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641

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GENERAL

1. Further reaction to the President's speech--US Ambassador Kirk in Brussels reports that both Premier Spaak and Foreign Minister Bevin have expressed their pleasure with President Truman's message to Congress. Spaak considers that the best US policy at present would be to support the Brussels pact with full moral and material aid but to assess Soviet reaction before undertaking anything more positive. Bevin believes that the USSR "needs plain speaking" and that it is neither ready nor willing to launch a war. He even considers Stalin a "strong stabilising influence" against war. Kirk says that Bevin apparently does not expect much more than moral and material aid from the US at this time.

(A summary of available foreign reaction to the President's address is published as an appendix to this issue of the Daily Summary.)

2. US-French-UK policy on Czechoslovakia--The Department of State has suggested to the US delegation to the UN that in handling the Czechoslovak case, the US: (a) should not be the active proponent in making charges against the USSR or in advancing any proposals in the case; (b) should support the establishment of a Security Council investigating commission until vetoed by the USSR, while avoiding any open showdown with the USSR; and (c) should fully exploit the political opportunities of the case, possibly laying the foundation for reference to the General Assembly or the "Little" Assembly of the general problem of indirect aggression.

US Embassy Paris has learned from a Foreign Office official that preliminary French thinking, while favoring full debate on the Czechoslovak case, questions the wisdom of pressing for establishment of an investigating commission. The French feel that such a move would only bring about another veto by the USSR, thereby again demonstrating the impotence of the UN. (The British reportedly favor submitting

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a resolution to establish an investigating commission in order to impose upon the USSR the necessity for another veto.)

3. Preliminary Arab reaction to US stand on Palestine favorable--Arab satisfaction with the new US proposals regarding UN trusteeship for Palestine has been expressed to US representatives by King Ibn Saud, the President of Syria, the Iraq Government, and a member of the Palestinian Arab Higher Committee. A Saudi Arabian Foreign Office spokesman has assured US Minister Childs in Jidda that Saudi Arabia is prepared to use its influence to end violence in Palestine; Musa Al Alami of the Arab Higher Committee has indicated to US Embassy Baghdad that Arab moderates favor immediate discussions with the Jews regarding a Palestine settlement. An official of the British Foreign Office has expressed to US Embassy London his belief that the idea of a truce in Palestine and the possibility of reassembling the UN General Assembly have great merit and will "broaden the field of maneuver." However, the official considers it likely that the Palestine Jews will attempt to set up a Jewish state in the near future.

EUROPE

4. USSR: Possibility of conciliatory statement by Stalin--US Embassy Moscow transmits rumors, in which it places some credence, that Stalin may attempt "to confuse the issue" by making a public statement emphasizing the USSR's "peaceful intentions." The Embassy notes that this stratagem has been used repeatedly and somewhat successfully in the past and warns that, if repeated, the US should take care not to drop its guard. The Embassy urges that, should such a statement from Stalin be forthcoming, the State Department be prepared to issue an immediate comment to the effect that while any "friendly statement" is welcome, the US must await its "concrete implementation" before giving it "any credence."

Approved For Release 2006/12/26 : CIA-RDP78-01617A006000060008-7

Approved For Release 2006/12/26 : CIA-RDP78-01617A006000060008-7

THE AMERICAS

5. COSTA RICA: Foreign intervention in crisis--US Embassy San Jose (Costa Rica) reports that President Picado has returned to Costa Rica after having gone to Nicaragua, government operations against the Costa Rican rebels are apparently continuing, and the situation remains relatively unchanged. The Department of State has informed Nicaragua's General Somoza of its "deep concern" over intervention by other countries in Costa Rican internal affairs and has instructed US Embassy Guatemala City to request a statement of Guatemala's position regarding the present situation in Costa Rica.

(CIA Comment: CIA believes that although US pressure may succeed in reducing active Guatemalan and Nicaraguan governmental participation in the Costa Rican crisis, this pressure will not solve the basic problem posed by the already deep involvement of Guatemalan and Nicaraguan interests and rivalries in the present Costa Rican impasse.)

Approved For Release 2006/12/26 : CIA-RDP78-01617A006000060008-7

Approved For Release 2006/12/26 : CIA-RDP78-01617A006000060008-7

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FOREIGN REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH

Available preliminary reactions to President Truman's 17 March address have in general been extremely favorable among Western Powers and in Latin America. The speech which has been given wide distribution, apparently has had a markedly heartening effect on the morale of democratic-minded elements, and it has hardened the will to resist Communist forces in those countries most directly menaced by Soviet-Satellite political and economic penetration. The speech has been widely hailed by democratic leaders as the maximum possible support to the recently established Western European Union. This enthusiastic response has in general been accompanied by expressed hopes of ultimate US military guarantees, in support of the European recovery program and western union, and by a declared recognition that the long-range effectiveness of the President's statements will depend upon the extent to which the US Congress implements his proposals. Non-Communist European spokesmen and press commentators have widely described the speech as a "final" or blunt warning to the USSR, but expressions of opinion that the speech may hasten the advent of war are outnumbered by expressions of relief that the address did not take the form of an ultimatum and, while firm in tone, avoided provocative language.

In some parts of the non-Communist world, the response was tempered or equivocal. Official Chinese reaction is still lacking, but the Chinese press moderated its praise with undisguised disappointment, and even strong criticism, because the Far East in general and China in particular were not mentioned in the President's message. The initial enthusiastic response by the Government-controlled press in Spain was followed by a semi-official expression of pique at Spain's exclusion from the European recovery program.

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Approved For Release 2006/12/26 : CIA-RDP78-01617A006000060008-7

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Strong criticism and unfavorable reaction to the speech was, with few exceptions, confined to the Communists. With the exception of a 22 March editorial in PRAVDA which may give an indication, the USSR itself does not appear to have laid down its formal propaganda line on the address; this is presumably because the Kremlin customarily takes at least a week to formulate its response to a major foreign pronouncement or action. In the meantime, the Soviet press has given little attention to the speech and has relied for comment predominantly on selected reprints of criticism expressed by US or foreign sources. The Soviet and world Communist press has thus made maximum use of Henry Wallace's attacks on the speech, both as appropriate comment and as indications of division within the US. PRAVDA's lone editorial comment sought to dispose of the speech as primarily election campaign propaganda designed to divert US public attention from the effects of ill-advised internal and foreign policies. The Communist press outside the USSR, pending guidance from Moscow, has followed a familiar pattern: (1) by citing the speech as further evidence of US imperialism, war-mongering, and interference in the affairs of other nations, and of the evolution of a police state and capitalist dictatorship in the US; (2) by contrasting Soviet efforts toward demobilization and peace with US militaristic tendencies; and (3) by reiterating standard attacks on US motives and intentions.

An indication of specific significant reactions by areas follows:

UK: British reaction, including that of Foreign Office officials, has been extremely favorable. Foreign Office officials have expressed their "genuine and hearty approval." The responsible press considers that the speech marks an historic milestone in the development of US foreign policy because it reflects a US decision that military support is necessary to bolster economic aid abroad; the prevailing belief is that, if the President's recommendations are implemented, international

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Communism can be effectively contained. An undercurrent of anxiety lest the speech increase general tension is overshadowed by an overwhelming reaction of relief that the US appears to be moving to support its foreign economic program with military guarantees.

THE DOMINIONS: Official reaction is largely lacking. Other reaction, however, has been favorable in Canada and New Zealand, though mixed in Australia. The Australian press considers the US to be in a state of "war jitters."

SCANDINAVIA: Official reaction is lacking; indications are, however, that it is generally favorable. The Swedish Foreign Minister, however, still appears to cling to his deep-set confidence in a policy of strict neutrality.

EUROPE: In non-Communist official circles, the response has generally ranged from favorable to enthusiastic. One exception is in Spain where semi-official expressions of pique at Spain's exclusion from the European recovery program followed praise which was initially expressed by the government-controlled press. The Foreign Ministers of France, the Benelux countries, and Austria have warmly approved the address and expressed the belief that it will give new courage to anti-Communists everywhere. French reaction was also marked by relief that the message was couched in non-provocative terms and by some expressions of official concern lest US public and Congressional reaction should be unfavorable and tend to disillusion those Frenchmen who have been heartened by the address. This concern also has found expression in Austria. In Finland and Trieste the speech has reportedly resulted in a marked bolstering of the will to resist among anti-Communists. The Finns may thereby be emboldened to turn down Soviet proposals for any alliance except a conventional friendship pact. In Trieste, however, some concern has been expressed that the speech came "too late," will "bring war closer," and may cause a Communist resort to violence or lead to Yugoslav occupation of the area.

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NEAR EAST: The speech to Congress was given extensive coverage and in most instances was received very favorably. The general Arab reaction to the speech is not yet known. The most enthusiastic reception was evidenced in Greece and Turkey. President Inonu of Turkey praised the speech as "the only language the USSR would understand." The Greek press generally interpreted the speech as evidence of a new and firmer US policy, but some fear was expressed that war may have been brought closer.

FAR EAST: Although official comment is still lacking, the principal significant Chinese reaction has been expressed regret that the President failed to mention the Far East. Praise for the address thus has been tempered by disappointment and even by predictions that a policy of "Europe first" will lead to catastrophe. President Roxas of the Philippines has given his strong personal support to the speech.

LATIN AMERICA: Reports of reaction have so far been received from 8 of the 20 Republics, indicating favorable response from all groups except the Communists.

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