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SNIE 71 - 64 ADVCON

1 July 1964

*SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE*

SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR THE AFRICAN NATIONALIST  
MOVEMENTS IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE

- **General Considerations on Portuguese Africa**
- **The Outlook in Angola**
- **The Outlook in Mozambique**
- **Probable External Developments Affecting  
Angola and Mozambique**

NOTE: This is an advance copy of the conclusions of this estimate as approved by the United States Intelligence Board. The complete text will be circulated within five days of this issuance.

**Central Intelligence Agency**

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*Submitted by the*

**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

*The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and NSA.*

*Concurred in by the*

**UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD**

*on 1 July 1964. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.*

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1 July 1964

SUBJECT: SNIE 71-64: SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR AFRICAN NATIONALIST  
MOVEMENTS IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the prospects of the African nationalist movements in  
Angola and Mozambique over the next year or so.\*

CONCLUSIONS

A. The guerrilla activities of Angolan nationalists have been for the  
past two years confined by the Portuguese military to sporadic fighting in  
a restricted northern area. There is little evidence of active dissidence  
elsewhere in Angola. The Government of the Republic of Angola in Exile  
(GRAE), in Leopoldville, is the political backing of the guerrillas. The  
GRAE is autocratically but inefficiently controlled by Holden Roberto; it

\* An NIE on Portugal is scheduled for August 1964.

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is torn by internal dissension and tribal rivalries and disheartened by its lack of progress. Roberto will probably seek help, including arms, from the USSR and Communist China, and we foresee some increase in Communist influence in the next year or so.

B. Roberto may be forced by others in the GRAE to share control and direction, but probably not for some months at least. The Angolan nationalist movement will be able to keep the rebellion alive at the present level if, as seems likely, it retains access to the Congo sanctuary, but we do not believe it will seriously challenge Portugal's hold in Angola over the next year or so.

C. The principal nationalist movement in Mozambique is Mondlane's Frelimo. The movement has not yet progressed to the point of open fighting, though a few raids and excursions in the north, based on Tanganyika, are likely during the next year or so. The Portuguese military and security services appear to have control of the situation and the Mozambique nationalist movement is more important in terms of African politics than as a physical threat.

D. Despite a few steps to liberalize their colonial policy, the Portuguese have not taken, and are not likely to take, any significant steps to meet the pressures brought on them to move towards self-determination or independence for their African territories. Portugal may be able to

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preserve its present control of Angola and Mozambique for a good many years. But, we believe that the growing political and military costs of maintaining control of the African provinces will almost certainly force Portugal eventually to accommodate to nationalist aspirations for self-determination and independence.

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