and resolved in our considerations of the proposed limited nuclear test ban treaty.

As it stands, of course, the treaty contains no provision for inspection. We see no need for it. We are in full agreement with the President’s decision, that we can check on the performance of the signatory nations by the use of our detection devices. That is, we do not need the treaty area of the treaty proposal which cannot be checked by black boxes, or satellites, or ionization counters or any technical means.

That is section 2 of article I. Let me read it:

Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.

The wording seems clear to me. A nation that signs this treaty will not cause a nuclear explosion, or test, anywhere in any of the environments described. A nation that signs this treaty would pledge not to encourage any such test. A nation that signs this treaty would not participate in any such test.

Let us now get down to cases. That clause says that we will not cause, encourage, or participate in regard to any tests that, for instance, the French might carry out. That clause says that the Soviets will not cause, encourage, or participate in regard to any tests that Red China might carry out, to cite just one of the nations that could be involved on our side.

How in the world can any such clause be meaningful if there is no way to inspect it for possible violations?

And how in the world can it be inspected for possible violation through existing technical means? The answer seems clear. It punched a major hole in the validity of the treaty.

Cannot the Soviets immediately claim that they are not violating the clause by sharing nuclear information with France? Cannot we immediately ask what protection there is in the treaty against Soviet tests inside the fastness of China? Talk of splits between the Chinese and the Soviets are no more meaningful in this than talk of splits between ourselves and the French. We still know whose friend is who and what the possibilities for violation actually are.

Secretary Rusk has commented on this by saying that we will not cause, encourage, or participate in regard to French nuclear testing. He can be believed, I am sure. Whether the Russians will share that belief, I cannot say. But Secretary Rusk can contemplate the other possibility—of the Soviet working with the Red Chinese simply says that he does not believe they will. That is not the sort of assurance on which a treaty can be based.

Inspection of the shipment of fissionable material would be just one of the sorts of inspection that this particular treaty area seems to envisage. Transfer of technicians and even of information seems another area. In short, it cries and begs for rigorous inspection and yet provides for absolutely nothing.

In that way it is symbolic of the entire treaty. It seems only half thought through. It is clear that the Senate have tried to plug some of the thinking so obviously lacking, lest the mistakes of a few negotiators become the peril of the entire nation, of an entire way of life.

I have spoken of one part of the treaty which demands actual, physical inspection and which will make the treaty meaningful. With that I do not want to gloss over, by that single point, the general impact that this treaty has upon the principle of inspection to which we have hewved with this very proposal.

We have, through countless negotiations with the Soviet, placed the heaviest emphasis upon the need for International inspection of arms agreements. That principle now is dropped in the proposed test ban treaty.

How, having finally renounced our demands for inspection, could we expect to present in future arms control agreements with which we may be faced?

Our position in the United Nations also has reflected part of this problem. We have long been firmly opposed to declaratory treaties, those treaties which simply declare a goal but provide no realistic machinery for inspection, maintenance, or effectiveness. That proposed partial nuclear test ban treaty is surely just such a declaratory treaty. Does it establish a broader precedent than even the arms control precedent? Will it, indeed, establish an entire new avenue of American diplomacy and relationship to international agreements of all sorts? Surely we must not beg this question in studying the proposed treaty.

The people of the United States have, and their representatives have, surely arrived at some conclusion on the need to inspect, and carefully to provide for inspection of any treaty signed with the Soviet Union. Our experience in Cuba alone shows how easily we may be burned. Even with the best air inspection, how long did it take before this Nation was permitted to awaken to the presence of Soviet missiles there? It took time before we knew.

We risk our lives then. How much more would we be risking our lives now in signing a treaty dealing with the mightiest weapons of all but with no inspection beyond sniffing the air, feeling the ground, or scanning the skies?

No, the question of inspection is not one that is apart from this treaty. Inspection is most too involved. It must be involved. I call on my colleagues to give this matter their most serious and urgent consideration.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

MR. GOLDWATER. I am happy to yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I am sure the Senator knows that the test ban treaty which is now the subject of hearings provides a very effective means by which this country can protect its security interests, that is, by having in case there is any violation, we can do this on our own volition, by serving notice on a 90-day basis; or, if we assume that there has been a violation, we can withdraw immediately.

I am sure the Senator knows that it is the position of this Government, from all the reports that have been given us in the hearings, to maintain at peak performance our laboratories and scientific capacity in the field of nuclear science and in the field of nuclear weaponry. We intend to maintain testing equipment for atmospheric, underwater and outer space to be ready alert, and to engage in an extensive underground tests, which are costly and time consuming—an area of testing the Soviet Union has not perfected but has one in which we have expert knowledge.

Finally, I point out to the Senator from Arizona that when raising these doubts—which surely is a legitimate activity on the part of any interested citizens or Senators—it is also important to cite what we do to overcome the doubts. For example, we have the most extensive system of inspection and detection of nuclear explosion of any nation on the earth. We have acoustical, electronic, and seismic detection and identification systems. Those systems are tied in with those of other countries.

The particular treaty under discussion would not cover underground tests for the purpose of inspection. Our international inspection system was primarily intended to extend upward to the surface tests. In this environment we needed on-site inspections within the Soviet Union to be able to ascertain whether there had been a violation by underground testing. The problem here is one of differentiating between earthquakes and underground nuclear explosions. This requires an extensive system of seismic stations surrounding the Soviet Union and within the Soviet Union, and a freedom to move within the Soviet Union for on-site inspection.

A limited nuclear test ban treaty relies upon the national systems of surveillance: seismic, electronic and acoustical systems, plus the regular intelligence gathering of Western Government and of friendly countries.

Furthermore, the treaty will be signed by many more nations, all of whom have a stake in seeing the treaty enforced and observed.

I rise to protest the strawmen that are set up day after day for someone to come in later and knock down and say, 'I have proved my point.'

The basic structure of this treaty was submitted by the previous administration; it has been recommended by Members of Congress, by resolutions. The treaty before us is the most simple and direct treaty we could sign in our national interest. The testimony reveals that it is in our national interest. I do not feel that we ought to be frightened off by some people as to what is in this treaty or what it means to our security.

The treaty provides every safeguard that could possibly be provided. The treaty provides more safeguards than there were in the case of unsuspected
moratorium, which was approved by the previous administration, and which includes ground tests.

The treaty requires careful consideration. The hearings have been productive. Nothing has been said in the hearings to suggest that it is not known before or which would in any way frighten the American people into a position of doubt as to the reliability of the instrument we have signed.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I have been listening very carefully. I have been trying to ascertain the point the Senator is trying to make.

I agree with what the Senator has said, but I think the point he is trying to get across is that Senators have no right to stand up and ask questions about the treaty.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Not at all.

Mr. GOLDWATER. If the Senator will read my remarks carefully, he will find there is an area of doubt, but not in the same area. The Senator from Minnesota has raised some very legitimate points. I agree with them. I agree with the Senate about our policy. I agree with the Senator that this treaty is not the right way to go. I agree with him on the need to have a strong, independent, and useful treaty. I do not agree with him on the point that we are not standing up and asking these questions. The Senator from Minnesota represents that this treaty is not going to work, that the inspection is not going to work, and that the Senator from Minnesota represents that this treaty is not going to work, that the inspection is not going to work, and that we are not standing up and asking these questions.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator is entitled to his discussions.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I am glad to hear that.

Mr. HUMPHREY. He would be remiss in his duty if he did not.

All I am saying is that the Senator has indicated certain things. He has indicated that the treaty would not be subject to inspection—which is not true. It is subject to inspection—it is subject to our national inspection system.

The Senator has questioned whether or not the treaty would be abided by. I think the point he is trying to make is that the American people is a conservative, namely that the treaty is an open invitation to avoidance or evasion. The Senator says the treaty is not subject to inspection. I say it is subject to inspection. The Senator's questions tend to obscure rather than illuminate the Senate's consideration of this treaty.

Mr. GOLDWATER. It is not subject to the scope of inspection that we have been insisting on year after year.

Mr. HUMPHREY. For underground tests?
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the United States. What is needed is reassurance from those who have listened to and that is the answer. All the questions that have been asked are being answered respectfully and effectively. The testimony of Secretary Rusk, the Senate's resolution, and the testimony of Mr. McNamara, as well as the testimony of other witnesses who have appeared before the committee, has been candid, to the point, pertinent, and responsive to the questions that have been asked by thoughtful Senators, including the distinguished Senator from Arizona. But let us now acknowledge that these questions have been answered.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senate yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I do not believe I have missed one session of the committee hearings on this treaty. I have heard Dean Rusk, and I have heard General Taylor. The fact is there is one question in my mind indicates that there are areas in the treaty to be questioned. I do not believe a treaty should be brought before the Senate and voted on in such a manner as to make the Senate responsible for the treaty as the primary, basic instrument of foreign policy. However, I believe it is a very important step in our effort to prevent further proliferation of these weapons. It is not the answer to all problems. It does not represent a major step toward disarmament. It does not reduce our military power. There are many things that it does not do.

As the President says in his message to the Senate, this is the first concrete result of 18 years of effort by the United States to impose limits on the nuclear arms race.

Then he goes on to say:

This is the first concrete result of 18 years of effort by the United States to impose limits on the nuclear arms race.

I thank the Senator for his indulgence. I will examine the Senator's speech in more detail. The Senator says, "Having finally removed our demands for inspection, could we expect to press those demands in future arms control agreements with which we may be faced?" I say that of that kind of question is misleading.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Is it a fair question?

Mr. HUMPHREY. It is not a fair question.

Mr. GOLDWATER. It is not?

Mr. HUMPHREY. No. It is not fair because we have not renounced our demands for inspection. Our demands for inspection are in connection with a comprehensive nuclear test treaty. The Senator from Minnesota has said on the floor dozens of times that he has been in favor of this proposal, and encourages it. Furthermore, I have not heard his entire speech. I have heard only a part of it. However, in his speech the Senator says, "Now in the world we can say such clause be meaningful if there is no way to inspect it for possible violations?"

Mr. GOLDWATER. Is that a fair question?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes; but the answer is as obvious as the presence of the Senator from Arizona.

The GOLDWATER. Why?

Mr. HUMPHREY. There are means of inspection; and the Senate knows it. He ought to be telling the American people that the means of inspection; namely, the inspection system of the United States, which is managed by the U.S. Air Force, of which the Senator is a renowned and distinguished member.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I wish the Senator would read the entire statement at his leisure. If he does so, he will see that I am not referring to a specific inspection which we have discussed previously. I am talking about the question that arose as a result of the signing of the treaty with other countries; namely, the extent to which they might allow another country to develop a nuclear power which they now have no opportunity to develop. I wish the Senator would read the entire statement, and not take portions of it out of context. I believe I have raised a fair, legitimate question. If the Senator can answer it, I shall be grateful to him.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I shall try to do so. With respect to inspection, we have not renounced our requirement for inspection in a comprehensive treaty. I believe that the Senator's statement presents a constant attitude of doubt and suspicion. I do not believe it makes a constructive contribution to a thoughtful discussion of the all-important treaty that is before us.

There is a doubt on some points. There is some doubt as to what will be the reaction of the Soviet Union if we were to give nuclear weapons and missiles to other countries. The Senator from Oregon [Mr. Mosses] has asked for specific information on that point from the Department, and he will get it. There is no way to know what the Chinese will do, or what the Chinese will try to do, or how the Chinese will act. It is possible that no Chinese weapons were used in the Chinese civil war, but they have been discovered in other places. The fact is that we do not know what we could expect if China were to explode a nuclear device. All these questions have been referred to in testimony, and they have been discussed at length. All the Senator from Minnesota is saying is that a continuation of the recital of the doubters, the setting up of straws, and the occasional knocking down of those straws by the one who initially sets them up, does not contribute to what I believe to be a thoughtful consideration of the treaty.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senate yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Perhaps I am in error, but when I am engaged in dealing with the Soviet Union, the Communists, I believe I have some ground for being a bit distrustful, and I shall continue to be.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Every man is distrustful. It is "old hat" to say that we ought to be distrustful of the Communists.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Is it wrong to say it?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Indeed not; let the Senator say it repeatedly. However, it does not follow that the Senator's argument is wrong. No treaty with the Soviet Union will be worth the paper it is written on unless it contains some mutual advantages. Furthermore, as Admiral Radford once said: "We develop our system of international inspection as an alternative to trust."

Mr. President, we have poured millions of dollars into the system of international inspection.

We have far-flung inspection facilities, and every Member of this body is fully aware of it. I believe the American people have been persuaded to be completely satisfied with the inspection facilities, that the treaty is not a declaration of war, that it involves a system of inspection. They
should be told that we are paying for it, and that we will rely upon our inspection system to make sure that the treaty is observed and that there is no violation of it. A violation, we will be ready to take whatever action is appropriate upon the existing circumstances.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

MR. HUMPHREY. The Senator is so helpful about admitting all these wonderful things.

Mr. GOLDWATER. If the Senator will allow me to direct his attention to the basic question that arises by the language of the treaty, I have no doubt about our inspection. I think I know as much about it as does the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Perhaps more.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I have great faith in the Senator. I am aware of its weaknesses, but we are not discussing today that. I am discussing a question I have in my mind, that I stated on the floor of the Senate, but which, except for the last part, the Senator from Minnesota did not hear. The Senator from Minnesota took exception to it. When he studies the question I propounded, if he can enlighten me on the subject, I shall be very happy to be enlightened. He will not find the question on the last page.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Despite all the gentle protestations, when I read again what the Senator from Arizona said, it is quite obvious what the impact or import of the question is. We know that suspicion exists apart from the treaty. I call upon all Senators to give this subject their serious attention. The Senator from Minnesota will give it serious consideration. Inspection is involved. The Senator from Arizona asks:

How much more would we be risking our lives now in signing a treaty dealing with the mightiest weapons of all but with no inspection of the air, feeling the ground, or scanning the skies?

Sniffing the air under the inspection system we have is a little more than talking about hay fever. It is a mighty process. It involves planes and manpower. It involves the highest, most intricate techniques of air inspection and filtration for atomic debris. It means scanning the skies with radar and electronic devices. That is no little picture of looking up at the milky way or the moon. It is a mighty, technical, and effective process.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. So let the Senator from Arizona put the question directly. He said the issue was inspection. That issue is about how a treaty. It is our inspection system. We are a judge of whether the treaty is being fulfilled. If ever there was a treaty that protected the nation sovereignly of the United States of America, this is it. If there were an international inspection system, I can imagine the Senator saying, “Are we going to trust those foreigners?”

No, we are trusting ourselves, and are trusting the inspection apparatus that any country has ever known.

Mr. GOLDWATER. We are getting into a discussion without the Senator’s recitation of my question. He is not giving attention to what I ask him.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Would the Senator like to tell me what the question is? I have re-read his statement the second time.

Mr. GOLDWATER. No; the Senator has not.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I would be most happy to have the Senator state the question.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I hope the Senator will read the question and give me an intelligent answer, because I think I asked a legitimate question. It has nothing to do with our inspection system.

Mr. HUMPHREY. What is the Senator talking about in his speech? Would he mind defining his remarks?

Mr. GOLDWATER. It refers to section 2 of article 1. That language reads:

Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes further to be guided by the principles of causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosions, or any act of nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this article.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. GOLDWATER. This wording, as I said, seems clear:

A nation that signs this treaty will not cause a nuclear explosion, or test, anywhere in any of the banned environments.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Then:

A nation that signs this treaty would not contribute to any such test.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes; that has been testified in the hearings.

Mr. GOLDWATER. A nation that signs this treaty would not participate in any such test.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator from Arizona is making a good case for the treaty, and the question?

Mr. GOLDWATER. I have yet to get to that. That clause provides that we will not cause, encourage, or participate in regard to any test Red China may carry out.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. GOLDWATER. This is where the present inspection system, in my opinion, is not meaningful, and where I have a question. How in the world can any such test be meaningful if there is no way to inspect for possible violations?

There must be a way to inspect for possible violations. We can inspect on the basis of our ability. I think we can do so without violating anything, that we can inspect the mainland, homeland, of Russia. I do not think we are set up to inspect any disturbances that might be geological in nature in China.

Mr. HUMPHREY. We can do so every bit as well as we can in Russia.

Mr. GOLDWATER. We cannot discuss that subject on the floor of the Senate.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator from Arizona and I know that. I do not say we can inspect all seismic events in Russia, but we can do it as well there as we can in China.

Mr. GOLDWATER. We cannot talk about that on the floor of the Senate. That is the question I would like to have answered.

Mr. HUMPHREY. What is the other question? The question is one of inspection. The Senator from Arizona not only raises the point of inspection in that situation, but the entire force of his speech was upon the subject of inspection, planting doubts in the American mind as to whether the treaty provides for inspection.

I say unqualifiedly that the treaty provides for inspection—our inspection. Who else said so? Secretary Rusk, Mr. McConaughy, and General Taylor. They were witnesses before the committee. Secretary McNamara also testified.

Everyone knows that the treaty provides for inspection. Whether the inspection is as good as it ought to be is a question that can be decided. I am of the opinion that our inspection system can be improved. But let the record be perfectly clear that we do not trust the Soviet and they do not trust us. We have our inspection system. They have theirs. Whichever is the alternative to trust. To me, the treaty is an enforcible document to protect our national security. We will rely on our national inspection system. The taxpayers of the United States have put hundreds of millions of dollars into this system and have reached a number of agreements with the friendly powers of the world, with whom theirs is in of their inspection systems with our own. Many scores of countries will sign the treaty, all of them interested in seeing that the treaty is abided by.

The argument of the Senator from Arizona has very weak underpinnings. It is primarily an expression of doubt, to which he knows the answer. That is the kind of protest the Senator from Arizona makes. I can question whether today is Monday and tomorrow will be Tuesday, but I can raise a question. But there are answers to everything that is proposed, and the answers have been made public. The answer to the Senator’s speech is in the record. It was answered by the Sec-