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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IDEALIST/TACKLE

SC-05769-62-KH

DIA-ID-21-62

23 May 1962

Copy 1

SUBJECT: Survivability of the U-2 over China

TO: Director, Central Intelligence Agency
ATTN: E. D. Duckett, Jr.
Deputy Chief, Intelligence Staff
DPD

REF: SC-05767-62-KH dated 18 May 62

1. The DIA has reviewed referenced document and recommends certain changes thereto. A number of the changes recommended are required in order for the paper to be in consonance with current and pending revisions to SNIEs on China.

2. It is also our opinion that capabilities not available to the CHICOMs, such as the SU-7 and SU-9 interceptor aircraft covered under "Present Situation", par 8, may lead the non-intelligence orientated reader to conclude that CHICOMs could acquire this capability on short notice, merely by the Soviets moving this advance equipment to China. Movement of an SU-7 or SU-9 element requires extensive on-base preparation and support, and could not, in our opinion, be accomplished without extensive preparation and would require a long lead time. Similarly, we have no confirmation of MIG-21 type aircraft in China.

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3. In addition, the reference in par 9 to "overflights near or toward the USSR border areas from China could provoke SU-7/SU-9 aircraft from VLADIVOSTOK...", etc, is undoubtedly a true assumption. However, we are certain that mission planning would not include or generate this risk, and see little reason for its inclusion. If a statement relating to Soviet capabilities on the edges of NE China is required, we believe it would be better to merely state the following: (for 2nd paragraph of 9)

"Mission planning in the Northeast China area will be conducted so as to avoid proximity to known Soviet SU-7/SU-9 fighter interceptor aircraft based at VLADIVOSTOK, VOROSHILOV and SPASSK DALNIY area. The SU-7/SU-9 aircraft have a marginal capability to perform a successful pull-up or zoom climb attack on the U-2. However, by maintaining a distance of 200 NM from these known Soviet SU-7/SU-9 bases, the Soviets would have very little, if any, capability to intercept the U-2 over China. Furthermore, we doubt that the Soviets would react against the U-2 over China unless a penetration of the Soviet border appeared imminent."

DIA review completed

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NSA review(s) completed.

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4. Subject to the recommended changes in attachment, and as enumerated in par 3, DIA concurs with the study and conclusions on "Survivability of the U-2 over China".

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1 Atch: Recommended changes

Acting Chief, Special Activities Office

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The Defense Intelligence Agency has reviewed subject document (SC-05767-62-KH) and recommends the following changes to the paragraphs indicated:

A. PRESENT SITUATION

Amend or replace paragraphs as indicated with following:

1. Two R&D SA-2 type sites are located at SHUANG CHENG TZU MTR.
2. Three SA-2 type deployed sites have been identified at one complex in China (PEIPING).



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4. The lack of SA-2 deployment in NE China (as reflected by T-KH) and in Central and Northwest China (as reflected by TACKLE) is undoubtedly due to the withdrawal of Soviet technological support, and the apparent inadequacy of the CHICOMs to develop these defense systems independent of Soviet support at this time.

5. The SA-2 missile system is believed to have a maximum effectiveness at altitudes between 3000 feet and 60,000 feet, with a limited capability between 60,000 to 80,000 feet at ranges of 25 to 30 NM.

6. OK as written except delete last sentence, "Relatively straight flight lines will help the ChiComs determine the track of the U-2 aircraft."

7. The CHICOM Air Force is equipped with MIG-15, MIG-17, and a limited number of MIG-19 interceptor aircraft. The MIG-15 and MIG-17 have no intercept capability against the U-2 at its operational altitude. The MIG-19 has little or no intercept capability above 62,000 even employing a dynamic climb maneuver. There is no evidence to confirm the existence in China of MIG-21 type aircraft.

8. Delete.

Attachment

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9. CONCLUSION

a. The SA-2 missile system is currently the only major threat to successful U-2 operations over the China mainland. 25X1D



e. Except for the PEIPING and SHUANG CHENG TZU MTR, the U-2 currently has a high survivability factor in all other areas of China.

B. FUTURE OUTLOOK

1. The future growth of the CHICOM Air Defense System will depend to a great extent on assistance from the USSR in terms of equipment and operational and technical manpower training. If the Soviets resume this type of support to the CHICOMs, the following trends are possible:

a thru e - OK

2. CONCLUSION - OK

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