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15 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
THROUGH : Director, Regional and Political Analysis
SUBJECT : Conference on Italy and Eurocommunism

1. The American Enterprise Institute-Hoover Institute conference on Italy and Eurocommunism, which ended on June 9 with a speech by Henry Kissinger, became a media event, as well as a serious conference. Though it ended with Kissinger's strong statement on the dangers of Eurocommunism, the actual proceedings--covered intensively by no fewer than 17 Italian newsmen including both TV networks--demonstrated general pessimism whether the PCI march toward power could be contained.

2. The proceedings opened with a session on the opening to the Left in the 1960's, historically unfocused and fairly superficially treated. The central point became American support for the opening. Various speakers explained that the policy had been neither supported nor opposed by President Kennedy but tolerated because Arthur Schlesinger made it his hobby-horse while the State Department resisted it; and that American support was historically unimportant, because the Italians would have done it anyway; or fairly important because it a) delayed or b) speeded up the timing of the actual opening.

3. In the following sessions, papers on the PCI were given by Profs. Joseph LaPalombara of Yale and Giacomo Sani of Ohio State. The latter, who has done extensive work on electoral patterns, suggested that the future PCI vote is unlikely to go up or down by more than two percent at the next elections. LaPalombara analyzed a series of counter-options to PCI entry into government, concluding that they

were impossible without a high risk of breakdown and violence, and went on to discuss the uses of buying time to delay PCI access to government. He was not particularly optimistic that time could be bought usefully, though it might ease the way for an accommodation. Milan editor (and Senator) Enzo Bettiza, a strong anti-Communist, chose to make a scholarly presentation on Gramsci's theory of hegemony, which he delivered in heavily accented and scarcely intelligible English.


4. The analysis thus far had strongly suggested that the PCI had every chance of coming into the government. At the next session, the young rightwing Milan deputy Massimo de Carolis gave an interesting analysis of the Christian Democratic party. He argued that neither Aldo Moro nor Giulio Andreotti believe that the DC can develop any new forces (parenthetically, other speakers had all dwelt extensively on the worn-out and corrupt nature of the old forces.) De Carolis listed three new forces: Comunione e Liberazione, which expect the advent of a more radical society in Italy, and chooses to coexist with it as a Christian sect within the DC party; the technocrats around Umberto Agnelli; and his own movement, which bases itself on the northern-Italian business classes and downplays confessionalism. De Carolis did not argue that these new forces were making great progress.

5. The Communist party was effectively represented by the next speaker, Lucio Libertini, working hard to confirm the moderate image of the PCI. The PCI, he said, did not want to change the strategic balance in Europe. It was neither anti-US nor anti-USSR. "Multi-nationals were not an invention of the devil." The PCI advocated a policy of taxes plus industrial rationalization plus austerity, and could get the workers to go along. But if the PCI policy were blocked by opposition, then nothing remained but another election--which would also not change anything.

6. The overall note of the conference was thus puzzlement whether any existent force in Italy could do more than delay Communist accession to the government. Vittorio Zucconi of "La Stampa" described the general effect as well as any: "The conference closed on a curiously ambiguous note. Reports

from scholars and other participants gave an image of sceptical but reasonable prudence towards the PCI and feeling that Eurocommunism must be studied in greater depth." After summarizing Henry Kissinger's final speech, Zucconi noted "to dispel the sense of inevitability the (other) speeches seemed subtly to have created, Kissinger intervened with his anti-Communism to re-establish the balance of emotions."

7. ORPA/WE has a complete set of papers delivered at the conference.



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