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ANNEX

28 July 1950

IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION'S RETURN TO THE UN

Although it is too early to discern clearly the Soviet Union's motives in returning to the UN, this surprise move re-establishes the Soviet Union's freedom of action in the UN and opens the door either to some form of negotiated solution of the Korean conflict or to obstruction of further UN action concerning Korea and other areas where the USSR may plan overt moves. The move was made, however, at the expense of an announced Soviet objective, the prior seating of the Chinese Communists in the Security Council. This modification of Soviet terms, as set forth in the Stalin-Nehru exchange, suggests that the Soviet objective in returning to the SC may be to seize the opportunity, at this low ebb in US military fortunes, for a favorable settlement of the Korean war. Moreover, the USSR probably considers that the tactical defeat suffered in returning before the Chinese Communists were seated will be largely obscured by the overwhelming North Korean military successes. It also seems likely that the USSR, having underestimated world reaction to the Korean conflict and disturbed at the coalescing of the non-Soviet world behind the US through the UN, is seizing this favorable opportunity both to strengthen its propaganda position as a "peace-loving" state not directly involved in the Korean conflict and to exert greater influence in future UN deliberations.

It is possible that the USSR, anxious to see a compromise solution on favorable terms at a time when Communist prestige in Korea is at a peak, is returning to the UN in order to set the stage for compromise negotiations. With the possibility that US forces will be either confined to a small perimeter around Pusan or driven entirely from Korea, the USSR may consider the present time a highly favorable opportunity to seek a solution which,

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while apparently compromise in nature, would eventually secure the fruits of victory to the USSR.

On the other hand, it is possible that the Soviet Union, pursuing a new phase of more active aggression and perhaps contemplating further moves in other areas, has determined to return to the UN with the purely obstructive purpose of hamstringing the further consolidation of UN action in Korea or even shielding from similar UN action other moves it may have in mind. In this case, not only the Soviet veto but the Chinese Communist issue would provide weapons for contesting the legality of any UN action. This is particularly true in such a case as Formosa where the USSR might be in the position of being able to call on the UN to prevent the US from blocking the movement of Chinese forces from one part of China to another.

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