FASCISTS

esses

pamphlet submitted by Frederick C. G. of Harvard regarding Fascll Propaganda among the Italians of the

Ames—Boston area.

Don't you think that we should turn this

suffer over to Kntnre? Please let me

know if you agree.

S.

Muse.

M. slovenian.
Report by GUSTAV STENGER

To Colonel William J. Donovan

Officials of the Italian Embassy affirm that the only case of an Italian government who in recent months has sought to obtain a visa to enter Italy was that of Charles Baptil, who left the State Office of His Associated Press early in the spring, as leave, and who asked permission to return to Italy. This permission was denied by Rome. The Embassy here and here knew the reason for the denial. It is believed, however, that the situation may have changed recently. It is probable that the person most likely to obtain permission to return to Italy would be my colleague, Violan, whose close personal contacts in Rome established during nearly eight years of residence are unusually good. He, too, might possibly obtain permission to re-enter the country, in view of the fact that the recall of Chiango and myself was primarily conditioned on the belief by International News Service officials that war was imminent and that it was need to have American citizens in Rome. Undoubtedly the best line to take would be that of the International News Service officials here, utilizing the probability of a long period of what might be called "expected neutrality" between Italy and America, and decided to send back either Charles or myself or both. This would be particularly unwise if it were done hastily, because the temporary setup I established on leaving Rome has not worked, and at present is not adequate International News Service coverage from Rome. I shall ask Hurley Fels, the General Manager of I.N.S. to consider sending me back to Rome, but under the circumstances I cannot press the request.
Report by FIRST VIEW

Note to Colonel Dunn--continued

It seems to me that some word from you or someone equally important in the national setup--either to Raso or to Joseph Cassott--or even to Mr. Burnett himself--would be the best means of approach. Failing that, I might try to suggest to the Italians here to sound out Raso on my susceptibility as correspondent for some other organization. But I cannot do this until it can be carried out in a formal manner as an official application to be forwarded to the Foreign Office and War Department in Italy.
GENERAL COMMENT ON THE PRESENT SITUATION IN ITALY

Report by WALTER WISEN

The attitude of the American public toward the Italian situation is
mainly based upon misinformation and unfounded thinking. The state of
many of the Italian people at this time is far better than it was six
months ago. Indeed, it can be said that in some respects it is better
than it has been since the war with Great Britain started. The Italiens
were extremely badly prepared psychologically for the war. They had
not recovered from the effects of participating in the Ethiopian
war and Spanish Civil war, and needed a relatively long period of quiet
and recuperation before embarking on what is obviously the most
serious and the most dangerous of all the enterprises undertaken by the
present government. Indeed, the so-called "pan of steel" between
Germany and Italy in 1935 forewarned the need for three years of military,
mental, and psychological preparation. The Italian upper classes,
particularly in the North, have traditionally tended to be pro-British
and anti-German. The common people remember the sacrifices and
the hardships of the last war with Germany, and have never had any
close feeling of friendship with the people so temperamentally different
from them. It used to be said, popularly, that in the North of Italy the
ancient enemy was the Turk and in the North the Austrian, which really
meant the Germans. During last winter, after the
terrible reverses in North Africa had revealed the degree of lack of
preparation and the extent of suffering involved in the war, morale reached a
ew point. Then in the spring, when German soldiers and officials flocked
into the country in connection with their participation in the Libyan
campaign,

a large number of Italiens openly grumbled about that they called the
occupation of the country by the Germans. The upper classes said that Italy
and last the benefits of a century of cultural integration, and was built by the cultural alliance of elevating the foreign nation to save her from another. It was a choice between Germany and England, and the upper classes in Italy, pretty evenly favored England. All this is changed during the last three months. In the first phase, the war, as a material, physically

invasion understanding directly affecting the lives of the people, no longer

an Italy's threshold. Mussolini's personal prestige, which had fallen

to an exceptionally low point because he was blamed for having ordered the

electronic Italian campaign in order to achieve a psychological victory to

celebrate the Fascist anniversary of March 25, has since that time gradually

increased. Mussolini has been wise enough to be fairly honest in what he has

in the Italian people, and to avoid open contacts with the Italian people

during the bad days. So has also been psychologically skillful in repeating

one of the greatest propaganda achievements of the early Fascist period.

will be recalled that, long before Hitler went about proclaiming that

enemy had never been beaten on the battle field but had been broken an under

the home front, Mussolini created the myth of "Vittorio Veneto." That is

to say, he made the Italians believe that Italy's recovery after Caporetto

reached the Austrian army and hence broke the back of German resistance in

the first world war. Again Mussolini skillfully avoided responsibility

for a campaign which presented very similarities from a military point of

view with the famous Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo, proclaiming that Italy

credited the French army here intelligent Italians—and the common people

to many wars as intelligent as the educated—recognize that it was

common sense that went, but Mussolini's propaganda, confusing the

facts with a deliberate pattern designed to bolster morale, has effectively
report by A.M. Fritsch

number-one had planned and directed most of the Italian about the earliest less successful phases of the fighting. In addition to all this, the Italians simply have grown accustomed to war conditions. Many a people with a low standard of living and with extremely restricted liberties in the democratic sense, they have adjusted themselves to present conditions by mere suffer little under them. Of course, many still grumble, but their restrictions provide a safety valve. The very fact that Italian discipline is less critical than the Soviets makes it more elastic and better able to weather sudden ups and downs. Military morale also has improved. In this connection, the willingness of Mussolini—once long last, after a great deal of ill-advised interference—to leave the generals do their jobs, has played a great role. The death of his son undoubtedly has improved his status, both with the civilian population and the military. Previously the Italian had noticed that while Hitler was effective command in the field, Mussolini, proclaimed Generalissimo, had never directly participated with the troops in the various campaigns. and at the same time had permitted political factors to get him away from the military men in their most essential tasks. Bit by bit, the army has taken over control in the little things as well as the large. Younger men are coming to the front. Differences and tensions between the Black Shirts and the regular army men have reached the vanished point. Mussolini has learned; the army has learned. I should say that an extremely small minority of the country believes that Italy is not in the fight—whatever it may be. It has become a matter of most in a matter of national survival. There is not the slightest possibility of movement for the overthrow of Mussolini or Fascism at this time. On the contrary, the very fact that Fascism has been merged into the pattern of a
action of news made many observers to believe that Fascism in its present form cannot long survive the war, even if there be a victory. It was not until the end of the winter that Mussolini realized the resentment of the people against political "stay-at-home-ism." But as soon as he did recognize the serious threat to the Fascist regime and ordered cabinet members, Fascist officials, and other "stay-at-home-ism" to go to the front or to get out of the way. In the possibility of the overthrow of Fascism in sight one or the other of the hopes of the diletta. On the one hand, there is no dependable force around which such a movement can rally. On the other hand, any such movement would obviously make it necessary for the Germans to take over, loot, steal, and burn. An interesting sidelight in this respect was the fate of the ultra-Fascist Iron Guard Movement in Romania, which was ruthlessly destroyed because it failed to play ball with the German military machine. The present regime in Italy does play ball, no other stands a chance until the war is over, or until this war falters in its allegiance, which is impossible during the lifetime of Mussolini. All of the so-called "forces of order" in Italy which might have led or inspired an anti-Fascist movement have disintegrated. First the Church: The Pope heads an organization which, whether American Catholics like it or not, is essentially Italian, in spirit and in organization; the Church with a vast and delicate administrative job to handle, knows that antagonizing Italy might ruin the plan of cutting off the financial and other ties which are absolutely essential for its survival; finally, the Pope, realizing the futility of any naval force in a world in the grip of violence, essentially religious current, has concentrated his personal energies on keeping intact a neutral and authoritative agency which might stand at the end of the war: a great role in the peace, and prevent that peace from being, as
were the last, the germ of still further disaster. Second: The monarchy is thoroughly discredited as a potential national bulwark, impotent of Fascism. The king, an intelligent man with a long term historical sense, is represented by his intimates as feeling that it is his task to preserve the monarchy at any cost and to play along with a regime which, whatever his personal disagreements with it may be, is satisfying certain historical aspirations. The aristocracy and upper middle classes are weak and discredited. Italy, in its middle class sense, has only the slightest influence.

Italy did not want the war. Mussolini advised Italy through Ciano that Britain would fight. Hitler disregarded that warning. Mussolini lived up to his bargains. He did so for two, among other, reasons. First, because he believed in Fascism—that is to say, he believed that the so-called "youth, laborious, populous people of Europe" would dispossess the British and French empires. Second, Mussolini, gradually moving away from the old competitive attitude with Hitler, has bit by bit established an amazing psychological relationship with the German leader. It may sound odd, but I say flatly, as a person with a certain competency in psychology, that Mussolini loves Hitler—Mussolini, the strong, virile soul is vastly attracted by the soft, more or less mystical Hitler—and vice versa. Mussolini suggests—Mussolini is the idea man. Hitler ponders the ideas, decides and chooses among them, and turns them over to his marvelous technical staff for execution. The people of Italy want no war at all. A very large number of them still ask: who will win, but when will it end? How, however, most of them are convinced that the German war machine must provide the answer. Or rather, they were so convinced until it began.
view that America was in the war at first and would be, in some near future, as far as the Italian upper classes generally lost their links with England, or perhaps it should be said, while continuing to talk in a pro-British fashion, they lost any hope of a British victory. The great common sense in Italy, always sympathetic to the Americans—connected with them by the millions of immigrants who have flocked to these shores over half a century—have of late been becoming bitter about America. They say it's America's fault that the war is continuing. England is bad enough in promising help to other nations which isn't fully provided, but America is far worse in making the whole world fight for it. Propaganda has effectively sold the notion that America is materialistic, and that its aim to Britain is intended as a bid for the power and even the possessions of the British empire. Yet America's intervention, real intervention, would have an enormous effect on the Italian people. America is still the fascinating, magical country. America is still the country which—despite the myth of Vittorio Veneto—even the last war.

Neither economic pressure or moral pressure nor any other non-military factor will enchant the Italian people. Italy's training for the belt-tightening of the present war goes back far beyond the period of sanctions. Italy cannot be starved out. Italy cannot be frightened out of the war, for the good and sufficient reason that the population of a totalitarian state is necessarily always more frightened by the state itself—by the open and secret police, by the vast paraphernalia of physical pressure close to hand—than it can be by some remote outside agency. Italy can definitely be defeated, but it must be defeated by force of arms. Nothing has hurt the British cause in Italy more than the Bristol's weakness and stupidity
in the war of arms and in the war of ideas. Whereas the Germans, even  above all, have carefully cultivated Italian self-esteem, the

British, Marshall and Busteller above all, have allowed the Italians, for the traditional Anglo-Saxon approach and condensation toward

"lower people." Whereas, the Germans, making no pretense, have

practically halted the Italians out of sight spots and chased the Italians

by helping the Axis cause by getting into those sight spots, the British

have repeatedly threatened the Italians with all sorts of military punish-

ment, such as raids on Rome which never really actualized. At this stage,

of the game it is no point whatever to stress the hardships, such as food,

rare and health of the civilian population. If Britain—and this may

sound like a paradox—so to recover any measure of prestige in Italy, she

must bring about military suffering of the civilians. If the British were

to hold on their excessive caution about bombing Rome and possibly

Italian property—and nothing of this sort would really affect the Italian's

attitude toward the war, which, as has been said, is based on deeper and

longer-term factors—they would regain lost prestige. Every unexploded

British naval bomb, and every one has been far too easy, convinces the Italians

that they had better play along with the Germans. Every humanitarian appeal,

every speech by an American officer, hurts the Anglo-American

image in Italy. But the presence of American flying fortresses is raids

over Italian cities, real raids instead of toy raids, would help the Anglo-

American image. With pride, with reluctance, the Italians are beginning to

learn the language of force. That is the only language which should be

clearly open to them. Italy will not become subject to the beneficial effects

of American propaganda until after America above itself to
Report by Eisable, James, Jan. 1.

The control of publicrice, with respect to the only zones of single-base attack by enemy submarines, must not be made free for a long time, even in areas where the Italian air force and anti-aircraft defense are largely unaccessed and indeed less efficient than the British. The retraining from border cities and maritime bases, such as Rennano, Florence, Naples, and the many others in central Italy, have close to the old pre-Fascist notions of bordermake. In fact, instead of retraining these cities, at least the barracks within them should be made larger, and the danger to historical treasures could bring here in the Italian no nothing up to the present has, the grim reality of the scene of their association with a nation which has not respected such treasures in England and elsewhere.

Considerable sums of money are spent for electronic power in tuning British broadcasts by Italians--so the know how many through they seek, number any hundreds of thousands--enough to pick up the broadcasts by satiffly tuning in at the suitable edges of the wave lengths. Each man or woman who listens is the front point of a great body, so that Italy is quite well-informed of the broadcast version of our events. It is a great tribute to British honesty--let us say relative honesty--to the fact, and in the evening of their press against London lies, tend to vote for the London version of any particular event before judging the news version on the German version. At times it has been said that the Italian
force is not at war with England, but with the British Broadcasting Corporation. American broadcasts are normally over heard except late at night by small groups of daring amateur. American propaganda in Italy, to be effective, should be based almost entirely on two things: first, presenting categorically factual details of growing American power and illustrating how this power is effectively being used. Second, presenting the Italians with precise facts, particularly those bearing on military matters, which clearly reveal that America knows exactly what is going on inside Europe and is in a position to tell Europeans what their own future may hold. Moreover, however, there exists a great need to convey more information on this second point. To tell Italians of removal of troops movements in Italy which have not really taken place, or of facts which have not occurred, misleads those who send out the information. In my opinion, direct American broadcasts to Italy in English, in Italian, and in French, of sufficient power to be effectively heard--and in short-wave broadcasting power to be heard by everyone would have an extremely valuable effect. From America the distance is great, yet it may be possible by some sort of relay, perhaps via Puerto Rico or Liberia or some other place on the African continent, or perhaps from Greenland or Iceland. The best plan would be for a secret, really high-powered American station, at least be powerful as Moscow or Moscow, operating from someplace in the British Isles.

British aids have thus far done no more than scratch the surface. Only the recent one in Spain have been really successful. Naturally the exact damage cannot be ascertained. The perambulators who made their daring raid some time ago really carried out extensive damage to the
...carving the South Eastern part of the country. It is hard to
understand why the British stepped after the first raid, or why they made
one psychological error of using men of Italian origin. If instead of
Italian, British personnel were turned out to be American volunteers
with captured weapons, the effect on morale would be great. It cannot be too
vigorously emphasized that the Italians consider the British to be fighting
on a footing at an amateur war as compared with the German effort, and
anything which proves to the Italians or allows them to believe that
the British are as tough on the offensive on Italian soil as they are on
British soil, would weigh heavily in the balance in forming opinion.

The notion current in this country that the Germans control Italy
is preposterous. There are many times more Italians in Germany than there
are Germans in Italy at least 500,000 Italian workers, including scores
of thousands of skilled artisans, are working in German factories. The
great influx of German troops into Italy last winter and spring created
a temporary impression that the Germans were in charge. Most of these
are left Italian soil, although considerable numbers remain in Libya,
and some in Sicily and in the area south of Naples. To be sure, there are
German advisors in many of the ministries. The German embassy has great
influence at the foreign office. Vallino, of the Ministry of Popular Culture,
that is the ministry of propaganda, tends to be dictated on joint Axis
matters from Berlin. But this results from the simple fact that the Germans
are fighting this war more than the Italians, and also from the practical
fact that the German propaganda machine is better and more efficient than
the Italian. German technicians have provided much help in training Italian
aircraft forces, especially tanks and anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery.
the way they have of late played a great role. Italy as present has
about two billion new under arms. I should say that at least a third of
the number is not equipped in the usual manner fashion. Possibly a half
of them are now under the Atlantic campaign. The entire Italian
force must be released by Italian troops from Greece to the Greek islands.

Expeditionary force to Russia consists of rough troops with excellent
equipment. Italian aircraft production is slowly stepping up. The raids
by the British have not succeeded in disrupting production. A ton
would be from 750 to 800 pieces a month, a high estimate, perhaps 150 or
a ton. Old machines, vastly inferior to the British in armament and in
speed, were gradually being replaced by new types, which include a new
fighter and a new all-aluminum fleet bomber.

Considering all the circumstances, the health of the Italian people
is generally good. Of course, the physical resistance and robustness of
the Italians are normally exceptionally good. Plenty of sunlight and a
relatively even climate reduces the necessity for as much fat protein and
high caloric content in the diet. Meat was never a staple of the Italian
diet, at least of the common people, and its restriction to one day and
half each week is no hardship. It would serve no good purpose at this
time to itemize the details of shortages, but it is probable that by
next winter they will begin to impose upon the health of the civilian
population, particularly in the cities. Thus far the conquest and occupation
of Italian countries does not seem to have improved the food situation.

Mills because the supplies are going to Germany, or because they are
being excluded to the armed forces in Italy, or perhaps because they
are being utilized for later use.
There is not any type of food in which shortage exists, but even fruits and greens during the present summer. Yet any propaganda appeal based upon such fundamental truths may actually satisfy the requirements. Instead of being general it must reveal a specific knowledge of the exact situation in the various Italian cities and localities. In order to avoid the accusation of being "nothing but army propaganda," and at most effectively sidestep running into the fundamental facts, propaganda attempts that America is generous and efficiently fashes and voluntarily deprives other countries of their entirely just rights to a minimally decent standard of living. As far as I know, the health of the army has been exceptionally good. The diet of the ordinary soldier has been well above the level to which peasants and even city dwellers in most of the southern regions of Italy have been accustomed in peacetime. Even with the civilian population, the food problem is still one of acute inconvenience so far as the ordinary people are concerned, rather than that of real suffering. To illustrate the hazards of foreign propaganda about such matters as wartime shortages, it can be pointed out that any emphasis on the lack of heat—and there probably will be little if any in ordinary homes in such cities as Rome this coming winter—must take into account that heat of any kind is in all but the zones of the wealthy was practically unknown until a generation or two ago.

The general point I am trying to make is that propaganda to be effective in Italy cannot be based on a contrast between present conditions in Italy and those in the United States. It must be based on the fear that even with a German victory, conditions will become worse in Italy and will shut off the hope of much material well-being as has been the implicit promise of the Fascist regime. Near in the small, indeed in the trivial manifestations, is
Report by DR. VIKER

the classic manifestation of all political pressure in Italy. The American
emphasis on hope and perfectibility is alien to the Italian experience and
temperament. Despite such truisms in the catch phrase that the classic
weapon of Communist Sheets, of East Germany and of Fascist Italy are
respectively, murder, torture, and intimidation. After all, the Italians
have lived for centuries on the one hand under a series of despots, and
on the other hand within warning distance of the central focus of hellfire.

by temperament they make up for a profound capacity for resignation and
adjustment by gravity and resignation—whichelden translates itself into
taking resistance to authority. They have very little romanticism, and
hence very little appetite for risking their skins to better their lot.

This all important fact must be kept in mind in gauging the possibilities
of any kind of internal uprising against it, however, in the other fact
that, accustomed to accept leadership which is held and doing, they can
swing over rapidly to the ranks of small aspirations of individuals who
demonstrate their ability to replace the currently existing constituted
authority. A very dear friend of mine, one of the bravest of the younger
fascist leaders, once told me that the symbol of Italian insurrection is
the man who, waiting in his house for the police to come and arrest him,
screws at them through the window, knowing that his gesture is hopeless
in itself but will provide an example for hundreds of others who do not
have equivalent courage. Thus in Italy the task is on the one hand to
prepare the masses for new leadership and the other—by far the more
difficult—to find the new leaders without the latter, the former is
meaningless. There are these leaders to be found? I have already suggested
that they do not exist in church circles, the aristocracy, the upper
middle classes, and among the extreme radicals. The only two remaining
classes are the army and the fascist party itself. The prestige of the
army is high and continues to grow. It must be remembered that fascism
itself is an outgrowth of the discontent of lower middle class and working
class young men who had risen to the rank of officers in the army but
perhaps the process can be repeated. There are as substantial same as
yet. All the old names must be discarded. For example, one like Salvo
ted, and Crastani are discredited. The future of Fascism lacks the necessary
strength, popularity, and ownership, although the present people respect
it as a force as an officer. A more likely figure is the youthful face of
fascism. Turning to the party, the situation is almost the opposite of that
in the army. The older men in terms of experience have retained and even
strengthened their position. Most important of them is the ultra extremist
and friend of Germany, Fieschi, who remains firmly entrenched close to
the top of the heap. Of course such men can have nothing to do with the
development of a new setup except as the targets for the aggressive action
of younger men. If some young men were able to challenge and undermine
a fascist, he would overnight become a national figure. It is scarcely
necessary to say that such a feat would be extremely difficult and
dangerous, but I think not impossible. There are dozens of minor figures
in their thirties, most of them now serving with the armed forces, who
are good enough party background to provide the raw material for the
fascism. These younger men, by the nature of their party work, have remained
close to the people. Among them is Mussolini, who has been an assistant
director of the state under several regimes, and who in a quiet way has

Report by JAMES VIGILE

Built up a stable following. Any consideration of party development must hinge on the future of Count Ciano. The Duce's close follower, gradually overcoming a widespread unpopularity, has succeeded in increasing himself as a figure who, while retaining the confidence of Mussolini, has made it appear that he is courageous enough to have opinions of his own. The Ciano clique has shifted its basis of operations from the party to the army. General Cavallo, the only military leader in this way to escape the ills of incompetence and defeat, is personally very close to the foreign ministers. Last winter the army did not have a high opinion of Cavallo, but now his position has greatly improved. So the army Ciano is a soldier who has really picked his skin in doing his duty. The Germans definitely do not like Ciano, because they cannot depend upon him. In private, Ciano even now expresses himself along clearly anti-German lines.

I have the means--if I can return to Italy--of fairly constant access to Count Ciano, and hence to perhaps the best source of inside information in the country. In Italy such channels can be maintained in one of two ways, through personal friendships or through direct or indirect bribery. Information still can be bought in Italy, and at not too-high prices.

And I knew that such information would be of value--but I knew that there were people here sensible enough to see its value. I could easily have compiled a comprehensive "who's who" of real and potential leaders, with their personal estimates of the chance of winning or buying them. I did not have such knowledge, though I could probably manage, in a series of contacts with Italians here over a brief period of time, to refresh my memory on the subject. All such persons can be reached only from inside, hence the information about their personal situations would be useful only if we had men operating inside Italy.
and so called dictators in civil lifetime, in plants, and in manipulation
in public ways. Propaganda in a totalitarian state succeeds not by
its grand but by being unsophisticate and just because of its crudity.
This is always the great appetite for material, no matter how silly or
unrealizable, which provides some relief from the deadly ennui of the
social context. I think I have already expressed my opinion that the
use of effectiveness of underground propaganda, or for that matter of any
propaganda based upon personal or group emotion, is constant and endless
in Italy. A couple of months ago Ambassador Phillips in Rome called in
the correspondent to ask him to maintain some sort of dignified,
modest front and appearance of unity in the face of Italian propaganda
saying to express diversity and confusion among the American people. He
suggested that the correspondent and other Americans present at the confer-
ence night, but was unable to answer because, he indicated, such
information would be outside the province of official in his position.
The conference, it must be admitted, was a flop, and hurt rather than
helped almost any one of the men in that conference knew just exactly
who should have been told to the source of Italian who elected for
information, but in the absence of any official support for personal
removal of influencing propounding. As probably took little advantage of his
suggestion. I know that if I return to Italy I will be besieged both by
Italians and Americans for information. I know, furthermore, that my
statement would be accepted as close to face value. I could start and
continue a highly effective propaganda which, believe it or not, might
force the Red Cross to furnis within forty-eight hours. If I
return to Italy, exam small measure of the same kind of influence
might be attained by my establishing and maintaining contacts with Italian officials and Germans in this country. At lunch yesterday (August 13) with four ranking officials of the Italian embassy, it was clear that such an enterprise might stand a good chance of succeeding.

In conclusion, I should like to express my opinion on the subject of outside propaganda, directed by radio or otherwise, to Italy and to other countries within the German orbit. I feel that Americans generally fail to recognize the essential dualism which lies at the bottom of modern psychological propaganda. The double standard rests on the realization that what must be told the home public must not be told the foreign public. Naturally such a concept presents practical difficulties for Americans, but we must learn how to evolve our own techniques of keeping home and foreign propaganda separate and distinct. For example, emphasis on idealism and high moral purpose possibly serves a necessary end in bringing some measure of national unity within the United States. But anything smacking of Wilsonism is deadly poison abroad. The Axis propaganda machine accuses us of being selfish, materialistic, ruthless, arrogantly desirous of money. If I had anything to do with foreign propaganda, I would not repress any of these accusations. I would accept them, alter them, and form them into the preliminary barrage of our actual military participation, which after all, must really be all these things. At home, on the other hand, I would allow, indeed instruct, our propagandists to deny these accusations. Our purpose, abroad at least, is to confuse and divide our enemy, and inconsistency fosters this end.

At home we must say that we are threatened, but that we menace no foreign nation. Abroad we must drive home the belief that our great power, few too secure to be seriously impaired or worried by the Axis conquests, cannot
I was to create the creation of a world past at variance with our
wants. I tell the world that we created all the arms which made
relate the date concepts. Ford and the men who developed modern assembly
production made possible the mechanized army. America laid the basis
for the techniques of political propaganda. American philosophers, Repro-
vement, created pragmatism and the modern concept of practicality.

We created efficiency. We practically built a continental economy
in France. The world dealt with Calvinist methods. But in claiming all
I would unceasingly point out that the German, in borrowing from us,
conceals and mistrusts what we let them have. I would point out that
they, not we, are a political democracy, but as a twentieth century free
people, we have a popular tradition, the secret of reconciling individual
liberty with national independence and wellbeing. I would not run away
with the popular notion in Europe that we are a violent people, but I
believe that action that although we may have crudities and brutal-
ities, these are the attributes of the strong which are infinitely preferable
to those of the weak. Finally, I would try to suggest that America is
not war and will never end because America, a country of people with the highest material living
standard in the world, has resolved to finish the job it began in 1917
and finally left unfinished. America won the last war. America will win
the next. Not with the illusion of creating peace on earth, but with the
realization that it is possible to create perhaps a century of worldwide
political and national wellbeing, based upon the restoration of the assembly
of techniques from tank and military airplane production to the purposes of
to remain totally of the factual and opined intent.

I will be available any time you desire to confer.

For the next ten days I can be reached care of

[Address]

[City, State and Zip Code]

[Name]

[Position]

[Company]

[Phone and/or Fax Number]

I assure you of my total and have Service, 299 East 5th Street,

approach.

I expect one that speed up of the occasion. If there is any

security that you would want me to return to Italy. I also express the hope

that all plan turns out to be undesirable or impossible, you will

be made aware of using me in connection with radio or other pressure

[Signature]
CONFIDENTIAL

A. (FOUO) Description of the revolutionary

[Text continues here]
In the absence of any definitive!, date that there are revolutionary
activities only. The Department should take precautionary
steps which may lead to the stabilization of a situation
that has been observed to be somewhat unstable.

The course of the revolutionary movement
is not entirely clear. Whatever the final outcome,
the revolutionary situation is likely to vary
in its course. The Department is advised to
extend its inquiries to the leaders of the
movement.

The present trend of the revolutionary
movement is one of increasing activity. It
is believed that the revolution will quickly
reach its climax. The Department is advised
to keep itself informed of the progress of the
revolution.

The present position of the government is
very uncertain. The present form of
government is threatened by the revolutionary
movement. The Department should make
appropriate arrangements for defense.

The present position of the government is
due to the revolutionary movement. The
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The propaganda efforts in Italy have produced some results. The Italian people are more aware of the dangers of Fascism. The Italian government has made some efforts to appease the people. However, the Italian people are still afraid of a repeat of the past. The current government is more stable and better organized.

100

A recent dispatch to the foreign office in Rome indicated that the Italian government has made some efforts to appease the people. The government has announced some measures to improve the living conditions of the people. However, the Italian people are still afraid of a repeat of the past. The current government is more stable and better organized.

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The editor of a popular Italian daily recently made a visit to Naples and wrote an article on the violent anti-Fascist action in connection with the formation of the new government. It is reported that some anti-Fascists have been arrested following the above-mentioned meeting.

CONFIDENTIAL
(The text is not clearly visible due to the image quality. It appears to discuss political matters, possibly involving revolutionary movements and the punctuality of individuals.)
The point for economic reconstruction of Italy was moving to North Africa in the summer of 1946. Gliedtano had plans for financial and industrial support for Italy. He sold their responsibilities were working on these. One not be mentioned any more.
The next phase of the war, he told the audience, was the struggle for national unity and the establishment of a democratic government. He emphasized the importance of unity in a time of war and the need for all citizens to work together for the greater good. He spoke about the role of the military in this process, highlighting the need for discipline and order.

The audience at the lecture hall was attentive, and several members raised their hands to ask questions. The speaker, a seasoned military officer, patiently answered each question, elaborating on the importance of morale and the role of leadership in maintaining the necessary level of national spirit.

The lecture concluded with a call to action, urging the audience to remain vigilant and committed to the ideals of democracy and national unity. The speaker expressed optimism about the future, emphasizing the importance of education and the role of youth in shaping the course of events.

In conclusion, the speaker underscored the necessity of unity and cooperation in the face of adversity, and the audience left the hall inspired and ready to contribute to the greater cause.
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The document contains a series of lines that are not clearly legible due to the quality of the image. It appears to be a written text possibly discussing political or military matters. However, the content is not clear enough to transcribe accurately into a readable document.