

# Spies: Rinaldi Broke Rule of Espionage, Kept Notes

Continued From Page A-1  
trips by Rinaldi to the Swiss town of Montoux and to Rome and with Girard's trips to Spain.

In recruiting spies, intelligence organizations will use any device they think will work. Love, sex, fear, pride, ambition. In Rinaldi's case, it was that old standby—money. According to an account in one Italian newspaper, he received 400,000 lire a month, the equivalent of about \$850. It was not a great deal of money, but it must have seemed handsome to Rinaldi, who had never made much of a success of anything he had undertaken.

There also were appeals to his pride and to his sense of belonging, as he was drawn even deeper into the Soviet espionage apparatus. He received special training in codes, photography and radio operation in both Italy and Switzerland. On at least four occasions, the most recent last July, he was flown to GRU headquarters in Russia for further training and pep talks by high ranking Soviet intelligence officials.

The early development of the spy apparatus centered around Rinaldi apparently was under the direction of Col. Mikhail Ilich Badin, a GRU officer who, suddenly, left Vienna shortly after Rinaldi was arrested.

Since late in 1964, when Pavlenko was assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Rome, he appears to have been Rinaldi's chief contact within the GRU. It is possible, of course, that Badin was still exercising control over the whole operation from his post in Vienna.

The full scope of the spy operation is probably not yet known even to the best informed Italian military intelligence officers who broke it up. But it appears to have been concerned primarily with U.S. and NATO bases in Spain, Italy, Greece and Cyprus, with support mechanisms in Switzerland, Austria and France.

There also are indications it extended from Morocco on the Atlantic coast to Somalia on the shores of the Red Sea and perhaps as far away as Japan.

Some of the Soviet agents involved may have been operating under the cover of positions with the International Labor Organization and the International Telecommunications Union, both in Geneva, and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.

## Spanish Targets

The targets in Spain reportedly were the U.S. installations at Sanjurjo near Zaragoza, El Ferrol near Cartagena, Torrejon



Yuri Pavlenko, his wife and son as they waited to board a Russia-bound plane after the Italian government declared him persona non grata. Pavlenko, an attaché at the Soviet Embassy, was the "case officer" for a mammoth spy operation attempting to penetrate NATO.

de Aviano near Madrid, and Rota, near Cadix.

Of these, only two are of major interest.

The Torrejon base is headquarters of the 16th Air Force and is the home base for three squadrons of F100 fighters of the 41st Tactical Fighter Wing. The base at Zaragoza is in a caretaker status.

The U.S. base at Rota is the Navy's largest installation in Europe. It serves as a major supply center for the 6th Fleet and can handle the biggest and fastest warplanes and ships in the fleet.

## Start of Pipeline

It is also the beginning of a 485-mile pipeline that feeds fuel to Air Force bases in the interior of Spain. El Ferrol is a fuel annex.

The Defense Department, under a standing policy, never confirms nor denies the presence of atomic weapons at any of its bases. But it is reasonable to assume that the ships and planes based at Rota and the planes based at Torrejon can deliver nuclear weapons.

The network also encompassed the British Royal Air Force bomber base at Akrotiri in southern Cyprus as well as communications facilities in Cyprus, the U.S. Air Force base

at Aviano in northern Italy and bases in Greece.

It is not yet clear how many were involved—willingly or unwittingly—in the spy operation. But it must be assumed that there were at least several persons at each of the bases, plus their contacts who served as links in the chain back to Rinaldi.

## Called Key Link

A key link was the Rinaldi's chauffeur, Girard, who scammed about southern Europe in his Volkswagen retrieving information from "dead drops," where it had been left for pickup, and delivering it to Rinaldi.

On March 10, Girard left in his Volkswagen for a trip to Spain and SID agents tried to follow him. But he never traveled more than 40 miles an hour, so it was impossible to trail him without making him suspicious.

From March 12 on, Italian agent put a special watch on the Alpine passes into Italy from the north. Late on the afternoon of March 15, he drove into the trap at the Monginevro pass.

Italian police whisked him out of his car and turned him over to the SID counterintelligence officers, who quickly found what they were looking for. They flashed the word to Turin and the other jaw of the trap

slammed shut on Rinaldi and his wife.

Rinaldi began to talk, supplying information that will keep Western intelligence officers busy for months, perhaps even years, untangling the leads he furnished. Whether he is still supplying valuable information is not clear. He reportedly suffered a nervous breakdown and had to be hospitalized.

According to an unconfirmed report, he was so terrified that his former masters would attempt to poison him that he would eat only eggs that had been boiled in his presence.

## Copious Notes Found

But probably of equal or even greater importance was what the SID agents found at the Rinaldi's Bottega di Lago.

As they had expected, they discovered the kind of supplies that would normally be furnished to an agent in Rinaldi's position: radio equipment, code books, concealment gadgets, chemicals for secret writing and micro-dot equipment.

And then, to their delight, they also discovered that Rinaldi had violated one of the most basic rules of the spy business. He had made copious notes about things he should have committed to memory. The officers found a vast

assortment of instructions, letters, reports and notebooks.

Immediately after the arrest of the Rinaldis, there was a report that they had enlisted 300 NATO officers in their spy apparatus. This was subsequently denied by NATO officials and it now appears that what was involved was a target list of persons the Russians would like to have enlisted rather than a list of those who actually had been drawn into a spy network.

## Arrests Kept Secret

Girard and the Rinaldis were picked up late Wednesday, March 15. But the arrests were kept secret while the SID agents waited for even bigger fish to swim into their trap.

By that time, the officers knew that the Rinaldis had used a number of points in both Turin and Rome for passing on information. There were "dead drops" at the cathedral and the zoo in Turin and in the streets and parks of Rome.

After Rinaldi was picked up, but before his arrest was made public, there was one last detailed radio transmission from Moscow that agents listened to on Rinaldi's Grundig-Satellite radio.

Rinaldi supplied the key to the code and Italian agents had instructions for him to leave the films brought back by Girard in a hole beside the fifth tree in a row of trees on a country road outside Rome.

## Spot Staked Out

They staked out the spot on the afternoon of March 15. About 10:45 p.m. the following night, a man and a woman in a Fiat—Pavlenko and his wife—stopped.

Pavlenko got out and retrieved the material from beneath the tree. When he saw the officers, he tried to get away but two cars quickly cut him off.

The Italian government informed the Soviet Embassy that he was considered persona non grata and that he had 48 hours to get out of the country. He didn't even wait that long. The following day, Pavlenko, his wife Natalya, and their 6-year-old son, Anatoly, boarded a plane for home.

## Greece Expels Two

By the end of the week, Greece had expelled two Soviet officials, Albert Zacharov, second secretary at the embassy, and Igor Ochurkov, a member of the Soviet Trade Mission.



GIORGIO RINALDI

ANGELA MARIA RINALDI

representative of the Soviet airline Aeroflot since 1961, were ordered to leave Cyprus.

A series of arrests, which has almost certainly not ended, then began.

In the wake of the disclosures of the arrest of the Rinaldis, a Soviet diplomat abruptly left his post in Japan and another departed from Morocco with equal haste. It is not yet clear, at least to those on the outside, what roles, if any, they may have played in the spy network.

The arrest of the Rinaldis also may help to explain several other incidents in various parts of Europe in recent months.

In the latter part of January, the Brussels newspaper Le Soir reported that two men in a car bearing license plates issued to the Soviet Embassy were picked up by officers of the Belgian Ministry of Justice as they stopped at a restaurant at Hever, a small town in Brabant province.

One of the men, Le Soir reported, was an agent of Aeroflot, the Soviet airline which employed one of the men expelled from Cyprus. Although the background of these two men is not known, some Aeroflot officials have received special training as espionage agents at the Military and Diplomatic University in Moscow.

Late in February, the Swiss asked the Russians to recall Ivan Yakovlevich Petrov, senior representative to the International Telecommunications Union in Geneva, after he allegedly asked a senior Swiss civil servant to become a spy for Russia. Here again, it is not known whether this incident might have been connected with the Rinaldi case.

Even earlier, on Nov. 4, 1966, Italians expelled Kir Lemzenko, a Soviet trade attaché, who was thought to be spying on

the Naples NATO base and reporting on U.S. fleet movements in the Mediterranean.

His expulsion followed the defection of Mrs. Olga Farmakovskaya, a green-eyed, red-haired beauty whose husband, Soviet Navy Commander Vadim Vadamovich Farmakovskiy, was believed to be a high-ranking GRU official. She slipped off a cruise ship in Beirut, Lebanon, and was whisked away to Brussels.

Perhaps the way in which these other bits and pieces fit into the Rinaldi picture—if, indeed they fit at all—may be revealed as the leads provided by the arrest of the Italian parachutist are run down.

The broad outlines of how Rinaldi operated are now fairly well known. But some gaps remain in this picture too.

It seems certain that he used his powerful radio apparatus to receive instructions, but it is not clear whether he also used it to transmit information or whether he passed his information to Soviet contacts in Italy for transmission to Russia. If the mode of operation of the Swedish spy, Col. Sig Wennerstrom, is any indication, he probably used both methods.

Portions of the Italian press, which has tended to give rather flamboyant treatment to the story, have speculated that Mrs. Rinaldi, who had served in the Italian armed forces under Mussolini, was actually the brains of the operation. According to other accounts, she merely helped her husband by decoding instructions from Moscow.

As a result of the arrest of the Rinaldis, the entire Mediterranean area is in the throes of a severe case of spy fever, and there are persistent reports that, even though this already appears to be the most extensive Soviet spy ring ever exposed, only the tip of the iceberg has so far been seen.