

AFRICA NO. R. MURPHY

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CONFIDENTIAL

November 2, 1942

My dear General:

Referring to the statements made several times by President Roosevelt, and to the agreements already drawn up by the American government as well as by the British government, I am in a position to assure you that the restoration of France to complete independence in all her grandeur and the full extent of her realm which she possessed before the war in Europe as well as overseas is one of the war goals of the United Nations.

It is well understood that French sovereignty should be reestablished as soon as possible in all territories, Metropolitan and Colonial, over which the French flag waved in 1939.

The United States government considers the French nation as an ally and will treat her as such.

I must add that in case of military operations in French territory (either in the Mother Country or in the Colonies) in all cases in which French collaboration is found, the American authorities shall in no way intervene in all the affairs which belong solely to national administration or which pertain to the exercise of French sovereignty.

As concerns command, the United States Government has no thought or desire other than to place the military command of this region in the hands of the French as soon as possible. However, during these phases of the operation which are concerned with landing, establishing security of French North Africa, and supplying the necessary base, it is considered essential that the American command and organization which has been put in readiness with so many efforts and difficulties especially for this operation remain unchanged. (The above clause results from the recent conference between the French and American representatives. It was drawn up before the receipt of your note of the twenty-seventh of October reading

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"It is quite normal, and is understood, that all the operations of landing will be regulated by the general staff of the American Army.

"The interallied command will begin to act after the landing, in other words, for each landing point, 48 hours after the hour fixed for the beginning of initial operations of landing of the first convoy. As concerns subsequent operations, the American troops will come under the interallied command as soon as they are on land".

I am communicating your suggestion to the General Staff of the American Army and I am certain that an acceptable formula will be found. During this period, the United States Government will stretch all its efforts to furnish the French forces with modern arms and equipment. While the equipping and organization of the French forces will thus be carried out, the details concerning the command can be completed in order that the French will be ready to assume supreme command at the desired moment. It would be desirable, in order to facilitate the direction of operations, that a General of the French Army be attached to the Commander in Chief immediately after the landing.

/s/ Murphy

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Confidentiel

Le 8 novembre 1944:

Monsieur le Général,

Me référant aux déclarations faites à plusieurs reprises par le Président Roosevelt et aux engagements déjà contractés par le Gouvernement américain aussi bien que par le Gouvernement britannique, je suis en mesure de vous assurer que la restauration de la France en pleine indépendance, dans toute la grandeur et toute l'étendue qu'elle possédait avant la guerre, aussi bien en Europe qu'Outre-mer, est l'un des buts de guerre des Nations Unies.

Il est bien entendu que la souveraineté française devra être rétablie aussi tôt que possible sur tous les territoires métropolitains et coloniaux, sur lesquels flottait en 1940, le drapeau français.

Le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis considère la Nation Française comme une alliée et la traitera comme telle.

J'ajoute qu'en cas d'opérations militaires en territoire français (soit dans la Métropole, soit dans les colonies) dans tous les cas où une collaboration française sera trouvée, les autorités américaines n'interviendront en rien dans toutes les affaires qui sont uniquement du ressort de l'administration nationale, ou qui relèvent de l'exercice de la souveraineté française.

En ce qui concerne le commandement, le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis n'a aucune pensée ni désir que de placer le commandement militaire de cette région dans les mains des Français dès que possible. Toutefois, pendant ces phases de l'opération dont fait partie le débarquement, établissement de sécurité de l'Afrique du Nord Française et fournissant la base nécessaire, il est considéré essentiel que le Commandement américain et l'organisation qui a été mise sur pied avec tant d'efforts et de difficultés tout particulièrement pour cette opération reste inchangée. (La clause ci-dessus résulte de la récente conférence entre les représentants américains et Français. Elle a été rédigée avant le reçu de votre note du 27 octobre lisant comme suit:

"Il est tout à fait normal, et la chose est entendue, que toutes les opérations de débarquement seront réglées par l'E.M. de l'Armée américaine.

"Le commandement interallié commencera à jouer après le débarquement, c'est-à-dire, pour chaque point de débarquement, 48 heures après l'heure fixée pour le commencement des opérations initiales de mise à terre du premier convoi. En ce qui concerne les opérations ultérieures, les troupes américaines, passeront sous le commandement interallié dès qu'elles seront à terre".

Je communique votre suggestion à l'Etat-Major de l'Armée américaine et je suis certain qu'une formule acceptable sera trouvée. Pendant cette période, le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis tendra tous ses efforts en vue de fournir aux forces françaises des armes et un équipement moderne. Tandis que l'équipement et l'organisation des forces françaises s'effectuera ainsi, les détails concernant le commandement pourront s'achever afin que les Français soient en mesure d'assumer le commandement suprême au moment voulu. Il serait désirable, afin de faciliter la direction des opérations, qu'un Général de l'Armée française soit adjoint au commandant en Chef immédiatement après le débarquement.

Signé/ MJR-HY.

CONFIDENTIAL

November 2, 1942

My dear General:

I have received your letter of October 28, which is as follows:

I attach the greatest importance to the fact that in case of combined military operations in French territories (of the Mother Country or overseas) which are not occupied under the terms of the Armistice Convention by Axis powers that, the United Nations Expeditionary Force which might come to collaborate with local French troops should be an expedition which is essentially American and under the leadership of an American commander.

This force should not be composed of any dissident French elements.

Only as a result of and after agreements between the local French authorities and the American authorities in case of necessity, non-American or dissident French or Allied formations could be introduced into these French territories.

I am happy to assure you that the views observed by you are completely in harmony with those of my government.

(signed) Murphy

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Confidentiel

Le 2 Novembre 1948

Monsieur le Général,

J'ai l'honneur de vous accuser réception de votre lettre du 28 octobre comme suit :

"J'attache la plus grande importance à ce qu'en cas d'opérations militaires combinées dans les territoires français (de la Métropole ou d'Outre-Mer) qui ne sont pas occupés aux termes des Conventions d'Armistice par les Puissances de l'Axe, le Corps Expéditionnaire des Nations Unies qui viendrait collaborer avec les troupes françaises locales soit une expédition essentiellement américaine placée sous un commandement américain.

"Elle ne devra comporter aucune participation des éléments français dissidents.

"Ce n'est que par la suite et après entente entre les autorités françaises locales et les autorités américaines qu'en cas de besoin des formations non américaines, alliées ou françaises dissidentes, pourraient être introduites sur ces territoires français".

Je suis heureux de vous assurer que les vues étudiées par vous sont tout à fait en harmonie avec celles de mon Gouvernement.

(signé: MURPHY)

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File Africa Op. Plan

*Africa North - 10112
x Giraud -
x Murphy -
x Letters*

November 2, 1942

General:

To answer different questions which have been asked me in your name, I have the honor of letting you know that:

1.) The American Government will extend the privilege of the Lend-Lease Law to the orders which will be given to the United States of America in the view of giving the French Army the means of participating in the common struggle.

2.) The American Government will facilitate the negotiation and execution of these orders.

3.) Likewise, the American Government will facilitate the order to the United States and the delivery of the necessary provisions to the revictualling of the civilian population in the French territories which would free themselves or would be freed from Axis imprisonment.

4.) Henceforth, adequate measures will be taken to reserve, in foreseeing these deliveries, quantities of merchandise of which the need is particularly urgent as well as to help the population to assure a better functioning of transports and to help resumption of local production.

5.) As concerns French North Africa, the list of the first "needs", that the United States Government agrees to satisfy as rapidly as possible, the rupture between these territories and the Armistice Commission so soon consummated, figures on the annex herewith which has not a limiting character.

6.) To hasten the arrival of this merchandise, the United States Government thinks, however, that the French merchant ships in the ports of French North Africa, at the proper moment, would be able to contribute to their transport.

7.) These deliveries of merchandise will be considered as official French purchases and invoiced on a world-wide course. For the acceptation and the invoicing of merchandise, one should refer, in principle, to the rules actually followed in the application of the Franco-American Agreement of 1941 for the revictualling of French North Africa.

CONFIDENTIAL

8.) Their payment will be executed by compensation. Credit openings corresponding to the sum total of deliveries will be executed in North Africa for the credit of the American Government. These credits will be utilized either for the needs of the American Treasury for its eventual military expenditures or its purchases of commissariats in French Africa, or for the payment of North African exports to the United States.

9.) In case it should appear that the American expenditures and purchases in Africa would not cover these deliveries for civil needs, the question of means of payment to use will be re-examined by a common agreement.

10.) The American Government is engaged in facilitating, in every possible measure, the placement of North African products, which, by reason of the circumstances would be deprived of their normal outlets. As soon as a military collaboration is realized, conversations would be entered into to study in common the conditions in which would be placed those products of which the French authorities would furnish the list.

11.) Having the firm will to do all compatible with the conduct of the war not to aggravate the sufferings of the metropolitan French population already so harshly put to the test, the United States Government will not raise any objection to the measures of assistance that the French population, freed from the grip of the Axis, would desire to take in favor of other populations of the French society. With the provision that these envoys be surrounded with the necessary guarantees so that they will not be turned aside from their destination, the expedition of family packages, of help to the cities of the Mother Country adopted by the cities of Africa, the gifts of the Red Cross, etc. would have to be, in the government's opinion, continued between North Africa and Metropolitan France (the mother country).

(signed) Murphy

CONFIDENTIAL

Confidentiel

Le 2 novembre 1942

Monsieur le Général,

Pour répondre à diverses questions qui m'ont été posées en votre nom, j'ai l'honneur de vous savoir que:

1°) Le Gouvernement Américain étendra le bénéfice de la loi "Prêt et Bail" aux commandes qui seront passées aux Etats-Unis d'Amérique en vue de donner à l'Armée française les moyens de participer à la lutte commune.

2°) Le Gouvernement Américain facilitera la négociation et l'exécution de ces commandes.

3°) De même, le Gouvernement Américain facilitera la commande aux Etats-Unis et la livraison des denrées nécessaires au ravitaillement des populations civiles dans les territoires français qui se libèreraient ou seraient libérés de l'emprise de l'Axe.

4°) Dès à présent, les mesures adéquates sont prises pour réserver, en prévision de ces livraisons, les quantités de marchandises dont le besoin est particulièrement urgent aussi bien pour soulager les populations que pour assurer un meilleur fonctionnement des transports et aider à une reprise de la production locale.

5°) En ce qui concerne l'Afrique Française du Nord, la liste de ces premiers "besoins", que le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis accepte de satisfaire aussi rapidement que possible, sitôt consommée la rupture entre ces territoires et les Commissions d'Armistice, figure sur l'annexe ci-jointe qui n'a pas un caractère limitatif.

6°) Pour accélérer l'arrivée de ces marchandises, le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis compte, toutefois, que les navires marchands français se trouvant dans les ports de l'A.F.N., le moment venu, pourront contribuer à leur transport.

7°) Ces livraisons de marchandises seront considérées comme des achats officiels français et facturées au cours mondial. Pour l'acceptation et la facturation des marchandises, on se référera, en principe, aux règles actuellement suivies dans l'application de l'accord franco-américain de 1941 pour le ravitaillement de l'Afrique du Nord.

8°) Leur paiement sera effectué par compensation. Des ouvertures de crédit correspondant au montant des livraisons seront effectuées en Afrique du Nord pour le compte du Gouvernement Américain. Ces crédits seront utilisés soit pour les besoins du Trésor Américain pour ses dépenses militaires éventuelles et ses achats d'Intendance en Afrique Française, soit pour le paiement d'exportation nord-africaines vers les Etats-Unis.

9°) Au cas où il apparaîtrait que les dépenses et les achats américains en Afrique ne couvriraient pas ces livraisons pour besoins civils, la question des moyens de paiement à employer sera réexaminée d'un commun accord.

10°) Le Gouvernement Américain s'engage à faciliter, dans toute la mesure du possible, le placement des produits nord-africains, qui, par suite des circonstances se trouveraient privés de leurs débouchés normaux. Aussitôt une collaboration militaire réalisée, des conversations seront engagées pour étudier en commun les conditions dans lesquelles pourraient être placés ces produits dont il appartient aux autorités françaises de fournir la liste.

11°) Ayant la ferme volonté de faire tout ce qui est compatible avec la conduite de la guerre pour ne pas aggraver les souffrances de la population métropolitaine française déjà si durement éprouvée, le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis n'éleva pas d'objection contre les mesures d'assistance que les populations françaises libérées de l'emprise de l'Axe désireraient prendre en faveur des autres populations de la communauté française. Sous la réserve que ces envois soient entourés des garanties nécessaires pour qu'ils ne soient pas déviés de leur destination, l'expédition des colis familiaux, des secours aux villes métropolitaines adoptées par les villes d'Afrique, des dons de Croix-Rouge, etc.... devra être, à son avis, continuée entre l'Afrique du Nord et la France métropolitaine.

Signé: MURPHY.

File Africa. P. 10

~~SECRET~~
EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

~~SECRET~~

23 September, 1942.

Mr. Robert D. Murphy
c/o War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Murphy:

Confirming our conversations with you as to preliminary actions to be taken by your agents ashore in the TORCH Theater, inclosed herewith is a list, prepared after consultation with the Task Force Commanders or their representatives, which indicates the general nature of the tasks which we desire be undertaken in each area. Information is requested as to those you consider to be within the capabilities of your organization. Upon receipt of this information from you, you will be informed as to the detailed and specific tasks which are desired in each area.

Very truly yours,

MARK W. CLARK
Major General, U. S. A.
Deputy Commander-in-Chief

COPY

~~SECRET~~

A. ACTION DESIRABLE WHETHER FRENCH RESIST OR NOT.

SECRET

I. ALGIERS AREA

<u>Priority Hour</u>	<u>Day</u>	<u>Action</u>
1	H-1	D* Destroy, or effectively put out of commission, the following coast defense batteries in the vicinity of ALGIERS:
<u>Battery</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Guns</u>
Battery de LAZARET	250 yds. S.S.W. hill 37 on C. MATIFOU	4 - 7.6" guns.
-	Between race course and sea 36° 44' 36" N 3° 7' 8" E	4 (?) 3" or 7.6" HA/LA guns.
Battery des ARCADES	-	3 - 3.7" guns.
-	On GRAND MOLE	2 - 3" guns or 1.9" MG's.
-	On JETEE DU NORD	2 - 3" guns.
Battery TAGARIN	Inside TAGARIN BARRACKS or to Southward.	Emplacements for 2 - 3" guns.
Battery de L'AMIRANTE	On PESQU' ILE DE L'AMIRANTE	4 - 4.7" guns (?) and 2 - 3" 2 - 1.9" guns.
-	C. KETTANI in old fortifications	4 - MG's 1.9" and 1.6" guns.
Battery DUPERRE	800 yds. S.W. of POINTE DES CONSULS	4 - 7.6" guns (?) and 3/4 - 1.6" AA guns.
FOET INDEPENDENCE	W of No. 6 and S. of POINTE LES DEUX MOULINS	Emplacement for 2 - 6" guns.
FOET ANGLAIS	W. of No. 7 and S. of POINTE PESCADE	2 - 6" guns 2 - 1.6" AA MG's.
SIDI FERRUCK	In old fort N.E. of SIDI FERRUCK village	4 - (?) 6" guns.

*H-hour on D-Day is the time of the assault of which you will be informed later.

SECRET

Letter to Robert D. Murphy, c/o War Department, Washington, D.C. (cont'd)

Battery

Position

Guns

SECRET

Mobile defenses W. of ALGIERS. 2/3 of way between CHEREGAS and GUYOTVILLE and 2000 yds. S. of shoreline. Battery 6" guns.

Empty emplacements. 4 - 16 ft. emplacements
Mt. ST. BENOIR
36° 47' 50" N.
30° 2' 36" E.

AA GUNS

FORT L'EMPEREUR Reported as AA defense center with mobile 75 mm. (3"

BABEL EL OUET Probably mobile AA batteries
BRIMANDREIS

Priority Hour

Day

Action

- 2 About 2200Z (10:00 PM) D-1 Wherever possible break electrical connections between infra-red detector stations, coast defense batteries and observation stations.
- 3 H D Seize BLIDA and MAISON BLANCHE airdromes and secure or destroy French planes thereon. Secure or immobilize tanks. Preserve installations, fuel, stores, ammunitions, etc.
- 4 " " Seize and preserve intact the main civil broadcasting station.
- 5 " " Seize and preserve intact (including records) the main telephone and telegraph exchanges, repeater stations and toll facilities in or near ALGIERS.
- 6 " " Prevent destruction of principal cable huts, cables and open wire lines in the ALGIERS area.

SECRET

Letter to Robert D. Mohy, c/o War Department, Washington, D.C. (cont'd)

SECRET

<u>Priority</u>	<u>Hour</u>	<u>Day</u>	<u>Action</u>
7	H	D	Prevent damage to main power stations.
8	"	"	Prevent damage to docks, dock installations at ALGIERS AND BOUGIE.
9	H + 2	D	Provide guides for City of ALGIERS. Guides to rendezvous at OBSERVATORY HILL.
10	H	"	Prevent damage to key road and railway bridges and tunnels.
11	H	"	Arrange, in so far as consistent with maintaining secrecy, for the seizure or neutralization of German and Italian armistice commissioners.
12	-	D+1 and after	Release United Nations prisoners.

II. CASABLANCA AREA

<u>Priority</u>	<u>Hour</u>	<u>DAY</u>	<u>Action</u>
1	H-1	D	Destroy, or effectively put out of commission, the following coast defenses batteries in the vicinity of CASABLANCA:

<u>Battery</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Guns</u>
No battery names available.	West of POINTE D'EL HANK Lighthouse on seaward side of road.	4 - 7.6" guns.
"	Spread in a line on seaward side of road between battery noted above and POINTE D'EL HANK.	4 - 5.4" guns.
"	TABLE d' AOUKACHA	4 - 3.9" guns.
"	On seaward side of head of JETEE TRANSVERSALE, 60 yards southeast of pilot station.	2 - 3" guns.

Letter to Robert D. McPhy, c/o War Department, Washington, D.C. (Cont'd.)
ANTI-AIRCRAFT BATTERIES

SECRET

<u>Battery</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Guns</u>
No battery names available.	SIDI BOU AZZA Area	6 - 3" guns.
"	AIN SEBAA Area	8 - 3" guns.
"	Base of JETEE TRANS-VERSALLE.	4 - 90mm guns.
"	JETEE DELURE	4 - 90mm guns.
"	South of EL HANK CEMETERY.	4 - heavy guns.
"	ANFA	4 - 3.5" guns.
"	HIPPODROME	4 - heavy guns.
"	VELODROME	4 - 3" guns.
"	CAMPS d'AIRE BORDJA	4 - heavy guns.

<u>Priority</u>	<u>Hour</u>	<u>Day</u>	<u>Action</u>
2	2200Z (10:00 PM)	D-1	Break electrical connections between infrared detector stations, coast defense batteries and observation stations.
3	H	D	Seize airdromes near PORT LYAUTEY, CASABLANCA and RABAT (two each) and secure or destroy the planes thereon. Preserve installations and supplies so long as consistent with retaining them.
4	H	D	Seize, if possible, but avoid damage to the group of radio stations at CASABLANCA, PORT LYAUTEY and FEDALA. Seize at risk of destruction the radio stations at RABAT.
5	H	D	Seize and preserve intact (including records) the main telephone, telegraph and repeater stations, in the area around CASABLANCA, PORT LYAUTEY and FEDALA.
6	H	D	Prevent destruction of cable huts, toll cables and open wire lines along routes in the area around CASABLANCA, PORT LYAUTEY and FEDALA.
7	H	D	Prevent damage to the main power stations and near CASABLANCA, PORT LYAUTEY and FEDALA.

SECRET

Letter to Robert D. Murphy, c/o War Department, Washington, D.C. (cont'd.)

<u>Priority</u>	<u>Hour</u>	<u>Day</u>	<u>Action</u>
8	H	D	Prevent damage to docks and port equipment at CASABLANCA, PORT LYAUTEY, FEDALA AND SAFI
9	H+2	D	Provide guides at PORT LYAUTEY, FEDALA and SAFI familiar with CASABLANCA and environs.
10	H	D	Prevent damage to key road and railroad bridges and tunnels with priority in the order of the difficulty of their replacement.
11	H	D	Arrange, if possible, without disclosing secret information for the elimination or neutralization of German and Italian armistice commissioners.
12	-	D+1	Release United Nations prisoners. and after

SECRET

III. ORAN AREA

<u>Priority</u>	<u>Hour</u>	<u>Day</u>	<u>Action</u>
1	h-1	D	Destroy, or effectively put out of commission, the following coast defense batteries in the vicinity of ORAN:

<u>Battery</u>	<u>Postition</u>	<u>Guns</u>
CANASTEL	9.4" guns 80-100 yds S.W. from edge of cliff. 3" guns S. or S.W. of 9.4" guns.	3 - 9.4" guns 4 - 3" AA guns MG's 2 S.L.S.
ESPAGNOL	About 4,000 ft. N.N.E. of ORAN light. Outside Old Fort.	2 - 3" guns ? - 2 emplacements.
GAMBETTA	4.7" guns about 2700 ft. N.N.E. of ORAN light. Outside an Old Fort. Light MG's on edge of cliff.	4 - 4.7" guns 4 - 3" guns ? Mobile AA Light MG's 3 AA S/L Sound detector.
HAVIN BLANC	On top of seaward edge of plateau at HAVIN BLANC 2500 ft. W. of ORAN light.	4 - 3" ?HA/LA guns 2 - 1.5" AA 1 S/L

SECRET

Letter to Robert D. Murphy, c/o War Department, Washington, D.C. (cont'd)

SECRET

<u>Battery</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Guns</u>
LAMOUNE	On the slopes above FORT LAMOUNE.	2 - 3.7" guns 1 S/L
FORT LAMOUNE	-	2 - 1.5" AA guns 1 S/L
ST. GREGOIRE	? - The old fort or slopes to seaward	(?) 4 - 3" AA guns AA M.G.'S S/L
MARABOUT SALI MOSSLI	On MARABOUT SALI MOSSLI	4 - 3.5" ? HA/LA guns 1 S/L
MERS EL KEBIR	On the promontory.	2 - 3" guns 4 - 3" HA/LA guns 3 - 1.5" MG's 8 - .5" MG's
DU SANTON	7.6" guns in pairs aligned N.E. - S.W. on N.E. and S.W. edge of SANTON ridge.	4 - 7.6" guns ? L.A.A. 3 S/L's
BOUISEVILLE	P.D.	4 - 3" mobile HA/LA guns M.G.'s
AIN EL TURK	About 800 yards W.N.W. of AIN EL TURK	4 - (?) 3" HA/LA guns.
CAP FALCON	P.D.	4 - 3" guns
ARZEU FT. DE LA POINTE	N.E. side of town on FORT POINTE	2 - 3" guns
ARZEU N.	6½ cables N.W. of oscillating light at FORT POINTE	4 - 4.1" or 3.5" guns 2 - 36" S/L's.

AA GUNS

LA SENIA		12 - 3" guns L and H.M.G.'s
COMBIER DJEBEL MURDJADJO ST. ANDRE) P.D.))	4 - 3.5" guns ? A.A. guns 3 - 1.5" guns) 8 - .5") M.G.'s

SECRET

Letter to Robert D. Murphy, c/o War Department, Washington, D.C. (cont'd.)

<u>Priority</u>	<u>Hour</u>	<u>Dis.</u>	<u>Action</u>
2	2200-Z (10:00PM)	D-1	Break electrical connections between infra-red detector stations, coast defense batteries and observation stations.
3	H	D	Seize TAFAROUJ and LA SENIA airdromes and secure or destroy French planes thereon. Prevent resistance to, and illuminate for, parachute landings. Preserve installations and supplies if consistent with gaining and keeping possession of them.
4.	H	D	Seize, if possible, but avoid damage to, the main military and naval radio stations at ORAN. Relief by our forces cannot be expected in less than two days.
5.	H	D	Seize and preserve intact (including records) the main telephone, telegraph and repeater stations, in the area around ORAN.
6	H	D	Prevent destruction of cable huts, toll cable and open wire lines in the area around ORAN.
7	H	D	Prevent damage to the main power stations at and near ORAN.
8	H	D	Prevent damage to docks and port equipment at ORAN, ARZEU AND MOSTA GANEM.
9	H + 2	D	Provide guides at points to be indicated later capable of directing forces within 20 miles of ORAN and in the city.
10	H	D	Prevent damage to key road and railroad bridges and tunnels with priority in the order of the difficulty of their replacement
11	H	D	Arrange, if possible, without disclosing secret information, for the elimination or neutralization of German and Italian armistice commissioners.
12	-	D+1 and after	Release United Nations prisoners.

B. ACTION IN CASE OF SERIOUS FRENCH RESISTANCE.
(in all three areas)

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Letter to Robert D. Murphy, c/o War Department, Washington, D.C. (cont'd.)

<u>Priority</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Day</u>	<u>Action</u>
1	-	-	Immobilize destroyers or larger warships and sink submarines or small craft. Avoid blocking harbors. To be done previous to D-day only if ordered by Commander-in-Chief.
2	-	-	Neutralize coast defense and searchlight batteries, direction finding stations and infra-red installations. To be done previous to D-day only if ordered by Commander-in-Chief.
3.	H	D	Destroy planes but not installations or gasoline reserves on airdromes which cannot be secured.
4	-	-	Demolish key points on roads and railroads such as bridges and defiles in accordance with a detailed program to be presented and discussed. To be done previous to D-day only if ordered by Commander-in-Chief.

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II

MEMORANDUM

S E C R E T

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SECRET

September 4, 1942

MEMORANDUMELEMENTS FOR CONSIDERATION IN THE
FRENCH NORTH AFRICAN SITUATIONSummary of the Situation

Since the Armistice, the resources and military means of French Africa have never been sufficient to insure its defense. Present effectives are relatively important and recruiting among the native population would permit of a substantial increase of effectives if necessary. On the other hand, industrial equipment is mediocre, inventories are extremely low, military armament is old-fashioned and notorbusly insufficient. The means for defence, therefore, must come from abroad.

There are material difficulties arising from the change of administration resulting from the departure of General Weygand. The latter has not been replaced. His

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civil and military functions and the coordination and control which he exercised on the ensemble of French Africa disappeared with him. The direction of civilian and military affairs is at present divided among civilian and military officials.. In other words, among six different people; to say nothing of the officials in charge of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. There does not exist at the moment in French Africa a civilian official or army officer who has the prestige or the authority necessary to undertake the initiative to place the country in a state of defence, and to obtain from abroad the necessary deliveries of materiel. These decisions must be provoked.

It should also be noted that if the large majority and the civilian and military authorities is either favorable to the American cause, or more precisely hostile to the Axis, the large majority of the population is apathetic. Favorable in principle to a reaction of defence, the mass of people will undertake no initiative, but, on the contrary, will submit if other decisions are taken.

To remedy this situation it would appear normal, first of all, to count on the French Government. There is

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no doubt that Marshal Petain wished sincerely that French Africa remain outside the conflict. It is doubtful that he will be able to cause this neutrality to be respected.

Problems of supply and direction regarding the Defence of Africa cannot be resolved without diplomatic conversations and without substantial delays. As far as we know, nothing has been done in this respect. There is little likelihood that the French Government will give the necessary orders in time to enable a decision to resist, if it had a desire to take such a decision. Indecision regarding policy reacts on the preparation for defence and at a given moment the lack of preparation for defence will react in its turn on the political decision.

✓ | To summarize, there is reason to fear that the future of Africa is dependent in the last analysis on the decision of Germany.

Exceptional Measures

Certain Frenchmen, who are worried regarding this situation, are making an effort, with the cooperation of

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civilian and military experts -

1. The study of political conditions of an agreement which would permit Africa to remain French and to receive outside support;
2. To study the material conditions of such an agreement (intervention, supplies, cooperation of specialists, etc.);
3. To obtain the necessary cooperation from the ranks of the civilian officials, the police authorities and the Army;
4. To find a solution of the problem of the high command when this project is raised.

Attitude of the United States

This project cannot be developed normally if the American Government does not approve in principle. The defence of Africa cannot be assured, except by supplies from abroad and it is impossible to contemplate that any initiative may be undertaken in an important manner without preliminary satisfaction in this regard. It is certain that the preliminary work can be undertaken, especially as relating

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to the study of the technical problems regarding defence and the enlistment of civilian and military collaborators. But this work which, as a matter of fact is now in course, cannot usefully be pushed beyond a certain point without information on the question of the attitude of the United States and the importance of the foreign cooperation which may be expected and the delays which may occur. Refusal to take a favorable attitude will lead undoubtedly to the interruption of the only substantial work which at present is being done to place French Africa in a state of defence.

The development of such a program is a time-taking matter involving political consultations, the assembly of stocks and the routing of deliveries and the accomplishment of liaisons which is is very delicate in its execution. In addition, the difference in the types of military materiel would require a period of instruction. This problem cannot be improvised.

The realization of the problem necessitates considerable cooperation in the civilian administration, with the police and with the Army. This cooperation is at present assured, but it can disappear quickly as a result of shift-

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Log of personnel by Vichy.

To summarize, it seems urgently necessary that a reply in principle should not be long deferred at a time when external incidents may at any moment intervene, in a way which would make desirable the application of the program described, and when a period of several weeks is necessary to prepare completely such a program from the moment that the reply in principle has been given.

The French Group in North Africa have evolved a program which they declare would be effective if the United States would be prepared for the following:

1. The recognition of a provisional government to be set up in French North Africa, promptly on its establishment;
2. Provide transport ships to carry French effectives and military equipment now at Dakar to French North Africa;
3. Arrange for the immediate shipment of arms and ammunition to North Africa against payment to be made by the provisional government with gold now stored in French Africa;

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4. Be prepared to send an expeditionary force of at least 12 divisions to French North Africa;

5. Guarantee the complete restoration of the French Empire to France after the termination of hostilities;

6. To accept French command of military forces in French Africa;

7. If and when French Africa proclaims its independence, the United States would send a contingent of naval units to Bizerta.

French Africa as a Theater of Operations

There can be little question regarding the importance of French Africa as a theater of operations against the German and Italian forces. The importance of the Mediterranean basin is demonstrated clearly in severe naval losses which have occurred largely as a result of Allied inability to control the North African shore, resulting in the acutely dangerous situation at Malta, Egypt and the Middle East. There is no doubt of the basic sympathy of the bulk of the French military establishment in North Africa for the

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American cause. This sympathy, unfortunately, does not extend to the British, against whom there is at the moment a distinct hostility. We have heard countless French Army officers declare that they would gladly cooperate with American forces, but that they would oppose by all means at their disposal British intervention in French North Africa. This hostility also applies to the de Gaulle organization. The French group with whom we have been in contact over a long period of months insists that it will only cooperate with the United States as it believes the risk involved in cooperation with the British will be great enough to insure failure of such an enterprise.

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Means Necessary for French North Africa in Order to Resist
German Aggression.

(December 22, 1941)

Aviation

Nota Bene: The moderate amount of material requested herein below must be taken in consideration with the purpose of this memorandum, that is to say it is devoted to a study of defensive action in respect to a territory or position which the enemy has not yet attacked.

I. French airforces in North Africa comprise:

6 groups of pursuit aircraft (1 group equals 27 planes) -----
---160 pursuit ships

13 groups reconnaissance bombers (1 group equals 13 planes) ---
---170 ships

These units have at their disposal 10 days supply of gasoline and munitions.

II. From the extreme weakness as shown by the above numeration, it will be necessary for immediate aid in the form of 300 combat planes with personnel. This aid, we feel, would be furnished by Great Britain as soon as she would acquire the certainty that F.N.A. desires to resist German threats.

It is necessary that the planes constituting this first aid echelon should arrive on the airports of F.N.A. within the first 3 days of a push. Mechanics and ammunition supplies for the plane armament should arrive at the same time by transport aircraft.

Bombs could be delivered from Gibraltar to any French North African Atlantic port to be delivered upon at time of need.

For 10 days these 300 planes could be supplied from the gasoline stocks now in North Africa. After that period, their supply would depend upon the gasoline stocks whose arrival is requested later on in this memorandum.

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The ultimate mission of these units of first urgency would be the destruction of German aviation based on south and southwestern Spanish fields.

III. The flying material of the 6 pursuit groups and the 13 bomber groups of F.N.A. should be renewed, by the delivery of planes and parts according, to the following schedule:

150 pursuit planes on the 15th day (after hostilities have commenced), thereafter 100 pursuit planes every fortnight;

100 bombers on the 15th day, thereafter 80 planes every fortnight.

These planes could be mounted either in Britain or in French Equatorial Africa.

The assembling of these planes could be envisaged in F.N.A. (at Casablanca) from the 3rd week on.

With the first deliveries it would be necessary to send 1 mechanic for 2 planes in order to instruct the French ground personnel, as well as an instructor pilot for every 6 aircraft.

IV. In respect for the gasoline supply for the above, from the 10th day on it would be necessary to count on a delivery of 500 tons of gasoline per day, as well as ammunition supplies as follows:

The necessary amount for 300 pursuit plane missions per day; the same for 300 bomber missions per day.

V. The first cargos of the deliveries should contain the following anti-aircraft material:

The amount necessary to cover their unloading (to be determined by the Navy Department interested);

To protect at least 20 airfields, i.e., 12 - 20 m/m or 25 m/m AA guns, in other words a total of 240 pieces. An instructor would be necessary for every battery of 6 guns.

VI. Aviation reinforcements (planes, gasoline, munitions, and AA material) would have the priority over Army supplies (tanks, etc.) as long as the aggressor has not established a bridge-head on F.N.A. territory.

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However, as soon as the enemy has established footing, all army supplies automatically take priority over those of aviation (aviation alone is helpless if the infantry and mechanized forces cannot assure the protection of its landing fields.)

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<u>Nature of Material</u>	<u>Re quirements</u> <u>for 1st month</u>	<u>imme-</u> <u>diate</u>	<u>1st</u> <u>week</u>	<u>2nd</u> <u>week</u>	<u>3rd</u> <u>week</u>	<u>4th</u> <u>week</u>
I - ARMORED VEHICLES						
Armored cars or light tanks but provided....						
with anti-tank guns	500	200	300			
Medium tanks (between 10 and 20 tons).....	500	200	300			
Heavy tanks more than 20T	500	200	300			
II - ARMAMENT						
Sub-machine guns.....	10,000	1,000	3,000	2,000	2,000	2,000
Grenade throwers.....	1,000	100	300	200	200	200
Anti-tank guns						
(light calibre below 40mm	1,000	500	500			
(heavy " above 40mm	200	100	100			
Anti-aircraft cannon						
(light below 40 mm...	500	500				
(heavy above 40 mm...	200	200				
III - AMMUNITION						
For tank guns						
(below 40 mm.....	2,000 shells	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	
	per piece					
(above 40 mm.....	1,000 shells	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4	
	per piece					
Cartridges for sub-machine guns.....	100,000,000	1/10	3/10	2/10	2/10	2/10
Grenades for throwers.	2,000,000	1/10	3/10	2/10	2/10	2/10
Incendiary Grenades...	1,000,000	1/5	1/5	1/5	1/5	1/5
Cartridges and shells for anti-tank guns						
(light.....	3,000,000	1/4	1/4	1/2		
(heavy.....	400,000	1/4	1/4	1/2		
Cartridges and shells for anti-aircraft guns						
(light.....	3,000,000	1/2	1/4	1/4		
(heavy.....	1,000,000	1/2	1/4	1/4		
Anti-tank mines.....	100,000	1/4	1/2	1/4		
Explosives.....	500T	1/5	1/5	2/5	1/5	

Nature of Material	Requirements for 1st month	Immediate	1st week	2nd week	3rd week	4th week
IV. AUTOMOTIVE EQUIPMENT						
Motorcycles with side cars	8,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,000	1,000
1 Ton Trucks.....	2,000		500	500	500	500
2 to 5 Ton Trucks.....	10,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000
Trucks more than 5 Tons	3,000		1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
Cross country cars - light	500	100	100	300		
heavy	2,000	500	500	1,000		
medium	1,500	500	1,000			
Tractors - light.....	100	50	50			
heavy.....	200	100	100			
medium.....	100	50	50			
Mobile repair shops for						
armored vehicles.....	30	10	20			
Automobiles.....	150	20	30	30	30	40
Traveling Kitchens.....	500	50	150	100	100	100
Tank trucks, light.....	500	50	150	100	100	100
Tank trucks, heavy.....	100			30	30	40
Ambulances.....	500	100	200	200		
V. MISC. MATERIEL						
1. Bridge teams.....	6 units		I	I	2	2
2. Optical materiel.....						
Individual binoculars...	10,000		2,500	2,500	2,500	2,500
Observation binoculars..	1,000		250	250	250	250
Infantry telemeters.....	200		100	100		
Artillery telemeters....	100		50	50		
Heavy Artillery telemeters	50		50			
3. Liaison materiel.....						
Light radio posts	1,000	200	300	500		
Heavy radio posts mounted						
on cars.....	200	50	50	100		
4. Individual equipment						
Haversocks.....	50,000	1/5	1/5	1/5	1/5	1/5
Canteens.....	100,000	1/5	1/5	1/5	1/5	1/5
Belts and suspender belts	50,000	1/5	1/5	1/5	1/5	1/5
Cartridge boxes.....	150,000	1/5	1/5	1/5	1/5	1/5
Light sacks.....	100,000	1/5	1/5	1/5	1/5	1/5
Tent rolls.....	100,000	1/5	1/5	1/5	1/5	1/5
VI. GASOLINE						
Kerosene.....	10,000 T				5,000 T	5,000 T
Automobile gasoline.....	60,000 T	15,000	15,000	10,000	10,000	10,000 T
Heavy grease.....	6,000 T	1,500	1,500	1,000	1,000	1,000 T
Petroleum.....	20,000 T		5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000 T
Containers.....						
Cans of 50 liters.....	40,000	1/5	1/5	1/5	1/5	1/5
Cans of 100 liters....	40,000	1/5	1/5	1/5	1/5	1/5
Cans of 200 liters....	20,000	1/5	1/5	1/5	1/5	1/5
VII. COAL	200,000 T	40,000	40,000	30,000	30,000	60,000 T

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- a. Armed vehicles to be delivered in running order with armament and radio equipment tools, spare parts and ammunition on board.
- b. It would be desirable to have all cañons which can be used as anti-tank or anti-aircraft, for both purposes.
- c. 1/20 of the number of all tank guns.
- d. Less than 1 ton.
- e. Can carry 1½ tons and carry as trailer a light anti-tank or anti-aircraft gun.
- f. Can carry 2½ tons and carry as trailer a field gun or an anti-tank or anti-aircraft gun heavier than 40m/m.
- g. Can pull tanks.
- g*. Short waves, receiving and sending sets for wireless radio, with a range of 50 kilometers. Maximum weight 10 kilograms, set up so as to be carried on men's backs or on cars. Should be the type that can be worked while moving.
- h. Short wave receiving and sending sets, working both for radio and telegraphy. The minimum range 400 kilometers while set up or 200 kilometers when moving.
- i. To be transported in the deliveries of automobiles.
- j. These figures correspond to the North African consumption as a whole ; they are therefore above military needs themselves. If impossible to deliver so much because of lack of tonnage, this amount could be brought to 75,000 tons.
- k. Locomotive coal.

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The increase in German demands and the unreasonable attitude of the actual government at Vichy can at any moment place the Empire in peril.

In this eventuality and in order to safe-guard its proper existence, North Africa--an essential component of the Empire--might be lead into a momentary separation from metropolitan France and to proclaim its independence.

The success of such an enterprise--within a French Cadre--is only possible if the following requisite conditions are fulfilled:

A necessary leader;

An initial favorable situation;

Outside help which would comprise military intervention and supplies both of munitions and provisions.

These different points are examined below.

A leader:

The military command in F.N.A. is actually decentralized. The recent replacements and the reorganizations of the high command doubtlessly would cause dissension and produce grave difficulties, were it necessary in the middle of a crisis to call for centralized action.

There is no one in authority at the moment, it would seem, who either by reputation or personal prestige could carry sufficient weight to assume sole leadership.

General Weygand is the only possible military leader. However, his taking over command presents a very delicate problem which will not be examined herein. It only appears necessary to state definitely that, if General Weygand refused his aid, the liberation of the F.N.A. could not be envisaged without armed intervention on the part of the allies and particularly the U.S.A.

Initial favorable situation:

The enemy may attack F.N.A. from the directions of Libya and Spanish Morocco, at the same time supplementing these ground movements with parachute attacks and landing operations in Northern Tunisia.

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The French army in North Africa could, even in its present state, defend itself against enemy landings and parachute movements if it were supplied with munitions and materiel. It could also defend itself with success against any attacks coming from the Spanish Moroccan Zone if forces which are now stationed there are not reinforced in tanks. However, these troops would be incapable of any serious resistance to an attack by the massed axis panzer divisions coming from Libya.

On the other hand in view of the urgency of the necessary supplies, their tonnage, the small number of Moroccan ports at one's disposal, the transportation difficulties in the interior and their weakness in respect to air bombings, the free utilization of the maritime route from Gibraltar directly to Algerian or Tunisian ports is imperative, especially for the first supplies.

As a conclusion therefore, the initial situation could be judged favorable if the enemy coming from Libya were destroyed or held in place by British action and if an important amount of tonnage of war materials could penetrate without loss into the western Mediterranean.

However, such a situation cannot result from any riposte which would leave the benefits of initiative of action to the enemy.

It is necessary in consequence, to take the initiative oneself in order to gain time, surprise the enemy, make effective reply to their reactions or avoid them, in a word create for oneself the initial situation desired.

This initiative can only be secured by following a set plan which would take into consideration these essential questions:

On one hand the intervention of allied military forces;

On the other hand the supplying to F.N.A. of indispensable munitions.

These questions are examined below:

Intervention of Allied military forces:

This intervention seems necessary only (I) for the defense of Tunisia and Northern Morocco and would only be necessary during the first few weeks.

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(I) An eventual intervention in the interior, in order to insure the safe taking over of command will not be examined in this document.

In respect to Tunis; here it is more a question of indirect aid, which would take the form of destruction or fixation of the enemy forces in Libya and Tripoli; later, of course, naval and air aid in case of enemy landings would be needed.

As for Morocco, in case of Spanish aggression, whether or not supported by the Germans, Allied participation should take the following form:

Blockade of the Spanish and Riff Coasts; air action against the bases in Spain and Spanish Morocco; for at least several weeks in the initial stages, the loan of 1 or 2 armored divisions in Morocco if the enemy has been able to reenforce to a considerable extent the armored forces now in the Spanish Moroccan Zone before the blockade starts in. It should be underlined that this military intervention is strictly limited to the above hypothesis. As a matter of fact, it is preferable to devote whatever tonnage can be spared to supplies and materiel, especially when the small capacity of the French Atlantic African Ports are taken into consideration.

Following along the same line of thought, it would be useless and even inopportune at the beginning to reenforce the F.N.A. troops with the garrisons now in French West Africa, which obviously lack modern materiel and equipment.

In addition, for the whole of F.N.A. whatever hypothesis is envisaged, it would be wise to have as a temporary reenforcement (say for 6 weeks) AA materiel and men for the special protection of ports. This reenforcement should be in the order of at least 100 heavy or light AA batteries INDISPENSABLE SUPPLIES TO F.N.A.

The French army as left by the Armistice Convention is poorly equipped in modern materiel, that is to say armored vehicles, AA and AT equipment, automotive materiel, etc.

It is therefore vital to supply the more important deficiencies in the shortest possible time.

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The memorandum joined herewith gives the necessary indications in detail. This memorandum establishes the amount of deliveries for the first month, and subsequent details by fractions, the quantities of first urgency to be delivered immediately and the weekly schedules to be followed.

The needs set forth herein concern solely the army. It must be understood, of course, that as our information is necessarily incomplete, the following tables are not as comprehensive or detailed as could be desired.

Likewise the fractioning of deliveries is made in a rather arbitrary manner and, of course, it will be followed only in so far as the possibilities of the situation permit.

In any event, the information contained in this memorandum will be sufficient to establish an adequate plan for transportation and will allow especially the routing in advance--before beginning of any military operations--of the cargoes carrying the first and urgent supplies whose delivery is called for immediately, besides those schedules from the first week.

The two supply contingents, called for during the first week, are very important, since it has been demonstrated above that, by taking the initiative and obtaining the benefit of surprise, this transportation of materiel can be sent via Gibraltar to the different designated points in F.N.A. This period of a week corresponds to our evaluation of the time the Germans will require to act in force through the south of Spain. In the event of axis action within a shorter time, all the cargoes which have not been able to pass the straits of Gibraltar would be sent to French Moroccan ports. In case the facilities of these ports would be overcrowded, unloading could be carried out in French West Africa or in the British possessions nearby.

We deem that the risk set forth is not too hazardous. It would find its compensation very readily through the advantages which special massive arrivals of materiel and provisions would confer throughout F.N.A. The instant use of this war materiel would permit, as a matter of fact, reinforcement of French North African armed forces to such an extent that they could, allowing for proper reorganization, take the offensive within a short time, both in Spanish Morocco and, if necessary, in Tripoli while at the same time behind their cover--throughout the Empire--"the Army of French Liberation would be forming."

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MATERIEL	1st urgency	2nd urgency	3rd urgency	4th urgency
Armored-cars	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4
Anti-tank equipment	1/2	1/2		
Anti-aircraft equipment { Light Heavy	total	1/2	1/2	
Munitions { Anti-tank Light Anti-air Heavy	1/4 1/2	1/4 1/2	1/2	
		1/4	1/4	1/2
Anti-tank mines	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4
Motorcycles with side cars	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4
Light trucks			1/2	1/2
Trucks	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4
Tractors for cross- country cars		1/4	1/4	1/2
Mobile repair shops for armored vehicles		1/4	1/4	1/2
Mobile repair shops for automobiles		1/4	1/4	1/2
Ambulances	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4
Radio equipment	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4
Canteens and tents	1/4	1/4	1/2	
Gasoline, oil and grease	1/4	1/4	1/4	1/4
Coal		1/4	1/4	1/2
Other materiel not indicated in the above.				Total

The table joined herewith gives separate totals by categories of the materiel and munitions required during the first month. This table indicates in addition the fractioning of deliveries, the contingent of first urgency to be sent immediately and the weekly schedules for later.

There is also indicated (1) certain directions for the establishing of a corresponding plan of transportation; (2) certain complementary indications in regard to the specialist personnel which is indispensable, as well as a fractional specification of the materiel of first urgency to be delivered immediately.

I. Transportation Plan

1. This plan calls for the utilization not only of the sea route but also of air transportation for the setting up in properly designated emplacements of AA and AT units. 2. To reduce rail and road transportation in F.N.A. it is imperative that this materiel be put into place immediately, so as to avoid massive destructive effects upon certain categories of supplies and to provide for the maximum of security with a minimum of bottle-neck conditions.

A. In accordance with the conditions of the moment the totality of F.N.A. ports should be utilized.

B. The cargo of each boat should not, in principle, be confined to one special category of supplies but should vary in general, especially for the first urgency fractions, a cross section of the whole list to be furnished. Where army vehicles, AA or AT guns or automotive equipment is concerned, each automatic arm or vehicle should always be accompanied by a first delivery of munitions.

3. No definite destination can be fixed a priori for any individual boat. The unloading ports will be indicated at the proper moment by the transportation units of F.N.A. forces in accordance with the general situation, unloading facilities, all in direct collaboration with American or Allied naval authorities.

MOROCCO	3.5	(or 35%)
ALGIERS	5.5	(or 55%)
TUNISIA	1	(or 10%)

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The loading of the boats and their route will be of course determined with this distribution in mind. As to the deliveries which are to be sent before the beginning of any hostile operations, they should be at least within 48 hours steaming distance from the designated point at the moment of attack.

Final orders to proceed to such designated ports will be given them while at sea by the American Navy Department, who as soon as hostilities arise if not before, will be in liaison with the F.N.A. command, through the intermediary of whatever American Naval Command will be assigned for the carrying through of the operations, working in conjunction with the transportation bureau of the F.N.A. GHQ.

II. Specialist Personnel Required:

To hasten the definite placing of AA equipment, it will be necessary that specialist personnel accompany certain categories. The entire number required should arrive at the latest on the day after the Axis attacks. This personnel would not be required for a great length of time, for from 2 to 6 weeks according to the different specialties. The necessary indications as to this are given below: Annex to Note #1.

MATERIEL	NUMBER OF SPECIALISTS	LENGTH OF STAY	OBSER- VATIONS
Armored vehicles	1 for 20 (if possible 10)	4 to 6 weeks	mechanition pilot
Anti-aircraft armament	1 for 10 guns	2 weeks	
Anti-tank armament	1 for 30 guns	2 weeks	mechanition
Automobiles	1 for 50 vehicles	4 to 6 weeks	"
Radio equipment	1 for 30 sets	3 weeks	

III. Complementary instructions.

a. All armored materiel should be delivered entirely assembled and equipped.

b. All automotive materiel according to the contingents required for the first 15 days should also be delivered entirely

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assembled. This disposition should be extended to all deliveries of automotive equipment because of the small F.N.A. capacity as regards assembly plants and technicians.

c. In addition all equipment delivered at later dates should be fully assembled and in working order.

d. In the event that the urgent list of supplies for immediate delivery are to be reduced, a list classifying the different types of urgency for the different categories of materiel and supplies is given herewith.

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Staff Talks

The French Group eager to cooperate with us in French Africa urge conversations between American and French representatives regarding - (1) deliveries of materiel, and (2) operations. These conversations would be held either in Algeria or Morocco, depending on our convenience, and would have for their objective the definition of the needs of materiel and supplies; the regulation of all questions relating to deliveries and division of the materiel and supplies; the eventual arrival of American personnel, and the solution of all technical questions arising from such deliveries, their protection and division.

Political Questions

The French Group hopes for a consolidation of all French nationals in an effort to resist the Axis, but understands that the British Government will never abandon General de Gaulle. It does understand, however, that the British Government will promise formally that the National Committee will not participate in any action in French North Africa.

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It is also understood by the French Group that questions regarding the relationship between the French in North Africa and the Fighting French in London and in Equatorial Africa, while important, are purely internal questions which concern the French. They hope that contact with General de Gaulle would only be established after the intervention in French North Africa had been realized.

Propaganda

Intervention in French North Africa would contemplate a serious propaganda effort immediately preceding such an operation. It would be unwise to engage in a premature propaganda effort which would only serve to alarm the Axis and disturb unfriendly elements in North Africa who would interpret it as a warning of intervention. However, careful study should be given to the preparation of propaganda material for distribution by airplanes preferably and through French sources of a character which would indicate its preparation by the French themselves rather than by a foreign power. In this connection, the French Group with whom we have been in contact is giving serious

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consideration to this problem and will be most helpful in its execution if and when the time arrives.

Arab Policy

The total population of French North Africa includes approximately 20,000,000 people, of whom about 18,000,000 are Arabs and Berbers and 2,000,000 are Europeans. In the event the United States should ever engage in a military intervention in French North Africa, the native population would constitute an element of the greatest importance and value. The administration of this population, however, suggests many complicated questions which it is our opinion that the United States is not qualified to handle by reason of lack of experience, language difficulties, etc.

This factor constitutes one of the important reasons why the United States, if contemplating a military operation in French North Africa, should cooperate closely with friendly French elements. These elements include specialists in Arab affairs who are well qualified to handle all matters relating to Arab administration. It is proposed, therefore, that relations with the natives in French

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Africa will be assumed by the French Group to which reference is made in this memorandum.

With reference to the relations with the natives in Spanish Africa, the French Group and the Americans would exchange information and consult at all times when it would appear necessary to elaborate and apply a common policy.

General Andre Giraud

Since his escape from Koenigstein last May, the leaders of the French North African Group have been in touch personally with General Andre Giraud. He has given them his authorization to continue their effort and has designated certain military officers in French North Africa for this purpose. One of these officers, Brigadier General Charles Mast, is stationed in Algiers as chief of staff of the 19th Army Corps. Mr. Robert Murphy has been closely in touch with Mast during recent months. He learns from Mast that operating with the assistance of the French Second Bureau in Vichy, Mast organized General Giraud's escape from Germany. According to Mast, and other staff officers with whom Murphy has talked, General Giraud is heart and soul for the resump-

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tion of hostilities against the Axis and will take command of the French forces in France and/or North Africa.

General Mast informed Murphy that staff talks might be held between French officers and American officers in this connection, subject of course to other developments, such as Axis provocation, which might precipitate earlier action. Mast stated the opinion, which he said is fully shared by General Giraud and numerous other French high ranking officers, to the effect that German defeat is assured and that the only hope France has to emerge from her humiliating position is the resumption of hostilities at a time when she can expect from the United States adequate and timely military aid.

General Mast also informed Murphy that the ideal of this group of French officers, including General Giraud, would be a general resumption of hostilities by the French in Metropolitan France and North Africa in the spring of 1943 for the reason that they consider that by that time the German position would have been greatly weakened due to losses on the Eastern Front and lower morale on the part of the German population, plus the factor that the Allied abil-

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ity of offensive action on the Continent would be greatly augmented by that time. They feel that it is of the utmost importance that the French be protected from premature action which they are convinced would bring about the utter and final ruin of the French nation. They all say that this is the last trump which the French have to play and that it must be timed most carefully.

Referring to North Africa, General Mast informed Murphy that the United States could count on the eventual cooperation in French North Africa of at least 14 army divisions composed of French officers and French and native troops. ✓

It is also refreshing to note the point of view expressed by General Mast, who with other officers, insists that it matters little what other politicians in Vichy might say or do in the coming few months. They say that the politicians will disappear and that French destiny will be taken in hand by the military.

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Small Arms Supply

The French Group on whom it is confidently believed that we can depend for material support and cooperation, have continuously urged that we provide them with small supplies of light arms and ammunition. A shipment of this materiel is now being made to a point in Algeria.

One of the group leaders is now in France and recently conferred with General Giraud and General Mast. He again confirms that the French in Metropolitan France will be ready to resume hostilities by next March or April but that Africa should receive equipment and materiel in order to be ready for an earlier emergency.

This leader again urges that arrangements be made immediately for conversations between French staff officers in French North Africa and American staff officers. We believe that such conversations should be undertaken at once. In themselves, they involve no commitments, they would serve to clarify a number of military phases and they would go far to encourage and support the members of the friendly French element which has patiently awaited our pleasure during the past year.

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Vichy is at present strengthening the secret police in French North Africa and now proposes to deprive the French Second Bureau of its authority in espionage matters. This is extremely important and it may lead to the dispersion of the French Group in question, but it will undoubtedly infuriate many French staff officers whose resentment may stimulate them to earlier action against the Axis.

French Personalities included in North African Movement

In our conversations with representatives of this Group we have limited our contacts to a few persons for obvious reasons of security. The latter include Generals Mast (Algiers) and Bethouard (Casablanca), Colonels Jous and Van Hecke, Lieutenant Colonel Freidaique, and Messrs. Luis Hardouin, Lemargie Dubreuil, Dastier and Rigaud. The latter four are civilians cooperating with the military through whom it has been preferable to maintain liaison for the reason that due to active Axis surveillance of French military officers frequent direct contact with the latter and Americans endangers their

position.

The persons in question are responsible, able and courageous. We have been in contact with them during the past year and have tested the sincerity of their purpose. We believe them true patriots who wish to contribute to a serious movement which will result in the liberation of France from its present bondage.

It is important to note that these representatives consistently emphasize that action in French North Africa must be under French, as distinguished from foreign, leadership; that if the United States intervenes, it should be at French invitation, avoiding the appearance of a violation of French sovereignty and with our formal assurances of respect for French territory.

Political, Economic and Financial Phases

The French Group have recently put the question

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whether the American Government is now ready to negotiate with them. They suggest that they have assumed a responsibility of preparing a movement in North Africa which involves economic and political accords. They propose that the American Government give to its representative in North Africa the necessary authority immediately to engage in such negotiations and to sign the agreements so prepared as soon as North Africa will have declared its determination to resist Axis interference.

In that connection the Group inquires whether the American Government is disposed to apply the Lease Lend Act to North African matters. If so, to what extent and under what guarantees could this measure be applied.

In event of the establishment of the temporary independence of French North Africa from metropolitan France and the control of foreign commerce and exchange being strictly maintained, would the American Government be disposed to adopt a fixed rate of exchange in its dealings with North Africa. In order to avoid speculation on the exchange and depreciation of the currency, it is absolutely necessary that only North African currency should circulate in that area.

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In order to avoid the economic and financial consequences of purchases eventually made by its nationals in a restricted market, would the American Government be disposed to provide for a proportional delivery of goods roughly corresponding to the total of the above purchases?

Is the American Government disposed to provide for the civilian needs of North Africa which will find itself deprived of the resources which it normally receives from France. In this connection, it is hoped that the American Government would be disposed to deliver the amount of goods contained in the quarterly quotas established under the current Weygand-Murphy Accord, the delivery of which is already in principle agreed to by the United States.

The question is also raised whether the American Government is disposed to negotiate immediately an extension of this Accord with regard to the increase of certain quantities and the inclusion of new products in the quotas. It is emphasized that it is of prime importance for the project in mind that the North African railways have a supply of coal put at their disposition immediately. The question of liquid fuels also is obviously of the greatest importance.

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A further economic question which must be considered is whether the American Government is disposed to guarantee temporarily the purchase of North African products which normally find their outlet in Europe.

French North Africa at present ships a considerable volume of family purchases which are distributed in France under the control of the Red Cross. Would the American Government, after intervention in French North Africa, be willing that this shipment be continued after all the necessary precautions were taken.

Summary of Shipments Tied up in French North African Ports on August 1, 1942

There is a total of 318,474 tons of merchant shipping tied up in French North African ports, divided as follows:

- Algerian ports, 149, 115
- Tunisian ports, 2, 283
- Moroccan ports, 67, 076

In the event of an American military intervention in the North African area, a considerable portion of this tonnage should fall into our hands.

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Present Military Situation in French
North Africa

Algeria, the largest of the three countries, possesses the most important military garrison - the 19th Army Corps Area, the biggest army corps command of the French Army in peace-time - embracing the three provinces of Algiers, Oran and Constantine. Its official strength is: Officers 2,123, non-commissioned officers and men 53,916. Total 56,039. The battle order of this area has been provided to the War Department.

The total number of troops in French Morocco is estimated at approximately 60,000.

The Tunisian garrison amounts to approximately 12,000 officers and men.

Thus the total North African strength is approximately 128,000 officers and men.

To the regular line units must also be added some 7,000 officers and men of the North African Supreme Air Command, the Douairs or native militia of Algeria, which numbers approximately 5,000 officers and men, as well as the Sultan's Guard in Morocco and the Beylical Guard in Tunisia, the lat-

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ter two being relatively insignificant as they are principally parade units.

Therefore, the total military strength lies between 140,000 and 150,000 officers and men.

Armament

Infantry - In a lamentable state, as shown by almost exclusive equipment of sections with the old light machine gun, called the fusil mitrailleurs, 1915 - modified 1917, with a maximum theoretical fire of 120 shots a minute. The rifle remains the old 1905, modified 1915, musket, a clumsy inaccurate instrument with five cartridge clip reserve. The rifling grooves of most of the rifles throughout North Africa are badly worn. The most that can be said of such equipment is that it is robust and has given excellent service in the past - but in the rather distant past.

Infantry accompanying guns - there are a few 37 mm. rapid-firers and still fewer 47's or heavier pieces, including mortars; nearly all are very old and in a poor state of repair. In fact, it may be stated that the armory services throughout North Africa are practically entirely lacking.

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Certain amounts of relatively new material has been shipped from France within recent weeks, but even this falls within the same category, since it all must pass before the sharp eyes of the Axis control officers, who retain everything of use for their own service.

Artillery - Taking the Constantine Division as a characteristic example, we find the two artillery regiments with a total of 48 - 75 mm. guns, 12 - 155's short (Schneider) and 12 - 105 mm. longs. There is no heavy artillery for the different divisional units, nor for the Army Corps. In certain divisional depots, as in Oran, there are a few score old artillery pieces of mixed medium calibres. An added characteristic of poor riflings in nearly all cases, so badly worn that a great deal of compensatory calculations are necessary for accurate firings.

Tanks - 400 in service in all French North Africa and French West Africa. A few of them are of the Souma type, but most are light medium FT's in poor repair in general. In addition, lack of proper repair facilities, gasoline and oil, renders this arm of little value, except in elementary and strictly limited means.

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Aviation - possibly 700 to 800 military planes are available in French Africa. In Algeria, for example, about 300 are available, of which not more than 150 to 200 are capable of any action against an enemy. The pilots are excellent, of good morale, but lack training, especially in recent combat work. Here again, a total lack of spare parts, repair facilities, gas and lubricating oils all provide handicaps which impair tremendously the combat potential of this army.

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Economic Supply Program

In the contemplation of American military intervention in French North Africa, the most careful attention must be given to the question of supplying the immediate economic needs of the population of twenty millions. The latter are at present dependent on metropolitan France to a large extent for manufactured goods. This results from long-established French policy to support home industries and involves a nice balance in commercial exchanges between France and French North Africa.

Based on the urgent needs for liquid and solid fuels and a list of goods outlined in existing quotas under the present North African Accord with the United States, it is believed that a minimum of twenty cargo ships would be required for this traffic. Some of the tonnage could be supplied from the ships now tied up in French North African ports, amounting to approximately 212,000 tons.

A list of current North African quotas is attached, to demonstrate the character of the goods needed.

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Provisional Quotas for Imports into French
North Africa from All Sources as at December 31, 1941

It is emphasized that the figures given below are only a provisional indication of the amounts which the British Government are in principle prepared to allow through the blockade, and do not necessarily indicate or imply that navicerts will be granted up to those amounts. The British Government retains the right to consider the merits of each particular shipment as and when the application is made for a navicert in respect of it, and having regard to the conditions pertaining at that time. The amounts given below indicate imports from all sources.

1. Condensed Milk	1,275 tons
2. Sugar	45,500 tons (quota to be filled as far as possible from F.W.I.)
3. Green Tea	975 tons
4. Black Tea	400 tons
5. Tobacco	1,000 tons
6. Cotton Thread	430 tons
7. Cotton Piecegoods	11,576 tons (this amount includes the unused balance of 5,076 tons from the previous quarter)

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| 8. | Rayon Thread | 35 tons |
| 9. | Wool Thread | 150 tons |
| 10. | Cord, String and Various Threads | 550 tons |
| 11. | Jute and Cotton Sacks and Baling
Material | 2,000 tons |
| 12. | Turpentine | No quota fixed; subject
to discussion. |
| 13. | Ready-made Clothing, Knitted
Goods and Lingerie | 430 tons |
| 14. | Second-Hand Clothing | 1,570 tons |
| 15. | Other Machinery and Spare
Parts | Reserved for further
discussion. |
| 16. | Medicine and Articles for
Medical or Pharmaceutical
Use | This is a referred item.
Individual consign-
ments to be considered
on their merits. |
| 17. | Chemical Fertilizers | |
| | (a) Potassie Fertilizers | 2,500 tons |
| | (b) Nitrogenous Fertilizers | 1,700 tons |
| | (c) Insecticides | 1,300 tons |
| | (d) Sulphur (Refined and
Sublimed) | 900 tons |
| | (e) Sulphur (crude) | 2,467 tons |
| | (f) Pyrites (from Spain) | 1,500 tons |
| | (g) Copper Sulphate | 12,800 tons (annually) |

The demand for this product is seasonal and is required to reach North Africa in April. If shipments are renewed M.E.W. would like this amount reduced to 8,000 tons. 5,000 tons of Potash is to come from Spain under the Spanish North African barter agreement. This will count against the quota.

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| 18. | Other Chemical Products | 2,000 tons (subject to approval by London. Precise information of materials required is to be supplied.) |
| 19. | Brads, Nails, Nuts and Screws | 1,700 tons |
| 20. | Paper and Cardboard | 6,500 tons |
| 21. | Matches | 210 tons (applications must state number of boxes) |
| 22. | Cotton Yarn for Matches | 8 tons |
| 23. | Tires and Spare Parts for Automobiles
(For further discussion) | No quota can be fixed pending guarantees that transport will not be passed on to Axis. |
| 24. | Fibre cement
(No quota fixed) | For further discussion. Details required as to types of material and uses to which it is to be put. |
| 25. | Electric lamps (ampoules for medical use) | 200,000 lamps |
| 26. | Electric Wire and Electric equipment | 500 tons (No tungsten wire) |
| 27. | Tools and Hardware | 400 tons (no power operated tools) |
| 28. | Copra | 350 tons |
| 29. | Cooperage Wood | 1,700 tons (to come from Portugal) |

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|-----|---------------------------------------|---|
| 30. | Pitch | 2,500 tons |
| 31. | Tar | 2,000 tons |
| 32. | Coke | 900 tons |
| 33. | Paraffin Wax | 600 tons |
| 34. | Calcium Carbide | 2,120 tons |
| 35. | Iron and Steel (no quota) | Each shipment to be the subject of a special request. |
| 36. | Iron Wire | 3,450 tons (this amount includes up to 900 tons of galvanized wire) |
| 37. | Galvanized Wire | 900 tons (see Item 36 above) |
| 38. | Binder Twine | 1,550 tons (this figure represents the unused balance of the total amount of 2700 tons allowed for the third and fourth quarters of 1941) |
| 39. | Petroleum Products | To be the subject of separate discussions. |
| 40. | Rubber Manufactures (excluding tires) | 150 tons |
| 41. | Bicycles | 1,025 cycles |
| 42. | Tin | 10 tons |
| 43. | Anti-Friction Metal | 5 tons |
| 44. | Glassware | 500 tons (no optical or quartz glass or heat resisting glass) |

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45. Asphalt and Bitumen 1,200 tons
46. Asbestos Information required whether short or long fibre. Request for 260 tons - normal import only.
47. Radio Valves and Equipment Only applications for receiving apparatus will be considered. Full technical details required.
48. Coal 110,000 tons (to be reviewed before next quota is fixed)
49. Spare Parts for Agricultural Machines London are prepared in principle to permit shipments of material already ordered provided quantities involved are not large.

SECRET

REPORT ON NORTH AFRICA BY MR.
ROBERT MURPHY 2/4/42

Psychological warfare, far in advance of military operations, would not have a good effect in North Africa, but psychological warfare in the form understood by this Committee, as a prelude to battle, would be valuable.

In the event of any future military operations the field can be prepared in advance by

- (a) Setting up an effective French operation inside the country to cope with the Arab elements; this would facilitate matters for the United States.
- (b) Obtaining the allegiance of the Arab leaders, either through purchase or persuasion.
- (c) Offering the Arabs and the French certain economic material advantages; their needs are listed below:

Cotton textiles.....	14,000 Tons (enough for 3 sections of N.A.)
Liquid Fuel.....	50,000 tons per quarter
Tea.....	750 tons per month
Coffee.....	unimportant
Sugar.....	45,000 tons per quarter (some local French beet sugar but small refineries)
Tobacco.....	2 or 3,000 tons a semester of American blend (15,000 tons are grown in Algeria, of which 10,000 are shipped to France. The remaining 5,000 tons are sufficient with the blend.)
Footgear.....	Substantial need for a population of 2 million.

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Soap..... Tremendous need

Dehydrated Food..... Need for everything that comes under the category of a daily necessity.

Solid Fuel..... 40 to 50,000 tons a month. (shipping question)

100,000 tons of goods in the first month would require 15 small cargo ships.

The economic situation at the present is one of despair rather than desperation as most of the refugees have exhausted their capital. It has not yet assumed an explosive character but the potentialities are there. The strongest plea for assistance would be the broad promise of economic help.

Possibilities of Invasion:

A Commando raid would have an unfavorable result. Any invasion would have to be on a scale large enough to stay and take control.

Elements to be considered in the event of landing

Civil Administration: Definite plans have been made by the French to take care of this. General Marshall has said that the Americans would take over first and then would restore administration to the French.

French Generals: Two representatives of General Giraud, one at Algiers, one at Casablanca.

Officers of the Service des Indigenes: Lt. Colonel Eddy, Gordon Browne and Ed. Coonley can deal with them.

Time: Operations now would be premature. It is preferable to wait until after the winter when the Germans are weaker and we are stronger.

British

There should be no British participation due to the intense anglophobia on the part of the Army and Navy. There is a prejudice to the Australians on the part of the officers who were transferred from Syria but this does not extend to the Canadians.

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The scarcity of shipping space may make it essential to include to some degree the British.

Liaison with French Army

Eventually there is a possibility of using 14 to 16 French Army divisions if we can make preliminary arrangements with French groups, prior to landing.

Size of French Army

France could develop over 200,000 men, although according to the Armistice Commission the number is limited to 110,000, due to the fact that a battalion usually has 1,500 instead of 1,000 men.

Free French

Although there is respect for General De Gaulle, the Free French have very little hold and for purposes of unity should be excluded from participation.

Spanish

The Spanish effectives are inferior to the French. The group of generals around Franco are anti-axis and do not want to see Spain dragged in. It has been hinted that Spanish aspirations might be considered in regard to an area of rich agricultural territory.

German Attitude

Fear of allied intervention on the part of the Germans seems to have disappeared lately as there has been little if any activity. Instead of 225 Germans in Morocco, there are now only 180. The effectives have been moved to the Spanish frontier away from the Atlantic. The German radio broadcasts from Berlin continue but tourists are not coming in and money is not being spent. General Boisson has successfully resisted pressure for additional Germans to come in by threatening to resign. Mr. Murphy does not believe that Vichy is anxious to have Germans in North Africa.

General Odie

According to Colonel Solborg, General Odie has been unsuccessful, but Mr. Murphy believes that he would fit in to a definite program or objective.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN

FROM: Robert Murphy

September 5, 1942

Two items occur to me in connection with your conversations in London regarding French North Africa.

1. General De Gaulle during recent days has made a statement to our Consul at Beirut to the effect that if the United States intervened in French North and West Africa without his leadership such an action would lead to great disillusionment on our part. The question arises whether General De Gaulle, who has adopted a hostile and arrogant attitude toward Great Britain recently over the Syrian question, would be capable of treachery should the U.S. undertake military intervention in French North Africa.

It would appear the part of wisdom to exclude the Fighting French at the moment from knowledge of your current discussion.

2. According to British naval sources in Gibraltar the British themselves are contemplating direct action in French North Africa, possibly as early as October. Apparently they are

Colonel Donovan

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September 5, 1942

planning an operation both in French Morocco and in Algeria. Undoubtedly the competent British authorities will take you into their complete confidence in this respect.

Algeria 895
Algeria 895
 July 6, 1942

Dear R....

During the interval since the despatch of my No. 187 of March 18, 1942, which had reference to my confidential letters of December 7, 1941, January 12 and March 14, 1942, to the UnderSecretary, I have been active in pursuit of the hope that the resumption of hostilities against the Germans and Italians might be developed in French North Africa. As you will have noted from a number of reports from this area, there are interesting trends in that direction.

I gathered from the Department's secret letter of March 5, 1942, enclosing the War Department's comment of February 25, 1942, relating to this movement, that it was desired that efforts along these lines be continued. It was obvious that the weakness of the North African movement consisted principally in the lack of a leader with the prestige of Weygand to insure its success from the beginning. I am reasonably confident that that deficiency may now be considered as rectified.

Since F's escape from Koenigstein in May, the leaders of the North African group have been in touch personally with General André Giraud. He has given them his authorization to continue their effort, and has designated certain military officers in French North Africa for this purpose. One of these officers, General Charles Mast, is stationed in Algiers as Chief of Staff of the 19th Army Corps. I have had several conversations with Mast. He tells me that, operating with the consent of the French Second Bureau, he organized General Giraud's escape from Germany. Mast himself had been a prisoner in that same fortress.

According to Mast, General Giraud is heart and soul for the resumption of hostilities against the Axis and will take command of the French forces either in France or North Africa. He believes that the action will start in North Africa. This statement is confirmed by two other members of this particular group who have recently visited General Giraud in France.

General Mast said that it is still too soon for the commencement of staff talks in this connection. He anticipates that these might be held in the autumn subject, of course, to other developments, such as Axis provocation, which might precipitate earlier action. He stated the opinion which he said is shared by General Giraud and other important French officers, that German defeat is certain, and that the only hope France has to emerge from her humiliating position is the resumption of hostilities at a time when she can expect from the United States adequate and timely military aid.

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Referring to North Africa, Mast states the opinion that we could count on the cooperation in French North Africa of at least 14 divisions composed of French officers and French and native troops. I refer in this connection to my telegram No. 167 of March 18, 3 p.m.

It is refreshing to have the point of view expressed by General Mast who, with other officers, insists that it matters little what politicians in Vichy may say or do during the coming few months. He insists that they will disappear, and that France's destinies will be taken in hand by the military. I asked in that connection, as a matter of detail, whether he considered Resident General Nogues of French Morocco as a politician or a soldier. He promptly replied that he considered Nogues as neither. The representative of General Giraud in French Morocco is General Béthouard, a divisional commander now stationed at Casablanca.

There are many phases of this tricky situation on which I would like to have the benefit of your advice and counsel, in addition to the strictly military angle, if we are to support a movement in this area. There are important financial, economic and political considerations which naturally arise. For example, the group have presented me with a questionnaire on financial and economic matters, a copy of which I attach in translation.

As you may know, Lt. Colonel Robert Solborg, Assistant Military Attaché in Lisbon, telegraphed me at Casablanca, suggesting that he come over for consultation. On his arrival in Casablanca I placed him in contact with certain individuals involved in this movement, and arranged for his visit to Algiers. He at that time provided me with a copy of the recent SOE directive for French North Africa. Colonel Solborg stated that he had a most favorable impression of the persons with whom he conversed in Algiers. He will report to the Office of Strategic Services and to the War Department these conversations in detail. Colonel Solborg is now in Lisbon enroute to the United States.

I cannot help but feel that the recent unfortunate developments in Egypt may serve to focus more of our attention on the Mediterranean area. If that is true, I hope that the Department may be able to devote some added attention to French North Africa. The more I study this area, the greater becomes my conviction that North Africa affords, by virtue of its climate, terrain and geographical situation, an ideal platform from which the French with our aid could launch military action against the Axis which would shorten the present conflict by many months and facilitate our victory.

The Department's decision to resume operations under the North African Economic Accord is a splendid step which I hope will lead in that direction. Might I have your comment, if practicable, on the attached questionnaire?

With warm regards, etc....