Approved For Release 2008/06/26 : CIA-RDP78-01617A006100070010-2

48146

15 FEB 1951

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

1521

## GENERAL

1. Conversations with Tito and Kardelj--US Ambassador Allen in Belgrade describes Assistant Secretary of State Perkins' talks with Tito and Foreign Minister Kardelj as highly useful. In separate talks with Tito and Kardelj, Perkins discussed Yugoslav requests for further assistance and pointed out that the present attitude of the US Congress and the public would make additional assistance most difficult to obtain without clear public indication by the Yugoslav Government of what it would do in case of war. Both Tito and Kardelj said that public opinion in Yugoslavia at this time was not ready for close alignment with the West but that in another year this situation might be different. Tito said he could not join any bloc because in case of aggression against Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav people must be absolutely certain that their government had done nothing whatever to justify Soviet allegations that the Western Powers had had aggressive intentions against the USSR with Yugoslavia as a base of operations. Perkins advised Tito that any further substantial aid from the US would require appropriations by the US Congress; Tito then said that perhaps for the moment Yugoslavia would have to depend on its own arms factories. Tito added, however, that if Yugoslavia at any time became convinced that an attack against Yugoslavia had been definitely decided upon by the Cominform and was imminent, his government's position might change promptly since the present reasons for caution would disappear.

25X1

In further conversations, Perkins informed Tito and Kardelj that the US Ambassadors in the Cominform countries did not think either the Satellites or the USSR was preparing for an imminent attack anywhere in Europe. Tito and Kardelj both said that their own information led them to the

[redacted]

State Dept. review completed



Document No. 039
NO CHANGE in Class. ☐
☐ DECLASSIFIED
Class. CHANGED TO: TS S C
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763
Date: 31 MAR 1978 By:

25X1

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2008/06/26 : CIA-RDP78-01617A006100070010-2

Approved For Release 2008/06/26 : CIA-RDP78-01617A006100070010-2



same conclusion. Tito said that, from his own knowledge of Soviet psychology, he did not think the Russians would take any action which would label the USSR as an aggressor in world opinion.

Allen adds that Kardelj expressed to him much appreciation over Secretary of State Acheson's recent press statement regarding Yugoslavia and indicated his government's satisfaction with the US public position in this regard.

## EUROPE

2. AUSTRIA: USSR believed tightening its controls--According to US Minister Donnelly, Austrian Chancellor Figl, Vice-Chancellor Schaerf, and Foreign Minister Gruber agree that there has been no letup in Communist planning for disturbances either in February or March. The Austrian officials are confident that the police force can control the situation provided the Communists do not receive overt Soviet support, and said that they were appropriating additional funds to increase employment. The officials also confirmed Donnelly's impression that Soviet controls in Austria are being tightened. Gruber expressed the feeling that the USSR was planning something but admitted he had not been able to find out what it was. He pointed out that most Soviet military commanders in the Soviet Zone had recently been changed.

25X1

3. ITALY: Communists anxious over Magnani affair--US Embassy Rome believes the anxiety caused the Communist Party by the Magnani affair may be measured by the fact that the biggest Party leaders in Italy are not only denouncing

25X1





Approved For Release 2008/06/26 : CIA-RDP78-01617A006100070010-2

Approved For Release 2008/06/26 : CIA-RDP78-01617A006100070010-2



Magnani and Cucchi but also feel obliged to respond to their criticisms. Moreover, practically the entire resolution voted by the Geneva Congress of the Party is devoted to the Magnani affair.

Meanwhile, US Embassy Belgrade reports that Yugoslav officials are following the Italian Communist difficulties with interest, avoiding excessive optimism while awaiting developments. The Yugoslavs are reluctant to hazard a guess as to the consequences of the Italian defections, but they apparently feel that unless the Italian Party succeeds in discrediting the dissident leaders with the rank and file, there is a good chance that an independent Marxist party may be created, with a substantial following opposed to subservience to Moscow. The Embassy adds that the Yugoslav press is treating the Italian Communist difficulties with caution.

## NEAR EAST-AFRICA

25X1

4. FRENCH MOROCCO: Sultan-Juin tension increasing--A high French official has presented US Consul McBride in Rabat with a paper containing the French point of view on the Sultan-Juin impasse, a statement which McBride finds "not overly convincing." The French official told McBride that although his government hopes for a conciliatory attitude by the Sultan, the French are not optimistic and consequently the deposing of the Sultan is "more than a strong possibility." The French hope to avoid deposition because French interests would suffer throughout the Moslem world. General Juin, however, has declared he prefers to eliminate "possible rear guard opposition" now rather than during a war and he utterly refuses to follow any line which might





Approved For Release 2008/06/26 : CIA-RDP78-01617A006100070010-2

Approved For Release 2008/06/26 : CIA-RDP78-01617A006100070010-2



seriously antagonize the Berber elements which have supplied 3 to 4 divisions for the Atlantic Pact army, as opposed to the Arab League which, he says, could not in its entirety furnish 1 effective division.

Meanwhile, the Sultan of Morocco has sent to Consul McBride a note conveying the substance of his reply to General Juin's oral demands of 26 January. McBride characterizes this reply as "significantly unyielding" and as representing a "less cooperative spirit" than expected. McBride says he cannot hope that the Sultan's note will ease the strain; on the contrary, it may cause the French to take an even sterner attitude.

## FAR EAST

25X1





Approved For Release 2008/06/26 : CIA-RDP78-01617A006100070010-2

Approved For Release 2008/06/26 : CIA-RDP78-01617A006100070010-2



25X1

6. INDONESIA: No present plans for Asiatic meeting--US Ambassador Cochran in Djakarta reports that Foreign Minister Roem has reassured him the Indonesian Government does not plan to initiate an Asian conference for the purpose of studying the Indochinese question. Roem said the Foreign Office was working on no Asiatic plans except separate treaties of friendship with the Philippines, Burma, India, and Pakistan. In reply to a question from Cochran, Roem said his government was not reopening the question of recognition either of Ho Chi Minh or Bao Dai.



Approved For Release 2008/06/26 : CIA-RDP78-01617A006100070010-2