

**TOP SECRET**

*ED*

25X1



26 April 1958

25X1



Copy No. 140


# CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE

# BULLETIN



25X1

DOCUMENT NO. 49  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. A  
DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS, S, C  
NEXT REVIEW/DATE: 2010  
AUTH: MR 702  
DATE: 3/20/78 REVIEWER: 



25X1

State Dept. review completed

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003600490001-8

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003600490001-8

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

26 April 1958

## DAILY BRIEF

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

25X1

25X1

25X1  
25X1

25X1

25X1


25X1A

*No*

\*USSR--Summit tactics: Ambassador Thompson reports there is some evidence that the USSR has changed its tactics, if not its policies, toward a summit conference, and that Moscow now doubts the possibility of forcing a meeting at an early date. The Soviet leaders may now feel that their inability to divide the Western governments on the timing issue has lessened any chance of holding a conference on terms satisfactory to the Kremlin. Thompson believes that, while continuing to press for a conference on its own terms, Moscow may now adopt a more threatening line in the hope of "softening" the NATO powers.

25X1A

25X1A



## II. ASIA-AFRICA



26 Apr 58

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1A

[redacted]

25X1

*yes*

Pakistan: Army Commander in Chief Ayub, who is scheduled to arrive in the United States about 29 April, is apparently deeply concerned over maneuvering within political and military circles in Pakistan. He has made some efforts to ensure that the situation remains stable during his absence and has said the Pakistani Army would not tolerate any policy change which would endanger the receipt of American military aid. Ayub is known to have been considering for some time the problems which might be created if further deterioration in Pakistan's internal political situation caused President Mirza to assume dictatorial powers. [redacted]

25X1A

South Vietnam: The Communist Viet Minh underground apparatus in Saigon has made plans for assassination attempts against American general officers there, [redacted] [redacted] Viet Minh terrorist activities, which have been at a high level since last fall, have been directed primarily against Vietnamese provincial officials but included bombings of American military personnel in Saigon on 22 October. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

*no*

### III. THE WEST

France-NATO: Defense Minister Chaban-Delmas' 17 April presentation of the order of priority of French armed forces missions publicly dropped the long-standing first place accorded to "respect for international engagements," including NATO. Now heading the list as two "nearly simultaneous" missions are "assuring the French presence overseas for a long period" and "equipping France with 'total' weapons." The significance of this statement for

*yes*

26 Apr 58

DAILY BRIEF

iii

25X1A

future French policy may be considerable if Chaban-Delmas' successor shares these views and if the firmly pro-NATO chief of the Armed Forces Staff, General Ely, is replaced by an officer who supports the view that Algeria must be saved at all costs. Ely is due to retire this summer.

25X1A

*2/28*

Colombia: Liberal leader Lleras Camargo's final acceptance--after protracted negotiations--of the joint Liberal-Conservative nomination for the 4 May presidential election virtually assures Colombia's return to constitutional rule as agreed by the military junta which ousted the Rojas dictatorship last May. Lleras, one of the most highly respected statesmen of Latin America, is considered pro-US and anti-Communist.

25X1A

25X1A

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003600490001-8

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003600490001-8

Current Attitudes of Pakistan's Army Commander in Chief

General Ayub, commander in chief of Pakistan's army, has recently shown anxiety lest the success of his forthcoming mission to Washington be jeopardized by some irresponsible action in Pakistan suggesting that Karachi is rethinking its ties with the United States. Ayub's mission seems mainly designed to press for the early delivery of light bombers under the US military aid program.

25X1C

[redacted] Ayub has stressed to Pakistani officials the advantages and extent of US military aid and has emphasized that the army would condone no policy change which might endanger continued receipt of such aid. He has urged that there should be no exacerbation of relations with India.

Ayub also seems to have desired to ensure that Pakistan's internal political situation remain stable in his absence. He probably recognizes that President Mirza's growing isolation from other Pakistani politicians will cause difficulty when Mirza seeks re-election. With elections promised for next November, Mirza is approaching the day when he may have to assume dictatorial powers or face the possibility of an electoral defeat. Ayub, who would probably only reluctantly support a dictatorial Mirza, can foresee possible disruption of US military aid and training programs and a weakening of Pakistan's national defense capabilities if the army is committed to internal security duties.

Ayub may also have heard reports that Mirza intends to replace him as commander in chief in the relatively near future. Since he has criticized Mirza's handling of the political situation recently, Ayub may feel that he will be undercut during his month's absence abroad. [redacted]

25X1A

25X1

Communist Plans to Assassinate High-ranking MAAG Officers in South Vietnam

The Communists have in readiness plans for the assassination of American MAAG general officers in South Vietnam, and implementation orders are expected shortly,

25X1C

[Redacted]

25X1C

Viet Minh terrorists reportedly have been instructed to avoid incidents such as the destruction of American military installations and billets which would involve lower ranking personnel.

The fostering of anti-American sentiment among the South Vietnamese masses and disruption of MAAG training of the Vietnamese armed forces are major Viet Minh objectives. Following the Communist bombings in Saigon last October, in which 13 American military personnel were injured, the Viet Minh underground [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted] have been instructed to prepare for additional attacks "whenever conditions are favorable." Meanwhile, Communist terrorism and assassination of Vietnamese officials continue at a high rate in the rural areas.

Unusually virulent anti-American propaganda has been unleashed by Hanoi recently in connection with a stepped-up campaign for national unification on Communist terms. Hanoi has stressed that the fundamental task of the entire Vietnamese people is to "end US interference in South Vietnam, the main obstacle to reunification."

Hanoi's more aggressive attitude may in part be linked to the rise in power in the Hanoi politburo of Le Duan, until fairly recently the Communist party boss for South Vietnam, and now considered second only to Ho Chi Minh in the Communist hierarchy. [Redacted]

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

[Redacted]

## III. THE WEST

Colombian Presidential Candidate Lleras Camargo Assured  
Of Election

Liberal leader Alberto Lleras Camargo, who has finally gained the support of almost all organized Colombian political groups, accepted the joint Liberal-Conservative nomination on 24 April less than two weeks before the 4 May presidential election date. The nomination is tantamount to election. Lleras is pro-US and anti-Communist, and his prestige is such as greatly to strengthen the possibility of bipartisan political cooperation and the prospects for stability.

Lleras, who was secretary general of the Organization of American States from 1948 to 1954, is the driving force behind a political pact which provides for the sharing of all political offices for the next 12 to 16 years on a 50-50 basis and the selection of joint presidential candidates. Partisan feuding and political turmoil between Colombia's two traditional parties resulted in 100,000 deaths in the past ten years.

While Lleras may still face some opposition from a minority faction of extreme right-wing Conservatives opposed to bipartisan government, his greatest difficulties after the 7 August inauguration will probably be economic. During the past year, growing inflation has driven the peso down from 2.50 to 7.04 while prices for Colombia's coffee have fallen about 20 percent. In addition the new government will inherit sizable debts from the regime of former dictator Rojas Pinilla. [REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1

25X1A

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003600490001-8

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003600490001-8

25X1A

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

25X1

France-NATO: Defense Minister Chaban-Delmas' 17  
April presentation of the order of priority of French armed forces missions publicly dropped the long-standing first place accorded to "respect for international engagements," including NATO. Now heading the list as two "nearly simultaneous" missions are "assuring the French presence overseas for a long period" and "equipping France with 'total' weapons." The significance of this statement for future French policy may be considerable if Chaban-Delmas' successor shares these views and if the firmly pro-NATO chief of the Armed Forces Staff, General Ely, is replaced by an officer who supports the view that Algeria must be saved at all costs. Ely is due to retire this summer.

25X1A

Colombia: Liberal leader Lleras Camargo's final acceptance--after protracted negotiations--of the joint Liberal-Conservative nomination for the 4 May presidential election virtually assures Colombia's return to constitutional rule as agreed by the military junta which ousted the Rojas dictatorship last May. Lleras, one of the most highly respected statesmen of Latin America,  
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003600490001-8  
is considered pro-US and anti-Communist.

25X1A

25X1A

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003600490001-8

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003600490001-8