

TOP SECRET

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State Department review completed

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
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GENERAL

1. Possible future Soviet diplomatic tactics reported:

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
regarding the plan of diplomatic action to be followed by the USSR if the West does not make concessions on Germany. According to the report, Soviet chiefs of mission in the Satellites were informed in late December 1950 that no early Soviet armed action was contemplated in the West. Western refusal to meet Soviet demands on Germany would be countered by the following program: (a) intimidation of France and Great Britain by vigorous diplomatic pressure on the question of German remilitarization; (b) denunciation of the military restriction clauses in the Satellite peace treaties; (c) a campaign to intimidate the West German Government and people in order to elicit a more favorable reaction to East German "unity" proposals; and (d) a rupture by Poland and Czechoslovakia of diplomatic relations with the West. [redacted] this program would be applied in progressive stages, and that the steps would probably be taken in the order listed. The order might, however, be changed or modified by circumstances.

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Comment: The USSR has already embarked on a diplomatic campaign to intimidate France and Great Britain. The Soviet notes of 15 December 1950 and 20 January 1951 stated that French and British action regarding West German remilitarization violates the Franco-Soviet Agreement of 1944 and the Anglo-Soviet Alliance of 1942. These notes contained an implied threat of Soviet denunciation of the treaties. Communist efforts to elicit a favorable West German reaction to East German "unity" proposals have as in the past been limited to propaganda and agitation. There has been no reported sabotage or attempt to apply the East German law "for protection of the peace" to West German citizens, although a few West Germans have been designated as "warmongers" by the East German press.

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
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
KOREA

Republic of Korea
2. ROK fears for the future:

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


Republic of Korea
Recent actions and statements by **ROK** officials reflect fear on the part of South Korean leaders that the particular interests of the Republic of Korea may be overlooked or even sacrificed for the sake of larger Western objectives. President Rhee has declared his firm intention to continue fighting even if the UN should order a cease-fire and his desire to obtain arms for "every Korean man, woman and child." The Chief of Staff of the ROK Army has advocated that, "because the Chinese have been branded as aggressors," UN forces should advance across the Yalu and capture Peiping and Nanking. Meanwhile, the ROK Government is continuing to exert every effort to obtain arms, even at the cost of expending a portion of its dwindling foreign exchange account.


Comment: While some of the irresponsibility in such statements reflects President Rhee's  character, the mounting international seriousness of the Korean conflict has created a genuine fear among ROK officials that the West may overlook the ROK's paramount interest in any settlement of the conflict.


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


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
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INDOCHINA

5. Vietnamese official reveals plan for ousting French:

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has informed US


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Legation Saigon unofficially that, while it would be illogical and unjust to deny the French a voice in the control of Vietnam's economy during the present period of French military and financial support, the ultimate objective of Vietnamese nationalists was the "ejecting of French interests," not by force of arms, but by diplomacy. The official, [redacted] at the Pau Conference, had there supported the tactic of conceding to the French a veto power in the quadripartite economic commissions, so that the Vietnamese, in turn, could use their own veto power to sabotage the quadripartite structure at an opportune moment in the future. In the official's opinion, this opportune moment might come with the re-establishment of Vietnamese control over the rich rice-producing regions of Cochinchina, now in Viet Minh hands, and the consequent lessening of Vietnamese economic dependence on the French.

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Comment: This is an unusually frank admission of ultimate Vietnamese objectives which derives added significance from the fact that it comes from an official in high favor with the French-

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supported Vietnamese Premier. The report highlights the known fact that few, if any, Vietnamese officials have any real loyalty toward French interests.

YUGOSLAVIA

6. Tito officially doubts USSR will take aggressive action in Europe soon:

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 In a conversation with US Assistant Secretary of State Perkins, Tito and Foreign Minister Kardelj agreed with a recent estimate by US mission chiefs in the Cominform countries that neither the Satellites nor the USSR were preparing an imminent attack anywhere in Europe. Tito added that his knowledge of Russian and Soviet psychology made him doubtful that the USSR would take action which would label it an aggressor in world opinion.

Comment: In other recent official statements, Yugoslav leaders have expressed the opinion that Germany was a more likely target than Yugoslavia for attack in the spring of 1951. Reluctance to be labelled an aggressor in world opinion did not prevent the Soviet-sponsored aggression in Korea.

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