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within limits, definite advantages would accrue.

Both Combat Intelligence of Navy and MIS would have the same direct access to files which now exists, except that the consolidated file would be of a quality superior to anything now available in any of the agencies.

By virtue of physical contiguity there would in effect be a committee or consultative arrangement established which should be of the greatest benefit to the total job. Each agency would profit by the ready access to his counterpart's number. It was a common remark in MIS that prior to the move to Pentagon much more frequent contact was maintained with Navy, a contact which was valuable and which is now missed. There is every indication that a physical set-up allowing for contiguous space for corresponding sub-divisions of the three agencies would contribute to the effectiveness of the Intelligence job.

It is noted that all or substantially all of the investigative
work done by the Washington office of ONI and the
offices remaining in the Navy Joint-
Staff Intelligence Division is done by Special Investigators for the
Investigations of Service
and that the presence of Naval officers are necessary
for the conduct of this work (see letter of APRIL 29, 1945).

The corresponding activity in the Army was not covered in direct contact with the persons responsible for this work. From various conversations with individuals acquainted with the matter, however, there would seem to be just as distinct knowledge in the Army as to the Navy in adopting the type of recommendation quoted above.

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Such a standardization does not imply any hard and fast personnel assignment to geographical subdivisions by the three agencies. For a given area MIS might have 10 representatives while Navy has 9, and OSS has a total of 100. All three agencies, OSS, MIS, and the Navy Combat Intelligence Branch would assign personnel as needed for any particular area.

6. Physical location of OSS, MIS and Navy Combat Intelligence Branch:

In MIS considerable emphasis is placed upon the importance of having the files at hand for ready reference in connection with incoming items of information. The point was made repeatedly that a current item of information is frequently of little value, or impossible of evaluation without reference to the background of which it is only one small part. In MIS, therefore, the files serve the highly important function of making constantly available the whole range of background material.

It is only natural that the problem of separating MIS into two parts presents a somewhat different picture than the Navy's problem. The files and their constant use constitute an important element in this problem.

It is therefore important to consider the physical housing of MIS with OSS, and the same plan could include Combat Intelligence of Navy if desired. If all three agencies were housed together, by Units and by Branches

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While units and branches would be reduced as to total personnel, the specialization by areas would be as important as ever and would remain.

It would also be important to arrive at a standard geographical breakdown which would be agreed to by Army, Navy, and OCS. In this way each of the three services would operate on the same geographical pattern, each unit, branch, or other sub-division embracing the same area for all services.

(See the chart which follows)

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agency will become for them a service agency on whom they can call for the many tasks which involve research and other detail work. They will be free to devote time and attention to the evaluation of incoming material and decision as to its use. ICB will thus be a counterpart of the Combat Intelligence which the letter of April 29, 1945 proposes to set up in Navy under Gansbach.

An example of reduction in staff might be cited with reference to the present Eastern European Branch of the War-Office Unit. In this Branch there are at present 24 persons, including 8 officers, 10 research specialists, and 8 clerical persons. Transfer of the strategic survey and file functions to the central agency would take the majority of this personnel, leaving perhaps 4 or 5 persons to concentrate upon the vital intelligence work of this area. Three officers and two majors should be adequate for review of incoming material, evaluating its significance, making decisions regarding its use and disposition, and making the necessary contacts. There would of course be small amounts of secret matter retained by such a Branch. The great percentage of material, however, would not be retained but would be disposed of to the central agency, and/or to other destinations.

4. International Branches would be retained.

The principle of geographic specialization would in no way be affected under the proposed plan of consolidation.

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result in an integrated central operation. Such officers and other experts as may be transferred should be made integral parts of the units to which they move. Such officers will no longer be directly responsible to Army or to Navy, but to the central agency.

3. A single integrated file will be maintained by OSS.

All of the material now maintained by Army, Navy, and OSS would come together under a unified filing system. Such a consolidation of file material would have at least these two effects:

- (1) It would enrich the file by adding to the central agency such additional material as now exists in the Army and Navy files respectively.
- (2) It would reduce the total file volume by eliminating such unnecessary duplication as will be found to exist. A secondary but important result would be a saving in total floor space now occupied by the three separate groups of files.

The first of these two considerations is of special importance because the net result of consolidation would be a more comprehensive and therefore more valuable file than now is available.

4. MIS would be reduced in size.

A drastic reduction in the size of MIS will occur. Relief from the task of maintaining file material, and of endless writing, should enable the much reduced MIS units and branches to concentrate on the real work of intelligence. The central

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the same organizational relationships as the present MIS.

While, at first, the idea of splitting up MIS may appear to be unfortunate, the end result should prove ultimately beneficial. The part that goes to OSS should contribute its share toward a greatly improved central operation, and the part that stays should become a more mobile as well as a smaller intelligence operation. Stripped of a great amount of detail, the remaining MIS organization should increase in effectiveness.

RECOMMENDATION - OSS - will have an opportunity to make use of the experts now employed by Army and by Navy

in their places in the central agency. Their present value will be enhanced by membership in this group of specialists. The total ability and coverage represented by the combination of these three groups should produce an improved overall result.

One of the present complaints in MIS is lack of staff with pending backlog of work. In some sections in MIS this backlog is constantly growing, and is a matter of deepest concern. By eliminating the duplication of effort which results from three separate approaches to similar work, a more central agency should prove an important aid in getting out in keeping the work up to date.

It is extremely important, as indicated in the letter of April 29, 1945, to be certain that transfers of personnel

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(3) Integrate the files and the personnel transferred from Army and Navy with the similar respective activities of OSS, so that there will result a single well-controlled and functioning strategic survey activity.

These are sound recommendations and they can and should be made effective. The comments which follow take up certain elements of the problem of consolidation of these activities.

1. The present MIS will be split into two parts.

- (1) A smaller MIS retained under G-2.
- (2) A group for transfer to OSS.

The difference between the Navy and Army situation grows out of the differences in present set-up and functions now performed. In the Navy there are already two fairly well established groups in operation. One is ONI which deals with long-range intelligence and the other is Cominch which deals with combat intelligence. The effect of the recommendations in letter of April 29, 1943 is substantially that of transferring ONI to OSS, and of better defining and formalizing the combat Intelligence Branch of Cominch.

In the Army, on the other hand, there will be the problem of separating a going concern into two parts. One part goes to OSS where it is integrated with similar activities of both OSS and Navy. The other part remains in

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Special Branch to various geographic sub-divisions within Col. Brutton's organization.

We thus have a mixed situation in both Navy and Army, but there is decidedly more of the combat type of Intelligence handled by MIS than by ONI.

Thus the recommendation quoted above is not so worded as to fit the Army situation. Rather than the creation of a Combat Intelligence Branch, the problem in Army will be to define what is retained in MIS in contrast to that which is transferred out of MIS to OSS. Some of the various elements of this problem are discussed in the following Section of these comments.

III. Transfer the foreign intelligence functions (with the files of certain functions mentioned later) of ONI and the files and all personnel engaged in the strategic survey processes with the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS. (Quoted from page 6 of letter dated 27, 1942.)

Elaboration of this recommendation includes the following suggestions:

- (1) Designate a central agency for the receipt, evaluation, filing, and preparation of strategic survey or monographic type of material -- an activity now functioning in at least three places -- Army, Navy, and OSS.
- (2) Choose the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS as such a central agency with which to combine the present similar activities of Army and Navy.

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combat intelligence are largely the reflection of the combat situation within the respective areas.

In the British Isles Branch, for example, there is not a great deal of combat intelligence because there is not fighting with the enemy within that area. In the Eastern European Branch, however, there is a great deal of combat intelligence because that area includes the German-Russian battle front.

It appears therefore that the significant difference between Army and Navy in this regard is that ONI is recognized as being practically excluded from combat intelligence, while MIB is recognized as being responsible for all intelligence, combat as well as long-range intelligence.

It should be noted, however, that there is some amount of intelligence which does not come to or clear through the various geographic sub-divisions in MIB. Some of the hot items of intelligence are held higher up, on the basis that the fewer persons involved the less the likelihood of a leak. There are, in fact, various gradations within MID and MIB. Some of the items of intelligence probably do not even go from General Marshall to G-2. It is definitely established that certain items do not go to the head of the Intelligence Group (Col. Stratton). One such example refers to items given by the head of the special Branch (Col. Clark) to the head of MIB (Gen. Eroner), thus by-passing the Chief of the Intelligence Group completely. On the other hand there are many items of information transmitted by the

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- II. "Create on the staff of the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet a Combat Intelligence Branch, unifying therewith the product of communications intelligence, and including therein the best men available from the standpoint of their analytical and evaluating ability and familiarity with the war theaters." (Quoted from page 1 of letter of April 29, 1943)

There are differences between the present intelligence set-up in Army and Navy which should be recognized at this point.

It is stated that ONI receives practically no combat intelligence, and that in any case not over 1% of its material could be so classified. The real combat intelligence comes to Cominch and is handled by that agency instead of by ONI. Thus in the Navy combat intelligence is almost completely separated from long-range informational material. Because the two types of intelligence are almost completely separated and handled by separate agencies, the above recommendation is a fitting one with reference to Navy.

There is no such clearout separation of intelligence in the Army set-up. Theoretically MIS is the single agency handling both combat and long-range types of intelligence. While this is not strictly true from an operating standpoint, it is clear that there is no such separation of these two types of intelligence as is found in Navy. MIS is, to a far greater degree than ONI, the intelligence agency for the service it represents.

In MIS each geographical sub-division has the responsibility for intelligence within the area assigned to it. Differences between sub-divisions as to the percentage of

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The work of such committees could be closely tied in with the work of the joint Intelligence sub-committee by designating at least one individual from each of the three services as member both of the Intelligence Committee of his own service, and member of the Joint Intelligence sub-committee. These points are illustrated on the following chart.

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committee are highly competent individuals who recognize the responsibility placed upon them both as representatives of their respective services and as joint representatives of the Nation's top intelligence activity. The judgment of each representative can be trusted to decide whether a certain item of information has a bearing on the joint job, or whether it is solely a matter for knowledge and action of the particular service he represents. If the civilian member of the committee turns out to be the right man for the job, there will be an ever increasing disposition to look to him as the central figure in the committee and to give him an increasing percentage of all information.

b. Sub-committee of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

One method of supporting the Joint Intelligence Committee in handling its responsibilities would be through a sub-committee whose full time would be devoted to this work. Such a sub-committee might have a membership of 9 persons - three each from Army, Navy and O.S.S. These members could be chosen to represent the various specialties which are important in any such work. From Navy's point of view it seems obvious that both air and submarine specialization would be of importance.

From Army's point of view, specialization on aerial subjects would be indispensable.

Within the respective services the need would seem obvious for an Intelligence Committee comparable with the Joint Intelligence Committee.

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Will all members of the Joint Intelligence Committee be given access to all information which each member has?

A tentative approach to this question was made in Mr. Warner's conversation with some of the Navy's top officers. There is a reluctance on their part to open up literally all intelligence to the others. Specific examples were related to Mr. Warner which illustrated the fact that certain information had no bearing whatever on Army operations. It was purely Naval, to be evaluated, and acted upon only by Naval Personnel. If the Army had been given this information, they would not have taken any different action with it than without it. It would merely have been interesting information. In such an instance, Navy takes the point of view that the closer such information is held, the less likely is there to be any leak. Therefore they do not divulge it to the Army. Similarly there is Army information which does not affect Navy operations, but which Navy realize they do not receive.

Incidentally, Admiral King has certain information which he does not give to General Marshall, and General Marshall has information which he does not give to Admiral King.

It would not appear that this situation raises any serious problems as to the functioning of the proposed Joint Intelligence Committee. The members of this

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3. Civilian member of Joint Intelligence Committee

It is gratifying to note that the idea of a civilian member of this committee is being received well and is being given real consideration by the top Navy officials. It is to be expected that the civilian appointed will have to sell himself to the other members and to the Joint Chiefs. His influence and value will increase as time goes on, if he is the right choice, and if he measures up to the opportunity inherent in the job. He should be a career man who accepts this work as his sole interest, and who plans to make it his permanent life work. If he is in his early forties, he can look forward to a useful period of service for the next 15 or 20 years. This plan will provide a continuity for this work which will be of the utmost value to the services and to the Nation. It will provide an urge, even in times of peace, to continue with such a program as may be found advisable, and will make it much easier to develop and hold to an adequate peace time program than if no such position or person were in existence. As confidence in this civilian increases, he will become a more and more potent factor in the U. S. intelligence operations. The civilian member might eventually become Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, a place which would be accorded him only on the basis of his performance.

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These are sound recommendations, but they do bring up one point of organization which the Army may find it important to consider. That is the question whether the committee should have two representatives from the Army or only one such representative. The recommendations, as stated, indicate that each committee member is the top person in his own particular service. This is as it should be, but it leaves the implication that in the Army there will be two Intelligence services, one for Air, and one for all other parts of the service.

It may be important to examine the implications of such an assumption on down the line, in an effort to determine just how an integration of the two intelligence services within the Army can best be brought about. The fact of two Army members on the committee will tend to emphasize the duality of these two services. It may be desirable to place emphasis on unification rather than duality. The problem of unification goes far deeper than the mere fact of having one or two members on the committee. If, however, a study resulted in the decision to accomplish integration as far down the line as possible, it would undoubtedly lend weight to the idea of such integration if the Army representation on the committee were confined to one person who would thus be unqualifiedly recognized as the head of all Army Intelligence.

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2. Members of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

The recommendation calls for a committee consisting of these five members:

- Army
- Navy
- Army Air Corps
- O.S.S.
- Civilian

The recommendation also makes these specifications, among others:

- (1) The committee member is recognized as the top person in the service which he represents
- (2) He makes the committee work his primary job and spends substantially full time on this work.
- (3) The operating responsibilities of the service which the committee member heads up are performed by his deputy
- (4) The committee job is recognized as being distinctly superior to that of the individual service
- (5) The committee member has full access to all intelligence in the service which he represents
- (6) The committee members are the primary source of intelligence for the Joint Chiefs

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Comments regarding consolidation from the point of view of the organization.

Comments which follow refer to the general headings discussed in Mr. Warner's letter to Admiral King dated April 29, 1943.

1. Forming a new Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible directly to the Joint Chiefs and working through the Joint Staff Planners. (Quoted from page 9 of Above)

1. Organization plan of the Joint Chiefs

It is believed that the establishment of a Joint Intelligence Committee as described would result in an organization of substantially the characteristics shown on the following chart.

James S. Callaghan Case 412, 923

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Introductory Comments

Contact with the Army to learn something of Army Intelligence activities was initiated by Mr. Warner, and resulted in a preliminary meeting on March 22, 1943. At this meeting Gen. Strong received Mr. Warner and Mr. Norris, and discussed Army Intelligence particularly in its relation to Navy Intelligence. Gen. Strong expressed the thought that the two services should be brought closer together in their operations.

At this time Gen. Strong introduced his assistant, Lt. Col. John M. Kemper, and instructed him to place at our disposal information regarding Army Intelligence activities.

Lt. Col. Kemper was functioning in the dual capacity of assistant to Gen. Strong, and member of the coordinating staff, a group of three officers charged with the duty of studying and simplifying the organization of G-2, and of defining the duties of the various sub-divisions comprising that organization. The other two members of the coordinating staff were Lt. Col. Gilbert S. ... and Major Norman E. Tenson. During his contacts with the G-2 organization, Mr. Norris made the office of the coordinating staff his headquarters. Contacts of an intermittent nature were made from March 22, 1943 to April 24, 1943.

Members of the G-2 organization were most cooperative in making available the files of various officers for interview, and in making available information concerning their activities.

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within Units, definite advantages would accrue.

Both Combat Intelligence of Navy and MIS would have the same direct access to files which now exists, except that the consolidated file would be of a quality superior to anything now available in any of the agencies.

By virtue of physical contiguity there would in effect be a committee or consultative arrangement established which should be of the greatest benefit to the total job. Each agency would profit by the ready access to his opposite number. It was a common remark in MIS that prior to the move to Pentagon much more frequent contact was maintained with Navy, a contact which was valuable and which is now missed. There is every indication that a physical set-up allowing for contiguous space for corresponding sub-divisions of the three agencies would contribute to the effectiveness of the Intelligence job.

IV. "Assign to FBI all or substantially all of the investigative work now being done by the Washington office of ONI and the District Intelligence Offices, retaining in the Navy Department only a limited number of trained investigators for the purpose of conducting those investigations of service personnel in which the services of Naval officers are necessary" (quoted from page 5 of letter of April 29, 1943).

The corresponding activity in the Army was not covered in direct contact with the persons responsible for this work. From various conversations with individuals acquainted with the work, however, there would seem to be just as distinct advantages to the Army as to the Navy in adopting the type of recommendation quoted above.

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Such a standardization does not imply any hard and fast personnel assignment to geographical subdivisions by the three agencies. For a given area MIS might have 10 representatives while Navy has 2, and OSS has a total of 100. All three agencies, OSS, MIS, and the Navy Combat Intelligence Branch would assign personnel as needed for any particular area.

6. Physical location of OSS, MIS and Navy Combat Intelligence Branch.

In MIS considerable emphasis is placed upon the importance of having the files at hand for ready reference in connection with incoming items of information. The point was made repeatedly that a current item of information is frequently of little value, or impossible of evaluation without reference to the background of which it is only one small part. In MIS, therefore, the files serve the highly important function of making constantly available the whole range of background material.

It is only natural that the problem of separating MIS into two parts presents a somewhat different picture than the Navy's problem. The files and their constant use constitute an important element in this problem.

It is therefore important to consider the physical housing of MIS with OSS, and the same plan could include Combat Intelligence of Navy if desired. If all three services were housed together, by Units and by Branches

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While units and branches would be reduced as to total personnel, the specialization by areas would be as important as ever and would remain.

It would also be important to arrive at a standard geographical breakdown which would be agreed to by Army, Navy, and OSS. In this way each of the three services would operate on the same geographical pattern, each Unit, Branch, or other sub-division embracing the same area for all services.

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agency will become for them a service agency on whom they can call for the many tasks which involve research and other detail work. They will be free to devote time and attention to the evaluation of incoming material and decision as to its use. This will thus be a counterpart of the Combat Intelligence which the letter of April 29, 1943 proposes to set up in Navy under Cominch.

An example of reduction in staff might be cited with reference to the present Eastern European Branch of the Eur-African Unit. In this Branch there are at present 24 persons, including 5 officers, 10 research specialists, and 8 clerical persons. Transfer of the strategic survey and file functions to the central agency would take the majority of this personnel, leaving perhaps 4 or 5 persons to concentrate upon the vital intelligence work of this area. Three officers and two helpers should be adequate for review of incoming material, evaluating its significance, making decisions regarding its use and disposition, and making the necessary contacts. There would of course be small amounts of secret matter retained by such a Branch. The great percentage of material, however, would not be retained but would be disposed of to the central agency, and/or to other destinations.

6. Organizational breakdown would be retained.

The principle of geographic specialization would in no way be affected under the proposed plan of consolidation.

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result in an integrated central operation. Such officers and other experts as may be transferred should be made integral parts of the units to which they move. Such officers will no longer be directly responsible to Army or to Navy, but to the central agency.

3. A single integrated file will be maintained by OSS.

All of the material now maintained by Army, Navy, and OSS would come together under a unified filing system. Such a consolidation of file material would have at least these two effects

- (1) It would enrich the file by adding to the central agency such additional material as now exists in the Army and Navy files respectively.
- (2) It would reduce the total file volume by eliminating such unnecessary duplication as will be found to exist. A secondary but important result would be a saving in total floor space now occupied by the three separate groups of files.

The first of these two considerations is of special importance because the net result of consolidation would be a more comprehensive and therefore more valuable file than now is available.

4. MIS would be reduced in size.

A drastic reduction in the size of MIS will occur. Relief from the task of maintaining file material, and of endless writing, should enable the much reduced MIS units and branches to concentrate on the real work of intelligence. The central

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the same organizational relationships as the present MIS.

While, at first, the idea of splitting up MIS may appear to be unfortunate, the end result should prove distinctly beneficial. The part that goes to OSS should contribute its share toward a greatly improved central operation, and the part that stays should become a more mobile as well as a smaller intelligence operation. Stripped of a great amount of detail, the remaining MIS organization should increase in effectiveness.

8. The central agency - OSS - will have an opportunity to make ~~use of~~ its staff.

Many of the experts now employed by Army and by Navy can find places in the central agency. Their present value will be enhanced by membership in this group of specialists. The total ability and coverage represented by the combination of these three groups should produce an improved overall result.

One of the present complaints in MIS is lack of staff with resulting backlog of work. In some sections in MIS this back-log is constantly growing, and is a matter of deepest concern. By eliminating the duplication of effort which results from three separate approaches to similar work, the one central agency should prove an important aid in getting and in keeping the work up to date.

It is extremely important, as indicated in the letter of April 20, 1943, to be certain that transfers of personnel

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- (3) Integrate the files and the personnel transferred from Army and Navy with the similar respective activities of OSS, so that there will result a single well-controlled and functioning strategic survey activity.

These are sound recommendations and they can and should be made effective. The comments which follow take up certain elements of the problem of consolidation of these activities.

1. The present MIS will be split into two parts.

(1) A smaller MIS retained under G-2.

(2) A group for transfer to OSS.

The difference between the Navy and Army situation grows out of the differences in present set-up and functions now performed. In the Navy there are already two fairly well established groups in operation. One is ONI which deals with long-range intelligence and the other is Cominch which deals with combat intelligence. The effect of the recommendations in letter of April 29, 1943 is substantially that of transferring ONI to OSS, and of better defining and formalizing the combat Intelligence Branch of Cominch.

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We thus have a mixed situation in both Navy and Army, but there is decidedly more of the combat type of Intelligence handled by MIS than by ONI.

Thus the recommendation quoted above is not so worded as to fit the Army situation. Rather than the creation of a Combat Intelligence Branch, the problem in Army will be to define what is retained in MIS in contrast to that which is transferred out of MIS to OSS. Some of the various elements of this problem are discussed in the following Section of these comments.

XII. "Combine the foreign intelligence functions (with the exception of certain functions mentioned later) of ONI and G-2, including the files and all personnel engaged in the monographing and strategic survey processes with the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS" (Quoted from page 6 of letter of April 29, 1943.)

Elaboration of this recommendation includes the following suggestions:

- (1) Designate a central agency for the receipt, evaluation, filing, and preparation of strategic survey or monographic type of material - an activity now functioning in at least three places - Army, Navy, and OSS.
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II. "Create on the staff of the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet a Combat Intelligence Branch unifying therewith the product of communications intelligence, and including therein the best men available from the standpoint of their analytical and evaluating ability and familiarity with the war theaters." (Quoted from page 2 of letter of April 29, 1943)

There are differences between the present Intelligence set-up in Army and Navy which should be recognized at this point.

It is stated that ONI receives practically no combat intelligence, and that in any case not over 1% of its material could be so classified. The real combat intelligence comes to Cominch and is handled by that agency instead of by ONI. Thus in the Navy combat intelligence is almost completely separated from long-range informational material. Because the two types of intelligence are almost completely separated and handled by separate agencies, the above recommendation is a fitting one with reference to Navy.

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The work of such committees could be closely tied in with the work of the joint Intelligence sub-committee by designating at least one individual from each of the three services as member both of the Intelligence Committee of his own service, and member of the Joint Intelligence sub-committee. These points are illustrated on the following chart.

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Sub-committee of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

One method of supporting the Joint Intelligence Committee in handling its responsibilities would be through a sub-committee whose full time would be devoted to this work. Such a sub-committee might have a membership of 9 persons - three each from Army, Navy and O.S.S. These members could be chosen to represent the various specialties which are important in any such work. From Navy's point of view it seems obvious that both air and submarine specialization would be of importance.

From Army's point of view, specialization on aerial subjects would be indispensable.

Within the respective services the need would seem obvious for an Intelligence Committee comparable with the Joint Intelligence Committee.

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4. How completely will members of the Joint Intelligence Committee trade information? Will all members of the committee be given access to all information which each member possesses?

A tentative approach to this question was made in Mr. Warner's conversation with some of the Navy's top officers. There is a reluctance on their part to open up literally all intelligence to the others. Specific examples were related to Mr. Warner which illustrated the fact that certain information had no bearing whatever on Army operations. It was purely Naval, to be evaluated, and acted upon only by Naval Personnel. If the Army had been given this information, they would not have taken any different action with it than without it. It would merely have been interesting information. In such an instance, Navy takes the point of view that the closer such information is held, the less likely is there to be any leak. Therefore they do not divulge it to the Army. Similarly there is Army information which does not affect Navy operations, and which Navy realize they do not receive.

Undoubtedly Admiral King has certain information which he does not give to General Wars all, and General Marshall has information which he does not give to Admiral King.

It would not appear that this situation raises any serious problem as to the functioning of the proposed Joint Intelligence Committee. The members of the

SECRET**3. Civilian member of Joint Intelligence Committee**

It is gratifying to note that the idea of a civilian member of this committee is being received well and is being given real consideration by the top Navy officials. It is to be expected that the civilian appointed will have to sell himself to the other members and to the Joint Chiefs. His influence and value will increase as time goes on, if he is the right choice, and if he measures up to the opportunity inherent in the job. He should be a career man who accepts this work as his sole interest, and who plans to make it his permanent life work. If he is in his early forties, he can look forward to a useful period of service for the next 15 or 20 years. This plan will provide a continuity for this work which will be of the utmost value to the services and to the Nation. It will provide an urge, even in times of peace, to continue with such a program as may be found advisable, and will make it much easier to develop and hold to an adequate peace time program than if no such position or person were in existence. As confidence in this civilian increases, he will become a more and more potent factor in the U. S. intelligence operations. The civilian member might eventually become chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, a place which would be accorded him only on the basis of his performance.

SECRET

These are sound recommendations, but they do bring up one point of organization which the Army may find it important to consider. That is the Question whether the committee should have two representatives from the Army or only one such representative. The recommendations, as stated, indicate that each committee member is the top person in his own particular service. This is as it should be, but it leaves the implication that in the Army there will be two Intelligence services, one for Air, and one for all other parts of the service.

It may be important to examine the implications of such an assumption on down the line, in an effort to determine just how an integration of the two intelligence services within the Army can best be brought about. The fact of two Army members on the committee will tend to emphasize the duality of these two services. It may be desirable to place emphasis on unification rather than duality. The problem of course goes far deeper than the mere fact of having one or two members on the committee. If, however, a study resulted in the decision to accomplish integration as far down the line as possible, it would undoubtedly lend weight to the idea of such integration if the Army representation on the committee were confined to one person who would then be unqualifiedly recognized as the head of all Army Intelligence.

SECRET2. Members of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

The recommendation calls for a committee consisting of these five members:

Army
 Navy
 Army Air Corps
 G.S.S.
 Civilian

The recommendation also makes these specifications, among others:

- (1) The committee member is recognized as the top person in the service which he represents
- (2) He makes the committee work his primary job and spends substantially full time on this work.
- (3) The operating responsibilities of the service which the committee member heads up are performed by his deputy
- (4) The committee job is recognized as being distinctly superior to that of the individual service
- (5) The committee member has full access to all intelligence in the service which he represents
- (6) The committee members are the primary source of intelligence for the Joint Chiefs

SECRET

Comments regarding consolidation from the point of view of Army activities.

Comments which follow refer to the general headings discussed in Mr. Warner's letter to Admiral King dated April 29, 1943.

- I. "Create a new Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible directly to the Joint Chiefs and working with the Joint Staff Planners" (Quoted from page 3 of above letter)

1. Organization plan of the Joint Chiefs

It is believed that the establishment of a Joint Intelligence Committee as described would result in an organization of substantially the characteristics shown on the following chart.

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SECRETIntroductory Comments

Contact with the Army to learn something of Army Intelligence activities was initiated by Mr. Warner, and resulted in a preliminary meeting on March 22, 1943. At this meeting Gen. Strong received Mr. Warner and Mr. Norris, and discussed Army Intelligence particularly in its relation to Navy Intelligence. Gen. Strong expressed the thought that the two services should be brought closer together in their operations.

At this same time Gen Strong introduced his assistant, Lt. Col. John M. Kemper, and instructed him to place at our disposal information regarding Army Intelligence activities.

Lt. Col. Kemper was functioning in the dual capacity of assistant to Gen. Strong, and member of the coordinating staff, a group of three officers charged with the duty of studying and simplifying the organization of G-2, and of defining the duties of the various sub-divisions comprising that organization. The other two members of the coordinating staff were Lt. Col. Gilbert G. Jacobus, and Major Norman E. Towson. During his contacts with the G-2 organization, Mr. Norris made the office of the coordinating staff his headquarters. Contacts of an intermittent nature were made from March 22, 1943 to April 24, 1943.

Members of the G-2 organization were most cooperative in making available the time of various officers for interview, and in making available information concerning their activities.

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL HOLDERS OF
J.I.C. 76/3

ESTABLISHMENT OF A TOPOGRAPHICAL SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

Note by the Secretary

1. At its 78th Meeting the Joint Intelligence Committee approved J.I.C. 76/3 subject to the following amendments:

Page 2, paragraph 6 a:

delete lines 4 through 7 (beginning "topographical or similar fact-finding" etc.) and substitute therefor: "military topographical or similar fact-finding character and, in consultation with the Joint Staff Planners, for coordinating reproduction in the United States, by and for agencies responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of military maps, charts, etc., required for the prosecution of the war, in accordance with the priorities then appropriate."

Page 2, paragraph 6 b:

revise line 8 (beginning "permanent subcommittee") to read:

permanent subcommittee consisting of Army, Navy, and O.S.S. officers."

Page 5, paragraph 15:

at end of paragraph, add:
Army and Navy officers.

2. As thus amended, J.I.C. 76/3 has been approved by the Joint Staff Planners.

3. All holders of J.I.C. 76/3 are requested to issue their paper in accordance with the changes indicated in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

A. SIDNEY BUFORD, III,
Secretary.

a. Administrative arrangements on an interdepartmental basis, as at present, with personnel and budget provided by the participating departments.

b. In addition to the representatives from ONI, MIS, and OSS, the J.I.S.P.B. might include representatives from A-2, the Office of the Chief Engineer, the Hydrographic Office, and the I.S.T.D. (British).

c. The Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board should be directed to look to the aforesaid subcommittee of the J.I.C. for operating directives.

d. Further recommendations may be in order when it becomes possible shortly to examine the first completed JANIS publication.

13. While it might still be possible to adjust individual difficulties in intelligence coordination on an improvised basis (as for example, revision of the present unsatisfactory JANIS priority list), we feel that the problem is of considerable magnitude, beyond the jurisdiction of the intelligence agencies as such, and incapable of prompt, coordinated solution under existing conditions. Proper machinery for this purpose is urgently required.

14. We believe that the Joint Intelligence Committee is best fitted to undertake the necessary coordination and that it should be given the authority to accomplish this mission.

15. To accomplish this mission we suggest the establishment of a subordinate committee of the Joint Intelligence Committee, interdepartmental in character, with duties and authority substantially as described in paragraph 2. above. Its membership, we believe, include the following under the chairmanship of the senior member:

- 1. Colonel, G-2
- 1. Captain, INI
- 1. Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel, A-2
- 1. U.S. Army Engineer Officer, field grade.

16. We believe that in addition to its responsibilities for coordinating joint and interdepartmental intelligence studies, this subcommittee should perform such additional services as may be directed by the J.I.C. in connection with the furnishing of topographical and similar static intelligence.

17. With regard to the agency at present responsible for the issuance of JANIS studies (the Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board), we believe as follows:

level which has clear responsibility for seeing that all such studies are coordinated as to preparation, content, suitability for use in joint and combined operations, etc. A number of difficulties have come to light in these connections. The following specific difficulties may be mentioned briefly:

a. Evidence of unnecessary duplication. At the present time the priority lists of both the British (I.S.T.D.) and the Americans (JANIS studies) contemplate independent studies of the same areas, e.g., France, Malaya.

b. Irrelevant priorities. The prospective usefulness of the JANIS publications may be seriously limited by the present priority list, which calls for completed studies on Libya, Arabia, Ethiopia, Palestine, Madagascar, Afghanistan, South Africa, and Canada, among other areas, but makes no mention of Japan, Manchuria, Korea or Formosa.

c. Conflict in intelligence requests. Producing sections in Washington (including MIS, ONI, OSS, the Hydrographic Office, the Army Map Service, the Beach Erosion Board, the Joint Meteorological Committee, the Surgeon General's Office, etc.) are constantly called upon for information by theater commanders. Frequently confusion results in the producing sections as to which demands for information should be fulfilled first--those of the theater commander or those required by the JANIS priority list.

d. Conflict in reproduction demands. Similar confusion constantly arises in the reproduction agencies as to conflicting priority demands for maps, charts, etc.

e. Lack of simplified procedure for handling new proposals. Various proposals for improving the machinery for intelligence studies, or for simplifying format, etc., arise from time to time both in Washington and in the theaters of operation. At the present time, most such suggestions are handled on an improvised basis, frequently without reference to overall intelligence planning.

APPENDIXFACTS BEARING UPON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

7. By an agreement of April 1943, signed by the A.C. of S., G-2, the Director of Naval Intelligence, and the Director of C.S.S., the signatory agencies agreed to suspend the initiation of further independent monograph studies and to cooperate in the preparation of a series to be known as Joint Army and Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS).

8. The stated purpose was "to make available one publication containing all the necessary detailed information upon which may be based a war plan for military or naval operations in a given area."

9. A priority list for studies was approved by the A.C. of S., G-2, the Director of Naval Intelligence, and the Director, C.S.S. Completion of the first JANIS study (on a Balkan country) is expected about 15 November.

10. For more than three years (since the Spring of 1940) joint service studies of a comparable character have been produced in Great Britain by the Inter-Service Topographical Department (I.S.T.D.). This agency has produced a number of encyclopedic area studies known as the ISIS books. U.S. agencies have contributed information, maps, etc., on a continuous basis, for many of these ISIS volumes.

11. In various theaters of command, notably in the Southwest Pacific, exhaustive topographical studies are also in preparation. In addition to information obtained in the command areas, the producers of these volumes call upon U.S. agencies in Washington for information, maps, charts, and similar materials.

3. We believe that the Joint Intelligence Committee is best fitted to undertake the necessary coordination and that it should be given the authority to accomplish this mission.

4. We believe that the Joint Intelligence Committee should be assisted in this mission by a permanent subcommittee, inter-departmental in character.

5. A discussion of these points, together with facts bearing upon the problem, is to be found in the Appendix.

RECOMMENDATION

6. It is recommended that the charter of the Joint Intelligence Committee be amended, therefore, as follows:

1. By inserting the following as paragraph 5 d:

Have executive responsibility for coordinating the preparation and production of intelligence studies of a topographical or similar fact-finding character and, in consultation with the Joint Staff Planners, for coordinating reproduction in the United States of maps, charts, etc., in accordance with priorities then appropriate.

2. By revising paragraph 8 to read:

The Joint Intelligence Committee will be assisted by a permanent joint intelligence staff consisting of members detailed from the respective organizations of the members of the Joint Intelligence Committee, functioning as a committee under the chairmanship of the senior Army or Navy member. The Joint Intelligence Committee shall also be assisted by a permanent subcommittee consisting of Army and Navy officers (and including at least one AAF officer and one Army Major General), under the chairmanship of the senior member, charged with assisting the Committee in carrying out its responsibilities under paragraph 5 d, above.

3. By inserting the following as paragraph 12:

The Joint Intelligence Committee is authorized to take all necessary measures to accomplish its mission described in paragraph 5 d, above.

SECRET

ESTABLISHMENT OF A TOPOGRAPHICAL SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee

THE PROBLEM

1. To amend the charter of the Joint Intelligence Committee to charge it with executive responsibility for coordinating the preparation and production of intelligence studies of a topographical or similar fact-finding character and, in consultation with the Joint Staff Planners, for coordinating the reproduction in the United States of maps, charts, etc., in accordance with priorities then appropriate; to provide the Joint Intelligence Committee with authority to carry out these missions, and to furnish it with a permanent subcommittee to assist it in these missions.

CONCLUSIONS

2. We find that machinery is urgently needed to perform, among others, the following functions:

a. To eliminate duplication between the area topographical studies issued by the British (ISIS books) and similar studies prepared in the United States (JANIS books, etc.)

b. In conformance with directives from the Joint Staff Planners, to allocate work and establish priorities for topographical studies, maps, charts, etc., prepared in the United States.

c. In conformance with its responsibilities under b, to initiate, review, and control such topographical and fact-finding intelligence studies, whether of a joint or inter-departmental character.

d. To maintain close liaison with the Inter-Service Topographical Department (British), the Allied Geographical Section (American), and with comparable joint or combined agencies.

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159-41
(J.I.C. 76/3)28 October 1943JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEEESTABLISHMENT OF A TOPOGRAPHICAL SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEEReferences: Minutes, J.I.C. 76th Meeting. Item 5.
J.I.C. 76/2/D.Note by the Secretary

At its 76th Meeting, held on 15 October 1943, the Committee directed the Staff to prepare a paper recommending the establishment of a Subcommittee under the J.I.C., interdepartmental in nature, which, in conformance with directives of Joint Planning agencies, should be charged with primary and executive responsibility for allocation of work and establishment of priorities in the preparation of topographical studies, maps, charts, etc. It was intended that this paper be forwarded to the Joint Staff Planners with the request that they submit appropriate recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.

The attached paper was prepared in response to the Committee's directions.

A. C. BUCKLE, BUFCRD III,

Secretary.

JIC - 13.10
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ROUTING SHEET

INFORMATION

Originator The Secretariat
Date 11/26/45
Addressee _____
Date Rec'd _____

Subject Topographical Subcommittee of JIC

To	Rec'd No.	Date		Initials	Comments
		Rec'd	Fwd'd		Indicate action desired or taken
<u>The Secretariat</u>					
<u>Colonel Morgan</u>	<u>216</u>			<u>JM.</u>	<u>copy of SSC 76/3 in this office.</u>
<u>Mr. Lester</u>	<u>203</u>			<u>[Handwritten initials]</u>	<u>I suppose it is ahead that O.S. is to supply Army or Navy officers</u>
<u>Mr. G. Brown</u>	<u>11</u>				<u>Section 3 (b) [Handwritten initials]</u>

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Officers, Field Grade"

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFDIRECTIVEPROPAGANDA PLANS

1. Whenever a plan for an operation is approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commander concerned will without delay submit a propaganda plan pertaining thereto. This plan will become effective upon approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. Such plans will be in consonance with basic propaganda plans in effect in the areas involved or will indicate any changes desired therein.

3. The plans will indicate:

a. The propaganda aims and themes to be effective before and during the operation.

b. The plan for effecting changes in approved themes to meet changes in the situation.

c. The assistance desired from agencies under the control of, or cooperating with, the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

d. The system for releasing information of the initiation of major phases of the operation.

e. Such other features as the commander may desire to include.

SECRET (1956)

20 APR 1943

Pages 1 - 2 incl.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

PROPAGANDA PLANS

References: a. J.C.S. 101st Mtg., Annex "A"
b. C.C.S. 310

Memorandum from the Deputy Chief of Staff, U. S. Army

1. Lack of a clear understanding between theater commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the propaganda to be used in furtherance of agreed operations has led to discrepancies which have had embarrassing implications.

2. Effective coordination between the theaters and all propaganda agencies of the United Nations can be assured if plans are prepared and approved in advance of operations. It is therefore recommended that the attached directive (Enclosure "A") be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. It is further recommended that any directive which may be approved be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their consideration.

SECRETENCLOSURESECRET

627

(1) JCS 456

(J.C.S. 456/1)

20 August 1943JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFPROPAGANDA PLANSNote by the Secretaries

At the present time a loose situation exists with regard to propaganda, security control, and deception planning, both from the Joint and Combined viewpoints. This situation has resulted from acting by expediency in meeting situations as they arose regarding these unusual wartime activities. It is believed that the proposals contained in J.C.S. 456 will tie up one loose end, but there are many others that need attention.

It is recommended that the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff be directed to appoint an ad hoc committee to study the related subjects of propaganda, security control, and deception measures with a view to establishing control of all of these by one agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who will be able to devote their full time and attention to these subjects.

J. R. DEANE,

F. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat.

SECRET

1 September 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE:

Subject: Propaganda plans.
 Enclosure: J.C.S. 456/1.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in their 112th Meeting on 31 August 1943 considered J.C.S. 456/1 and:

"Agreed that the Joint Intelligence Committee should study and submit recommendations regarding the related subjects of propaganda, security control, and deception measures with a view to establishing one agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which will be able to devote its full time and attention to handling these subjects in so far as they are under the cognizance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

2. It is requested that the Joint Intelligence Committee take the necessary action to implement this decision.

/s/ FORREST B. ROYAL
 Captain, U.S. Navy
 Deputy Secretary.

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- (1) JCS 456
- (2) JCS 456/1
- (3) CCS 332

1 September 1952

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

INFORMATION, SECURITY CONTROL, AND DECEPTION MEASURES

Note by the Secretary

Attached is a memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

ROY B. SNAPP,

Acting Secretary.

ENCLOSURE "A"

SECRET

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

SECRET

Memorandum

Date: 9 September 1944

From: Lt. Col. G. B. Millican, Editor, Weekly Summary

For: Members of the Weekly Summary Editorial Board

In the 13 issues of the JIC Weekly Summary appearing from 15 June to 7 September the several contributing intelligence agencies have been represented as follows:

Special Articles

"Shorts"

OSS:	11	OSS:	61
FEA:	9	FEA:	6
A-2:	4	A-2:	5
ONI:	3	ONI:	4
Joint Commissions:	1	G-2:	0
G-2:	1	States:	0
State:	0		

It should be borne in mind that the State Department is an operating, not an intelligence, agency. The representative of the State Department cooperates in reviewing all items of a political or diplomatic nature.

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

10305
f. i. c. weekly summary
DATE: 25 Sept. 1944
con. to...

TO : General Donovan
FROM : Ray S. Cline *RSC*
SUBJECT: OSS Contributions to JIC Weekly Summary

The enclosed copy of a memorandum from Col. Millican refers to the OSS intelligence reports prepared by the Current Intelligence Staff, R & A, for the JIC Weekly Summary. The preponderance of OSS contributions is obvious from the memorandum which was sent to representatives of all of the listed intelligence agencies. Such a record probably does OSS reputation no harm, and perhaps you would be interested.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

**THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON**

Memorandum

Date 9 September 1944

From Lt. Col. C. B. Millican, Editor, Weekly Summary

To: Members of the Weekly Summary Editorial Board

In the 13 issues of the WFO Weekly Summary appearing from 15 June to 7 September the several contributing intelligence agencies have been represented as follows:

Special Articles		"Shorts"	
OSS:	11	OSS:	61
FBI:	2	FBI:	6
A-E:	4	A-E:	5
ONI:	2	ONI:	4
Joint Committee:	2	G-2:	0
G-2:	1	State:	0
State:	0		

It should be borne in mind that the State Department is an operating, not an intelligence, agency. The representatives of the State Department cooperate by reviewing all items of a political or diplomatic nature.

SECRET

J. C. Weekly Summary
15,305
SECRET
W. J. Donovan

13 October 1944

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION FOR THE JOINT U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF
SUBJECT: Contributions by intelligence agencies to Joint Intelligence Committee Weekly Summary

The enclosed memorandum is forwarded for your information.

William J. Donovan
Director

ENCLOSURE "A" Memorandum, dated 8 September 1944 from Lt. Col. P. E. Millican, Editor, JIC Weekly Summary to Members of the Weekly Summary Editorial Board

copy sent to Elms

SECRET

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SECRET Date: 13 Oct 61

Subject: Contributions to JIO
Weekly Summary

Attached is a proposed memo-
randum to JIO forwarding data on
this subject.

W. H. Halliday
13 Oct 61

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SECRET
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

16 May 1948

WEEKLY SUMMARY EDITORIAL BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR the OIS Member, Weekly Summary Editorial Board

Subject: Contribution of O.S.S. to
the J.I.C. Weekly Summary.

1. It is desired, first, to commend O.S.S. and Mr. Roy S. Gline, O.S.S. representative on the Weekly Summary Editorial Board, for O.S.S. contributions to the J.I.C. Weekly Summary through the surrender of Germany, and, second, to urge that adequate coverage from the O.S.S. point of view be continued on things European. It is assumed that from now on O.S.S. will even increase the number of short items and special articles relating to the war in the Pacific.

2. The Executive Secretary of the Weekly Summary Editorial Board cannot stress too much the dependence of the Board upon O.S.S. for adequate coverage of political and special intelligence items. The unflinching loyalty and cooperation of Mr. Gline have been a tower of strength to the present editor of the Weekly Summary ever since he assumed his duties. Since the last itemized account of contributions to the Weekly Summary, O.S.S. has had printed in the Weekly Summary -- from 1 March to date -- 12 special articles and 80 short items.

C. HOWIE HILLMAN
Lt. Col., U.S.A.
Executive Sec.

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