


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14 June 1956



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
# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTROL NO. *14*  
 DECLASSIFIED BY: *[initials]*  
 TO BE DECLASSIFIED  
 CLASS. CHANGED TO: *[initials]*  
 NEXT REVIEW DATE: *2005*  
 AUTH: HR 70-2  
 DATE *12-26-74* REVIEWER: 

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## OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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**TOP SECRET**

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Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002600140001-7


Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002600140001-7

**CONTENTS**

**1. NEHRU, NASR AND TITO REPORTEDLY PLAN TO MEET  
IN BELGRADE** [redacted]

25X1A

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\* \* \* \*

**THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION**



25X1A

\* \* \* \*

**THE TAIWAN STRAIT**



25X1A

25X1A



**1. NEHRU, NASR AND TITO REPORTEDLY PLAN TO MEET IN BELGRADE**

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25X1A


Nehru, Nasr and Tito plan to meet in Belgrade in August to discuss the reduction of world tensions, [redacted]

25X1

Such a meeting would arouse widespread interest throughout the world but have its most significant impact in Asia. The participants would have an opportunity to exchange views in the light of Tito's recent trip to Moscow and Nehru's experiences at the Commonwealth conference and elsewhere in the West.

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Whether or not the meeting resulted in a new statement of common policy, it would almost certainly be widely interpreted in Asia and Africa as another sign that the lesser powers are becoming more important in world affairs. It would also encourage exponents of "neutralist" or "independent" foreign policies and possibly lead to greater co-operation in the currently loose grouping of "neutralist" states. The meeting would be unlikely, however, to result in any formal organization. [redacted]

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[redacted]

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

**THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION**  
**(Information as of 1700, 13 June)**


Nothing of significance to report.

14 June 56

Current Intelligence Bulletin

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25X1A



**BIWEEKLY SUMMARY  
1-13 June 1956**

**THE TAIWAN STRAIT**

**Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group  
for the Taiwan Strait Problem**

25X1A

1. There was no significant combat activity during the period. [redacted]

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2. [redacted]

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[redacted] the 422-mile rail line from Yingtan to Amoy will be finished late this year. The line is now operational along a 165-mile stretch south of Yingtan. Additional bridges and tunnels are required along the southern half of the line. [redacted]

25X1A

3. The Peiping Foreign Ministry on 12 June released a statement containing the texts of the most recent Chinese Communist and US drafts for a renunciation of force. The Chinese Communist statement seemed intended to increase pressure upon the US for a foreign ministers' meeting, but otherwise provided no clear indication concerning Chinese Communist intentions in regard to the Taiwan Strait. [redacted]

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[redacted]

TAIWAN STRAIT SITUATION

14 JUNE 1956



CHINESE COMMUNIST AIRFIELD LEGEND:

DESIGNATIONS	PRIMARY AIRFIELD CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT IN AREA WITH PREPARED RUNWAY GENERALLY 5000 FEET OR LONGER.		SECONDARY AIRFIELD AUXILIARY OR EMERGENCY BASES OR FIELDS OF LESSER IMPORTANCE. RUNWAYS GENERALLY LESS THAN 5000 FEET.	
	●	▲	▲	▲
ACTIVE BASE FOR MILITARY & CIVILIAN AIR-CRAFT. SOME BASES USED BY PISTON TYPES MAY BE USABLE BY JETS	●	OPERATIONAL	▲	
INACTIVE BASES CAPABLE OF USE BY AIRCRAFT	●	SERVICEABLE	▲	
CURRENT STATUS UNDETERMINED	●	UNKNOWN	▲	

USABILITY

+	I	?	■
MIG-15	TU-2,		
MIG-17	IL-10		
TU-4	LA-9/11	UNKNOWN	UNDER CONSTRUCTION
IL-28	LI-2		
	ETC.		

\* FIELDS NOT CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING SUSTAINED OPERATIONS AT PRESENT.



★ NATIONALIST AIRFIELD  
 Railroad  
 Under construction or projected  
 Primary roads  
 Secondary roads