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# EFFECTS OF INTERDICTION OF HAIPHONG HARBOR

ORR Project S-1191

23 March 1964

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## EFFECTS OF INTERDICTION OF HAIPHONG HARBOR

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Blocking of the Canal Maritime would prevent oceangoing vessels from entering the port of Haiphong; however, after some delay most of the normal imports, except large pieces of equipment and petroleum in bulk, could be off-loaded into small craft downstream and brought into the port. An in-shore and off-shore blockade of Haiphong probably would be essential to stop traffic completely.

If denied use of Haiphong harbor, nearly all seaborne imports through Haiphong could be diverted to Fort Bayard, China, and transported to North Vietnam by rail via P'ing-hs'ang. If this rail line were also interrupted over a sustained period, the country would be deprived of most of its imports. Denial of imports would result, after two months, in a drastic fall in the output of modern industry and would bring the industrial construction program to a halt. However, the country is basically self-sufficient in food, and the denial of imports would not bring about a collapse of the economy.

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Interdiction of Haiphong would be universally ascribed to the US. Except for allies of the US, most government and public reaction in the Free World would be adverse. In the case of Japan, staged disorders by the left might in extreme circumstances endanger US use of certain Japanese bases and facilities for a time.



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I. Economic Significance of Foreign Trade

Foreign trade is crucial to the industrial development of North Vietnam and is equal in value to about 15 percent of gross national product (GNP). The regime recognizes the continuing dependence of the economy on imports of capital equipment and machinery as well as a wide variety of industrial materials. The value of foreign trade in 1963 was US $241 million, an increase of 4.3 percent over 1962. (For direction and composition of foreign trade, see Appendix, Tables 1-3). About 85 percent of North Vietnam's foreign trade is with other Communist countries, Communist China and the USSR together accounting for approximately two-thirds of the value of total trade.

Nearly 60 percent of North Vietnam's exports are made up of products from agriculture, forestry, fishing, and handicrafts; about 30 percent are minerals, principally coal and apatite; and the remainder consists mostly of cement and light industrial products. The country imports all of its petroleum products, steel, railroad rolling stock and vehicles, and most of its complex machinery and metal manufactures, spare parts, industrial chemicals, and raw cotton. Priority has been given to imports of complete plant installations, machinery and equipment, and industrial raw materials. Machinery and equipment have accounted for about one-half of North Vietnam's imports in recent years. Imports of food have generally been small, but the poor agricultural performance in 1963 and fragmentary data on food purchases abroad by Hanoi suggest that food imports increased in 1963 and early 1964.



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## II. Seaborne Trade Through Port of Haiphong

### A. Haiphong Harbor

#### 1. Physical Facilities

Haiphong is situated on the southern bank of the Cua Cam about 10 miles upstream from the Gulf of Tonkin. The harbor consists of a 3-mile section of the Cua Cam fronting the city, and 1 basin and 2 small waterways in the city. The principal wharves extend about 4,000 linear feet, virtually all of which are suitable for transferring general cargo. During 1963 one pier was rebuilt and extended about 100 feet. There are some off-shore wharves of open concrete or steel piling and a few T-head piers of the same construction. Six Liberty-size vessels can be accomodated at the docks simultaneously and it is reported that as many as 6 ships can also be loaded or unloaded with lighters while anchored in the stream.

Cargo for the most part is loaded and unloaded using ships' gear, although one floating crane of approximately 50 tons is reported to be in the commercial dock area. Harbor operations are said to be inefficient, and clearance of the cargo from the dockside is slow, although some improvement has occurred in recent years. Some fork lift trucks and a few dock cranes are now used on the docks to move bulky or heavy items, but most cargo handling in the port area is by truck and dollies. Ore is loaded by a few old dock cranes with grab buckets. In addition, several conveyor belts were built during 1963 to load ore. Harbor clearance takes place by rail, road, and barge.



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Petroleum tankers dock at the Shell Petroleum Pier which has at least two pipelines to carry the petroleum to the three storage areas. These storage areas have tanks installed with a total capacity estimated to be about 30,000 tons.* A second petroleum pier, the Standard-Vacuum Pier, probably is not used currently.

In 1960 Haiphong harbor had ample harbor craft for normal operations, including 10 or more 100-ton wooden lighters and 30 or more 200-ton steel lighters. In addition, a large portion of the river and oceangoing craft in North Vietnam can be expected to be in or near Haiphong. A complete craft census for North Vietnam is not available, but in 1959 the government owned at least 16 oceangoing barges, 53 river-type barges (8 known to be self-propelled), one transport tanker of 300 GRT, 5 oceangoing tugs, and 14 river-type tugs, as well as other tugs and various miscellaneous craft. About 500 junks with capacities of up to 50 tons each are also available at Haiphong and can be used for lighterage purposes.

The inventory of small vessels and barges has increased since 1960, because of a heavy emphasis by the North Vietnamese government on the expansion of water transport. The government announced the construction in 1963 of 15,000 tons of barges and ships and the repair of 7,000 tons of river craft. Haiphong has at least 7 shipyards, and another under construction with the help of Soviet technicians, for assembling and repairing small vessels. The new shipyard is reported to have produced 200-ton and 1,000-ton lighters and tugboats in 1962.

* Tonnages are given in metric tons throughout this report unless otherwise indicated.



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2. Port Capacity

The capacity of the port of Haiphong is estimated to be about 4,000 tons per day (or nearly 1.5 million tons per year) of general cargo, cement, and dry raw materials, and 800 tons per day (or nearly 300,000 tons per year) of petroleum in bulk. The volume of dry cargo passing through the port in 1963 approached the capacity level. Petroleum imports amounted to about one-half of the capacity of the petroleum pier. The total imports through Haiphong in 1963 were about 1,400 tons per day and exports about 2,700 tons per day. In the last half of 1963 the port was said to be continually congested. 25X1

The work of reconstructing one pier in Haiphong may have contributed to this congestion. During 1962 the Soviet Union agreed to help expand port facilities at Haiphong and the construction underway in 1963 was probably part of this agreement.



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## III. Vulnerability of the Port of Haiphong

### A. Vulnerability to Blockage

The entrance to Haiphong harbor is gained from the Gulf of Tonkin through the lower reach of the Cua Nam Trieu and the Canal Maritime. The Canal Maritime is about 3,900 feet long and between 450 and 700 feet wide. The harbor fairway is dredged to a minimum of 26 feet (at low water). The depth of the Canal Maritime at its northwestern end is shown on a hydrographic chart to be 23 feet, but this area has probably also been deepened to 26 feet by dredging. If the Canal Maritime could be effectively blocked, the harbor at Haiphong would be closed to oceangoing ships, because there would be no alternative routes to the port for vessels with drafts of more than 11 feet.* Blocking the Canal Maritime would also cause silt to accumulate in the harbor area at a faster rate than usual, and would, therefore, further complicate the rehabilitation of the port.

The Cua Cam empties into the Gulf of Tonkin south of the Canal Maritime, but is so shallow that oceangoing ships could not use it to gain access to Haiphong. There is a passage from the Cua Cam north of the Canal Maritime which then empties into the Cua Nam Trieu and the Gulf of Tonkin,

* Although the draft of vessels is not necessarily related to their size because of the varying styles and shapes of ships, it can be assumed that a vessel of 5,000 to 6,000 GRT has a loaded draft of between 23 and 26 feet. A Liberty ship (7,176 GRT) has a loaded draft of 28 feet. A tanker than can carry about 10,000 tons of petroleum also has a loaded draft of about 28 feet. Small coastal vessels vary greatly in design, but most of the Chinese coastal vessels of 1,000 to 3,000 GRT that operate in this area have a loaded draft of 18 to 20 feet.



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but this passage, although deeper than the southern arm of the Cua Cam, is also too shallow to permit oceangoing ships to travel through it. To deepen either of these branches of the Cua Cam to accommodate oceangoing vessels of the type currently serving the port would require dredging for a distance of at least 4 miles. This effort would require at least a year under the most favorable circumstances and using the most modern dredging equipment.

Although the normal operation of the port of Haiphong is chiefly dependent on the availability of the Canal Maritime, blocking the Canal Maritime will not halt all traffic in and out of Haiphong. Small coastal vessels, lighters, barges, and junks that draw less than 11 feet could pass through the silted river channels at high water. Consequently the only way that all traffic to and from Haiphong could be halted appears to be through the imposition of an effective in-shore as well as an off-shore naval blockade.

B. Vulnerability of Dredges

The harbor of Haiphong must be dredged continually to keep it open to oceangoing ships. If dredging operations were not maintained, silt would begin to accumulate immediately, and it is estimated that the harbor would be completely blocked to oceangoing ships within 6 months. Estimates as to the number of dredges available vary from three stationed in the Haiphong harbor to eight available in the entire country of North Vietnam. Of the three said to be in Haiphong harbor, two were reported to be clam-bucket type dredges and one a suction-type with a rated capacity of 950 cubic yards



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an hour. Denial of the suction-type dredge would impair dredging operations to a much greater extent than denial of the two less modern types. If the bulk of the dredges in North Vietnam were put out of operation, it would be necessary for North Vietnam to borrow or purchase new dredges from abroad. The acquisition of additional dredges would take a considerable amount of time, possibly several months; to train personnel to operate the new dredges would require an additional period of time. In the meantime the harbor would begin to silt up.

C. Vulnerability of Port Facilities

It is believed that the operation of the port would not be greatly hampered by the damage or destruction of port facilities. With the possible exception of the petroleum pier, damage done to piers could be repaired fairly quickly, and during the rehibilitation vessels could be anchored in the streams and cargo could be unloaded through the use of lighters and junks. The area around the petroleum pier must be dredged before the arrival of each tanker at the pier. Destruction of the dredges, therefore, would also interrupt the bulk supply of petroleum to Haiphong, because arriving tankers could not unload supplies at the petroleum pier. Petroleum shipped in drums, however, could still be lightered at very high cost.



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## IV. Alternate Transport Facilities

### A. Shipping

Although it is highly unlikely that all small craft, barges, and lighters could be prevented from moving between the Gulf of Tonkin and the port of Haiphong, it can be assumed that for a short period of time there would be drastic reduction in the volume of traffic. Oceangoing vessels would have to anchor about 10 miles downstream from the port and off-load in a lighterage operation. Only a small percent of the normal trade would be hauled that distance on the fleet of shallow-draft vessels presently available at Haiphong. This type of operation would be very inefficient and costly. The initial confusion and problems of organizing this fleet of vessels and acquiring additional vessels from other ports in North Vietnam and China would preclude any significant amount of trade being handled in the first few weeks after a blockade of the channel. It is conceivable, however, that eventually these craft could handle all of the imports except the largest pieces of heavy equipment and the petroleum in bulk. Some exports could be handled in this manner although with considerable loss of efficiency. However, since most of the exports are bulk commodities, which are difficult to handle by small craft, it is likely that they would be shipped via other ports in North Vietnam and China insofar as possible.

North Vietnam has only two secondary ports, Cam Pha and Hon Gay, that can accommodate oceangoing vessels of over 5,000 GRT. These two ports are located just northeast of Haiphong and are especially equipped to export coal, but also have very limited facilities for handling other types of cargo. Besides the coal piers and their mechanical loading facilities, each port has a second quay which could be used for general cargo. At Cam Pha,



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the second quay possibly is used in connection with transloading goods into small coastal ships and barges, and no warehouses are associated with the quay. The small general cargo area at Hon Gay has one wharf about 80 feet long and 10 warehouses. These two ports are served by a narrow gauge railroad which connects the ports with the coal mines but not with the main rail system.

The amount of general cargo that moves through Cam Pha and Hon Gay could be increased. If the goods were not moved to and from the port by coastal water transport, they would have to be moved by truck. Highway route 2 that passes through these two ports and continues on to Haiphong is mostly gravel-surfaced with portions bituminous treated. There are a number of ferry crossings on the route, some with limited capacity of two or three jeep-type vehicles per ferry. Other bottlenecks on the route include narrow bridges; some fords, sharp curves, and a causeway with two or three short bridges 5 miles north of Haiphong. Trafficability of route 2 is limited also in the rainy season by the low-lying terrain which is subject to inudation.

Two other minor ports in North Vietnam that could also be used to some extent as possible alternates to Haiphong are Do Son and Ben Thuy. Do Son, located 10 miles southeast of Haiphong on a point of land extending into the Gulf of Tonkin, has a petroleum pier and storage for about 3,000 tons of petroleum at an airfield that is not presently in use. Extensive exposed anchorage is available in the open roadstead for general cargo ships, but berthing facilities and wharves are limited.

Ben Thuy, the port for the town and the military staging area at Vinh, has a fairway depth over the bar that limits the port to vessels of about 5,00



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GRT and under. A general cargo wharf, located about 200 feet from the shore, has about 450 feet of berthage at the wharf and 4 warehouses and 1 large storage building. The petroleum wharf is located about 2 nautical miles downstread and has 11 oil tanks for storage. [redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted] port facilities at Ben Thuy apparently had not been expanded in recent years except for the naval facilities.

Expansion of port facilities has been observed at two other minor ports, Dong Hoi and Quang Khe, located to the south of Ben Thuy, but the piers under construction at these ports are either naval facilities or T-head piers suited for vessels of not over 125 feet in length. Vessels requiring a depth of more than 12 feet cannot use these ports because the high water over the bar at the harbor entrances has a maximum depth of 12 feet.

B. Railroads

If the blockade of the port of Haiphong were 100 percent effective, a considerable amount of the imports and exports of North Vietnam could be handled through South China ports, primarily Fort Bayard. The goods could then be transported by rail to Hanoi, a total distance of about 840 kilometers from Fort Bayard. The railroad between these cities consists of a single-track standard-gauge line from Fort Bayard to P'ing-hsiang, China, and a single-track meter-gauge line from P'ing-hsiang to Hanoi. The meter-gauge line, which is the limiting section of the route, has an estimated capacity of 2,500 to 2,700 tons each way per day (EWPD). The line is [redacted] well constructed and maintained. Actual freight traffic over it at present probably averages about 1,000 tons EWPD, leaving an unused capacity of 1,500 to 1,700 tons EWPD. 25X1



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Water-borne exports from Haiphong are estimated to be 2,700 tons per day, and water-borne imports are estimated to be 1,400 tons per day. In the event of a total blackade of Haiphong, all of the water-borne imports that normally move through the port and as much as 1,500 to 1,700 tons of the exports could be shifted to rail transport. The meter-gauge line to P'ing-hsiang could not haul the remaining 1,000 to 1,200 tons of the exports.

The additional cost to North Vietnam to use the rail line for the 1,400 tons of imports per day that normally move through Haiphong would be about $16,000 per day, or about $6 million per year. This cost amounts to about $12 per ton for the distance between Fort Bayard and Hanoi, including a transloading charge at P'ing-hsiang. This cost may not be excessive for the majority of the imports, which are essential to North Vietnamese industry. The cost per ton might be prohibitive, however, for some North Vietnamese exports, especially for apatite, a low-value, bulky commodity that is the major export item in volume. The Chinese railroads could lower the freight cost for some of the cement, which China normally imports, and possibly for other commodities in order to fill the Chinese railroad cars delivering North Vietnamese imports to P'ing-hsiang, thus avoiding an empty haul back to Fort Bayard. Because of the high cost of transportation and a possible shortage in North Vietnam of suitable covered freight cars to haul apatite, this commodity would probably not be exported.

Possible congestion at P'ing-hsiang, the transloading point on the border between the standard-gauge rail system of China and the meter-gauge system of North Vietnam, might initially limit the actual tonnage transported to a figure somewhat below the theoretical capacity of the line, although no significant delays or limitations on traffic are known to have occurred in the



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past from the transloading operation. If continued congestion occurred at the transloading point, it could be eliminated by the expansion of the transloading facilities, a task that could be accomplished rather easily and probably within one month.

The narrow-gauge rolling stock park probably would not be a limiting factor in the attainment of the theoretical capacity of the P'ing-hsiang-Hanoi line. Although freight cars and locomotives are not plentiful in North Vietnam, Chinese narrow-gauge rolling stock from the Kunming Railroad Bureau could be used to supplement a deficiency in the North Vietnamese rolling stock park. Furthermore, rolling stock previously used to move seaborne traffic between Hanoi and Haiphong could also be used. Repair facilities are believed to be adequate to service the increase in the active park. The North Vietnamese probably do not have enough narrow-gauge tank cars for carrying petroleum. Some petroleum products could be moved in drums by rail, but this would require considerably more time than movement by tank cars. The inability to divert all petroleum shipments to the rail system could be the most serious problem for North Vietnam in the event Haiphong channel is blocked.

C. Motor Vehicles and Air Transport

The extent to which motor vehicle transport can be used to supplement rail transport in case of a blockade of Haiphong depends on how much aid Communist China makes available to North Vietnam in the form of trucks, gasoline, and spare parts. At present these items must be imported and are scarce in North Vietnam. The combined military and civilian truck park is



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estimated to include 5,000 trucks ranging in size from 1/4-ton to 3-tons. Little information is available regarding the problems of repair, spare parts, and fuel availability for these trucks. Due to the high cost of motor vehicle transport, about 3 times that of rail transport, and to the problems of obtaining suitable trucks, it seems likely that only essential imports and possibly those exports from North Vietnam that originate near the Chinese border would be transported by truck.

Three road systems connect Kwangsi Region and Kwangtung Province of China with Hanoi and Haiphong. Route 2 along the cost, discussed above, has a low capacity due to a limiting sector near the Chinese border which probably has only a narrow, improved-earth surface, Route 1, which runs roughly parallel to the Hanoi-Dong Dang railroad line has a gravel or crushed stone surface, with surface widths ranging from 10 feet to 19 feet. Route 3 is located further inland, extending north from Hanoi to Cao Bang near the Chinese border. To connect with a Chinese rail line the road extends to Hi-ch'ih on the Kuei-yang-Lui-chou line or to Ning Ming on the Lui-chou - P'ing-hsiang line. This road has the lowest capacity of the three routes and would not be used to move goods unless absolutely necessary because of the distance involved and because of one 4 -mile section in North Vietnam between Cao Bang and the border that is described as improved-earth road with some light gravel sections, about 9 to 15 feet wide, passing through rugged mountainous terrain.



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Small amounts of high-priority items could be flown from Chinese airfields to North Vietnam. Shortages of spare parts and fuel for aircraft in North Vietnam and China, however, would limit the use of air transport unless an airlift were supported by the USSR.



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## V. Economic Effects of Denying Imports to North Vietnam

If denied use of the port of Haiphong, the North Vietnamese could shift almost all of the commodities previously imported by sea (with the possible exception of petroleum) to South China ports, in particular to Fort Bayard, from where they could be transported by rail to Hanoi. If at the same time, this rail transportation were interrupted (e.g., by the sabotage of the Dap Cau railroad/ highway bridge and sabotage of other transportation targets of the route to the north), the country then would be deprived of most of its imports. Such a denial of imports would, after the first two months, increasingly disrupt the industrialization program and cause a drastic fall in industrial output.*

The immediate effect of such a denial of imports would be in capital construction where work currently under way would soon have to be curtailed or come to a halt largely because of the lack of steel, machinery, and equipment. Work on the rail line and bridges south of Vinh could not be completed without imported structural steel, reinforcing rods, and rails.

* Because North Vietnam's economy is basically one of subsistence agriculture with only a small modern industrial sector which accounted for about 12 percent of GNP in 1962, the denial of imports would not have as great an impact upon the total populace as it would upon a country which is not able to feed its own population. The conclusions as to the impact on the economy of a denial of imports exclude the possibility that Communist China or the USSR might commit themselves to supplying some of the most essential imports to North Vietnam by air.



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Cutting off imports of metallurgical equipment such as components for steel-producing furnaces and rolling facilities would prevent the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Mill from coming into full operation. Lack of coking coal for the steel mill's blast furnaces, however, could be offset temporarily by more intensive mining of small domestic resources of coking coal. The denial of equipment to complete high-pressure units for ammonia synthesis, large quantities of corrosive-resistant piping, and control and measuring instruments would postpone the completion of the large nitrogenous chemical fertilizer plant at Phu Lang Thuong. In addition, the cutting off of imports of generators, steam turbines, boilers, transformers, and transmission equipment would prevent the planned expansion of the Thai Nguyen and Uong Bi Electric Power Plants, which together account for about one-third of the electric power capacity of the main grid in North Vietnam which supplies Hanoi, Haiphong, Viet Tri, and Thai Nguyen.

Manufacturing industries now in operation, which accounted for about 80 percent of the gross value of modern industry in 1962, would be seriously affected by denial of imports. Most manufacturing industries probably would be able to continue production for about two months on the basis of current stockpiles of materials. With the depletion of these stockpiles, such industries as machine-building and textiles would be forced to curtail output drastically unless imports of steel and raw cotton were resumed. Denial of some industrial



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chemicals, particularly caustic soda, would adversely affect the production in the chemical, pulp and paper, soap, and textile industries.

The effect of a denial of imports of petroleum products to North Vietnam would become an increasing problem after the first two months. It is estimated that the North Vietnamese may have as much as four to six months of reserves of petroleum. If the POL storage facility at Haiphong were destroyed in denying the North Vietnamese use of the port, the economy would lose at least one-third of its storage capacity and possibly as much as one-half of its reserves. With the depletion of petroleum reserves, the industrial and motor transportation sectors of the economy would come to a halt. Failure to obtain spare parts for machinery and equipment in industry and for the various modes of transportation would also be an increasingly serious problem after two months. The increased use of trucks and small motorized craft by the regime in an attempt to offset the import blockade probably would use up rapidly the present inventory of parts, and thereafter the regime would be forced to cannibalize other vehicles.



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VI. Political Effects Among Free World Countries of Interdiction of Haiphong Harbor (This Section was written by ONE)

Interdiction would be universally ascribed to US support and direction, whether or not US involvement were overt. Reactions would vary with the particular audience and the particular interdiction tactics. Whatever those tactics interdiction would probably be welcomed by the governments of the Republic of China and the ROK. There would be similar reactions on the part of South Vietnam and Thailand, touched with some official and public concern over possible retaliatory actions by the Communists. Whatever the interdiction tactics, reactions would probably be ambivalent in Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand: satisfaction, on the one hand, that the US was taking a tough stand; concern, at the same time, over possible adverse consequences.

Elsewhere in the Free World, government and public reactions would be adverse for the most part. In general, such reactions would probably be relatively low-keyed in the event of channel blocking, sharper in the event port facilities were damaged, and sharper still in the event of mining or blockade. In these latter two cases:

a. The US-sponsored actions would be considered aggressive and dangerous, tangential to the central problem of South Vietnam, and in violation of international law.

b. Most of these states would support initiatives for a conference or international discussion of the new situation, and many would probably support Communist efforts to condemn US actions.



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c. The US could not expect support from the UK, although London would probably abstain from radical counteraction.

d. Reactions would be especially significant in the case of Japan. The extreme Left would probably raise considerable noise. Government and conservative elements would be uneasy about the US action. Staged disorders might in extreme circumstances -- depending especially on the nature of Communist retaliation to the US actions -- endanger US use of certain Japanese bases and facilities, at least for the crisis period.

e. US relations with the Government of Japan and of our Western allies could become suddenly tense, in the event of incidents or expanded crisis, although probably not to the point where these countries would support Communist moves to condemn the US interdiction actions.



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# APPENDIX

## Statistical Tables



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Table 1

North Vietnam: Direction of Trade, 1962-63 a/

In million US $

| | 1962 | | 1963 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Exports | Imports | Exports | Imports |
| Total | 87.9 | 143.0 | 91.2 | 149.7 |
| Communist Countries b/ | 67.0 | 130.9 | 66.2 | 135.7 |
| USSR c/ | 30.2 | 54.6 | n.a. | n.a. |
| European Satellites c/ | 21.0 | 25.0 | n.a. | n.a. |
| Communist China and other Communist Countries b/ | 15.8 ~~14.9~~ | 51.3 | n.a. | n.a. |
| Free World c/ | 20.9 ~~21.8~~ | 12.1 | 25.0 d/ | 14.0 d/ |
| Japan | 13.0 | 3.4 | 9.9 d/ | 4.3 d/ |
| France | 2.2 | 2.9 | 3.6 | 2.5 |

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Table 2

North Vietnam: Commodity Trade with Free World

In thousand US dollars and percent of total

| | Value | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Exports | 21,844 | 100.0 |
| Food and beverages | 2,211 | 10.1 |
| Cereal and cereal preparations | (907) | (4.2) |
| Rice | ((906)) | ((4.1)) |
| Coal | 15,754 | 72.1 |
| Cement | 1,826 | 8.4 |
| Crude materials | 1,092 | 5.0 |
| Oilseeds | (162) | (0.7) |
| Crude fertilizers and minerals | (116) | (0.5) |
| Crude animal and vegetables materials | (696) | (3.2) |
| Other goods | 961 | 4.4 |
| Imports | 12,052 | 100.0 |
| Manufactured goods | 6,141 | 51.0 |
| Base metals and manufactures | (856) | (7.1) |
| Iron, steel, and semimanufactures | ((511)) | ((4.2)) |
| Textile yarn, fabrics, and manufactures except clothing | (3,866) | (32.1) |
| Chemicals | 2,201 | 18.3 |
| Nitrogen fertilizer other than natural | (918) | (7.6) |
| Machinery and equipment | 742 | 6.2 |
| Nonelectric machinery | (312) | (2.6) |
| Electric machinery and appliances | (204) | (1.7) |
| Transport equipment | (226) | (1.9) |
| Food and beverages | 227 | 1.9 |
| Corn | (171) | (1.4) |
| Textile fibers | 953 | 7.9 |
| Crude rubber | 896 | 7.4 |
| Other goods | 892 | 7.3 |



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Table 3

North Vietnam: Commodity Trade with the USSR
1962

In million US dollars and percent of total

| | Value | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Exports | 30.2 | 100.0 |
| Parquet frieze | 4.6 | 15.2 |
| Food and beverages | 1.2 | 4.0 |
| Manufactured consumer goods | 18.6 | 61.6 |
| Clothing except footwear | (13.5) | (44.7) |
| Oilseed produce and other unprocessed food products | 0.1 | 0.3 |
| Other goods | 5.7 | 18.9 |
| Imports | 54.6 | 100.0 |
| Machinery and equipment | 31.4 | 57.5 |
| Complete plants | (21.7) | (39.7) |
| Motor vehicles, transportation, and garage equipment | (2.5) | (4.6) |
| Tractors and agricultural machinery | (1.0) | (1.8) |
| Ships and marine equipment | (1.2) | (2.2) |
| Petroleum products | 4.2 | 7.7 |
| Gasoline | (1.7) | (3.1) |
| Kerosene | (0.8) | (1.5) |
| Diesel fuel | (0.8) | (1.5) |
| Lubricating oils | (0.6) | (1.1) |
| Lubricants, non-liquid | (0.2) | (0.4) |
| Metals and metal products | 7.8 | 14.3 |
| Ferrous metals and products | (6.3) | (11.5) |
| Rolled ferrous metal | ((4.4)) | ((8.1)) |
| Nonferrous metals and products | (1.5) | (2.7) |
| Ammonium sulphate | 1.6 | 2.9 |
| Manufactured consumer goods | 2.9 | 5.3 |
| Other goods | 6.7 | 12.3 |



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