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-lem of most underdeveloped nations, -ision of an adequate food supply, -he prohibition on the use of funds the construction of buildings under tropical Africa program immediately -rdicts the raising of small schools medical structures, two of the most -ous needs in these countries.

-he elimination of funds for the -rto Rican Center is to drastically -ler one of the most useful ways of -noting technical skill and knowledge -he Latin America area. The contri- -ons that Puerto Rico has made in the -t in teaching skills and processes to neighbors to the South have been -luable. Now this admirable pro- -m is to receive no boost from us. One the objectives of President Eisen- -ver's tour of Latin America in the late -ter will be jeopardized.

do not believe that these prohibitions, -se policy determinations, can redound the benefit of the United States. In- -ad, I fear that we are once again -ing opportunities slip away that in -long run can mean the difference be- -een success and failure in our demand- -struggle with communism.

Expert after expert has testified that intensity of the struggle will increase Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The -mination of these programs will only -pple our efforts in the very areas -here we should be dramatically in- -asing them.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that efforts will made to restore much of the funds -at have been cut by this bill. States- -anship and concern for the future of -r Nation and of the free world dictate -at this is the only wise course. This -es not mean that misfeasance is to be -ndoned. We must continue to root out -ch situations wherever they occur. It -es mean however, that our approach the program should not be governed -most entirely by our reaction to these -olated occurrences. We have too much -l stake. The Communist challenge to -ur civilization is too ominous.

Mr. TABER. Mr. Chairman, I yield minutes to the gentleman from New -ork [Mr. DOOLEY].

Mr. DOOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I am -ot a member of this distinguished com- -mittee and I feel rather reluctant to -peak on this bill. I have the most pro- -ound respect for the distinguished gen- -leman from Louisiana, as well as for -he ranking Republican member on the -ommittee, the gentleman from New -ork [Mr. TABER]. However, the cir- -umstances surrounding the mutual se- -curity program remind me of a situation -hich developed a short time ago. It -ppened 2 years ago in California. The -oach of a great team out there had lost -ix games in a row. The gentleman from New York asked him one day what had happened to his team, that it could not seem to win. He said: "Well, the boys have a mental block when they get down to the 10-yard line. When they get down to the 10-yard line, they disintegrate, lose their sense of rhythm, and attack." He seemed to emphasize that the 10-yard line, was a psychological -or mental hazard. So the gentleman from New York said: "Well, that happens to a lot of teams when they get to the 10-yard line." He said: "I am talking about my own 10-yard line, not the opposition 10-yard line."

Mr. CANFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DOOLEY. I yield.

Mr. CANFIELD. I think the gentleman now addressing the House can qualify as an expert on the 10-yard line. In yesterday's newspaper he was Dartmouth's All-American quarterback. Football history shows he was a great scorer, and I believe he still holds an intercollegiate record for forward passes.

Mr. DOOLEY. I thank the gentleman from New Jersey. This was not prearranged, I assure you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this most important appropriation measure. I deplore the decrease by the Appropriations Committee in the amount requested originally. If ever there was need of a mutual security program—and certainly there has been much need—it is now, now, when our posture in world affairs is critical, and the future status of a number of our allies stands in doubt.

Ever since the U-2 incident splashed itself in headlines across the country, and brought about a volley of vindictive threats from Khrushchev, Americans by and large have been more eager to see our mutual security program implemented effectively. They know, as we know, that without the supplemental support guaranteed to a host of nations who participate in the program, we would resemble a solitary yet valiant soldier, standing alone in a field of despair.

We do not have to apologize for our military assistance program, for which the bill authorizes almost $1½ billion for carrying it forward.

In addition to the parts of the program included in the authorization, the Executive requested a total appropriation of $2,720 million against authorizations already in effect, of which $2 billion is for military assistance and $700 million for the Development Loan Fund.

We need not defend such a vast expenditure on the basis of generosity, morality, altruism or responsible leadership in the free-world bloc. Rather can we say that stark reality and objective self-interest dictates that this is a major device to counter the threats of communism.

Because of our mutual security program, it is an established fact that in the event of hostilities only 10 percent of the ground forces that would come under the NATO leaders command would be American troops.

In the volatile Far East, the commanders of the allied forces would have to rely largely on non-Americans to sustain and maintain his forward strategy, in time of war.

Only a small force of U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines form a nucleus of an allied force of almost 2 million men, which in the event of war would provide a deterrent band of resistance in the Pacific area, rather than on our own western coast.

Of the 21 operational divisions in Korea, [illegible] are taken up by Americans.

In Spain there is a close relationship to [illegible] of a retaliatory force.

[illegible] to the mind of anyone [illegible] mutual [illegible] in certain [illegible] the field of [illegible] mutual security [illegible] assistance [illegible] some- [illegible] time [illegible] United [illegible] give [illegible] and [illegible]

However, it is [illegible] believed by most [illegible] of the program [illegible] mutual security and future [illegible] in large part on improving [illegible] by which this complex [illegible] can be made to work [illegible] rather than to curtail [illegible] the aims and scope of [illegible]

One of the drawbacks has been the [illegible] of the governments receiving [illegible] and economic assistance [illegible] experience in administrative and technical fields, have little aptitude for [illegible] contrivances and modern accounting methods, and sometimes their ethical standards are widely at variance with our own.

In such a [illegible] well-conceived efforts are sometimes thrown into complete [illegible] by directives from Washington which show no understanding of the complexity of the problem on the local scene. In other words, we must realize that, regardless of how painful it may be to our sense of economy, there may be cases where there is waste [illegible] all efforts to be meticulous [illegible] and supervising expenditures.

Where are these so-called underdeveloped countries? They are Cambodia, Taiwan—Nationalist China, Greece, Iran, Korea, Laos, Pakistan, the Philippines, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam.

No less than 12 of these 12 are in the periphery of the Soviet bloc, and the twelfth is within easy striking range. Superior Communist forces are on the borders of Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Yet, combined, these countries maintain forces of 1 million men. Bilateral treaties exist between the United States and the three countries I just mentioned.

Speaking of these nations we call underprivileged—there is one close to our national shoreline that should be receiving aid from us, and if it does not it will surely fall prey to the blandishments of communism. That country is Haiti, and it is teetering on the verge of fiscal chaos and national panic. With Cuba lost to the western orbit, Haiti has increased political significance to us, and if we see it lost it will indeed be a tragic occurrence.

Let me say that the military assistance program is a vital and integral part of

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