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Security Information

Junior Officers' Committee

Final Report

on

Reasons for Low Morale Among Junior Officers

and

Recommended Courses of Action

9 November 1953

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9 November 1953

TO : The Inspector General

FROM : Junior Officers' Committee

SUBJECT: Final Committee Report:

Reasons for Low Morale Among Junior Officers and Recommended Courses of Action

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INTRODUCTION

This Committee has performed its task with a certain sense of diffidence--fully conscious of the momentousness of the problem facing the Agency and sincerely grateful for the opportunity to do what lay within its power to bring about a greater awareness of the seriousness of the situation and to suggest possible solutions. We offer our recommendations only as guides, but the very fact that we have a clear impression of personnel abuses may also mean that we have been in a position to sense general directions toward solutions.

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The Committee has tried to present only those general problems and specific cases which constitute legitimate indictments of the Agency's personnel procedures. The facts speak for themselves more dramatically than we can hope to do. We have merely tried to point out the weaknesses, for without this knowledge the Agency will never be in a position to foster the growth of a permanent, workable career system. Unless it can be demonstrated to today's junior officer that it will be possible to have a worthwhile, well-directed and secure career in the Agency, many of the best of them will be lost and the future effectiveness of the Agency may well be jeopardized.

We feel strongly that all people respect (and are happier in) sound, strong organization. We also feel that the principles of good personnel management are already well enough known to obviate the necessity of this Agency's proceeding through the full, tortuous and costly cycle of experimentation--the unique demands of a clandestine service notwithstanding.

In its investigations, the Committee has applied the following standards to the term "junior officers:" all men and women having grades GS-7 to GS-12 and, roughly, under 35 years of age.

The Committee wishes to express its gratitude for the interest shown and the courtesy and cooperation received from all quarters. It urgently hopes that, whether or not in the manner suggested in its recommendations, strong steps will soon be taken to remedy a rapidly deteriorating situation.

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I - STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

A. Problem

1. To investigate the personnel problems which appear to have contributed to the dissatisfaction of a large number of junior officers having career potential for the Agency; and to recommend means by which such problems may be resolved.

B. Procedural Matters

2. The Committee first examined existing personnel and career service policy and machinery--as a base from which to pursue its investigation of current practices and complaints.

3. In trying to determine the exact nature of the problems facing junior officers, the Committee, working under a limited time factor, tried to assess the opinions of a sizeable group of junior officers from each of the Agency's five major components, with emphasis, of course, on those elements suffering real complaints. From the questionnaires and over 200 personal interviews that ensued, definite trends of opinion were established and from them were compiled the categories of problems treated in Part II, Discussion. A collection of Case Histories (Appendix A) and intelligent individual comments (Part II) added strong evidence to the trends established initially.

4. The Committee has prepared statistical graphs (Appendix C) of the results of its interviews for the convenience of the reader. The graphs do not purport to embody representative samplings of Agency-wide opinion but do claim to reflect the opinions of the 115 people polled throughout the Agency.

5. We feel that resignations are not the only vital part of the total picture and, although turnover for GS-7 --12's is only a small percent higher than other categories (see Appendix E), concern should be for the continuing discontent, the sense of vague insecurity and lack of direction which impairs the efficiency of junior officers and undermines their sense of dedication. Such factors cannot be represented on graphs.

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II - DISCUSSION

6. The problem of low morale among junior officers which this Committee was asked to investigate obviously has several facets. In its initial investigations, the Committee discovered that the itemized topics discussed below were those that were commented upon most often. In addition to interviewing junior and senior personnel in various components of the Agency, an attempt was made to gather statistical evidence from junior officers regarding the general criticisms. (See Appendix D.) Even where less than 50 percent indicate dissatisfaction regarding a particular subject, the Committee feels that the problem is a serious one. If one-fifth of the junior officers polled are dissatisfied with internal training policies or with any internal policy, it appears to the Committee that those policies need investigation and possible revision or activation; certainly if approximately three-quarters or more indicate dissatisfaction (as was the case regarding efficient use of personnel, rotation and re-assignment opportunities, the career system), some immediate action would appear to be necessary. The major problems which evolved from the Committee's investigation are as follows:

(NOTE: In many cases the Committee was unable to determine the validity of the individual comments quoted in the following sections. No comments were omitted on this basis, however, since the Committee feels that if they reveal misconceptions - and some certainly do - they may also reflect another Agency problem; the inadequate lateral flow of information concerning Agency policies and practices.)

A. Recruitment and Placement

7. The Committee feels that the question of personnel recruitment and placement is the most important step in getting new employees of CIA off on the right foot. Of the 115 personnel queried by our Committee, 67 felt that the recruitment and placement techniques were inadequate; 38 felt they were adequate; 10 did not feel qualified to express an opinion.

The major complaints resolve themselves into four categories:

False Impressions and Promises Given by the Personnel Interviewer or the Prospective Employer Interviewing Job Applicants:

"The completely false impression given the prospective employee by the recruiter (e.g., you are going overseas immediately) has been the cause of most of the dissatisfaction and loss of morale."

8. The comment quoted above is representative of those received on this subject. It is obvious that personnel responsible for hiring well-qualified individuals must have sufficient inducements to offer prospective employees. However, when the promises and inducements so offered fail to materialize, they boomerang badly. Lowered morale and a mistrust of those in authority result. Some type of control must be exercised to discourage such practices.

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9. The Committee recommends that administrative disciplinary measures be taken against employees engaging in such practices.

Over-restriction of Information on Positions:

"More information could have been revealed to the recruit without losing security. Many individuals could have been able to accept or reject a job without later disillusionment and resignation."

10. The comment quoted above is typical of those made on this subject. The fact that insufficient information concerning the specific duties and responsibilities of the position was made available to the prospective employee made it difficult for him to evaluate the job in terms of his own interests and capabilities. Consequently, when he entered on duty he often found that the duties and responsibilities of his position were quite different from his "pre-employment" conception of them. The result was usually evidenced by dissatisfaction or eventual resignation.

11. If recruiting and placement officers were afforded greater latitude in discussing the specific requirements of positions with prospective employees, this problem might be alleviated.

12. It is believed that considerably more information could be made available to prospective employees for many covert, semi-covert, and overt positions. Particularly sensitive covert positions would be excepted from this policy.

Over-emphasis on Recruitment of Highly Educated and Trained Individuals for Jobs at Lower Levels:

"The Agency went overboard in hiring college graduates as employees and then couldn't find suitable slots for them so that many were shoved into 'temporary' positions as typists, messengers, etc. Those people are left in these 'temporary' slots until they complain loud enough and get the reputation of being troublemakers or until they quit in disgust."

13. The policy of getting the best educated and trained personnel for a job is commendable. However, when it is applied to GS-3 and GS-4 filing and messenger positions with those functions only, then the policy is being carried too far. The effectiveness of the present idealistic policy lies in the ability to recognize greater capabilities in our junior employees and allow them to move ahead. A purely low level position in which an employee has no opportunity to demonstrate his capacity for increased responsibility does not meet this criterion.

14. The Committee feels that college graduates should not be hired for jobs requiring relatively less skill than professional positions.

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Non-utilization of Qualifications

".....was specifically recruited to work on the /x/ Desk because of ..... background and language ability. Shortly after completing training, ...was sent to an opposite section of the world .... now back in ZI without a job." (Subject resigned after /x/ Desk reneged on their earlier promise.)

15. The comment quoted above represents a typical criticism regarding the non-or mis-use of qualifications. Qualifications which the operating office supposedly requires often are not utilized when the applicant enters on his actual job assignment. The non or mis-use of a particular skill can and often does lead to dissatisfaction and low morale.

16. The Committee suggests that the Personnel Office in conjunction with the area and division personnel officers attempt to identify over a period of time those positions or types of positions which are "problem" positions from the standpoint of resignations or requests for transfers in which non-utilization of qualifications is the primary factor involved. If the career service machinery proposed elsewhere in this study is adopted, the role of the proposed boards in this connection would be apparent.

17. Once identified, these positions should be carefully reviewed to determine what qualifications have been requested by the operating office and what qualifications are consistently not utilized. Necessary revisions in the qualifications listed in recruitment requests for those positions could then be made.

18. Certain information which has come to the attention of this Committee, leads us to believe that considerable effort has been made to correct the problems mentioned above. However, the Committee feels that the Agency needs to devote more attention toward further improvement in these areas.

(NOTE: See Appendix A, Case nos. 2, 4, 6, 10, 11 and 13.)

B. Rotation and Reassignment

19. One of the gravest problems affecting the morale of the Junior Officers is the lack of an effectively operating rotation and reassignment system. Of the 115 individuals polled, 17 indicated that the present system was adequate, 24 did not feel qualified to express an opinion, and 74 thought the system inadequate.

20. Dozens of documented cases indicate that there is almost no realistic planning for systematic rotation between field and headquarters or even within headquarters components. This particular flaw in the Agency's personnel procedures has been the breeding ground of many types of complaints - all of them legitimate and many of them so extreme that this committee feels the incidence of resignations might justifiably have been much higher.

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21. Without effective and well-coordinated rotation: People become stultified and frustrated in relatively onerous jobs which they were told they would have to fill for a specified period, long past; neither the Agency nor the individual profits from that breadth of experience which, alone, can create mature leaders for the future; time, money and - eventually - people are lost among the hundreds of officers who after returning from creditable overseas tours, have to wander the corridors for months searching for a job that will give them some sense of belonging or of purpose. Naturally, these people have pride, they have talent which must be exploited and they have energies which must be expended. Unfortunately, under the conditions which obtain at present, it is usually those most heavily endowed along these lines that resign first.

22. In some cases the Office of Personnel and the existing Career Service Boards may have been hampered by lack of information concerning anticipated vacancies and personnel due for rotation. But the central fact is that - even armed with such information - the existing machinery is not thorough enough, existing responsibility not clearly delineated enough and existing authority not competent enough to provide and enforce a satisfactory, long-range rotation and reassignment program.

23. There are scores of cases of young men and women returning from overseas and searching for jobs or sitting idle for as long as eight months, receiving almost no guidance, and then - out of desperation - accepting the first position which they are fortunate enough to find. Since, under these conditions, the principle of 'job compatability' is often not weighed at all, continued low morale is practically inevitable. It may sound irresponsibly drastic, but there are many indications that, insofar as it is used at all, the most common intent of rotation is to get rid of some 'undesirable' rather than to further individual careers.

24. In this Agency, because of the security factor which restricts the individuals knowledge about job-types and career opportunities, a Career Service System must be able to assume a much greater share of the responsibility for ensuring that the most appropriate association possible is made between the job and the individual. Now, however, the matter is left largely to chance and to kndividual initiative. The great majority of the people who are jobless now are quick to admit that the Agency, by its very nature, is in a peculiarly difficult position. But they protest that their cases would not be so hard to bear if they only felt that realistic steps were being taken to deal with the problem.

25. When faced with uncertainty and delay in reassignment, many individuals feel they are not wanted and become totally disaffected. They cannot be expected to have many feelings of loyalty for an organization that has not demonstrated any continuing interest or ability to assist in the development of their careers.

(See Appendix A, Case nos. 5, 6, 7, 9 and 11.)

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C. Career System

26. It became immediately apparent when interviewing personnel regarding the CIA Career Service Program that there were two clear-cut areas of criticism: (a) Lack of communication regarding the program; (b) lack of an active authoritative system. Some said "Career Program - What is it?" with sincerity, some with irony. Conversations with senior, as well as junior, officers indicated that many of them, including some Office Career Board members, did not know how much of the Career Program was fact and how much was paper theory. Without exception, those familiar with the Program felt that it needed to have clear-cut channels of responsibility delineated to ensure that individual programs could be realized.

27. Of the 112 individuals who expressed an opinion, 22 considered the existing program adequate; 66 considered it inadequate; and 24 indicated that the adequacy or inadequacy of this Program did not apply to them. The fact that these 24 thought the question inapplicable appears to the Committee to be almost as strong criticism as if they had said "inadequate", since all were career employees, by existing definition.

28. The following samples represent verbatim some of the comments made regarding the Career Program:

a. "I never heard of a career system in the Agency. This should be given more publicity among the personnel, and the qualified people should be encouraged to remain with the Agency."

b. "In the course of five years with the Agency, I have never been approached by any individual concerned with career service."

c. "I have found the career system non-existent for all practical purposes. It fulfills few of its functions as defined by the regulations."

d. "There seems to be more planning and not enough action as regards the career program. It is felt that the information about the Agency's program is not widely enough circulated and that the place of the individual in this program is spelled out in insufficient detail."

29. Most of the junior officers who indicated dissatisfaction stated that a functioning, authoritative career system could dispell much of the existing low morale; several indicated that if such a program were activated and if opportunities involved in it were clarified, they would reconsider their decisions to resign. To quote Charles McCormick - a man who has devoted considerable time to career development in his Multiple Management plan:

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"To the young man, opportunity is an even more significant factor of human nature than security. He wants to know what his chances are to advance if he does his work well, and what the possibilities are of increasing his income and his position as he gains in experience and skill... Particularly for the creative and ambitious type of worker, the question of opportunity and future potential may even surpass the question of hourly pay or weekly salary..."

(NOTE: See Appendix A, Case nos. 2, 5, 8, 9, 10 and 11)

D. Supervision

30. The Committee feels that the problem of inadequate supervision cannot be over-emphasized, in that supervision immediately affects almost every other aspect of an employee's career: training, rotation and reassignment, the utilization of time and career potential - as well as prestige and morale questions.

31. Out of the 115 polled, 62 judged supervision 'inadequate', 43 'adequate' and 10 'not applicable'. Polls on related problem areas produced the following figures:

	Adequate	Inadequate	Not Applicable
Delegation of Responsibility	38	60	17
Efficient use of Time	52	47	14
Efficient use of Personnel	25	79	11
Job commensurate with ability	52	35	27

32. Of the comments submitted to support votes of 'inadequate' on the question of Supervision, the majority reaction reflected an absence of any clear-cut policy of career supervision, due primarily to insufficient direct contact and rapport between supervisor and junior employee. Supervision itself was interpreted to embrace the supervisor's advisory and directive capacities, his administrative function, and his role in orienting those under him to the larger effort and aims toward which the junior employee is expected to direct his own personal effort.

33. The reason most often provided for inadequate supervision was "absence of clear channels of responsibility". One comment, for instance, stated: "No one is ever held directly responsible. Supervision is not necessary, therefore, because there is no responsibility."

34. The separate poll covering Delegation of Responsibility produced mainly criticism of the confusion and misdirection in delegating responsibility. Comments also remarked upon the incongruity which forces the junior officer, by the simple evasion of responsibility on the appropriate higher level, to assume responsibilities -- which he is clearly not authorized to assume. A constructive comment, in partial answer to his problem, stated: "An employee should receive a specific statement of his duties from his superior, and this delegation should be his alone, with all the responsibility for the job on him."

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35. The following quotes raise a second major consideration - that of the supervisor's qualifications to hold a supervisory position and his awareness of what comprises the effective supervisory role:

> "Supervision is spasmodic, inconsistent and frequently consists of interference on the part of improperly briefed supervisors."

> "Constantly observe poor supervision, from top down, with following factors most noticeable: poor communication, lack of training in executive responsibilities (i.e. lack of knowledge of good management practises), ignorance of "human relations" factors in handling of personnel,...."

36. The morale questions contingent upon poor supervision are mainly three-fold: (a) a consciousness of apathy, emanating from the non-execution of the proper supervisory role; (b) frustration of talent and capabilities in insufficient or misdirected delegation of responsibility, and (c) the feeling of confusion and purposelessness arising from the employee's not being made aware of where he fits into his unit, or of what are his specific duties. This situation is further aggravated by the lack of clear-cut channels of responsibility and finally, by the lack of an orientation policy which would clearly relate his smaller personal effort to the larger effort of his unit.

37. The Committee urges, in this connection, that serious consideration be given to the institution of a compulsory training program for supervisors on all levels. In order that the success of this program be realized, it is strongly recommended that it have backing throughout the whole chain of command, and that inefficient supervisors either be removed from their positions or be directed to take supervisory training. XX

(NOTE: See Appendix A, Case nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12 and 13)

E. Pay and Promotion

38. The poll revealed that about two-thirds (65) of those persons commenting on Pay said that their pay was adequate, 37 felt it was inadequate, while 12 had no comment. Regarding Promotion Opportunities, 48 said adequate, 48 said inadequate and 18 indicated not applicable.

39. Although the subjects of Pay and Promotion Opportunities were separated for purposes of canvassing, they are however, closely related from the viewpoint of the career-minded employee. i.e." Pay is ...a result of...promotion policy." Throughout the answers given on the questions of Pay and Promotion, regardless of adequacy or inadequacy, there is a note of similarity which ultimately rests on the word POLICY. If there is a policy per se, very little, if anything is known about it. Consequently, the individual concludes (whether he is right or wrong makes little difference as long as he believes it) that promotions ultimately lie directly in the hands of his immediate supervisor. Hence, he will be promoted or not

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promoted insofar as he "gets along with the boss". The resulting tendencies in such a situation are obvious. There will be a deficiency of proper criticism, objective presentation, initiative, resourcefulness and self-respect resulting from a lack or the appearance of a lack of a fixed, publicized, promotion policy.

40. The following selected quotations represent a cross-section of the various comments on inadequacies;

a. "...I entered for duty at a ...higher grade than those with the same background who had entered for the same position the previous year. A year later, another group with the same background entered at a still higher grade. This hardly gives any consideration for...those who have been employed in the same position the longest."

b. "Pay is inadequate as a result of conflicting directives on promotion policy."

c. "Pay is inadequate because there is a tendency to keep good personnel in the same job as long as they can take it--as long as they will stay in it."

d. "The salary of a GS-9 is inadequate to support a man and his wife in Washington at anything better than a sacrifice level, and still worse - he can only foresee that his family responsibilities will continue to outstrip his financial advancement in the course of a normally successful career."

e. "Because there is no single board to initiate promotions, equally qualified personnel have been promoted or failed to receive promotions due mainly to the interest of their supervisors."

f. "Young men (PMs) who went to the Far East in late 1951 or early 1952, received their promotions way in advance of those sent to Europe...even though the majority of them were the same age and had been given the same amount of responsibility."

g. "...I can think of only one female who has achieved the rank of section chief - and she keeps the files for a branch."

h. "I was recommended for promotion twice, both times in the field. On the first occasion, in May 1952, after being presented to the Field Promotion Board in June..., it was deferred until September....I was informed at the time that because a new man was taking charge of the Branch...for which I was working that it was believed he should initiate promotion requests. In November, the new Chief recommended me for promotion. Ht was considered and approved and forwarded to Washington by the Field Promotion Board in December.

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"In January, 1953, I was informed that promotions were frozen pending approval of the new T/O. Later in January I was informed that only persons having slots in the Field T/O could be promoted. Shortly thereafter I was notified that I was on the surplus list, slated to return PCS to Washington before completion of my two-year...tour. When assigned to my current job in late May I was told that I would have to work at it for at least three months before I could be considered for promotion here at Headquarters. Since then there have been no concrete developments promotion-wise for me." (Nov.'53)

(NOTE: See Appendix A, Case nos. 9 and 12)

F. Security

41. The poll taken on Security revealed that 52 persons felt that it was adequate, 33 that it was inadequate, while 10 stated "not applicable". The fact that 43 persons stated that Security was inadequate or "not applicable" is not reassuring in an activity of the sensitivity of this Agency where security can only be as strong as its least security-minded individual.

42. For purposes of clarification the following report has been divided into four sections; (a) Domestic Individual Cover, (b) Overseas Individual Cover, (c) Overseas Installation Cover, (d) Domestic Security. The following selected quotations represent a cross-section of the various comments on inadequacies:

a. Domestic Individual Cover
   (1) "Since my return I have lacked a good cover story..."
   (2) "It is difficult to buy property, establish credit..." (without an adequate cover story)

b. Overseas Individual Cover
   (1) "Open association with the agency in Washington both physically and by statement does not mean you can go to the field and be automatically disassociated."
   (2) "The cover...of those in sensitive spots overseas has been in some cases so ridiculous as to be transparent. A man suddenly announces he is 4F and goes to X area with a mysterious publication firm. He is in perfect health, and is unable to give any particulars on the overt activities of this firm."

c. Overseas Installation Cover
   (1) "In the Fall of 1952, the (installation area was completely blown to the public by the X newspapers and radios and was picked up by various news services.... As early as the previous winter, the case officers reported to their superiors on the extremely bad security in the area."

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(2) "The American military personnel delegated to assist in the training had no concept of security."
(3) "...due to the lack of help and supervision, the trainees frequently slipped into the town for various illicit purposes."

d. Domestic Security Practices
(1) "The extremely loose dissemination of published intelligence information is a definite security hazard, i.e., why is it that information from a covert or semi-covert sources must be sent to all IAC agencies...as a 'courtesy'."
(2) "Information classified 'Secret' is being treated as casually as if it had been published in the newspaper."
(3) "Office talk at outside gatherings in the presence of unauthorized persons...is still too rampant."

43. The poll revealed a consensus of opinion that insufficient attention has been paid to the field of Security in general and Cover in particular throughout the Agency.

G. Training

44. Of the 106 answering the question on "training," 54 said it was adequate, 31 inadequate, and 21 felt that it did not apply. Pertinent comments usually involved constructive criticism, and several recognized OTR's steady progress during the last few years and its awareness of the difficult tasks it faces.

45. One of the most important observations made in the interviews was the feeling that the individual, his supervisors, and the Office of Training are not always sufficiently clear as to the specific purpose for which the individual is being trained. When the concrete objective is not clear to any one of these three, the effectiveness of the training is seriously reduced, because much of the training may then be, or seem to be, superfluous.

46. Several of the comments illustrate this point:

a. "Training has been too spotty and in many cases quite unrelated to the subject's present assignment. Training would have been more valuable if the individual was informed specifically why he was taking it."

b. "Immediate Supervision and (those) above have no awareness (of what training is required)."

c. "I have seen many cases in the field where a person was sent to do a job for which he was not trained..."

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47. If the supervisors would explain clearly to both the individual and the Office of Training exactly why their man was to be trained, the benefits of such training would increase sharply. Also, those teaching the courses might spend a little more time helping the student understand why he is there so that he can relate specific facts and lectures to the over-all aim.

48. It was also pointed out that if Training was clearer as to the specific job the student was to fill, its final evaluation of the student's ability would be more accurate. For instance, certain jobs require a high degree of emotional stability, regarding which one of those interviewed commented:

a. "If testing is to be continued, testing for the measurement of the emotional stability and discretion and maturity would benefit the Agency. Recent tragedies have indicated a lack of the above, or extremely poor working conditions, or both." ?

49. Language training also received a few comments. Several people, including one of the language teachers, felt that a great deal of the Agency's time, money, and effort, has been wasted in superficial language training. Too often there is no follow up to introductory courses except self-study which is usually insufficient to maintain a student's proficiency, let alone increase it. If advanced courses in Russian, for instance, were offered to the most outstanding students in the introductory classes, this would serve as an extra incentive for hard work and would not mean that most of the students' or teachers' time was totally wasted. The Agency might offer to pay for advanced night classes for the best students in these introductory courses, if they were unable to continue during working hours.

50. Two persons commented on the difficulty many have in leaving their desks for three to four weeks at a time - either from their supervisor's point of view or from their own reluctance to let work pile up. Their suggested solutions are perhaps less useful than their criticism, but the problem itself remains a serious one:

a. "Proper training which would directly benefit an employee would be helpful. However, as most training courses are of a minimum of three weeks, the employee is not benefited in the least, as he returns to his HQ job to find his work undone and in a complete mess. A more constructive training course could perhaps be to train the employee on a daily basis of from two to four hours, thereby allowing him to keep his HQ work current and also benefit from specific training." ?

b. "I think at least some training involves the problem of T.O. I have had difficulty sending in an application for a long term training course because my supervisor feels that as long as two appear on his T.O., his superiors expect so much work done. If I am gone for a prolonged period, then he feels his record is impaired. If this is the state of affairs, then it would be logical to transfer people in training from the office T.O. to a training T.O."

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H. Efficient Use of Monies

51. Many young men throughout the Agency have become thoroughly discouraged by the lavish expenditures of money, principally in the field of operations. This fact was reflected in interviews, the poll's comments and the poll itself. Of the 114 polled, 31 answered adequate, 32 inadequate, and 51 not applicable.

52. Most of the opinions expressed by experienced young case officers focus the reason for this waste of operational monies on the inadequate prior planning and supervision that went into many of the less productive projects. This is especially true of many of the training-type operations where agents were recruited, trained and handled at great expense, especially in Europe, with practically no productive return on the investment. In fact, many of these projects were outright failures in which the time and effort of the individuals concerned, as well as the money involved, were wasted.

53. Large amounts are needlessly spent on equipment and material. One comment mentioned the overabundance and improper use of Agency vehicles in overseas areas. The lack of controlled distribution of money and how it is spent seems to be the sharpest criticisms of this important problem. One comment ran: "Hardly a word need be said, when it is spent, it's frequently used as though the source were unlimited."

54. Some of the other verbatim comments were:

a. "A shocking amount of money has been available to inexperienced people who have not gotten a fair return for our dollar. Under the guise of security and prestige and lack of feeling for the use of other people's money there has been waste and misapplication."

b. "...when questioned about the spending of several thousands of dollars, the supervisor...replied that he couldn't understand why he was concerned --that the Government had the money and as long as 'Uncle Sam' was paying the bills, he didn't care."

c. "I have heard it said: 'Such and such an agent hasn't produced too well. Let's double his salary as an inducement for better production.' There seems to be a general unwillingness to eliminate marginal or sub-marginal projects."

d. "They are willing to spend several times as much money for an operation which, if they were running it out of personal funds, could be accomplished much more economically."

e. "...To protect jobs and prestige... Headquarters mission (in country X) is to whitewash the operational budget...with, to say the least, exaggerated statements."

f. "Until everyone - not only Finance - feels a need for the proper accounting and use of money, there will continue to be chaos in that department."

(NOTE: See Appendix A, case nos. 8 and 12)

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I. MILITARY CREDIT

55. This problem primarily affects Para-Military personnel, certain reserve officers and draft-age Agency employees who have not received military training.

56. The committee feels that military credit should be given to those employees who have had Agency experience comparable to military service. This is especially true of young men, who, after completing a six month PM course, were led to believe military credit would be forthcoming and then departed for an overseas tour. If they were honestly told at the outset that they would not receive military credit, the problem wouldn't exist today, for most of them would have first gone into the service. Many of these men were either involved in hazardous duty or served in uniform or both.

57. On returning home, they must either resign to enter the service or apply for one of the Agency military credit programs which involve from six months to two years time. In addition, there appears to be no provision for awarding reserve officers credit while they are engaged in PM or other Agency activities while overseas.

16 weeks program

58. Resignations among the PM's recruited during a period of expansion of the several PM-type activities and sold a strong bill of goods is alarming. In the second class, there are approximately three left out of 24. In the ~~third~~ fourth class, approximately 23 are left out of 47. Of the 95 who were polled, 13 said the present system was adequate, 15 inadequate, and 64 indicated that the subject was inapplicable.

(NOTE: See cases No. 8 and 10)

J. MEDICAL BENEFITS

59. This particular problem has not had widespread application, hence the poll figures do not appear on the surface to have much

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to have much significance. The results obtained were: adequate - 23; inadequate - 15; not applicable - 28. However, those individuals who were knowledgeable on the subject had strong feelings. It was generally felt by those who had either received injuries or contracted illness in the line of duty or who knew individuals who had, that the existing policy is inadequate. Since there is no precedent for handling the various medical problems, each case is handled as something new, as a "flap" -- with consequent delays, undefined responsibility for action and hardship to the individual. And when compensation is awarded it is often inadequate -- particularly if disability is involved. Some comments received are included here verbatim:

a. "Immediate consideration should be given to the establishment of a disability compensation program similar or identical to that employed by the military services. This would greatly improve the morale of personnel engaged in hazardous duty. While it is realized that such a program will probably require legislation, the action should be initiated."

b. "Little is known of the Agency's policy and for practices in this regard (i.e., medical compensation). My experience has been that overseas an individual is provided with free medical care, but if his health was seriously impaired as a result of 'on the job performance' it is not known what compensation would be provided by the Agency."

c. "As of this date men in the field in hazardous assignments cannot obtain either Agency Insurance or hospitalization coverage unless they are under official cover."

(NOTE: See Appendix A, case No. 17)

K. INTANGIBLES

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K. INTANGIBLES

60. In the following category, the Committee attempted to discover the general feeling regarding the more intangible areas specified by some as problem areas. This problem was not important to the majority, but the fact that approximately 1/6 of those polled indicated some dissatisfaction is perhaps significant. Results obtained:

Question	Adequate	Inadequate	Not Applicable	Total
Influence Commensurate with Job	65	18	27	108

61. The evidenced dissatisfaction is worth consideration for it often involves those individuals who appear to be the most capable--those who could succeed in a variety of careers and who are tempted to go outside of Government service where higher salaries and greater prestige are available. It was suggested that to a greater degree the prestige needs of an individual could be determined in the original assessment and those who evidenced an exaggerated need should not be considered for employment, or, should only be hired on a contractual basis.

62. Also, several people mentioned that the failure to sufficiently point up CIA's mission and its prestige within Government circles contributes to a sense of isolation, low evaluation of the Agency and uncertain sense of purpose. Many people commented on their lack of respect for the Agency because no one has taken the trouble to explain the Agency's mission and how the individual's work contributes. A clearer stronger sense of mission could outweigh some of the attractions of other careers, such as the financial attraction of business, if more emphasis were placed upon it.

(NOTE: See Appendix A, cases No. 1 and 16)

L. SPECIAL, JUNIOR

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L. SPECIAL, JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINEE PROGRAM

63. The opinions on the JOT program were not sought in the poll for it has limited application, but it was thought worthy of comment since, contrary to present opinion, a ? number of the JOT personnel are dissatisfied. There is still the feeling of resistance to the program by other personnel in the Agency, but this fact is not responsible for the specific complaints of the JOTs themselves. Most of their comments indicate a sense of frustration stemming from inadequate supervision. Incompetent or inexperienced supervisors are held responsible for the inefficient use of personnel, for time, money, and effort waste, and the JOT appears to be most outspoken in his intolerance of this inefficiency.

64. Next in major importance is their criticism of the career service program. There is little or no faith in the present system because of a lack of information regarding opportunities and the lack of an authoritative command chain to see that the various facets of the program are in fact functioning.

> "If The program is still in the paper stage, say so; avoid the verbiage devoted to the chimeras of long-range training, rotation, reassignment, etc. until they are possible."

65. It was also suggested that the Agency cease recruitment of JOT's from among young college men without intelligence experience. It was further recommended that the Agency utilize the talent of those who have demonstrated over a period of time the ability for intelligence work necessary in this type of career program.

66. All of the comments in the preceding section on Training also were applied to the JOT program and therefore will not be repeated here.

(NOTE: See Appendix A, cases No. 4, 14, 15)

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III. RECOMMENDATIONS

General - Career Service Program

67. The Committee feels that existing policy needs modification and improvement in some respects and that more thorough and clearly defined career service machinery must be devised to implement a consistent, authoritative program - springing from clearly delineated responsibilities and based on the principle of mandatory assignments. It is the opinion of the Committee that a considerable portion of many of the problems cited in this study could be substantially eased by an effectively operating Career Service system and that most of the remainder could be overcome by an enforced program of supervisory or managerial training, designed to instill an awareness of and respect for fundamental principles of good personnel management.

68. The Committee further feels that the "Career Service" designation in the Agency should be considered an accolade to be sought after and to be obtainable by all personnel, regardless of job category or component - with the reservations indicated below. We also believe that the full implications, prerogatives and responsibilities inherent in such a designation should be fully understood by all personnel, with instructions on the subject given in indoctrination courses as well as in periodic staff, office or division briefings. Recommended reservations concerning eligibility in the program are:

a. future applicants must be made to serve a two-year probationary term;

b. those who desire to attain 'career' status may so indicate upon entering on duty or at any later date;

c. those people who do not desire 'career' status or who have joined the Agency with the understanding that they are to perform special administrative, scientific or other functions for a limited tour would be carried on an 'auxiliary' status.

69. As many of these latter as possible should be 'contractual' personnel and would, of course, enjoy the right to apply for 'career' status at any time. Meanwhile, the rights and implications of their 'auxiliary' status should also be specified and thoroughly disseminated. Those who had applied for career status and who, after at least two years, were considered to be less than adequate for the post would have it clearly indicated to them that their future with the Agency could not be considered secure and would be encouraged to resign. Ultimately, the goal would be to have all personnel, except those on a 'contractual' or 'auxiliary' basis, within the career service.

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70. In talking with Junior and Senior Officers, the Committee repeatedly ran into the concept (which it endorses) that the 'career designation' system as presently employed is unrealistic and unnecessarily imposes restrictions on lateral movement of personnel. The Committee recommends, for instance, that in the DD/P area a primary career designation of Clandestine Services (CS) be given all personnel - with secondary designations of PM, PP, FI, etc., for administrative convenience. This procedure would facilitate the rotation system which the Committee recommends be adopted and implemented by the Career Service machinery recommended below.

Career Service Machinery

A. Organization (see Appendix C)

71. The Committee recommends that a CIA Career Service Board, meeting at the direction of a permanent chairman appointed by the DCI as head of the Career Service System, be established and be designated as the DCI's executive agent in all matters pertaining to career service policy, programming, implementation, and review. The primary - and, ideally, the sole - duty of these and other officers to be specified herein would be that of discharging the responsibility clearly imposed upon them by the DCI to ensure that an effective career system be implemented throughout the Agency.

72. In addition to the Chairman, the Board should be composed of: The Career Service Chiefs (see below) of the DD/P, DD/I, DD/A ~~and Office of Training~~ (all of whom would have full representation and voting powers in all matters coming before the Board); the Career Service Chief for OTR and AD/COMMO (who would have full representation at all time, but voting powers only in matters of concern to OTR and COMMO); and non-voting advisors representing the AD/Personnel and the Director of Training.

73. The Career Service Chiefs mentioned in Par. 72, supra, would be the permanent chiefs of the Career Service Boards (CSBs) in their respective components. In order not to violate the normal chain of command, these Career Service Chiefs should be appointed by the mutual agreement of the Chairman of the CIA/CSB and the Deputy (or Assistant) Directors of the components concerned. They would be designated as the executive agent of their Deputy (or Assistant) Director for all matters pertaining to career service and would act for him in all such matters, but they would be responsive (in such matters) to the policy direction of the Chairman of the CIA/CSB in his capacity as executive agent of the DCI. This seeming dichotomy need not, in practice, violate command prerogatives. Working parallels may be found in industry and other governmental agencies.

74. The component CSBs would be further composed of full time career service representatives from each of the subordinate offices or staffs of the component - who would probably be the chairman of the

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boards currently existing on those levels. For example, the DD/P CSB would be made up of: A Chairman (appointed by the DD/P and the CIA CSB Chairman); the Career Mangement Officers of the existing FI, PM, PP, TSS and ADMIN Boards. All members of the DD/P Board, to continue the example, would devote their full time to matters of concern to the Board and should be located within one office. (NOTE: The Committee feels strongly that, as an immediate measure, the central location of the various existing Boards within each component would facilitate the working of the machinery that now exists.)

75. Retention of the Boards now operating on the Staff or Office level of the various components would be a matter to be decided by the Staff or Office concerned. The Committee feels that they should be retained and it should be pointed out that, if they are, the officers constituting the Boards (other than the Career Management Officers) should be rotated as often as is feasible - in order to provide a maximum number of supervisors with experience in dealing with the policies, personnel problems and other considerations with which the Boards deal. Such a device would be a useful adjunct to the supervisor training recommended elsewhere in this study.

B. Functions

76. The primary function of the CIA/CSB would be to evolve, supervise and be responsible for an adequate Agency-wide Career Service System based on mandatory assignments. The Committee wishes to make it clear that it feels the principle of mandatory assignment is a tool essential for the effective, long-range planning and guidance to be performed by the machinery recommended herein. Once recognized by all personnel as a basic power residing in the Agency, much of the confusion rampant now (and causing so much discontent) should evaporate. In practice, however, the Committee does not mean to imply that it will be a power exercised indiscriminately throughout the Agency. For instance, many officers (particularly those specializing in research, science, etc.) may never be affected by mandatory rotation, but it will be a residual authority which the CSBs may exercise (with restraint dictated by common sense) in order to further the career of the individual and to maximize his total worth to the Agency.

77. The CIA/CSB would process all assignments involving transfers between any of the Agency's major components (DD/P, DD/I, DD/A, OTR, and COMMO). In practice, it might ultimately be decided that the CIA/CSB would pass upon only such transfers involving officers of grades (e.g.) GS-12 and higher, with the component Boards processing those below GS-12.

78. The CIA/CSB would retain 'action responsibility for the implementation of an adequate information and education program on all matters dealing with career service, as well as on other matters touching upon the general morale, sense of purpose and mission, of Agency personnel as a whole. For example, the CIA/CSB might sponsor the publication of an Agency "Newsletter".

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79. The CIA/CSB would also adjudicate all career service matters which cannot be resolved within the component Boards.

80. Each component CSB would have the primary responsibility and authority for making itself fully cognizant of all the personnel and recruitment needs - both in the field and in headquarters - of the divisions, staffs and offices within its jurisdiction. Further, it would maintain files on all existing T/O vacancies, all personnel seeking reassignment, and all personnel for whom - in its judgment - rotation is overdue and would be beneficial. All requests to fill T/O vacancies and all requests for the initial recruitment of additional personnel would be first applied against the data contained in these files.

81. The component CSBs would be responsible for the implementation of the internal (within the component) mandatory rotation principle and for the recommendation to the CIA/CSB of all cases which call for intra-Agency rotations and transfers. In the case of rotation from the field, the component CSB would be notified six (6) months prior to the return of the assignee as to his background, field performance, preference for reassignment and the field's pertinent recommendations. The Board would then determine the individual's next assignment and so notify him before he leaves the field.

82. The component CSBs would also initiate action involving rotation of personnel to other government departments and agencies. Final authority in such matters would , however, rest with the CIA/CSB.

83. In connection with personnel returning from overseas, the component CSB would further have the responsibility for seeing that the individual is adequately received on his return to headquarters, that the division personnel officer and/or the Board, itself, is sufficiently cognizant of the individual's background, field performance and career desires to be able to give him a mature and realistic debriefing. If, because of a surplus of returning personnel due to operational circumstances, the Board has been unable to assign the man prior to his return and has been forced to place him in a temporary pool, he should be given a frank statement of the case during his debriefing and alternate means of interim employment (training, extra-T/O performance in under-staffed offices, etc.) should be suggested to him and arranged by the Board. The Board should also satisfy itself as to the adequacy of the 'cover story' given the individual on his return.

84. In acting upon all cases involving placement or reassignment, the component CSB should be guided by the general principles broadbly defined below (see 'General Principles') and its decisions in the form of mandatory assignment of personnel should be final - with the proviso that:

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a. The Offices of Training and of Personnel should have the rights of veto in cases involving inadequate training or medical security or personnel qualifications;

b. The individual's current supervisor may likewise, if he can present just cause reflecting the necessity for retaining the individual in his present position, exercise a right of appeal;

c. If the new supervisor cares to present to the Board in writing a statement of the reasons why the individual should not be assigned to the designated post, he may so exercise a right of appeal;

d. The assignee, providing he has a strong 'hardship' case or a very strong counter-proposal concerning the evolution of his career, may submit his case in writing to the Board and, thus, exercise a right of appeal.

e. All supervisors' appeals would be reviewed by the next higher authority to determine their suitability before submission to the Board. The individual would have the right of direct access to the Board, however he would have the privilege of personal presentation only upon the invitation of the Board and that procedure would be reserved for those individual appeal cases deserving serious consideration.

f. In practice, the exercise of appeals and/or technical vetoes would probably be kept to a minimum through the Boards' informal coordination of proposed actions.

85. The Boards shall encourage the supervisors in their area to attend such suitable 'supervisory refresher' or 'personnel management' courses as may be established. The Boards shall make it clear that part of their function is to assist and/or advise, on an informal basis, any supervisor ~~initiating such a request~~ concerning any specific or general problem. The Boards should, however, take pains to avoid giving the impression that they are in any way competent to, or desirous of, supplanting the role of the supervisor. To the contrary, they should do all in their power (in their official actions and papers, and in their attitudes) to put more emphasis on the importance of the supervisor's role and the extent of his responsibility.

86. Notwithstanding the principles expressed in para. 85, supra, the Boards should review and provide guidance on the promotion practices within their areas and on the thoroughness with which personnel training standards are met. They should be empowered to receive from the individual, through the normal command channels, requests for reassignment and for further training. Such requests, if deemed by the Board to be warranted, would be maintained in the files mentioned in para. 80, supra.

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87. Since all requests for initial recruitment would be channeled through the pertinent Board, the Boards should be in an ideal position to determine or suggest the extent to which (without violating security) the exact nature of the position may be revealed to the recruitment office in order that the task of recruitment may be more realistically performed.

88. Under the direction of the CIA/CSB, the individual Boards would take action to ensure that the educational and informational programs mentioned in para. 78, supra, are implemented in their areas.

General Principles

89. The Boards should in all their decisions be guided by the best interests of the Agency as a whole in fully developing its personnel. Within this context, they should consciously direct the development of each officer's career; and only insofar as it is consonant with the larger interest should they defer to the wishes of the individual.

90. Insofar as is possible and consistent with the larger interest, the Boards should implement the principles of mandatory assignment, intra-Agency transfers, and overseas rotation on a regular and non-discriminatory basis.

Junior Executive Inventory

91. The Committee is of the unanimous opinion that there should be some means of spotting Junior Officers who have demonstrated exceptional ability and who appear to have definite potential for future executive positions. In its survey, however, the Committee found that there would probably be almost universal distaste for any system which created a distinct 'privileged' group, the composition of which was generally known. The Committee feels, therefore, that a system which incorporated the machinery and technique of the present Executive Inventory, as well as some of the principles of the present JOT program, would be the most advisable.

92. The following are suggested general criteria which might be applied in determining eligibility for the proposed Inventory:

a. The individual must be on 'career' status (i.e., must have passed through the two-year probationary period) and must have been on that status for at least one year;

b. The individual, male or female, must be in the grades GS-9 through GS-12 and within the ages 25 through 38;

c. He (she) must meet certain standards concerning the breadth of job experience within the Agency, these standards to be established by each of the five major components;

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d. He (she) must meet established standards in regards to health, training evaluations, psychological assessments, adaptability, etc.;

e. He (she) must meet such other criteria as may be established by the CIA and/or component Career Service Boards.

93. The following are suggestions concerning the manner in which the proposed Inventory might be administered:

a. After establishing the machinery with which the program could be carried out with almost total anonymity (patterned after the existing Inventory) and determining the number to be included in the proposed inventory (perhaps the same number as in the present Inventory), the various components would come up with their quota under the direction of their respective Boards;

b. Each supervisor, having been thoroughly briefed as to the purpose of the program, would be asked to recommend two men for the program - men whose performance he had personally observed, though they need not be still under his supervision. It should be made clear to each supervisor that he does not have to recommend even one man, if he knows of none suitable for the program;

c. This process of selection would be carried out each year and the supervisors' recommendations would be forwarded to the component CSB where the final selection will be made and, if necessary, previously selected officers dropped from the list (see para. 94 below);

d. The machinery would be devised so that only the Chairman of each CSB would know the total list from his area and that would be forwarded to the CIA/CSB where only the Chairman, the DCI and the DDCI would have access to the entire list.

94. This program should be supplemented by an appropriate information program, designed to familiarize all personnel with the nature and intent of the program and to impress them with the facts that: only a handful of people in the Agency have access to the list; it does not necessarily create a privileged group since competition for a place on the list is a continuing process; and that anyone on the list can easily be 'bumped' if his performance is not consistent or if it doesn't maintain a rate of growth consistent with that of all other potential candidates.

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IV CONCLUSION

95. The Committee would like to point out, in conclusion, that - naturally - the Junior Officer morale picture is not all black. For every dissatisfied junior officer it would be possible to find several satisfied ones. But even if the picture is merely one of dingy grey, the situation is bad enough and the conditions which give rise to it might, if not corrected, infect any of the satisfied officers eventually. Indeed, some categoric problems - such as the treatment of junior officers returning from overseas - are bound to influence all who are touched by it.

96. Finally, it cannot be stressed enough that the harm accruing to the Agency from inept personnel practices mounts in geometric, not arithmetic progression. For every capable officer that the Agency loses through discontent or frustration, there may well be two or three more competent men (sharing the same educational, professional or social background) that the Agency will never have the opportunity to employ. For the word spreads - and distortion is incorporated - and the harm done may be irreparable. The fact is, moreover, judging from some of the cases the Committee has briefed in this report, that distortion would not always be necessary.

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Appendix A

INTERVIEWS AND CASE HISTORIES

(NOTE: On the following pages of this Appendix you will find general comments and/or case histories gleaned from the Committee's interviews with Junior Officers. They are numbered consecutively 1 through 17 and they have been referenced to - by number - at the conclusion of the discussion of each problem in the text.)

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INTERVIEW #1

Individuals interviewed in group: 3 males (JOT's) ages 25-28 with 28-36 months service in CIA. Female GS-5 with 7 months - college graduate doing filing. One male considering resignation. Group knew of 6 resignations pending. Strong criticism re lack of info re job. Denunciation of putting professional in clerical jobs. Strong feeling re promises not kept re rotation program. "If career system doesn't exist say so don't propagate false illusion." Violent discussion of waste of government funds and improper utilization of talent due to poor supervision. Group reiterated that grade and money were relatively unimportant to young career officers. Knowledge of opportunity is important if ability is demonstrated - ditto utilization of talent, knowledge of purpose, direction, and info. Feeling that working career program would dissipate many ills. Removal of mediocre or incompetent supervisors to non-supervisory positions essential.

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INTERVIEW #2

General Walter B. Smith, in one of his last conferences with staff members of CIA was asked a question, to which he replied, "Mediocrity is not to be tolerated in this Agency--," and went on to develop this theme in some detail. As is obvious to many, an ill-fitting sequel to this story is that the Agency is shot through with mediocrity and less. When the statement was made, it was construed to mean that some juggling of personnel, certainly not wholesale firing of them, would be done in order to assign that person to that job wherein the demands for excellence would not exceed the capabilities of the person assigned. In office X, to my knowledge, nothing has yet been done.

For myself, there has been a series of setbacks and disappointments working for this Agency which have brought me to the point of actively searching for another job, in or out of the Agency. Some of the reasons for my present pique are as follows:

Item: On arrival, was told would receive advancement automatically at end of six-month waiting period. This was a bald-faced lie; time was three times that long. Should never have been told such a thing.

Item: For the better part of a year I have been engaged in trying to write an intelligence report on an installation. Due to interference from above (DAD down to Branch Chief level) this report must be completely re-written; I will not be responsible for it as it stands.

Item: One of the reasons for hiring me, as I understand it, was be cause of a talent for generating ideas. I have been dutifully giving birth to ideas for two years and some, and have not yet received credit for one of them. Advice to superiors here; "Render unto Caesar--"

Item: Personnel Evaluation Reports are as brazen a method as has been seen for many a moon, for telling nice things about people while maintaining the tongue firmly in cheek. They are, in short, snares and delusions.

Item: There is general dissatisfaction in my division. One reason may be that the division has no stated purposes or mission. We do, however, turn out more papers than most of the rest of the divisions in the office put together. Another reason is that not one research unit has ever been initiated with a clear-cut intelligence objective in mind, in this division.

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Item: As far as the career program is concerned, what seems to be lacking is a common definition of "career" and one of "program". By my definitions there is no such beast. I have about as much chance of rotation as I would of winning against Ike in the last election. Among other things, I'd like a chance for advancement based upon and commensurate with known ability on my part—demonstrable ability.

Item: Is there any way of tactfully making a move when one's immediate supervisor is something less than brilliant? Especially since the Division Chief is excellent at his job, and a good man to work for? (Note: My immediate supervisor is a warm-hearted Christian and a likable, wonderful person; he just cannot administrate.)

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INTERVIEW #3

My gripe against the Agency is directed mainly toward poor Administrative and Operations policies.

Administrative (Personnel) policies are such that numbers of obviously disinterested - possibly incompetent - persons are placed in positions of some responsibility. By reason of their indifference and "pass the buck" attitude, they become a veritable bottleneck; consequently, the Agency is fast becoming a bureaucratic paper-mill. Regardless of the importance of the document, it is shuffled back and forth, written and rewritten, passed here and passed there - and so on ad infinitum. For fear of jeopardizing their position, the bottlenecks cringe from decisions or positive opinions - other than to substitute gobbledegook for English. In all it results in a mass of confusion and frustration. And resignations.

Operations policies are equally poor; unfortunately, much of the blame can be placed on the above-mentioned bottlenecks. For the most part, operations that I am connected with leave much to be desired. They are largely ineffectual and quite expensive. Some are directed against targets that are hardly logical -- let alone legitimate. Thus, to protect jobs and prestige, both here and in the field, Headquarters mission is to "whitewash" operational budget and programming justifications with, to say the least, exaggerated statements.

Eisenhower said, "An eight hour day for eight hours pay" (sic) -- what he means is: eight hours work for eight hours pay. As an operational Case Officer, my eight hours consists of filing, shuffling papers and running senseless errands. It amounts to an eight hour day - two years of them now - and eight hours pay -- but NOT the satisfaction of seeing a job well done. The pay is good, the hours are good and the future is impossible.

Result: I am resigning.

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INTERVIEW #4

A. Recruitment and initial job assignment;

Main criticism: no effort is made to acquaint the applicant with the nature of his probable employment; such phases as "reading and summarizing reports," "analyzing statistics," et. al. are not security breaches. The usual high grade applicant labors under the assumption that a contribution toward policy making and an opportunity for intellectual self-expression are potential concomitants of an Agency career. The J.O.T. Personnel heads are aware of this, as must be those interviewing other professional applicants - yet nothing is done to dispel this illusion.

B. Rotation and reassignment; and more A) initial placement.

The chronic failure of the J.O.T. program to maintain interested and informed supervision over the employee once he or she is past the initial B.I.C. training and has begun office work is total and abominable, making - in fact - a mockery of the grandiose plans, lengthy interviews and elaborate testing which preceded. In almost all instances with which I am familiar the first - and, perhaps, most important - job assignment was made (usually after a considerable period of complete inactivity and uselessness) on the bases of expediency, availability, limited liaison and contacts, or short-lived urgency. Experience with such recurrent ineptitude led J.O.T.'s to seek for themselves, wholly disregarding the pre-conceived channels, and to divorce themselves as quickly as possible from the nominal jurisdiction of OTR. Prior verbiage, devoted to the chimeras of "long-range training (F.L.A.B.)" "rotation," reassignment," etc., is suitably filed.

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INTERVIEW #5

(NOTE: This case history was given to the interviewer by a Colonel X, a career military officer with no ax to grind and whose only interest is to see that certain 'deplorably inefficient personnel practices' in the Agency be corrected. He has close personal knowledge of the case presented here, but spoke objectively and dispassionately in the presentation of it. A mature man, he was until recently senior case officer for a large project.)

Mr. X, 38 years of age, married and with two children, is a GS-9. Described as a very capable "operations-commo" man, he speaks four foreign languages. Originally, his motivation appeared to be of a very high order and he hoped to make a career in the Agency.

When the foreign project reached a stage that demanded termination and disposal of all assets and indigenous personnel, it was determined that the 8 or 10 most valuable staff personnel (those who had been key men in the operation) would be kept on the spot to carry out the termination and disposal. The balance of the staff (about 20 men) were to be returned to Washington immediately. Headquarters was notified of the impending return of all 30 men - with particulars on their field experience and their evaluations.

Mr. X was among those chosen to remain to help in the termination activities. The balance of the staff returned to Washington about two months prior to Mr. X and his colleagues. They immediately absorbed all available slots in the division and when Mr. X returned he was informed that there were no slots left.

Mr. X, after a period of home leave, has spent three months trying - totally on his own initiative - to find a job. He has, as yet, been unsuccessful. He has not been gainfully employed (from the point of view of the Agench) for one day since his return.

Colonel X commented that if effective career service machinery has been able to afford any sort of long-range coordination a position would (and should) have been held for Mr. X - rather than giving all available positions to less capable or less experienced men merely by virtue of the fact that they returned at an earlier date.

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Mr. X is seriously considering resignation. He can't stand idleness.

Lacking such machinery jobs will continue to be allocated on a short-range expediency basis - to the detriment of the individual and of the Agency as a whole. In view of the number of projects which may be terminated each year, and since the procedure of retaining the most indispensable men until the last moment is fairly universal, it would seem that this case is not as unique as it might - at first glace - appear to be.

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CASE HISTORY #6

Mr. X, who is married and has four children, is a GS-12. He has been with the Agency for about 39 months, 34 of which have been spent overseas as a staff agent with Proprietory cover. For the last 13 months of his overseas tour he was Deputy Chief of his Mission. Mr. X has some knowledge of industrial personnel practices, having worked for four years as a personnel efficiency expert for a large U.S. corporation, and when he spoke of the Agency's personnel problems he spoke advisedly and with commendable restraint. Briefly, the interviewer's impressions of Mr. X were extremely favorable: he appeared modest, industrious and extremely conscientious - both as to his work and as to the security implications of his present anomalous situation. It was manifest that he had been, at least, very highly motivated and had entered the Agency with high ideals about the Agency and its mission and with high hopes for a career; the fact that he was still trying to cling to those ideals was even more painfully apparent.

On 19 June 1953 Mr. X left his overseas station for Washington - his orders reading 'TDY and further assignment.' Ten months prior to this time Headquarters had been notified of his impending return, with full particulars on his background and experience in order to facilitate his reassignment. On his arrival in Washington on 13 July, Mr. X reported to his area division and to the pertinent Branch, where he was informed that there were no slots available for him in the Branch and that the 'freeze' made it impossible for him to be picked up elsewhere in the division. He was given no further guidance and no indication of either what courses of action lay open to him or of how long the present situation might last. He was forced to seize the initiative in searching for a job, since no one individual or office seemed to fee responsible, and proceeded to "walk the corridors" seeking any position which might afford him a sense of belonging or purpose. The division sent him to a series of training courses and after each was completed he recommenced his search. There are, now, no training courses left. No job is in sight.

On 23 July, Mr. X was put on a staff employee status, but he was unable to obtain satisfaction from any of the numerous offices he visited as to the question which had arisen concerning whether he was on TDY or PCS. Although his initial orders read TDY, he was informed here (at the end of thirty days) that he could no longer be given per diem allowances (he received per diem pay for the first 22 days) and that - to all intents and purposes - he was no longer on TDY. He indicated that he was perfectly agreeable to that as long as he was placed on PCS and was allowed to bring his personal effects from the West Coast. He was told, however, that since it wasn't certain whether he would eventually be assigned in Washington or elsewhere in the United States or, for that matter, to another overseas post, it wasn't possible to put him on PCS status either. As a result, he has had to rent (for the last three months) an apartment completely furnished - including

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such items as linen, blankets, and silverware, etc. - at a cost of $240 per month. That extra expense did not seem unreasonable while he was receiving per diem allowances - but since that time he has been going further into debt every week and no resolution of his problem is in sight. The financial problem, alone, is forcing him to consider the advisability of seeking less costly employment.

Mr. X also pointed out the peculiar disadvantage of men who were initially recruited as staff agents, have served overseas, return and (like himself) are put on 'true-name' staff employee status and have to try sell themselves to supervisors when the only file they have to present concerning their background and experience (the staff employee, or true-name, file) contains no information on their overseas duty. The job-seeker is placed in a false position if he does not volunteer an account of his overseas duty and in an embarrassing one if he does. Further, even the relevant personnel data sent to Headquarters from field was not entered in the 'pseudo' file; second, in many cases, promotions were blocked because Headquarters did not know what the man was actually doing.

Mr. X also expressed considerable concern over the security implications of his present position. He pointed out that the cover story he was given on return to Washington was quite inadequate and would stand up only for the most naive of audiences. As a consequence, he is finding it necessary to avoid his friends here in Washington until his position is clarified.

Mr. X was fully aware of the special problems confronting the Agency - in the form of fluctuating project loads, influx of returning personnel, etc. He was emphatic that he (as well as all the people he knew who were in similar positions) would be willing to accept a rather difficult transition period as long as some attempt was made to receive and guide and orient them. As it is, he and many of his friends have been wandering around, lost in a limbo of confusion and vagueness - with no sense of direction or of career security. When they returned from overseas no one knew who they were, where they had been or what they had done. The simple device of an informal 'returnee' interview with some career service officer or board (one which would demonstrate a certain familiarity with them as individuals and with their background and overseas tours) would have made all the difference in the world in their attitudes - particularly if, from that interview, they could have obtained a simple yet fairly authoritative statement of the situation and of what the Agency was trying to do to overcome it.

Mr. X may yet be salvagable as an extremely valuable career office. But his case seems to be at that sensitive juncture which might lead to a precipitous resignation at any moment.

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Mr. X knows, personally of ten men who are generally in the same position. He feels that any of them might resign within the month.

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Mr. X knows personally of two very capable men who preceeded him in rotation from overseas by a few months. They remained in Headquarters for a few months under the same conditions: general lack of guidance or of personal interest in their cases; lack of a definite status; increasing indebtedness; poor cover stories, etc. Both had resigned by the time Mr. X returned.

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INTERVIEW #7

After spending two years overseas on a job that he was not intended or suited for, X was returned to the ZI for reassignment. On arriving at Headquarters, his desk had nothing for him nor could they see any need for him in the future. Since no machinery was available in finding another job, X, without any help from his desk or Division began to shop around. Today, four months later, he's still shopping and has found little prospect of finding a job. Led to believe that he would have an assignment on arriving in the ZI, X bought a house and has placed his two children in school. Though still highly motivated in the job CIA is doing, X says that he can not continue on under present circumstances without a job, and a career system to guide him. His morale is very low and he is presently looking for an outside job prior to resigning. Would reconsider resigning if a workable career system existed whereby he could see what was in store for himself as a future security.

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After having been sent overseas without a job assigned to him, this case returned to the ZI less than a year later as a "reduction in force returnee". While overseas he never had a definite job but was shopped around from area to area until sent home. He has been without a job for three months at headquarters and has given up "shopping around." Is about to resign for without a job and without a promotion in sight, his morale is very low and as a 29-year-old GS-7 he can't afford to support himself and his family. He feels that he's got to get started in an outside job without any further delay. Commented that if a workable career system existed he probably wouldn't resign for he would not be in the position he is in now.

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Case returned from overseas after completing an overseas tour of duty. After clearing through Central Processing, subject ran into a blank wall. His division personnel office took up his case and constantly put off placing him, largely because they could not get anyone to take him on, in spite of his good agency record. Since shopping around produced nothing, he was told by his personnel division to call in every week. ~~Eight~~ Six months after returning he was found jobless, reading in the library.

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INTERVIEW #8

Interviewee is an Operations Officer in an area division with two and one-half years experience in the Branch. He was recruited by an official of the Agency and had no complaints about recruitment or initial placement.

There was not only lack of knowledge of Career Service Program evidenced, but rather a definite antagonism as reflected by his statement that "Career Service is a boondoggle for a lot of high muckermucks who didn't have jobs." The essential and somewhat pathetic plight of this Junior Officer was reflected over and over during the interview in statements that indicated he no longer felt recognized as a member of a team, but rather a somewhat forgotten man. Lack of any indication of personal interest in his career by his supervisor, his division officers, or by Career Service seemed to be the basic factor in his low morale. He evidenced strong desire to at least have the opportunity of meeting his Seniors and of having them evidence some interest in his contribution.

An example of this lack of communication is that, although he was responsible for preparing early drafts of country plans, he had no knowledge whatsoever of the final outcome of his efforts. He also stated that he felt that he was trying to plan in a vacuum, since he received no clear-cut policy from above and even in cases of specific projects, received no decision from his Superiors as to their reaction to his proposals.

He also very strongly opposed the policy of hiring young men and giving them military service credit for their time with CIA. He felt that the Agency should concentrate on hiring men who were older, more settled, and less likely to be called into the Service.

He felt considerable time, money, and effort was wasted because programs were established on a year to year basis, rather than on a two or three year basis, which is normally required to fully implement an operation. He further stated that operations presently underway in the Field were in many instances, hastily planned and implemented, the result being that considerable money had been spent without proper control of assets being established.

He feels that the salaries for Junior Officers are equal to or better than those offered in industry; however, he felt that career employees should not expect salary to be an important factory in their job satisfaction.

He felt that security limitations as related to the prestige of working for CIA enhanced, rather than detracted from the official standing.

He felt that the Agency should sponsor more outside substantive training for personnel who had been well established as career employees.

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INTERVIEW #9

ILLEGIB

Author: A GS-9 CE officer with additional responsibilities for (a) correspondence and inter-branch business of secondary importance, and (b) as Headquarters case officer for an agressive operation.

The career system suffers its major breakdown at the point of rotation and reassignment, and this is proving to be a disastrous one. The lack of a definite schedule of normal progression based on performance measured against standards of excellence and experience is working to the disadvantage of the Agency at both ends of the spectrum of officer caliber: able and potentially useful individuals are being shunted aside through failure to prepare them for career leadership by career guidance, and persons proven unfit are reassigned to other parts of the Agency except for cases of shocking dereliction.

The senior officers of the Divisions assume no responsibility for the supervision of the careers of their junior officers; by custom this function has been within the province of the Branch chiefs, whose principal interest is, quite understandable, in preserving the status quo if the individual is serving satisfactorily. If the individual is not serving acceptably the Branch chief's interest takes the form of attempting to have the offender removed - again quite understandably - and the simplest method is to maneuver his transfer. Those Branch chiefs who do undertake to place their junior officers in better positions therefore find their recommendations viewed with suspicion.

In this morass the careers of young officers eventually funder. They cannot themselves express an interest in a position to another Branch chief without offending protocol unless by applications to personal friends they make their interests known so that a request for their services from the new Branch presents their Branch chief with a fait accompli. Obviously this affords no opportunity for an intelligent and thorough-going examination of the many factors and possibilities that should be considered for the mutual benefit of the branch and the officer, and leaves the aftertaste for all of having witnessed the engineering of a slick deal rather than the normal progress of a career officer. While such jockeying for position

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takes place in many private concerns, there exists is those cases an opportunity for substantial financial reward which satisfactorily compensates for the rigors and risks of such competition; in those fields where no significant remuneration is offered there is provided a maximum of stable progress. In this Agency there is neither.

Finally, it must be said in fairness to the Agency and those who may attempt to improve its career program that the inescapable facts of government service in general, which it cannot be hoped that anyone may quickly remedy, throw a great shadow over the whole problem of junior-officer-career management. The salary of a GS-9 is inadequate to support a man and his wife in Washington at anything better than a sacrifice level, and still worse - he can only foresee that his family responsibilities will continue to outstrip his financial advancement in the course of a normally successful career. Those without such responsibilities or those with private means will be able to make useful and rewarding careers for themselves with the Agency despite those handicaps listed above, but many others, like myself, must reluctantly conclude that the sensible course is follow the Director's example and take a twenty-year leave of absence in order to be able to afford to give our efforts here.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Assign career supervision responsibilities at the Division level.

Draw up standards of excellence for job performance for use as guides.

Chart typical careers for the guidance of the individuals and their supervisors.

Institute planned long-range programs of foreign assignments.

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INTERVIEW #10

A Junior Officer with over one year experience with CIA in administrative work assigned to an area division was interviewed. He was recruited by a senior employee of the Agency and has been satisfied with the recruitment and initial placement.

He indicated that he thought it was "a big fat mistake to recruit Junior Officers and promise draft exemption." He indicated that he did not feel that this was a benefit that the young man should expect or require in order to have him consider a career with CIA.

He felt assured that when the appropriate time came he could successfully request rotation in order to advance himself and broaden his qualifications.

On the subject of wasted time, money, and effort, he singled out operations as being too expensive and as being poorly planned and, therefore, not often successful.

Although he felt that salaries in CIA were the best in Government, he indicated that a considerable number of young men felt that they could improve their financial position in private industry.

He feels that being an employee of CIA gives him more prestige than he could obtain by being associated with any other Government organization. He did not feel that security restrictions relating to this factor limited the prestige, but rather enhanced it.

Subject stated that he did not know that he was a member or a part of the Career Service Organization.

Subject is a former State Department employee who volunteered this comment: "Do not fall into the serious error of establishing a Corps similar to the Foreign Service Officers. They are looked upon as God's chosen few." He indicated that the FSO system in State had been a major factor in lowering employee morale because of the vast difference in pay, quarters, and social life, which factors were especially important to the employee and his family in an overseas assignment. He stated that FSO personnel and non-FSO personnel were constantly at logger-heads because of the recognition by both parties that Foreign Service Officers had an "inside track in the Career Program."

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INTERVIEW #11

A frequent cause of complaint and disillusionment among young potential careerists in CIA concers the problem of placement, and specifically that of establishing the newly recruited junior officer in a situation where his talents, training, interests and potential may be most happily exploited, both for his own well being and, in the long run, for that of the Agency. It is appreciated that this is an eternal problem for personnel people and that it is complicated in our organization by unavoidable security considerations. It is widely felt, however, that a considerably better job might be done in this respect since all too often new employees, brought into the Agency with but a very sketchy idea of what they are getting into, find themselves in situations that they cannot but regard as highly unsatisfactory from the point of view of their backgrounds and inclinations. The result is invariably frustration, unhappiness and sooner or later a disrupting effort to change positions. In some instances it undoubtedly leads even to the loss by the Agency of a potentially valuable person in whom a considerable amount had already been invested.

Because of the security factor it would seem undeniable that a much greater than normal responsibility must be shouldered by the personnel section of an organization such as this one in seeing to it that the most appropriate association possible is made between the job and the man or woman. In accordance with this, it seems to me that a more cautious and conservative recruitment policy is necessary and that, secondly, a greater effort should be made to facilitate the transfer, particularly as between Offices of the Agency, of justifiably unhappy personnel already on duty to more suitable positions. It would seem a better policy in the long run to postpone consideration of or perhaps even reject entirely applicants who are qualified and appear to be of potential value but for whom satisfactory places are not at the time available rather than lead such persons on to positions which t ey are almost bound to find inappropriate. It is felt that in most cases it should be possible to anticipate this if a truly sound judgment of both the individual and the position has been made. If, for the sake of developing a career service or for other reasons, it is considered desirable to recruit personnel even though positions in areas of interest are not available then at least it should be clearly explained to prospective employees that an assignment which does not have much regard for interests or abilities is the only current alternative. If employment is accepted on this basis, the Agency should furnish some assurances of a proper adjustment - and then should maintain a continuing interest in such personnel and make every effort to redeem such assurances as speedily as possible.

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I feel strongly that my own case history lends some substance to the arguments put forth above. Originally interviewed and processed for what sounded like a most suitable and interesting position in a special part of the Agency, the spot I was slated for was reorganized out of existence last fall before I was able to enter on duty. After a five month delay from the time my papers initially entered the mill, I was duly informed of the situation and eventually re-interviewed and assigned to X area where I first reported early this year. Since my full clearance had long since come through at the time of my second interviews, I was told something more of the work of this Branch than I could have expected as an initial applicant and I was able to make some adjustments in my expectations accordingly. The briefing I received, however, fell far short of giving me anything like a true appreciation of the nature of the operation or the calibre of the personnel involved. The result has been keen disappointment and ever mounting frustration. It does not help either to have no definite knowledge regarding areas within the Agency where my interests and considerable educational background would seem to indicate that I belong.

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INTERVIEW #12

The following comments are based on my experience in the Administrative offices of the Agency:

Although I have checked C and D (Delegation of Responsibility and Supervision) as adequate, I feel that E and F (Efficient use of Time and Personnel) cannot be classified as such. C and D are usually the result of personnel policies in the immediate office, but E and F fall under the responsibility of the Agency as a whole. I think one of the greatest weaknesses is lack of standardization. One area operates one way while another area operates another way. In addition, we have about 8 or 9 different sets of regulations to follow. Some of these are Confidential Funds Regulations, Foreign Service Travel Regulations, Standardized Government Travel Regulations, Agency Regulations, [redacted] etc. This multiplicity of regulations results in loss of time. To settle a problem, one first of all has to figure out under just what regulation the problem falls. Then if there appears to be a conflict one must find out which one supersedes the other. In addition to the number of regulations, there is a constant flood of new ones issued—so many in fact it is almost impossible to keep the books current. Secondly, there seems to be a lack of follow-up to ensure implementation of new procedures throughout the Agency as a whole. Because of peculiar problems, some areas have to work out separate methods to comply with the regulations.

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There is also a general lack throughout the Agency of establishing functional responsibilities on the division level. I have been some administrative problems come in from the field which have been bucked from one branch to another with none assuming responsibility for taking action. One recent case floated around the division for three months before someone finally answered it.

G: Failure of operational people (who actually spend the money), generally speaking, in thinking of CIA funds as ultimately coming out of their own pockets. They are willing to spend several times as much money for an operation which if they were running it out of personal funds would be accomplished much more economically. Second, the lack of an agency program of review and analysis. Someone should be analyzing costs of projects in relation to its production. Where production is sub-standard, the project should be reviewed for continuation of CIA support. I have heard it said: "Such and such a man (indigenous) has not produced too well. Let's double his salary as an inducement for better production." There appears to be a general unwillingness to eliminate marginal or sub-marginal projects.

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J: There are too many people in responsible positions who apparently don't know what they're doing. They possibly pick up one facet of their job and ride it to death, completely ignoring or being unaware of the existence of other equally important problems.

R: Although actually not applicable in my own case and I feel I have been treated fairly in this respect, I feel that as a rule women in the Agency are not given the same consideration for promotion to higher grades (GS-13 and up) as are men. I personally can't think of any woman who holds a grade of GS-14 or higher (and I have been around here for seven years and am fairly well acquainted). Women are just as interested in a life-time career as are men. But it is somewhat frustrating to feel that the limits to which a woman can go is not the same to be expected by men. If women have the ability, the sex of the individual should not enter into job consideration.

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INTERVIEW #13

July 1952 — I entered on board with the idea that I would receive about six months training and then I would be assigned overseas. I was told precisely this by the recruiter and all other interviews. I entered as a grade seven with perdiem.

Sept 1952 — After preliminary training, I, along with about 20 others, went to school for an extensive training course for thirteen weeks to include all phases of PM training.

Prior to leaving for school I was told that I would not received per diem while there but that on returning I would received per diem again, picking up where I left off.

Jan 1953 — After thirteen weeks training, which included many risks on the part of the individual, I returned to Washington only to find that the job for which I was hired was no longer available. I was sent shopping within the organization for another job. Very little effort was made on the part of the Agency to help me find another position. I was furnished with several leads, but certainly not in excess considering the vast amount of money, time, and effort that was spent on the part of the Agency and myself. As it worked out, most of the training was a waste of time and money to say nothing about the effort and risk.

Much to my financial misfortune I was told also that the time we spent at school was to be construed as part of the 180 days of per diem regardless that we did not actually receive any compensation. Probably since we did get free room and board while at school, that is compensation enough; however, the fact that each one of us had to maintain our families and our homes was overlooked. My big complaint is that I was promised six months per diem when I came here and that was one factor that I considered when I came on board with the Agency.

Jan. 25 — I was picked up by the X Division to work in the X Branch. I was not misled nor do I have any complaints about this division or branch except one. With the risk of sounding too much like the "proverbial I character" I just don't have enough work to keep me busy even a reasonable amount of the time. Granted I could read and study, but believe me that gets tiresome after six or eight hours a day for weeks at

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a time. Besides a man wants to feel a certain amount of responsibility and pride in his work. Perhaps it is my fault but I don't have that feeling.

Lastly, I have been put in for a promotion for over three months and I still have not received it. Why should I get one? That's a good question. My complaint is directed more to the fact that it takes so long for a promotion to go through than to the fact that I did not get it.

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Case History #14

I Background

1. JOT,

II. Attitude: incompatible with persons in his office in terms of interests and backgrounds, extremely frustrated by red tape and incompetency in his own area and in the handling of the JOT program, seriously misses the large amount of social prestige and recognition he and his family have always enjoyed and he sees no prospect of gaining such in the Agency. Has been mishandled in his job in terms of promises broken, his specific intelligence training and experience not being used to fullest advantage, and being switched from job to job. To some extent I feel he finds himself, for the first time, in a situation where he can not bring his own and his family's prestige and reputation with him and he's quite frustrated because of this.

III. DECISION: His decision is to leave the Agency as soon as possible, establish himself in business , become a success and something of an expert and perhaps some day come back to the Agency or government at a higher more influential level where he doesn't feel lost or useless.

IV. SOLUTION: If the JOT Program had an effective means of checking up on its young personnel from time to time so as to catch these estrangements in their early stages, some of the people now resolved to resign might have been saved.

SECRET
Security Information

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X

Interview #15

ATTITUDE: He is willing to do Agency work temporarily especially since it was offered him with no strings attached and is by far the most pleasant way of getting his military service out of the way (OCS, a few months of duty, and back to the Agency to complete his active service). He does not see any real possibility of his remaining with the Agency for any length of time, and it seems clear from his background, education, and previous jobs that no one else could expect this either.

COMMENT: Unless the Agency wants to spend all the money and effort training this man only to have him on call in case of an all out emergency, the Committee feels this man should not have been recruited for the JOT program.

Because the JOT supervisor can not extract any commitment for a permanent intelligence career from young men just out of college, they must increase their emphasis on careful selection of JOs initially. Only if those with high promise AND high potential for making CIA a career are recruited can the JOT program accomplish its stated purpose.

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Interview #16

My observations apply mainly to the economic field since I have been in this line of work. However, I believe that they may apply to other fields as well.

If clandestine services is to maximize the effectiveness of its economic operations, those operations must be well-conceived. That is, they must be based on facts. For example, an analysis of economic developments in the satellites two or three years ago would have revealed that a major Soviet vulnerability was the low standard of living in countries which were accustomed to western living standards. We could have capitalized on this vulnerability to encourage resistance. Again, an analysis of trade patterns for illegal east-west trade reveals that clandestine services could play a significant role in combatting this trade at little expense. This could be accomplished by penetrating a relatively small number of forwarding agencies, which are focal points for information on this trade.

Clandestine Services has thought almost entirely in terms of "production" (operations) and has had little respect for analysis. On the other hand large companies make huge outlays so that their executives will be fully informed and be able to make correct decisions. A large staff of accountants gives them a picture of the company's financial position; the sales department makes customer surveys and keeps in close touch with its dealers so that information relative to the company's sales position and prospects are readily at hand; a small staff of economists will provide the executive with a picture of the industry and general business outlook. All of these staffs deal in facts and the interpretation thereof. Furthermore, the chiefs of each of these analytical functions are members of the high command of the company.

In Clandestine Services no office is charged with economic analysis, and those who are concerned with so-called economic warfare are scattered among numerous offices. Economic research and liaison with other agencies is the function of "X". An economic warfare staff is attached to C/"X", apparently charged with planning "X" operations, but with no provision for either economic analysis or for planning operations. Some area divisions have economic warfare officers who are supposed to do the same work for their areas as the economic warfare division does on an overall basis. Much duplication is involved here, of course, and attaching an EW officer to a division staff is like attaching an economist to the staff of a factory superintendent; "X" has no provision for staff work in the economic field.

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I believe that the answer is to be found in the following points:

1. Do not think in terms of economic warfare, but in terms of economic analysis. Economic warfare is simply psychological warfare, resistance, sabotage, etc., with an economic objective. Where the operations themselves are economic, e.g. covert buying, staff support can best be provided by the Commercial Division.

2. This staff should ideally be attached to "X", as it would be if modeled after any large company.

3. This staff would be very small with the division of labor broken down approximately as follows: one person working on general economic developments in the Soviet bloc; one working on industrial developments in the Soviet bloc; one or two concerned with illegal east-west trade and related matters; and perhaps one working on miscellaneous economic problems in the free world. Such an office if staffed by qualified people could have accomplished more in one year than has been accomplished in the last three years by all economic warfare staffs combined.

4. All case or staff officers in an area dividion should be encouraged to present their views to this office. This would avoid the current situation where new ideas may be squelched within the division. In one case a set of proposals prepared in an area division was not even read by the author's superiors. However, these proposals were presented to C/"X" and "X" through a staff division and were enthusiastically supported.

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Case History #17

As a PM and 1 of 3 similar cases, I severely injured my spine while going through parachute training. After 6 months ~~in a hospital~~ RECUPERATION, during which time I received ~~no~~ pay, I was discharged as partially disabled. Unlike the army, I recieved no disability compensation nor funds to pay necessary future medical expenses. For over a year no one of authority has taken the initiative to solve my case, primarily due to lack of precedent. My only compensation was a pat on the back and a hearty "there's nothing we can do". If I were in the service or member of a private firm, I would have been cared for or else could have filed suit!"

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Appendix B

SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON EACH PROBLEM

(NOTE: On the following pages of this Appendix you will find - categorized in the same manner as in the text - specific comments on each problem, written by individuals in their answers to the poll. The Committee recognizes that many of these comments are of questionable value, but feels bound not to suppress or edit any evidence which might be significant.)

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TAB A

RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT

I was recruited for a certain desk and never did get to that desk, or ever get to use my language ability.

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They knew when I was recruited I wasn't a college graduate and was still recruited for a special assignment because of my language qualifications. This desk later turned me down for lack of a college degree.

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Subject graduated cum laude from Harvard University. He was hired in 1948 as a CAF 4 and was assigned to the Industrial Registry in OCD. This, he feels, put him considerably behind his own age and intelligence level and, although he has done well, he has thus been put at a considerable disadvantage in catching up. Speaking objectively, he feels that an initial assignment such as his was nonsensical in that his background and education had afforded him special capabilities which were never considered, much less exploited. Entirely through his own efforts and personal contacts, subject was able to get himself reassigned.

— — — —

There has been an apparent lack of proper placement of personnel from the very beginning which has caused great dissatisfaction and lack of interest on the performance of the job. The efficient use of personnel can only come thru using the abilities and educational background of those people who have been hired. It is obvious that people are used more to fill up openings with little respect to their capabilities. Need it be also mentioned of promises made that were never fulfilled.

— — — —

A clandestine intelligence service demands a maximum of sacrifice from young people who enter into its employ in that they enter with the spirit of adventure and service and in many cases with unusual abilities, slants of mind, and sometimes loyalty. They deserve and should get a thorough and concisely specified explanation of what they are signing up for and what is expected of them, how they will be compensated financially and why they will be promoted and the mature and complete reasons why they must cut themselves off from outside contacts.

In recruitment

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In recruitment more emphasis is given to the glorification of intelligence work than to the job to which the person will be assigned. This results in a great deal of dissatisfaction when it is found that many of the jobs to be had do not differ, by necessity, from jobs found in any office.

The Agency went overboard in hiring college graduates as career service employees and then couldn't find suitable slots for them so that many were shoved into "temporary" slots as typists, messengers, etc. These people are left in the "temporary" slots until they complain loud enough and get the reputation of being troublemakers or until they quit in disgust.

"A man should be generally informed of his job before his recruitment. Perhaps psychological testing before a person is recruited would eliminate the hiring of people later proven unfit for their job."

This individual has found initial job placement left entirely to the individual's own efforts.

Many people with whom I have been in close contact were recruited for one type of job and were offered an entirely different job after entering on duty. Even when they were completely uninterested in the job offered, no attempt was made to place them in a position for which they were suited. When a recruit is asked to fill out a 13 page Personal History Statement in duplicate, is it asking too much of the personnel directors to read the statements and use them as a basis for job placement?

In one of my interviews during my initial recruitment the interviewer told me that "the Agency would black-ball me with all other government agencies if I left CIA before 8 or 10 years." On this alone I turned down his particular offer and went into the JOT program instead. This man, by the way, is still here in Headquarters.

Recruitment and job placement was satisfactory in my case, but in at least 75% of the cases I know, the completely false impressions given the prospective employee by the recruiters (you are going overseas immediately) etc.) has been the cause of most of the dissatisfaction and loss of morale.

Probably one

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Probably one of the major problems regarding the recruitment of new personnel is that promises made to the applicant in the initial interview are seldom carried out. Of course, "fresh" college graduates are not prepared for such glamorous positions as most expect to receive, but they should not be hired with promises of positions unless placement personnel actually plan to carry them out. My initial assignment was in a typing pool with approximately a dozen others, all of us having been hired with promises of being assigned as "analyist", "researcher", etc. I remained in the typing pool for five months after having been told I would have such a temporary assignment for a period of only one or two months. Others in the pool had not been told of the arrangment and were completely surprised at this first assignment. Most of us later were reassigned to more adequate positions within the same Division, but this resulted only after each of us had consulted a supervisor. The work was extremely monotonous and was of no assistance or preparation to us for our later assignments. I felt it unfortunate for "employer" as well as "employees" as the work could have been carried out by less qualified and less salaried personnel, and much loss of money and time in training could have been prevented by placing personnel according to interests and qualifications.

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Recruitment and job placement -- This program falls short of its desired ends. I believe the sensitive nature of the work in CIA has caused many recruiting officers to be overly "hush hush" about the jobs. Consequently, many people do not realize that the work neither suits their capabilities nor their interests until it is too late. As for job placement, far too many people have been placed in jobs which do not exploit their potential. The system of placing personnel where personnel are needed regardless of ability and training is not realistic.

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Case had no idea of the kind of job he was being recruited for ended up as a PM officer in the Far East, a job he was psychologically unsuited for. Completed his tour begrudgingly and now is doing the kind of work he likes through no credit to a career system but to the understanding of a sympathetic supervisor.

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Too indefinite, more could have been revealed to recruit without losing security. Many individuals would have been better able to accept or reject job without later disillusionment and consequent resignation.

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"Still don't know the job you're getting, no coordination between recruiter and job placement, bad placement."

I saw no

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I saw no recruitment. I stumbled into a CIA man and made an application in San Francisco and then heard nothing for 8 months until I had moved to Washington, D. C. Appearing here, I had some tests and an interview. I then waited 8 months more for clearance. During clearance, Personnel Dept. never kept their word about calling or writing when they said they would, they told me at one point not to look for a job as they had a temporary one for me. After waiting two weeks and no word, I called and Personnel told me that they had no job for me, that the girl had been wrong in saying so. (A very lean month until I got another job.) Also, I could have used the 16 months before entering CIA for general reading on the Bloc, etc. All in all, I wonder how and why I ever came here. A very unsatisfactory process.

An employee was brought into the Agency, assigned to an area desk and given training. While in training the employee knew nothing of the job that he had been hired for, his contact with the branch was occasional and casual. He was given to understand that he would be sent overseas within eight months after he was on board.

After the period of training was completed, the employee was brought on the desk but was assignedno particular duties for a period of two months. During this time he had to find work for himself, and wait for a decision as to what his duties were to be. It was during this two month period that it became evident to the employee that no definite planning for his area of interest had been formulated and that his expected transfer overseas was not imminent, but a nebulus plan. The whole situation had the earmarks of being a case where a man was hired, then the job created.

The end result of the situation was to considerably lower the morale of the individual, and point up the lack of proper direction and guidance on the branch level. He still sees no immediate prospect of overseas assignment.

I have been employed here for more than 2 years, so possibly my complaints are no longer justified. I am perhaps typical of the "problem" group. I was recruited for CIA before my graduation from an Eastern women's college, along with approximately 20 classmates. I came to Washington the autumn following my graduation and have never been employed other than at CIA.

I have seen

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I have seen many of my friends assigned to positions which were good for training purposes, but which were not consonant with what the recruiters had said. I imagine that because of security reasons, the recruiters cannot and may not disclose the nature of probable assignments, but many young women they bring in are, by the nature of their background and education, certain to have ambitions. These young women will inevitably be dissatisfied with the clerical jobs to which they have been assigned unless they are given the opportunity to get further training and thus advancement.

The fact that I consider myself "lucky" (I like my job very much) indicates how prevalent is the opinion that the recruiters sold us "A bill of goods".

It would seem that a general outline of future responsibilities could be given to the prospective employee within the limits of security . This would enable him to do outside research in that particular field while awaiting clearance. Also, more attention could be paid to previous training and experience in placing new personnel. And it would be beneficial psychologically if the new recruit could at least start out with the feeling of usefulness by being established in his new job immediately upon entering his division.

Recruitment done with too much secrecy. Since applicant presumably knows nothing about the Agency, some explanation of type of work done is needed. I found out what the Agency had in store for me two weeks after coming aboard. This type of surprise caused one person to quit. Job placement at first unsatisfactory for me, as I dropped into first open slot, with little background or training for that job. Career training program started out fine in my opinion, but I have lost sight of it since returning from military service.

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TAB B

ROTATION AND REASSIGNMENT

While seeking a reassignment, from a job which I was very enthusiastic about and enjoyed but decided to leave when I felt proper credit was not being given, I found that although an effort was made to find a place for me, little real effort was made to place me in a position where my previous training and experience with the Agency would be utilized. Having a definite need for a job I was more or less forced to accept a position for which I was really not trained and had very little interest in. After being on the present job for several months, I feel that I have lost a great deal of enthusiasm and have thought that unless another job can be found for me I will leave the Agency.

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I was hired as an IO and worked for six months earning 5,000 a year as a clerk, before being assigned as a case officer.

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After returning from overseas I knocked on doors for three months and had one interview with the career board who slapped me on the back and told me what a fine job I did in the field. Personnel lost all my files, and everyone appeared to be having T/O troubles.

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This subject is a thorn in the flesh for the majority of individuals that I have known returning from the field. Many thousands of man hours are lost annually through the absence of a concrete policy on this subject. Further, many individuals feel that they are not wanted, due to the delay in reassignment and their thinking becomes so disaffected that they ultimately tender their resignation. Others accept a position just to have a job and in many instances this position is not commensurate with their capabilities and background resulting in incompetency. and inefficiency within the Agency.

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There may be rotation and reassignment programs in effect, but for the most part it is my opinion that this could be improved, especially in the case of trainees. Rotation and reassignment is often mentioned but little practiced.

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The rotation program appears to have been used as a method of getting rid of undesirable rather than being used as the Agency had intended in furthering the careers of the career personnel.

Have not

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Have not received any rotational training nor have I seen any indication that others have received such training.

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Only way to transfer from one job to another in the Agency is to make a personal contact with people in another office and through them try for another job. I should think that Personnel Offices should theoretically and actually be able to find jobs for people where they wished, and not hold on to or keep possible job openings in another office from the knowledge of interested personnel.

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It was my understanding after my EOD 1 June 1951 that I was expected to go overseas almost immediately, to which I agreed. I was informed that there would be a delay on three separate occasions after I had already made personal arrangements for departure. 3-1/2 weeks of the time was used for covert, safehouse type training. Finally I departed for overseas on 1 October 1951. I returned in March 1953 after approximately 18 months overseas, spent about 10 days in Wash., processing and job hunting, then went on home leave. (I had to pay my own expenses home and back to Wash. despite the fact that I returned PCS to Wash. after 18 months overseas, before completion of my two-year tour, at the convenience of the government) for one month. Returning to Wash. on 4 May 1953, I spent three more weeks at Headquarters before I was assigned a job and sent to take six weeks of training.

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In order that both the Agency and the returnee from overseas or transferee obtain the most benefit from experience a completely adequate debriefing system must be established. From observation, it is evident that all returnees are not debriefed. Participants in those few debriefing sessions that are held are generally people who happened to be available at the time.

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With the mandatory presence of a panel consisting of representatives from the Training Division, Career Management, Area Branches of the Division concerned, Logistical Branch, and appropriate Admin. Staffs, the following factors and many more could be determined -

Specific assignment --	Qualifications necessary	- Logistical support
	Admin. support	- Responsibility involved
	Grade appropriate	- Logical next assignment
	Operational Info., etc.	

A further check

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A further check with desk and case officers by appropriate panel members will tend to establish firm job qualifications. This panel should be assigned on a permanent basis, so that at least the key members thereof have few if any other responsibilities.

Individual is male; GS-9; two years with CIA; married. Resignation papers written and being held. Strongly criticizes recruiting professionals and putting in clerical slots; lack of info. re type of work to be done unnecessary. Reassignment opportunity basic problem. Blocked in attempt to transfer to utilize background - knows of others in other office who would welcome his job and vice versa. No knowledge of opportunity; no guidance; little faith in present "paper" career program.

Individual is male; age - 26; GS-7; 15 mos. in CIA. Extremely bitter about his job - blames recruitment - indicates that word "analyst" is used too freely when "indexer" or "coder" is more appropriate. Says college background not necessary for his job. Indicates considerable strong feeling re this setup in his whole Division. Has been completely frustrated in transfer attempts - no one is interested in picking him up. Has no idea of qualifications necessary for jobs in other offices and thinks such info should be available. Has no immediate supervisory trouble, but thinks many of his division supervisors are over-paid. No faith at all in the career program. Training opportunities denied on the "can't spare you" basis. Will resign very shortly.

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Tab C Career System

Voluminous regulations and notices pay lip service to "career management." There has been no evidence of practical application.

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This is one of the major weaknesses of the Agency's policies and practices. Until a concrete policy has been established for the rotation and reassignment of its personnel, a career system will be extremely difficult to instigate. Returning personnel are required to dig out their own assignment.

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As stated above, career system started well for me. It gave me excellent breaks, but when I came back from service, it seemed to be running on one cylinder. There is little, if any team spirit because there is nothing to tie people together personally in this sprawling organization. I think there should be periodic meetings of career personnel (during evenings). New policies and measures affecting career service could be explained and more important, the lowly career man could get a chance to see, hear, and question the shadowy characters on "The Hill." Who can get inspired, filled with team spirit, by Memo X-89 on meetings of the Career Board. All the training courses in the Agency emphasize the importance of personal contact with principal agents. How about a little of that for career employees?

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Many of my complaints about the soi-disant career system are explicit under other headings. In general, however, its designation seems pointless and not descriptive of any extant situation. Nowhere have I heard of a firm, coherent career curriculum being mapped out for a junior officer. Where any plans have been presented at all, they have been couched in the vaguest terms possible. Even then, the cart tends to be placed before the horse in that the job will first be assigned, and then the career "plan" will be manipulated a bit to justify the assignment. Training (see under same) is spasmodic and not necessarily relevant.

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What is the distinction between career and non-career officers? The deputy director of training once stated that none existed, that everybody was "career". That argues that the Agency ostensibly couldn't give less of a damn about implementing a long-range and rewarding career program, and that the word consciously or unconsciously is meant to provide a sop for the unwary.

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A Career System provides our agreeing with a board of individuals who work solely on the problems of forging a career for the individual within the Agency. Such a board handles promotions, reassignment, recruitment, and training etc. objectively and continously in relation to the individual. At present, no such system is present: it is left solely to individual initiative.

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Very little long-range briefing on what to expect as a career officer in the Agency was given to me. This may be because of the impossibility of doing so at the time I was hired but it resulted in my being unsure of my future in light of other careers and positions which I could enter.

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Tab D SUPERVISION

This is not to imply that all supervision is inadequate. However, in some situations improvement in supervision could be effected either by training or replacement of the supervisor. More emphasis should be toward developing the employee in a constructive manner so that maximum output and efficiency will be obtained from the employee while he is in turn receiving greater job satisfaction. One large obstacle preventing the achievement of this is that in many instances the supervisor is not prepared to offer the guidance and assistance that is needed to develop good career employees.

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In connection with the problem of supervision and training, it would be helpful if more attention were given to briefing the junior officers on the overall aims and efforts undertaken by the office. In many instances a junior officer could benefit considerably from being allowed to sit in on discussions, simply as an observer. That this is not done to any appreciable degree, is probably due more to a lack of foresight and planning than to any actual security precautions.

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C.D.E.F. These four together constitute the main crux of the problem; universal opinion says that the situation is sad. The major points are (1) lack of a practicable general policy to guide research operations, and (2) lack of proper supervision in carrying out those policies that do exist. The analysts are left with a feeling of constant pressure and confusion--usually resulting in a feeling of uselessness. And so there is needed a policy, a system of priorities, and supervision that would involve a realistic appraisal of number of personnel, time available, abilities and areas of responsibility of the analysts as applied to the enormous tasks to be done.

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Constantly observe poor supervision, from top down, with following factors most noticeable: poor communication, lack of training in executive responsibilities (i.e. lack of knowledge of good management practices), ignorance of "human relations", factors in handling of personnel, poor planning, etc.

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For nearly three years I have worked "on my own", more or less. I feel that more qualified supervisions will be developed as time goes on but it is a fact that on my last assignment I had very little help from my supervisors.

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In many cases if there were more adequate supervision there would be far more efficient use of time and adequate delegation of authority and responsibility

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Personnel could generally be exploited more fully with proper supervision.

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Supervision is the condition which we have least, to coin a phrase, from top to bottom. In addition to weakening morale, the lack of proper supervision had had a tremendously negative effect on the quality and quantity of production of intelligence research, primarily because of the failure of those responsibile to establish priorities and provide continuing guidance of research efforts. There are indications that this inadequacy is being remedied, though it is too soon to determine to what extent.

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Tab D SUPERVISION (con't)

Supervision is at best cursory; too often the supervisor doesn't know what your job involves.

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Difficulty of getting anyone to assume final responsibility gives rise to mass coordination and consequent confusion. No one is ever held directly responsible. Supervision is not necessary, therefore, because there is no responsibility.

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Efficient Use of Personnel: New personnel coming into the Agency sometimes with no experience are often placed in a job that other people in the agency can do equally as well, if not better. I should think more effort could be made to place into suitable available slots, people already working for the Agency. It is my opinion that I would be of more value to the Agency had I been reassigned to a job where my experience could be fully utilized.

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I have been in country X abroad for 25 years. I know the area and language thoroughly. But when I came aboard they put me in another country in a different division. To me this means that either my personnel history statement was never read or the statement means nothing anyway. Such a policy is a moral factor as it reveals an inefficient use of personnel whereby both the Agency and the individual suffer.

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Horizontal stratification should be disbanded because it prevents the necessary contact between interested parties (in the same operation) from having contact. It is too much like the military and because of this feature the lower echelon is not being fully utilized.

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Too often the junior officer is not given clearly defined responsibilities of his own, but rather is assigned random tasks in support of the senior officer's activities. "Bird-Dogging" has obvious value as a training device; however, this makes it difficult to derive the personal sense of accomplishment which is essential to job satisfaction. Where possible each junior officer should be given complete responsibility over certain of the less complex and routine operations. This would not only serve as excellent training experience but would also contribute to the individual's morale.

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Lines of responsibility above the Branch level seem very vague. Have seen many instances of failure to pin responsibility after something has gone wrong through neglect, bad planning, etc.

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Delegation of responsibility is seldom sufficiently clearly defined; believe this due largely to lack of knowledge of efficient administration on higher levels.

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An employee should receive a specific statement of duties from his superior, and this delegation should be his alone, with all responsibility for the job on him.

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Tab D SUPERVISION (con't)

The case officers in my office are not permitted to take much responsibility. This, again, may be the outcome of the nature of the work we do. This fact probably results in the horrifying waste of time on the part of many of the case officers. (Why bother when someone else will make the final decision, anyway?)

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In many instances the responsibility is in the field but the authority is not delegated.

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The success of any desk or division depends on the unity and friendly relationship within that unit. The chiefs must make their people feel a part of the unit. The people must feel that they are accomplishing something in the overall effort. Such a feeling or relationship does not exist in our desk. A man who leaves a friendly stable way of life at home to come to a job which provides an unfriendly and unstable atmosphere is not going to remain long in that job.

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No supervision, probably because no interest on part of supervisors in perfecting any functions.

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Most supervisors are too busy keeping abreast of "the Big Picture" to properly discharge their supervisory functions.

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People with "Paper Qualifications" and no administrative ability whatsoever are holding down many supervisory jobs. Their inability to handle personnel problems has resulted in low morale among their staff.

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Supervision---This is perhaps the most outstanding complaint. Supervision is not clear. The analyst does not receive the clear and thoughful guidance which he needs.

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One of the weakest links: supervision is spasmodic, inconsistent and frequently consists merely of interference on the part of improperly orientated superiors - interference frequently executed without consulting person directly responsible; supervisors frequently fail to keep subordinates informed of matters pertinent to cases or operational problems.

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Tab E PAY & PROMOTION

Because there is no single board to initiate promotions, equally qualified personnel have been promoted or failed to receive promotions due mainly to the interest of their supervisors. Young men who went to the Far East in late 1951 or early 52, received their promotions way in advance of those sent to Europe or other parts of the world. Most of those sent to the FE are either 9's or 11's while their counter-parts in Europe are either still 7's or in a few cases, 9's, eventhough the majority of them are the same age and have been given the same amount of responsibility.

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Promotion opportunities and career service should be united with rotation and reassignment and training. At the present time promotion policies seem to vary with the particular Agency components. In some offices there does not seem to be any functioning promotion policy, but it is more or less a paper affair which may be presented to any individual or group which inquires about the matter. The same may be said of career service in some Agency components. In summary, there should be a combining of promotion, rotation and reassignment, training and career service into a workable plan. This is being accomplished by some Agency components and it seems reasonable to assume that it could be achieved by the others - Admin. as well as operational.

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Subject stated, when questioned about promotion policy, that there was simply no policy that he had been made aware of. His promotions, he feels, were never policy-directed but were more or less in the way of personal favors. Subject added that his relatively fast promotion rate, until a year ago, was perhaps not entirely justified.

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For the past year, however, Subject had been given intensive training and was detached from his desk. Due a promotion, he was assured before leaving the division that this would be taken care of exactly as if he were still attached to the desk. He has not received his promotion, however, and cannot admit to any supervisory attention given his promotion status while he was away in training. He, of course, refuses to ask for his promotion.

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Salaries are generally adequate, but much bickering and salary consciousness could be eliminated by the establishment of a definite and consistant policy especially in regards to new employees. For example, I entered for duty at a salary at a step higher grade than those with the same background who had entered for the same position the previous year. A year later, another group with the same background entered at a grade higher. All groups have advanced at approximately the same rate and as a result all retain equal grades. This hardly gives any consideration for on-the-job experience and training of new personnel by those who have been employed in the same position the longest.

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Promotion opportunities---All too often promotions are not given to those individuals who most deserve them simply because they have not been in their present grade for a specified amount of time. Educational background and not merit is often used to allocate unwarranted promotions.

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Tendency to keep persons in same job year after year with money raise in some cases only.

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Tab E PAY & PROMOTION

I was transferred from one division to another on 1 October 1952 to replace a GS-7. I was at that time a GS-5 and had been in that grade about two years and doing similiar work to that which I was to take over. At the time I accepted the transfer I was told that within 90 days I would be given my GS-7.

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After about 2 or 3 days working with the former incumbent I took over the work completely on my own. At the same time I was taking over the work I also had to teach another girl a part of the work. This girl knew nothing about the job. When she left I had to train another girl to do the same work who also knew nothing about the work.

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As yet I have not been given the GS-7 I was promised. My Administrative Officer stated I could not be given a two grade jump since I was in Administrative work. In the latter part of September 1953 I was finally given a GS-6 and the girl I taught part of the work and who came into the Agency in Feburary or March 1953 was also given a GS-6 at the same time even though I am still answering questions for her and she only knows a part of the actual job.

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Others who have transferred from the same office I formerly worked in to other divisions have been given their promotions form GS-5 to GS-7 and are doing similiar work to mine. One did work 90 days and was given her promotion and one did not have to work 90 days to get her promotion.

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To me it is an insult to keep an individual who has the qualifications and can and is doing a job without instruction at a grade lower than the actual grade of the position he or she is occupying. Also I believe it should be uniform throughout the Agency whether and administrative person can or cannot jump two grades.

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Promotion opportunities are plentiful but once again persons from within are often overlooked in filling jobs. This is too often the fault of an operational brance rather than personnel. For example; personnel who have been in this branch for more than one year presently number one man (the branch chief) and five women. At the moment, I can think of only one female who has achieved the rank of section chief - and she keeps the files for a branch. Also, piople who have been recommended for promotions 6 months ago are still wound up in red tape with no end in sight.

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Promotion system in office seems to be tied up in red tape and confusion as a result of conflicting directers and promotion policy. This results in inadequate pay for the job.

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Since I have been in service, I have never had a clear explanation of what constituted grounds for promotion, when to expect promotion or when to apply for it. I learned by virtue of "cunning and intuition" some of the actualities which were being practiced in this regard which seemed in many cases to be advancing individuals endowed with no special ability but a healthy supply of "cunning and intuition" and leaving consientious men in one salary level for an inordinately long period of time. I myself have been very fairly

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Tab E PAY & PROMOTION (con't)

treated so I speak for others. I have knowledge of three individuals of about the same age, who have been in service for approximately the same period of time and who have roughly the same amount of responsibility who are respectively drawing salaries as a GS-9, GS-7 and GS-5. I feel that a clarification of promotion should be given new employees and they should be told what they can expect with a timetable as is the practice in private firms.

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(I was recommended for promotion twice, both times in the Field.) (On the first occasion, in May 1952, after being presented to the Field Promotion board in June 1952, it was deferred until September 1952.) I was informed at the time that because a new man was taking charge of the Branch in June '52 for which I was working that it was believed he should initiate promotion requests. In November 1952 the new Chief recommended me for promotion. (It was considered and approved and forwarded to Washington by the Field Promotion Board in December 1952) In January 1953 I was informed that promotions were frozen pending approval of the new T/O. Later in January 1953 I was informed that only persons having slots in the Field T/O could be promoted. Shortly thereafter I was notified that I was on the surplus list, slated to return PCS to Washington before completion of my 2-year overseas tour. (When assigned to my current job in late May 1953 I was told that I would have to work at it for at least three months before I could be considered for promotion here at Headquarters. Since then there have been no concrete developments promotion-wise for me.)

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Promotion opportunities are inconsistenly. This applies as well to the implementation of the career system. When the Agency, as typified by an administrative unit with which I am familiar, is graciously changing the status of an individual from a Clerk to an I. O., or a Grade 5 to a Grade 7, or a Grade 7 to a Grade 9, the process involved is analogous to the negotiation of an Austrian peace treaty. One does not hear of such intricate convolutions taking place when grades above 9 are being awared.

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After one year of service on the staff, I am unable to get any positive comments on the possibility of a raise. Since my Personnel Evaluation Report was faverable and a full year has been completed, it would seem that some decision would be in order conderning my possible advance from the clerical to the professional ranks. The assignments of the past year have not been the clerical assignments of a personnel clerk.

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Experience with the promotion opportunities has been that there is no logical system; too often it is not based on ability or performance but on some other criteria.

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Inefficient use of personnel has blocked normal advancement opportunities.

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Tab F Security

[redacted]

These seem to be general indications of insufficient backstopping and hastily contrived covers, which are not healthy.

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In my opinion each returning individual from an overseas station is a potential security risk. Cover provided is so thin that individual is hampered in his normal existence. It is difficult to buy property, establish credit, purchase an automobile etc. This is particularily true of individuals who have been [redacted] 25X1

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Subject was a case officer in charge of training agents in a small town in Europe during the winter of 1952. During the spring months, people became aware of just what was going on in the training area. In fact, due to the lack of help, and superivision, the trainees frequently slipped into the town for various illicit purposes. When it became quite evident that the entire country side knew what was going on, the operation was moved. After being in the area for five months. During the subsequent months, additional training projects moved into the area, one that was completely insecure because of the previously blown operation. By the spring of 1953, there were still several training groups in the area. One of these groups was dispatched into [redacted] picked up and confessed everything they knew about their training, the area and American personnel envolved. It all pointed to this region being discussed. The European newspapers picked up the subsequent [redacted] charges but they were flatly denied by the American authorities, even though it was almost common knowledge in that part of the country that this type of activity was going on. ILLEGIB ILLEGIB

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At times very irrational. Unreasonable use of police tactics has been known to cut production of an entire division for a week at a time. This issue is dynamite as far as morale is concerned--doesn't arise often but is certainly negatively effective when it does.

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The small segments of security are stressed too much and the overall not stressed enough.

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Security continued.

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The extremely loose dissemination of published intelligence information is a definite security hazard, e.g., why is it that information from covert or semi-covert sources must be sent to all IAC agencies and to every component of CIA as a "courtesy". Only those agencies and those components actively working with the collection of specific types should have access to appropriate reports.

It is suggested that Service personnel attached to overseas CIA installations be given stricter security briefings. It is obvious from published interrogation results carried out by Service personnel that the difference between "sensitive" or operational and positive intelligence has no line drawn.

Security talks should be given all CIA employees periodically to enable them to keep abreast with new security regulations as well as to keep security in mind. New employees in covert offices as well as "overt" employees transferring to covert offices should have more briefing of security aspects in the covert sections than to be requested to read endless pages of the regulations.

New employees should have operational vs. positive intelligence explained more fully.

Information classified "Secret" is being treated as casually as if it had been published in the newspapers.

Office talk at outside gatherings in the presence of unauthorized persons (i.e., former employees of CIA as well as the husband or wife of a CIA employee) is still too rampant. It is shocking the information that can be picked up at alcoholic as well as non-alcoholic parties.

In several cases security is overdone, i.e. Dick Tracy stuff. However there are also places where cover is inadequate for its purpose--it does not cover anything.

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Security is too vaguely defined, enforced and coordianted by responsible elements. There is a security problem in every detailed segment of Agency activities. The people responsible for security know too little about specific problems and confine themselves to dispensing general and unrealistic directives.

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It is difficult to make brief comment on security practises. When the practise of security, as the Agency teaches it, amuses non-Agency people, we are fooling only ourselves and certainly not the enemy. To my mind security and cover are all or nothing. To excuse malfunctions because of security on the one hand and then to break security for convenience on the other, is difficult to understand. Open association with the Agency in Washington both physically and by statement does not mean you can go to the field and be automatically disassociated.

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In spite of the warnings expressed as long as nine months beforehand, theywere not heeded and the inevitable major flap occurred. Even after it occurred, it was four months before the training areawas completely shut down.

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Many polygraph interviews very poorly handled, leaving permanent and undesirable mental scar tissue on those accepted and denied (fear and distrust of security office). The intimidation and abasement of prospective employees is poor public relations and personnel policy.

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Tab G Training

Training has been of a negative nature; i.e. it has been largely a matter of picking up information through reading various Agency materials, brief contacts with various phases of personnel through numerous short-term assignments, etc. No supervisory conferences have occurred for the purpose of outlining my development or discussing my progress.

Training. I think at least some training involves the problem of T.O. I have had difficulty sending in an application for a long term training course because my supervisor feels that as long as I appear on his T.O., his superiors expect so much work done. If I am gone for a prolonged period, then he feels his record is impaired. If this is the state of affairs, then it would be logical to transfer people in training from office T.O. to a training T.O.

If testing is to be continued, testing for the measurement of emotional stability (and discretion) and maturity would benefit the Agency. Recent tragedies have indicated a lack of the above or extremely poor working conditions or both.

I think training is getting on a more solid footing now. I also think they are getting plenty of complaints from people who want to know why, if its so important that they go through training now, they weren't put through all basic training immediately upon coming aboard. No one should be allowed to sit at a desk until he has received all the training or has the equivalent experience required for that job.

Have noticed improvement in training facilities and opportunities over last 3 years, however, this improvement applies largely to persons who have recently joined the agency; training for employees of more than two years standing is still quite inadequate.

Too much emphasis has recently been placed on training (operational nature), much of which will be of little or no benefit to many people in the type of jobs they now hold. Real economy could be accomplished here if a stop was put to the indiscriminate training procedures now in effect within the DDP complex.

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Tab H Efficient Use of Monies

My position is directly concerned with the spending of money. In numerous instances where I have found opportunities to save considerable amounts of money or when I have questioned the justifiability of spending money, I have not had the authority to control such expenditures nor have I had the cooperation of other employees or their superior officers. In one particular instance when I questioned the spending of several thousands of dollars, the supervisor of the employee involved replied that he couldn't understand why I was concerned - that the government had the money and as long as "Uncle Sam" was paying the bills, he didn't care. After I consulted administrative officers for advice, the employee concerned happily found ways in which he could cut this expenditure in half. I believe all employees would have more respect for the organization for which they are working, for their employers and for their own responsibilities if more rigid controls were enforced regarding the spending of funds.

EFFICIENT USE OF MONIES (operationally): Since my experience was not in the field of operations I have very little comment that I can make. I have witnessed, however, grave errors made in purchase of ships and aircraft. These errors resulted from individuals assigned the responsibility of these purchases, being unfamiliar with the requirement, and unqualified to perform this assignment.

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Tab J Medical Compensation

Immediate consideration should be given to the establishment of a disability compensation program similar or identical to that employ- by the military services. This would greatly improve the morale of personnel engaged in hazardous duty. While it is realized that such a program will probably require legislation, the action should be initiated.

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Little is known of the Agency's policy and/or practices in this regard. My experience has been that overseas an individual is provided with free medical care, but if his health was seriously impaired as a result "on the job performance" it is not known what compensation would be provided by the agency.

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As of this date men in the field in hazardous assignments cannot obtain either Agency insurance or hospitalization coverage unless they are under official cover. Fine situation.

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"Currently, each serious injury or illness is treated as something entirely new, all of which causes long delays in providing services, a loss of man hours and poor security, particularly if the patient is covered by BEC. All of this causes the individual undue strain as to his status, as well as his present and future medical treatment. In short, at present there is a distinct lack of authority, control and direction in handling employees who become serious medical cases in the line of duty."

RECOMMENDATIONS:

a) That a medical system of compensation similar to those used by the services, be studied and considered, whereby an individual is covered in practically all cases.

b) That the present sick leave regulations be ammended to better accommodate serious medical cases in case of injury sustained in the line of duty.

c) That the procedure to be followed and areas of responsibility be clearly established.

d) That emergency medical slots be established at Division or Staff level to handle serious medical cases resulting while the employee is on duty.

e) That sufficient funds be set aside to handle all of the accruing financial Agency obligations, such as pay, bills and disability compensation.

f) That final disposition of the case be turned over to the CIA/CSB's with consultant advice coming from the division concerned, Security and Medical offices."

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Tab K Intangible Dissatisfactions

It has been determined that many of the T.O. Slots at Headquarters do not jive with those in the field as far as the assignment of personnel. It has been determined on many occasions that individuals recruited for certain slots, are actually better qualified to fill other slots, sometimes of a more technical nature.

In each occasion, Headquarters is advised of this transfer and a request is submitted to make the necessary adjustment to the T.O. at Headquarters to offset possibility of duplicate recruitment and to make it possible for the individual concerned to receive credit for his new assignment in his official personnel file at Headquarters.

Unfortunately this has not always been the case. I personally was penalized for being in a slot, which I had never occupied except as collateral duties, when a recommendation for promotion was submitted. The recommendation was turned down since the slot only called for the grade that I held and no consideration was mentioned of my primary responsibilities in a position(s) calling for at least one or two grades higher.

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Many of the men returning from this Station were not given credit for their transfers to positions of greater responsibility and as a result when they are out "canvassing for a position of reassignment" their personnel files do not reflect this advancement. This can curtail in many instances their future with the Agency and deprive the Agency of the skills of this individual(s) that were gained through field experience.

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I have seen a man with a GS-7 rating with a GS-12's responsibilities and capabilities. He was responsible for the care of and training in the use of hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of arms and amunition, he was a man of excellent training and experience, thoroughly capable of the job and indeed worthy of pay and the title equal to the job he was required to do. This experience also is not limited to just one case.

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The Case Officer is a responsible, basic individual to the inverted pyramid construction of the DDP complex. Yet regard for his job and responsibility is demonstrated by poor understanding from the staff level (Div.)and support staff such as covert training. This stems largely from the fact that few staff officers have ever been case officers.

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My experience has indicated that the Agency's policy towards these items has been adquate. The only major shortcoming that I have observed in that the T.O. in the field and the T.O. at Headquarters does not in all cases agree. It is quite possible as a result of this inconsistency that an individual will not receive credit for duties performed and recommendation for promotion submitted by the field not receiving favorable consideration.

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Influence keyed to ratings rather than knowledgeability.

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"Whom you know" is the answer to personal aggrandizement and job accomplishment. Proper channels are often circumvented for practical reasons--they are too lumbering for efficient work.

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I find that having an approximately equal GS level is a more effective help in doing business than having knowledge and experience with the specific task at hand.

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I have filled a 12 slot since January of 1951, coming on board as a 7 and while being promoted rather rapidly to an 11 at the present time, I feel that I should have been hired as a 12. No one told me that the slot was a 12 slot. This can be said to be my "hard luck", but I do believe people should be given the pay if they are considered able to fill the slot.

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Much of my work with my division could hardly be classified in other than clerical category. With not too immense a lack of modesty, I hereby claim that my abilities exceed those demanded by clerical work. I have no complaints along this line re my present assignment.

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I have a special commentary rather than a criticism of this item. I believe that no one working for this service should expect or want any prestige from outside circles due to the nature of the duties which he enters into. The fact that several people do (perhaps some of those who are commenting in this study) is the result, again, of insufficient and poor briefing and indoctrination.

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In my own office I have found that undesirable situations such as overcrowded working space have not been remedied apparently because of lack of influence on the part of office heads. In one small room ten people are packed in among numerous file cabinets and other office equipment. The crowded condition has resulted in short tempers among the staff and an overall morale problem. The administrators have presented the problem to the proper people but so far have been unable to obtain action. The situation grows steadily worse and at least one emotional upset occurs every day.

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Individual interviewed is an administrative officer, senior grade:

1. Lack of information on what a career means--how to go about "joining"; lack of info. re. other jobs--qualifications, movement possibilities, etc.
2. Lack of active career mechanisms--no authority.
3. Poor recruitment (professionals in clerical jobs).
4. Overseas rotation difficulties.
5. Recommends executive inventory including junior officers.
6. Problem of recognition for academic personnel; security restriction too tight in unnecessary areas.

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Individual interviewed is an executive officer:

1. Recruitment and initial assignment definite factor in low morale, particularly professionals doing clerical work.
2. Time, money, and personnel waste due to faulty supervision is very large problem. Recommends mandatory supervisory training for supervisory personnel. Management program must have backing from top down.
3. Lack of career system and information program has resulted in let-down feeling, feeling of being tricked for individuals who had heard the original plans and who know the "paper" policy that exists.

Personnel Officer with Agency since its inception:

1. Lack of working career program of great concern.
2. Supervisory training essential. Idea of grade determining supervisory responsibility needs revision, particularly re. technicians or scholars of high competence in their field, but without management ability.
3. Favors establishing a means of tabbing capable junior officers who demonstrate potential for future more responsible jobs if such can be done with discrimination or classification.

Senior grade administrative officer:

1. Generally, no observed morale problem except placement of professionals in clerical jobs. (However, several individuals interviewed were from this office and indicated a serious morale problem--particularly in regard to mediocre or incompetent supervision).
2. Agreed that the Career Program needs "teeth".
3. Desires cooperation between offices re. rotation.
4. Favors system of earmarking junior officers of demonstrated ability without creating an elite corps.
5. Essentiality of career information program expressed.

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Appendix C

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

(NOTE: On the following page is a chart depicting the Committee's concept of the Career Service machinery recommended in Part III of this study.)

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S E C R E T
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PROPOSED CAREER SERVICE
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



LEGEND:
CSB = Career Service Board
CSC = Career Service Chief
CMO = Career Management Officer

——— = Normal Command Channel
- - - - = Career Service Responsibility Channel

(NOTE: Existing Boards having the designations of P, I, A, TR, and CO would be replaced by the component CSBs indicated above.)

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Appendix D

INTERVIEW STATISTICS

(NOTE: On the following page is a reproduction of the Questionnaire used by the Committee in its poll. The composite figures - representing the answers of the 115 people interviewed - are entered in the appropriate spaces. The discrepancy in totals arises from the fact that some people did not even check the "Not Applicable" category - either from total lack of interest or from, perhaps, understandable confusion as to the import of the question. The Committee, again, wishes to emphasize that the results of this poll are offered for convenience; the poll does not purport to be a thoroughly representative sampling of Agency-wide opinion.)

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1. The following questionnaire is an anonymous survey of various career-type individuals regarding their views on topics which affect all CIA personnel. Answers to the following questions should be based upon personal experience.

2. In your opinion are the following policies and/or practices (a) adequate, (b) inadequate, (c) not applicable. If your opinion is (b) (inadequate), please comment.

		(a)	(b)	(c)	Totals
A.	RECRUITMENT AND INITIAL JOB PLACEMENT....	38	67	10	115
B.	ROTATION AND REASSIGNMENT.....	17	74	24	115
C.	DELEGATION OF RESPONSIBILITY.....	60	38	17	115
D.	SUPERVISION.....	62	43	10	115
E.	EFFICIENT USE OF TIME.....	52	47	14	113
F.	EFFICIENT USE OF PERSONNEL.....	25	79	11	115
G.	EFFICIENT USE OF MONIES (operationally)..	31	32	51	114
H.	INFLUENCE COMMENSURATE WITH JOB.....	63	18	27	108
I.	PAY COMMENSURATE WITH JOB.....	65	37	12	114
J.	JOB COMMENSURATE WITH ABILITY.....	52	35	27	114
K.	PROMOTION OPPORTUNITIES.....	48	48	18	114
L.	CAREER SYSTEM,.....	22	66	24	112
M.	MILITARY CREDIT.....	13	18	64	95
N.	TRAINING.....	54	31	21	106
O.	SECURITY.....	52	33	10	95
P.	PRESTIGE (external).....	31	12	25	68
Q.	MEDICAL COMPENSATION.....	23	15	28	66

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Appendix E

RATE OF TURNOVER TABLE

(NOTE: On the following page is a table reflecting percentage rates of turnover - Agency-wide - for various grades. The Committee wishes to reiterate its feeling that these figures are not too significant in that they, obviously, do not reflect the continuing discontent which vitiates the morale and sense of dedication of the Junior Officers still on board.)

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MONTHLY SEPARATION RATE
EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF PERCENTAGE
FOR MALES, FEMALES & COMBINED SEXES

	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE
TOTAL AGENCY	1.4	1.1	1.9
CS TOTAL	0.9	1.1	1.9
GS-13 & ABOVE	0.9	0.8	1.2
GS-7 THRU GS-12	1.0	0.9	1.2
GS-6 & BELOW	2.3	2.5	2.3
OTHER (CPC,WB & PL's)	1.0	1.0	0.9

NOTE: Above separation rate is based on a 6-month period (March thru August) and covers only employees. It excludes military personnel and contractual personnel.

MONTHLY SEPARATION RATE
EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF PERCENTAGE
FOR MAJOR AGENCY COMPONENTS

AGENCY COMPONENT	SEPARATION RATE PER MONTH
AGENCY	1.4
DCI	1.6
COMMO	1.3
TRAINING	1.6
DDA	1.4
DDP	1.4
DDI	1.2
IAB	2.7

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