H. PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNITY COORDINATION

4. PLEASE GIVE SPECIFIC EXAMPLES, INCLUDING DATES AND CONTENTS, OF ANY ITEMS OF INTELLIGENCE PRESENTED BY THE AGENCY WHICH HAVE BEEN WITHHELD FROM PUBLICATION, DELAYED, OR SIGNIFICANTLY ALTERED BY THE COORDINATION PROCESS. IF DELAYED, HOW LONG? IF ALTERED, IN WHAT WAY?

As a result of USIB discussion on 7 September, a restraint was placed on the dissemination of all intelligence alluding to the existence of coastal defense cruise missile sites in Cuba, except to those who had an absolute need to know. Following the USIB meeting on 13 September, this restraint was expanded to restrict the dissemination of any intelligence relating to the delivery of offensive weapons to Cuba, the use of Cuba as a Soviet base, the stockpiling of weapons in Cuba for transshipment to other points in Latin America and indications of Cuban aggressiveness. Again dissemination was to be accomplished only to those personnel who had an absolute need to know. Thus, the DIA/CIIC was unable to report developments of this nature in its publications.

On 12 October a formal control system was established with respect to intelligence relating to the delivery or presence in Cuba of offensive weapons, actual or implied. A specific code-word (PSALM) was created under which all such intelligence was wrapped up at the TOP SECRET level. Very narrow lists of personnel eligible to have access to TOP SECRET PSALM intelligence were created within the military departments (outside of intelligence) under the criteria that only those serving in an advisory capacity to the President on the Cuban problem were to have access to such intelligence. Again DIA was unable to publish any intelligence relating to offensive weapons including the significant disclosures from reconnaissance on 14 October. While these restrictions created a number of internal problems within DIA/CIIC and the Estimates Office and may have retarded to some degree the analytical effort, DIA considers the real impact of these dissemination restraints was on the Unified and Specified Commands which were responsible for contingency planning and which were charged with operational responsibilities in the Cuban area.

DIA review(s) completed.
B. COLLECTION ACTIVITIES

The Defense Intelligence Agency has not had and does not have now any collection facilities under its immediate control and direction. All information on the Cuban situation received by DIA during the period of this report was collected through facilities subordinate to other intelligence agencies and activities. Therefore, no response to this portion of the report is provided by DIA.
C. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

The Defense Intelligence Agency did not originate any raw intelligence reports during the period under review. Consequently, no response is addressed to this area of examination.