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SPECIAL REPORT

TANZANIA TAKING THE LEFT TURN

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TANZANIA TAKING THE LEFT TURN

The United Republic of Tanzania under President Julius Nyerere has been drifting slowly but steadily leftward. Today, it has moved into the vanguard of Africa's radical states and offers the Chinese Communists an unusually promising opportunity to penetrate the continent. This process has been under way at varying speeds since Tanganyika became independent in December 1961, but has been accelerated by Nyerere's determination to lead the struggle for the liberation of southern Africa and by Tanganyika's union with Zanzibar last year. Far from coming under moderate Tanganyikan control, Zanzibar has continued to be a center from which radical, pro-Communist influences radiate.

The Leader

Nyerere is Western educated and, at least initially, was biased in favor of Western political principles and procedures, but he has tailored these drastically to fit what he views as the exigencies of Tanzania. He is a weak executive, and since he has surrounded himself with radical lieutenants, it has become difficult to tell whether or when vital decisions of policy are his own.

Some observers contend that Nyerere's hand is being forced at every turn. The current situation in Tanzania, however, seems to be largely of his own making; in any event there is little evidence to suggest that he has tried seriously to reverse the trend. In his uncompromising pursuit of African freedom and nonalignment he appears determined to keep his country on its present course, even though this parallels radical African and Communist objectives and is likely to lead to a further erosion of the Western position.

On the question of African liberation Nyerere is a fanatic. Beneath a charming personality which disarms many Westerners, he is a man of strong conviction, prepared to pay almost any price to achieve a united Africa ruled by black Africans. Independence came easily and peacefully to Tanganyika, but had Britain not been prepared to accelerate the hand-over of power, Nyerere would have done nothing to prevent the use of violence by his more extreme colleagues. Hypersensitive to any suggestion of outside interference, Nyerere has not hesitated to expel US diplomats and reject West German aid regardless of the consequences.

In southern Africa, as with his own country, Nyerere would prefer to employ peaceful procedures. The political solutions he occasionally proposes to Western leaders for the dismissal of

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

Congolese Premier Tshombé or for the termination of Portuguese rule in Africa may seem naive and idealistic, but they are none the less sincere.

Until a year ago Tanganyikan support for the various liberation movements was largely political. A few training camps for Mozambique rebels had been established on Tanganyikan soil and a shipload of miscellaneous small arms had been accepted from Algeria, but this was a minimum gesture of African nationalist pressure. Political action to marshal "world opinion" has not moved the Portuguese or the South Africans, however, and Nyerere's irritation clearly has mounted.

Action Abroad

Personally frustrated, and pressured by militant radicals at home and abroad, Nyerere has turned to more activist methods. Today his regime is involved in training and arming dissident exiles from the Congo, Mozambique, Malawi, South Africa, and Rhodesia.

Strategically, Nyerere's chief enemy is South Africa, whose apartheid is anathema to him, with Mozambique as a target en route. Ever since Tshombé's rise to power in Leopoldville last July, however, Nyerere's main tactical effort appears to have been directed against the Congo. Tshombé's use of South African mercenaries to kill black Africans is considered by Nyerere to be treason to the pan-African cause. By the same token, Prime Minister Banda of Malawi has become a target of Tanzania's radical nationalists because of his friendship with the Portuguese and his refusal to allow Malawi

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to be used as a sanctuary for raids against Mozambique.

As Tanzania has increased military support for the various rebel groups, Tanzanian fears of Portuguese or Congolese retaliation have risen. The Congolese incursions into Uganda and the Sudan, recent implied threats by Tshombé, and even the US strikes into North Vietnam have brought this fear to almost pathological proportions. The Portuguese foreign minister's public reference, most recently in mid-May, to the possibility of bombing Tanzanian bases has fed the Tanzanians' neurosis.

Communist Arms Influx

This situation has offered the Communist nations an extraordinary opportunity to peddle military hardware, and Dar es Salaam has received over 2,500 tons of arms from China and the USSR during the past year. Tight security precautions have made it difficult to determine the precise disposition of these arms. Many have transited Tanzania to the eastern Congo, and some have gone to the various liberation training camps, particularly the Kigoma camp on Lake Tanganyika, where some 3,000-4,000 Congolese are in training. The Tanzanians are known to have offered Chinese arms to the Malawi dissidents.

A large part of these shipments including armored personnel carriers, artillery, antitank and antiaircraft guns, mortars, trucks, and a variety of small arms, has probably been used in the extensive build-up of Tanzanian forces. This build-up is taking a large and growing percentage of the country's budget and is contributing to its deteriorating financial condition, even though most of the Chinese arms are believed to have been a gift. The Tanzanian People's Defense Force, which is to be at least five battalions strong, now has one Chinese-equipped, one Soviet-equipped, and the original two British-equipped battalions. It seems likely that the Tanzanians will gradually adopt Communist weapons for all their armed forces.

Until recently there were about 50 Soviet and 27 Chinese military advisers in Tanzania, including those on Zanzibar. The eight Soviet officers on the mainland were sent home on 17 May, ostensibly because they had completed their duties and Tanzania considered multiple training missions undesirable. The Chinese advisers have finished training the Chinese-equipped battalion and are reported to be giving a short course in light weapons to a 600-man reserve group from the Mozambique border area. They had earlier trained two similar groups which now are part of the new 10,000-man Volunteer Reserve Force. The Chinese are also expected to participate in military training for the police force, prison services, and National Youth Service, all of which would be mobilized during a national emergency.

Nyerere probably would like to have some Western presence to balance the Communist influx.

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A US proposal last year to send a substantial number of instructors to train a paramilitary police force has been sidetracked, however, and there is some question how much longer the Israeli police advisers will be welcome, as the police are becoming increasingly involved in training foreign freedom fighters. A Canadian training mission has established a military academy and will probably take on the air force program abandoned by the West Germans. Nyerere is still looking to Britain and Canada for overseas training of officer candidates, but 37 naval cadets have gone to Indonesia and about 75 trainees from various arms are in Communist countries.

Tanzania and the Wider World

The cornerstone of Nyerere's foreign policy in its broader aspects has been nonalignment. To him this means not only the maintenance of good relations with all powers, but also a parity of aid and representation from each power so that no one country can achieve a dominant position in Tanzania. In his pre-independence writings, Nyerere discussed Africa's role in the cold war; he saw a need for East and West to compete there economically and to learn to get along with each other while working toward the same goal of economic development. Nyerere wanted no part of the world's political quarrels, but in his quest for economic aid he has had to contend not only with the East-West conflict and the Sino-Soviet split, but with the East vs. West German issue and the Arab-Israeli quarrel.

Nyerere has welcomed representation and aid from any interested Communist country to offset the extensive Western influence which existed in Tanzania at independence and to balance Tanzania's membership in the commonwealth, which he views primarily as an anti-Communist club. Today, the envoys of the 18 Western and neutral nations resident in Tanzania slightly outnumber those of the 11 Communist countries, four radical African states, and Indonesia. The latter grouping, however, is the more active and enjoys more ready access to Tanzanian officials.

Western, and particularly US, contact with Tanzanian leaders has been limited and the scope for exerting effective influence is rapidly shrinking. It would appear that some time last year the Tanzanian leadership concluded that the US is the principal impediment to Tanzania's aspirations in Africa. Suspicions of US intentions in that part of Africa and in Tanzania, in particular, were heightened by US support of Tshombé and fanned by the radical African and Chinese representatives in Dar es Salaam. [redacted] 25X1 forged documents [redacted] disclosed a US-Portuguese-Tshombé "plot" to overthrow the Tanzanian Government. Last January, the Chinese on Zanzibar taped an innocuous conversation which led to the expulsion of two US diplomats for "plotting the overthrow" of the Zanzibar regime. As a result, Nyerere has become more and more isolated from Western counsel.

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The Chinese Communists were the first nation to establish an embassy in Dar es Salaam after independence and have since attained the most influential and trusted position. Foreign Minister Kambona has long allowed the Chinese to disregard the 12-man limit placed on all other foreign embassies. China's presence and prestige in Tanzania has increased steadily. Vice President Kawawa's visit to Peiping in June 1964 was a major contribution to this process. He negotiated both economic and military agreements and, perhaps more important, returned greatly impressed by Chinese capabilities and overwhelmed by Peiping's generosity. His guide was Zanzibar's former foreign minister Babu, Peiping's principal Zanzibari agent, who also accompanied Nyerere to China last February. Babu received a $4,000 bonus from the Chinese for convincing Nyerere to make the trip.

Nyerere's delegation signed a trade agreement and discussed additional economic and military aid, but the final communiqué papered over some fundamental disagreements on such issues as the UN. At first Nyerere was cautious in his dealings with the Chinese, but he told a visitor recently that Tanzania realized the power and importance of China and must accommodate to the future. He needs Chinese assistance and probably believes that he can limit their influence within Tanzania. He has been impressed by their performance, by the quality of their arms--as opposed to the older Soviet materiel--and by what he believes to be the unselfishness of their aid. Since his return from Peiping he has taken to wearing a simple tunic--without the Chinese collar, however--and has embarked on an austerity program, publicly citing China as an example of careful management of resources and of spending on only absolute essentials. The Chinese may eventually press too hard in Tanzania, but so far they have been more successful than the West or the Soviets in relating themselves to the African.

China has given Tanzania $4.8 million in hard currency and $39 million in interest--free credits for agricultural and industrial projects. While there is a steady stream of Chinese flying in and out of the country, those stationed there total well over 100. Nyerere often points out, somewhat defensively, that there are over 300 US Peace Corps teachers, and he becomes incensed at those who lecture him on the Chinese peril. A US demarche last August concerning the arrival of seven Chinese military instructors incited him to a public denunciation of such interference. He told a visiting West African delegation this month that the Chinese would be welcome as long as they continued to behave correctly and helpfully. He added that he had recently seen the Chinese in Mali addressing aid to the real needs of the people, while the only Soviet project was an expensive stadium for propaganda.

Soviet-Tanzanian relations are polite. Dar es Salaam accepts Soviet economic and military

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aid because it is needed, but with a certain amount of reserve. The Tanzanians were annoyed last year when the Soviets refused to help them persuade the East German Embassy to leave Zanzibar and later when Moscow sent about 25 Soviet military advisers to the island without notifying Dar es Salaam. Moscow has offered a $20-million credit for mineral and agricultural surveys, a hospital, a radio station, and schools, but Dar es Salaam is still haggling over the terms. The main difficulty for the Soviets has been Tanzanian dissatisfaction with the Soviet interest rate and with the financing of the local costs of the proposed projects. The Chinese, on the other hand, have provided hard currency and consumer goods which the Tanzanians can sell to generate local currency for this purpose.

Polish and Czech credits and East German aid to Zanzibar amount to another $18.5 million.

The Zanzibar Disease

The Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, hastily enacted a year ago, has not only failed to eliminate the Zanzibar cancer, but has in some ways facilitated its spread throughout the mainland government. The union proclamation of 23 April 1964 caught Zanzibar's pro-Communists by surprise and blocked them from the complete takeover that then appeared imminent. Zanzibar's foreign minister and leading Communist, Abdulrahman Mohammed ("Babu"), realized that he had been outmaneuvered and restrained those militants who wanted to resist union with the thought, as one of his lieutenants expressed it, that it was "worth losing Zanzibar's 300,000 people for the sake of Tanganyika's ten million."

Babu's rationalization may yet prove to have been sound. President Nyerere gave the Zanzibaris heavy overrepresentation in the Tanzanian cabinet in the belief that the "wild men," as he calls them, could best be neutralized by "smothering" them in Tanganyikan nonalignment. The less competent of the Zanzibaris who were transferred to Dar es Salaam have since drifted back to Zanzibar, but those that remained have strong voices in Nyerere's administration. Together with radically inclined Tanganyikans they control all the important ministries. Babu, now minister for commerce and cooperatives, has proved to be able and effective and his influence with Nyerere has grown steadily.

The deputy finance minister, a Zanzibari Communist, stated in March that the island radicals were pleased with the way things have developed. They believe they have established themselves as the brains and main source of inspiration and information in the Tanzanian Government. In order to strengthen their influence over Nyerere, they have successfully worked for the removal of all moderate advisers. One of the last moderates of any stature in the Tanzanian regime, the finance minister, has been ill --on the verge of a nervous

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breakdown--and apparently expects to be dropped from the cabinet in the near future.

At the same time the Zanzibaris have been able to resist real integration of the island's administration. Nyerere's uphill struggle in this direction has been another source of personal frustration and has had a disproportionate effect on his conduct of both domestic and foreign policy. In his desire to avoid a direct confrontation with the islanders he has frequently compromised and agreed hastily to positions which he might not otherwise have taken. Each surrender to radical pressure has resulted in a further diminution of his authority and future maneuverability.

In Zanzibar itself, the union has never been popular, and it was only Tanganyika's steamroller tactics which forced it in the first place. Mainland leaders convinced Zanzibar's President Karume, now also first vice president of Tanzania, that union with Tanganyika was the only way to prevent Babu and his pro-Chinese Arabs from gaining complete control. Karume gave little thought to the consequences of such a union, and obtained Zanzibar's ratification of the agreement even though only one third of the island's Revolutionary Council voted in favor and despite strong opposition from radical labor and youth elements.

A year later the Zanzibaris remain usually uncooperative and often ignore their mainland colleagues. They still control their own entry and exit procedures. Several councilmen traveled recently to East Germany without even notifying Dar es Salaam. West German diplomats on the mainland have been unable to visit the island despite Tanganyikan permission, and visiting US aid officials are frequently blocked or harassed. The Communist-trained Zanzibar Army has not been integrated with mainland forces; the one attempt to do so last fall resulted in the recall of the island soldiers after they looted a Tanganyikan town.

Karume now allows the mainlanders just enough authority on Zanzibar--particularly through the mainland police unit--to ensure that the "wild men" of the Revolutionary Council do not get the upper hand completely. Most of the 32-man council are either rabid radicals--many Communist trained--or uneducated gunslingers who roam the island arresting "plotters" and confiscating property at random.

Until this month Karume had never really come to grips with the long-term problem of what to do with these men. In his relations with the council he seems to have been following a policy--much like Nyerere's --of proceeding slowly and avoiding trouble at almost any cost. Karume may also see in the council a useful defense against the "imperialist" ambitions of the mainland Africans.

In early May, Zanzibar adopted a new party constitution which makes Karume's Afro-Shirazi

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Party the supreme authority, above the government and all its organs. The labor union, youth corps, and other mass organizations--which have been a source of Communist power on the island --will be absorbed into the party as separate departments. The new constitution may well allow Karume, as president of the party's all-powerful central committee, to curb the more unruly members of the Revolutionary Council, but it remains to be seen whether it actually reduces Communist influence or facilitates integration with Tanganyika.

Karume is a true African nationalist who desires to build a socialist society for his people, who wants no involvement in the cold war, and who would welcome aid from both East and West. He is also a racist who detests particularly the Arab landowners and Asian merchants who long monopolized power and wealth on Zanzibar and who relegated the African to an inferior status. His distrust of capitalism and private enterprise is an outgrowth of this experience, and last month he ordered the confiscation of 237 clove plantations and all 25 of Zanzibar's soft drink, sugar, and other processing plants. The regime already controls most of the island's import-export trade.

Until recently Asian businessmen have merely been harassed, but now that they realize that the regime intends to nationalize all privately owned enterprises, the rate of emigration will increase. More than 8,000 Asians left the island in the first 13 months after the revolution. The Arab population was halved during the same period--about 4,000 were killed during the revolution and some 22,000 emigrated.

The popular Karume is politically shrewd, but he is poorly educated and not as sophisticated as many of those around him, some of whom are firmly in one Communist camp or the other. The foreign Communist advisers have considerable influence, particularly in economic affairs, with the pro-Communist Zanzibari ministers who in turn have Karume's ear. Karume does not seem to worry about the pro-Communists in his government, unless they happen to be Arab; he believes they are loyal to him and that most of them are merely paying lip service to the foreign Communists.

Communist influence meanwhile is taking a variety of forms. The Chinese are training the security service, among other things. They brought in ten more economic advisers in March and appear to be gaining the upper hand in a conflict with the East German financial advisers, who were on the scene earlier. The Soviets are the least noticeable, but their 80-man contingent includes twelve known or suspected intelligence officers. The East Germans, now that their former embassy has become a consulate, are putting pressure on the Zanzibaris to downgrade all consulates general to their level.

The expulsion of the US consul last January was a significant victory for the Communists.

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He had been able to exert a moderating influence on Karume and could claim some credit for Karume's change from a violently anti-US attitude to relative friendliness. Zanzibar, because of Karume's efforts, was one of the few African capitals that had no anti-US demonstrations after the Stanleyville paradrop. Since the consul's departure Karume's pendulum seems to be swinging back.

Outlook

Tanzania is gradually isolating itself from the rest of East Africa. Its radical policies and its flirtation with the Chinese have alarmed the moderate elements which still make up the majority in Kenya and Uganda. Furthermore there are increasing strains in the economic ties that bind the three countries through the East African Common Services Organization--which was begun by the British to make possible more rational economic development to assist ultimately in forming political ties.

The Tanzanians have drawn closer to Uganda's top leaders because of their common fear of Tshombé, but Nyerere's doctrinaire attitude toward the Congo situation is further estranging Kenya's President Kenyatta. On 15 May, Kenya seized 11 Ugandan trucks carrying arms from Tanzania. This, together with Nairobi's recent anti-Communist crackdown may eventually add Kenyatta to the Tanzanian radicals' list of neocolonial targets.

At some point, Nyerere may try to redress the balances in Tanzania. Foreign aid for his five-year plan is falling short of expectations, and he realizes that foreign investment can only be attracted to a reasonably stable environment. Although he has turned to the East for material assistance, he has maintained Western predominance in education. In domestic politics, Nyerere appears to be backing Vice President Kawawa in an effort to curb the power of Foreign Minister Kambona, but these rivals are only radicals of varying shades. It remains to be seen whether the radicals that now dominate Tanzania's single party would allow Nyerere to change course, even if he wanted to. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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