Director

75, 104

Karlow, Lt Peter

X Africa N.
X Navy Dept

5 October 1944

Lt. S. P. Karlow
U. S. Naval Hospital
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

My dear Peter:

Thank you for your letter of 2 October. I am more than pleased that you are getting on so well, and I look forward to seeing you here.

I talked to Bill Langer the other night about you. I told him that we were anxious to have you here, whether you were in Naval or civilian status.

I don't need to tell you in what respect and affection you are held here, or how glad we'll be to have you back with us. There is still a big job to do.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

FORM 4001a

Date

19

To: Majin Lee M.S. 19

Amman.

Has checked with Dorsey
who does not know to whom
the letter should be addressed or
at least the General had in
mind in view of this and will
Mrs. Williams letter in actually
reply of the General's letter to her
suggested, and Col. Quincy agreed,
that the matter could now be
dropped.

Ans.
Office of the Secretariat

(9139)

Karlows Bus P. 10,304
x Africa U. x Navy Dept

March 29, 1944

Dear General Donovan,

It was very good of you to write me, and I appreciate your kind words greatly.

At last I have had letters from Peter from the hospital, quite wonderful letters, that make me ashamed of my faint-heartedness. What he seems to be concerned about most of all is his chance to serve again, and I believe it would be a great comfort to him to know that he won't be "useless" at twenty-three and that he might be allowed to go back abroad. Such are the boys that fight this war for us, may the outcome reward them.

Sincerely yours,

----- K. Karlow

W.P.T.
2/21

COPY

To	
	U. C.
	C. A.
	J. B.
	D. C. L.
	G. S. P.
	F. I. P.
	E.

OSS Form 4001

OSS SECRETARIAT - ROUTE SLIP

Date 3 Apr. 1944

To	Name	Initials
	O. C. Doering, Jr.	
	C. A. Bane	
	J. B. Donovan	
	D. C. Lee	
	G. S. Platt	
	P. F. Pugliese	
	E. J. Putzell, Jr.	
X	A. W. Sulloway	
	R. Thrun	
	Files	

(23695)

Alvah:

I do not know to whom this letter should be written. Will you find out, and could you prepare the letter?

D.C. Lee
D.C. Lee

Paulson, Gus Y. 10,304
x office to x Navy Dept
March 29th, 1944

HK

Dear General Donovan,

It was very good of you to write
to me and to appreciate my kind
words so they.

It cost a few extra dollars, from
out of my pocket, quite wonder-
ful letters, that make me ashamed of
my selfishness. It is never
to be concerned about most of all
in his desire to serve again, and
believe it would be a great comfort
to him to learn that he won't be

"use case" at Treaty - Alice and Red
he might even be allowed to go back
abroad. See the boys that
light his way for us, may the out-
come be what Red!

Sincerely yours

Fellow K. Kerlan

19 304
X of Mrs. N
X Henry Dept

(85)

18 March 1944

Mrs. D. P. Karlow
1484 Somerset Place
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mrs. Karlow:

It was only a few weeks ago that I saw your boy in Corsica. I know you will want to know in what great affection he is held by all members in the group and what a real contribution to our work his energy, his intelligence and his fine spirit have always made.

The vessel on which he was serving was destroyed by enemy action. Others have already told you of the admiration which everyone had for the patience and courage with which he bore all the difficulties encountered in getting to hospital care and attention. You will be glad to know that this was accomplished through the devotion of his comrades.

While I realize that you must be greatly worried, I am sure that it will be some relief to you to hear that the doctors feel he will have a quick recovery.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

HT:HW

Research and Analysis Branch
European Office
Office of the Chief
2000 Army Ave. 1
Telephone: 214-704-7000

To: Lieutenant Tarrant
Dallas, Admiral

Mr Kent thought
General Donovan
might like to push
this request - our
name may not mean
much.

Date: 16 March 62
By: [unclear]
[unclear] (Bourman)

Radson Smith
✓ Africa North
✓ Navy Dept

15 March 1944

Capt. Ward P. Davis

Sherman Kent

Lieut. (jg) S. P. Karlow, USNR

The Casualty Office of the Navy Department has notified us that Lieut. (jg) S. P. Karlow, USNR, who was injured recently in the Mediterranean area, will be transferred to a Naval hospital in the United States as soon as conditions permit.

Lieutenant Karlow's mother has asked us to request that he be sent to the Naval Hospital at Bethesda, Maryland, unless there is some reason why his injuries can be taken care of better in some other place.

In addition, Lieutenant Karlow has served recently in an area where this Branch now has no representative, and there may be occasions during his convalescence when it would be helpful to have him available for consultation.

If you consider that it would be appropriate for you to request Lieutenant Karlow's transfer to Bethesda we would appreciate your doing so.

Sherman Kent
Chief, Europe-Africa Division

CH



TO:

OSS Form 1448

General Donovan

9/3

A copy of this report was requested.

WLL

Nels Buxton

(24304)

FROM: WM. L. LANGER

WLL

*Karlow, Peter 101204***SECRET**

HEADQUARTERS
 2677 HEADQUARTERS COMPANY EXPERIMENTAL
 APO 512 U. S. ARMY

* *Personnel*
 * *Navy Dept.*

1 March 1944

To: Dr. William L. Langer, Director, R & A
To be circulated only at Dr. Langer's direction

From: Lt. (jg) John E. Sawyer, USNR

Subject: Preliminary report on Lt. (jg) Peter Karlow

Notes: As I stated in my cable of 29 February, very strict regulations prevented any immediate report on this subject and even now this information must not be permitted to circulate until OSS has cleared its release with the Navy Department, which alone is charged with notifying his family. Information on the military operation itself is, of course, solely for your official information.

The latest report is that Peter's left leg had to be amputated above the knee, but that he otherwise is believed all right. Earlier fears of a skull fracture have proved unfounded. The details, as far now known are given below.

Following a German raid on Capraia on 20 February, Lt. (jg) Peter Karlow on the 21st went with a British officer on an Italian manned MAS boat to investigate the damage that had been done. The party had completed its observation mission at 2100 and was a short distance off the dock, when the explosion took place - apparently an acoustic mine. The British officer and eight Italians were killed. Peter was taken ashore by civilians on the island. At about 0200 on the 22nd another small boat was sent to the island. Peter had to be rowed out to this, and finally reached the 15th Field Hospital at Bastia at 1000 on the 22nd.

The whole back of his leg behind the left knee had been shot away, the knee cap smashed, his pulse was extremely high (indicating possible skull fracture) and his head was badly bruised. At Bastia he was apparently given about four quarts of plasma and two blood transfusions. The probable need of amputation was apparent, and it was at first planned to fly him to the Naval Hospital at Oran. This was considered a longer

-2-

trip than his condition allowed, however, and instead he was flown to the 60th Station Hospital at Cagliari, Sardinia.

There the mid-thigh amputation was done, apparently on the 25th. His pulse had dropped, there were no indications of fracture, and he otherwise was reported all right.

Everyone - including British officers who have seen much of the war - has the highest admiration for Peter's courage and control, and for the way his spirit and constitution stood up under the strains of successive handlings and transport by boat, ambulance and plane.

We will do all we can for him, and I will report further information as it is known.

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Lt. Commander H. V. Smith DATE: 1 February 1943

FROM: Dr. William J. Langer

SUBJECT: Orders for Ensign Karlow

In connection with the projected work of the O.S. in North Africa, I intend to send Ensign Serge Peter Karlow to North Africa in the near future. I would like him to have freedom of movement throughout the region in connection with his O.S. duties. Present plans call for his working especially in Casablanca and Alajara. Some of his time, however, will be spent on trips throughout the region.

As I would like Ensign Karlow to be ready to start for North Africa as soon as possible, would you help him in expediting all necessary arrangements, both as to orders and as to medical and passport matters.

William J. Langer

Casablanca file

Karlow, Peter 10,304
x Africa, N.
x Navy Dept.

Donovan

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

DATE: February 1, 1943.

FROM: Robert H. Alcorn
TO: Mr. James R. Murphy
SUBJECT: Ensign Peter Karlow.

Dr. Langer has approved the assignment of Ensign Peter Karlow to Casablanca, French Morocco. Mr. Karlow will replace Mr. Roberts, whose assignment to that post was not approved. He will work with Mr. Winnacker and will eventually be attached to the OSS Office which is to be established in Algiers.

May I have Colonel Donovan's approval at an early date so that we may proceed with all necessary travel arrangements and Navy orders.

Bob

CSS Form 1064

DATE 13 March 1945

TO: General Donovan

The attached papers regarding
the recommendation for promotion
of Lieut. Kellogg are forwarded
for your information and files.

Respectfully,

J. English
JOHN W. ENGLISH, Lt., USNR
Executive Officer
Field Photo. Br.

1290:

EKT.

7, 2-2
 Kellogg, Lt. Edgar
 16 11 45

15 Mar 1945

To: Commanding Officer, Naval Command, OSS.
 From: Chief, Field Photographic Branch.
 Subj: Lt. Edgar Ray Kellogg, S(I), USNR; Recommendation for
 advancement to Lieutenant Commander, S(I), USNR.

Enc: (A) Recommendation from Gen. Donovan to SecNav, 3-19-42.
 (B) Ltr from Maj. Gen. T. Allen, 23 Nov 1942.
 (C) Ltr from Capt. M.R. Tawas to BuPers, 2-21-44.
 (D) Ltr from Comdr. Ford to Gen. Donovan, 3-30-44.
 (E) Ltr from SecNav to Gen. Donovan, 1-29-44.
 (F) Ltr from Capt. G. Markey to Director, 2-22-45.
 (G) Ltr from Capt. Armour to Mr. Cheston, 3-2-45.
 (H) Statement of Training and Experience.

1. It is highly recommended that subject officer be advanced in rank to Lieut. Comdr., S(I), USNR, in recognition of his duties and responsibilities and the outstanding manner in which he has performed them.

2. Attention is invited to the fact that at the present time in the Branch, there are 36 officers -- Navy: 1 Comdr., 2 Lieut. Comdr., 12 Lieutenants, 2 Lieut. (JE), 5 Ensigns, and 6 Chief Warrant Photographers; Army: 1 Lt. Colonel, 3 Captains, 4 1st Lieutenants, and 2 2nd Lieutenants -- in addition to 167 Army and Navy enlisted photographic specialists. During the absence of the Chief of Branch, Comdr. John Ford, USNR, (who is currently directing a civilian motion picture at the request of the Secretary of the Navy), the subject officer is the Acting Branch Chief. In view of the specialized nature and scope of the Field Photographic activities, it is deemed advisable and fitting that the subject officer be promoted.

3. The enclosures are submitted as attestations of the subject officer's outstanding performance of duty. Enclosure (G) particularly reviews in considerable detail the career of Lieut. Kellogg since assignment to this organization.

4. Prior to his commissioning as an officer in 1941, Lieut. Kellogg was employed as Assistant Head of the Special Photographic Effects Department of the 20th Century-Fox Studios, Hollywood, Calif., from July 1928 to September 1941. The background and experience he acquired during this period of civilian employment in the motion-picture industry has admirably equipped him to carry on as an assistant chief of the Branch (at present as Acting Chief of Branch).

JOHN W. ENGLISH, Lt., USNR
 Executive Officer
 Field Photographic Branch
 By direction

JWE-ar

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March 19, 1942

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

Dear Frank:

Ensign Edgar Ray Kellogg, U. S. Naval Reserve D-V(S), is on duty in this office attached to the Photographic Presentation Division. Ensign Kellogg has been made head of the Special Photographic Effects Department. In addition to his being head of this department, he is required to make field expeditions as the commanding officer of a photographic camera crew. He is performing this duty in an outstanding manner.

I should greatly appreciate it if you would consider a promotion for Ensign Kellogg to the rank of Lieutenant (Junior grade), U. S. Naval Reserve, and I am glad to endorse him for such a promotion.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

/s/

7, 8, 2

Headquarters 1st Infantry Division
In the Field
Algeria, North Africa

23 November 1942.

Subject: Commendation of Lieutenant Ray Kellogg, U.S. Naval Reserve.
To: Whom it May Concern.

1. Lieutenant Kellogg, U.S.N.R., has been under my close observation as an official photographer of the 1st Infantry Division since about October 18, 1942. His conduct in that capacity has been most exemplary.
2. In his official capacity as a photographer with the 1st Infantry Division, he cooperated in every way possible. He did not hesitate to expose himself to all the dangers incurred by the assault units of this Division. With his photographic equipment he accompanied the first assault units of the 18th Infantry in the initial assault on Arzew Beach, while such units were exposed to enemy fire. In later actions of this Division, he accompanied the forward combat elements and set an example of fearlessness and devotion to duty, to all of the soldiers with whom he was in contact. He asked no favors in the way of transportation, rations, or other necessities which were entirely conspicuous by their absence with the forward elements.
3. I personally observed Lt. Kellogg under all sorts of conditions and take great pleasure in commending him for commonsense, for being unusually tactful, and for personal courage in the performance of his duties.

/s/ TERRY ALLEN
Major General, U.S. Army
Commanding

WAR SHIPPING ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON

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February 21, 1944.

From: Captain M. R. Tawer, D-V (G) U.S.N.R., Special Assistant to
Commissioner Edward Macauley, Maritime Commission and Deputy
Administrator of War Shipping Administration.

To: The Chief of the Bureau of Personnel, Navy Department

Subject: Lieutenant E. R. Kellogg, D-V (S) U.S.N.R., recommendation of

1. Lieutenant Kellogg reported on board the USS SAPELO at Iceland on December 28, 1941, for transportation to the United States. During my first conversation with Lieutenant Kellogg I learned that he was an amateur yachtsman and a skilled seaman. As we were then short of experienced watch-standards I detailed Lieutenant Kellogg to take over a bridge watch.

2. The SAPELO departed from Iceland on January 4, 1942 for Hampton Roads, arriving on January 30 - 26 days steaming to make 2500 miles. During the passage we experienced full winter gales, were in company with an escort for only 6 days, and were continually receiving reports of vessels being torpedoed close by.

3. During the voyage Lieutenant Kellogg stood an excellent bridge watch which was a great help during the unusual conditions under which we were cruising. At present he is Executive Officer of the Field Photographic Branch of the Office of Strategic Services at Washington, with several Lieutenant Commanders under him.

4. Owing to the excellent qualities demonstrated by Lieutenant Kellogg while aboard the SAPELO, and the manner in which I am told he is performing his present duties, I wish to commend him to the Bureau for deserving consideration when his name next appears for promotion.

M. R. Tawer



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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March 30, 1944

To: General W. Donovan
From: Commander John Ford
Subject: Promotion of Lieut. M. R. Kellogg -- request for

This is a note formally asking that Lieutenant Ray Kellogg, USNR, be promoted to Lieut. Commander, USNR.

The circumstances are well known to you.

Lieutenant Kellogg was brought by you from an overseas job of great responsibility and placed here as Deputy Chief of Branch. He entered on his new duties with great enthusiasm and his record here has been excellent. We have a slot in ONS for another Lieut. Commander and the position of Deputy Chief of this Branch calls for an officer of that grade.

I hereby request that every effort be used towards furthering his promotion.

/s/ JOHN FORD

7,852

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON
January 29, 1945

My dear General:

I wish to express my appreciation to you and to the Field Photographic Branch of the Office of Strategic Services for their excellent work on the production of the film BROUGHT TO ACTION. You undoubtedly already know how well this film has been received by the public all over the country.

Deserving special thanks for their efforts in the making of this picture are Lieutenant Ray Kellogg, Lieutenant (jg) D.W. Schulberg and the enlisted personnel concerned.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ JAMES FORRESTAL

Major General William J. Donovan
Director, Office of Strategic Services
122 Administration Bldg.
25th & E St.,
Washington, D.C.

February 22, 1945

1299

From: Director, Navy Photographic Services,
Office of the Secretary of the Navy.
To: Director, Office of Strategic Services.
Subj: Lieutenant Raymond Kellogg, USNR, commendation of.

1. This office is keenly appreciative of the outstanding services performed by Lieutenant Raymond Kellogg, USNR, Officer-in-Charge, Field Photographic Section, Office of Strategic Services, in the preparation of the Navy film BROUGHT TO ACTION. The efficiency with which Lieutenant Kellogg supervised the production and his devotion to duty during this arduous period deserve highest commendation.

O. MARKBY

COPY 7,952

HQ & HQ DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
European Theater of Operations
United States Army
(Main)

APO 413
2 March 1948

Mr. Charles Cheston
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear Charlie:

Lt. Ray Kellogg of Field Photographic Branch has been here with us and is going to the Continent in the morning, and I wanted to take this opportunity of telling you that I think he has done a most excellent job since he has been over here, having reorganized the Branch along just the lines that I hoped he would recommend that it should be reorganized on.

In my opinion, he is a hard working, intelligent officer and we will welcome him to this theater any time that he comes.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ LESTER ARMOUR
Captain, USNR

7, 25

General Statement of Naval Training and Experience

RE: Lieutenant Edgar Roy Kellogg, S(I), U.S.N.R.

- (a) Ordered to active duty with the Office of Naval Operations, for assignment to the Field Photo. Branch, ONS (then known as OOR), in SO Sept. 1941. Original duties were to formulate in detail the needs of a photographic division for the purpose of obtaining motion pictures of strategic nature.
- (b) After requirements for equipment and supplies were submitted, he was then placed in charge of their initial procurement.
- (c) Later was ordered to Iceland on a photographic mission of 3 months' duration; was officer-of-the-deck at various times enroute to and from the area.
- (d) Set up and put in operation a Special Photographic Effects Department in F.P.D. On completion of this project, was sent to South Seas on several missions. Returned to be immediately despatched to the ETO, as photographic officer in charge of a photographic combat crew on the assault on Africa. Served with the British 1st Army, French Foreign Legion, and with the 1st Infantry Division in the Tunisian Campaign.
- (e) March 1943 - June 28, 1943. Served alternately with the American Torpedo Squadron, British motor gun boats and destroyers in the Mediterranean Area. During this period, landed with the assault wave on the Island of Pantelleria and was the only American officer to land with the assault troops.
- (f) June 30 - Oct. 15, 1943. Served with the American 1st Infantry Division in the assault on Sicily and the subsequent Sicilian Campaign as photographic officer and aide to Gen. Donovan; returned to Washington, D.C., and was made Deputy Chief of Field Photographic Branch, acting as Branch Chief during Comdr. Ford's assignment on a Far Eastern mission (Sept. 1943--Jan. 1944) and on an ETO mission (April 1944--Sept. 1944).
- (g) Since October 1944, subject officer has been the Acting Branch Chief, F.P.D., in the absence of Comdr. John Ford, USNR, who has been granted several months' leave of absence from active duty to produce the film "They Were Expendable." As Acting Branch Chief, subject officer is currently on a temporary additional duty assignment in the ETO for the purpose of effecting a

7, 8, 9

* 8 *

reorganisation of Field Photographic activities and studying
problems which face Branch personnel in the field.

(h) Date of present rank: 1 May 1945.

Kellogg - 7.852
X Navy Dept

In reply address not the number of this letter, but Bureau of Naval Personnel, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 20334-50
Refer to No. **105177**

**NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.**



JUN 2 4 1944

From: BuPers.
To: Director, Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.
Subj: Lieutenant Edgar Ray KELLOGG, D-V(S), U.S.N.R. -
Recommendation for promotion of.
Ref: (a) Your ltr., dated 9 May, 1944.

1. Your recommendation for the promotion of Lieutenant Kellogg was submitted to the Special Board convened by the Secretary of the Navy to consider all recommendations for temporary promotions which continue in effect during a specific duty assignment. The unanimous approval of this Board is required before such a promotion will be effected.
2. Since Lieutenant Kellogg did not receive the approval of this Board, his promotion to Lieutenant Commander cannot be effected at this time. Reference (a) has been filed with his record where it will be available for review when he becomes regularly eligible for temporary promotion.

R.A. Koch

copy to Bureau of Naval Personnel

Letter 5 of 7. 5. 44

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

9 May 1944

From: The Director of Strategic Services
To: The Chief of Naval Personnel
Subj: Lieutenant Edgar Ray Kellogg, DeV(S), USNR,
 Recommendation for Promotion of.

1. Subject officer has been on active duty since 30 September 1941 and in grade as a Lieutenant since 1 May 1943. During this entire time he has been assigned to the Office of Strategic Services.

2. He has performed all of his duties in an excellent manner, both in Continental United States and overseas, and there is on record at the Bureau in this officer's jacket commendations from Major General Terry Allen, USA, and Captain M. H. Taves, USNR, which attest in detail to Lieutenant Kellogg's skill and courage as a naval officer.

3. For over six months subject officer, during the absence from Washington of Commander John Ford, USNR, has been the Acting Chief of the Field Photographic Branch of the Office of Strategic Services. This branch includes in its T/O 27 officers and approximately 150 enlisted men, among them 9 Lieutenant Commanders in the Navy and a Major in the Marine Corps. The T/O of this branch calls for the grade of Lieutenant Commander for the Deputy Chief, which position subject officer occupies when Commander Ford is in Washington.

4. In civilian life Lieutenant Kellogg occupied an important executive position in the motion picture industry, with which he had been connected for thirteen years, and he has brought this executive ability and specialized training with him in a most successful manner in his duties with the Office of Strategic Services. It is felt, however, that he would be considerably aided in the performance of these duties if he were given the rank commensurate with his position.

5. For the above reasons, plus the fact that he has been approved by a board of senior officers of the Office of Strategic Services, I strongly recommend his promotion to the grade of Lieutenant Commander.

William J. Donovan
 Director

Kellogg, 7, 85-2

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

15 Apr 1944

Interoffice Memo

From: Chief, Field Photographic Branch.

To: Mr. Robert Thrun

The attached correspondence is returned
to your files.

As suggested by Mr. Cheston to you, a letter
of recommendation for the promotion of Lieut. H. R. Kellogg
has been submitted to the Officers' Promotion Board via
Commanding Officer, Naval Command.

John Ford
JOHN FORD
Commander, USNR

for: Mr. Cheston

General Donovan wants to
relay to you his approval of
this request. He believes that
all that Commander Ford says is
true.

W.J.T.

31 March 1944

Director's Office

(1308)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Robert T. ...
FROM : Mr. ...
SUBJECT : ...

DATE: 1 Apr 1944

If the ... approved, ... under Ford ...
... to the ... for ... promotion, ...
...

O'Brien Board

Thru Capt Davis, Naval Command

Kellogg, Lt. Edgar Ray 2/23/44

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

March 30, 1944

To: General W. Donovan
From: Commander John Ford
Subject: Promotion of Lieut. H. H. Kellogg -request
for.

This is a note formally asking that
Lieutenant Ray Kellogg, USNR, be promoted to Lieut.
Commander, USNR.

The circumstances are well known to you.
Lieutenant Kellogg was brought by you from an over-
seas job of great responsibility and placed here as
Deputy Chief of Branch. He entered on his new duties
with great enthusiasm and his record here has been
excellent. We have a slot in O.S.S. for another
Lieut. Commander and the position of Deputy Chief
of this Branch calls for an officer of that grade.

I hereby request that every effort be
used towards furthering his promotion.

John Ford
MAR 30 1944

Kellogg SR 7852
x Navy Dept

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Field Photographic Branch
10 August 1943

Memorandum

To: General William J. Donovan.
Subject: Lieutenant Edgar Ray Kellogg, USNR --
commendation of.

Dear General,

After chatting with you and Kellogg regarding the Sicilian Invasion and subsequent events, I would assume that both of you did a grand job.

Do you think that Kellogg's service and assistance to you during that period would warrant a citation or a letter of commendation?

I hate to bother you with such details, but these kids in OSS are dear to my heart. A letter from you, as senior officer on the field, to the Chief of Naval Personnel would insure its reaching the proper channels.

Thanks,

J.P.
J.P.

Kellogg, Lt. E. R. - 7 ps's
X Navy Dept
X Orals

Lt. (jg) Woodring
General Donovan

14 October 1945

1. In the absence of Commander John Ford, Chief of the Field Photographic Branch, Lt. D. R. Kellogg has been designated as Deputy Chief and is hereby authorized to sign all over time for the civilian employees of the Field Photographic Branch.

William J. Donovan
Director

#50699 7862
X NAVY Dept.
X @M DOTS

Form 315-JLK

2-5348

Lieutenant (jg)
Edgar R. Kellum, D-V(S), U.S.N.R.,
Naval Operations,
Navy Department.

6. The cost of this travel is chargeable to "Pay, Subsistence and Transportation," and ultimately chargeable to the Office of Strategic Services.

Copy to:
Naval Operations,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D.C.
cdr., U.S. Naval Forces
in Europe.

Detail Office,
Transportation Div.
Mr. Taylor,
Identification Section.

HANBALL JACOBS

Form-510A/1X

T-2248

AUG 14 1942

From:
To:

The Chief of Naval Personnel,
Lieutenant (jg)
Roger R. Kellomä, D-V(2), U.S.N.R.,
Naval Operations,
Navy Department.

Via:

The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject:

Temporary additional duty.

1. When directed by the Chief of Naval Operations you will proceed to such port as he may direct, and thence take passage, via naval or commercial vessel, to the British Isles, on a mission the nature of which cannot be divulged for reasons of security, and upon arrival proceed to London, England, and report to Commander Giles S. Moore, U.S.N., for temporary duty.

2. In the performance of this duty you are authorized to perform such travel as may be necessary, including travel by land, sea or air, in the United States, Canada, Newfoundland and the United Kingdom, and to whatever countries as are deemed necessary for the successful completion of this mission.


3. Report also by letter to the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, for this duty.

4. This is in addition to your present duties and upon the completion thereof and when directed by the proper authority, you will return to Washington, D.C., via such transportation, including via air, as may be available, and upon arrival resume your regular duties.

5. In addition to the actual cost of travel a per diem of \$6.00 in lieu of subsistence will be allowed while absent from your station, except while on a ~~commercial~~ vessel.

These orders constitute your assignment to duty as a part of the Aeronautical Organization of the Navy and you are hereby detailed to duty involving flying effective upon reporting in obedience to these orders.

This detail to duty involving flying will terminate upon the completion of this temporary duty assigned by these orders.



Kellogg, R. B. 735
X Navy
X Orders

Form 513-511

AUG 5 1942

7-4113

From: The Chief of Naval Personnel,
Lieutenant (jg)
Edmund S. Kellogg, (jg), U.S.N.,
Naval Operations,
Navy Department.

Via: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Travel Orders.

1. In connection with your duties you are hereby authorized to perform such travel from time to time as may be directed by the Director of Naval Operations. Travel via commercial air, or other authorized means, is authorized.

2. The Chief of Naval Personnel will be notified of such travel.

3. The Chief of Naval Personnel will be notified of such travel.

Copy to:
Naval Personnel
Office of the Director of Naval Operations,
Navy Department.

Field Photographic Division
20 March 1948

From: The Director of Strategic Services.
To: The Chief of Naval Personnel.
Subject: Commendation of Lieutenant (jg) Edgar Ray
Kellogg, D-V(S), USNR.

1. It is respectfully requested that the enclosed letter of commendation received from Major General Terry Allen, U.S. Army, in the Field, Algeria, North Africa, be made part of Lieut.(jg) Kellogg's official file.

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Director

JOHN FORD
Commander, U.S.N.R.
By direction

JF-ar

**HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
In the Field**

23 November 1942

**SUBJECT: Commendation of Lieutenant Ray Kellogg, U.S.
Naval Reserve.**

To: Whom it May Concern.

1. Lieutenant Kellogg, U.S.N.R., has been under my close observation as an official photographer of the 1st Infantry Division since about October 18, 1942. His conduct in that capacity has been most exemplary.

2. In his official capacity as a photographer with the 1st Infantry Division, he cooperated in every way possible. He did not hesitate to expose himself to all the dangers incurred by the assault units of this Division. With his photographic equipment he accompanied the first assault units of the 18th Infantry in the initial assault on Arzew beach, while such units were exposed to enemy fire. In later actions of this Division, he accompanied the forward combat elements and set an example of fearlessness and devotion to duty, to all of the soldiers with whom he was in contact. He asked no favors in the way of transportation, rations, or other necessities which were entirely conspicuous by their absence with the forward elements.

3. I personally observed Lt. Kellogg under all sorts of conditions and take great pleasure in commending him for commonsense, for being unusually tactful, and for personal courage in the performance of his duties.

/s/ **TERRY ALLEN**
Major General, U.S. Army
Commanding.

C-O-P-I-E-D
AR
cc General Donovan
Comdr. Ford
Personal File
Official File