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3 July 1958

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

3 July 1958

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
DAILY BRIEF



I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC


ok
Geneva technical talks: At the first session of the Geneva technical talks on 1 July, the Soviet chairman insisted that his delegation would refuse to proceed with technical talks until the Western delegation makes an "unequivocal" statement agreeing that a test cessation is the objective toward which the scientists would be working. He had already presented an outline of Soviet views on detection methods, obviously prepared for possible future publication, but emphasized that these are not essential for test suspension and would merely provide additional guarantees.

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Poland: At the Polish central committee plenum scheduled for July the majority of the Communist party will probably maintain its support for Gomulka as the only leader capable of protecting Poland's present limited autonomy within the Soviet bloc. While opposition from the Stalinist wing can be expected, most Polish Communists are sufficiently anti-Soviet to rally behind Gomulka as the only feasible alternative to Soviet domination and popular revolt. It is still not clear whether Gomulka's recent stand regarding the Yugoslavs and the Nagy execution is acceptable to the Kremlin.




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Yugoslavia: The relative mildness of the Yugoslav reaction to Gomulka's recent attack on Yugoslav "revisionism" indicates that Belgrade still sees Poland as a potential ally in its dispute with Moscow. This could provide the Kremlin with an additional excuse to exert pressure on the Polish leader.




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II. ASIA-AFRICA

25X1 *No* *Lebanon: Rebel Druze forces appear to have renewed their attempted offensive toward Beirut. Rebels in the Moslem quarter of the city may hope that the Druze forces can establish a supply line to them. After heavy fighting, the situation in the Tripoli area remains unresolved. 

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III. THE WEST

oB France - Tropical Africa: De Gaulle on 14 July may announce a special referendum this fall in the French territories south of the Sahara, other than Cameroun and Togo, on the

3 July 58

DAILY BRIEF

ii

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question of whether they desire direct federal union with France. This plan for federal union may run into difficulty in view of African interest in autonomous federation arrangements among the African territories. [redacted]

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[redacted]

LATE ITEM

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*Khrushchev letter: Premier Khrushchev's letter of 2 July to President Eisenhower is aimed at offsetting the damaging effects of the Hungarian executions by reaffirming the USSR's desire for summit talks. In an effort to display fresh initiative on a subject which both sides have proposed as an agenda item at the summit, Khrushchev called for a joint study by military experts of measures to prevent surprise attack. This move recalls a similar effort to restore the USSR's peaceful coexistence posture following the suppression of the Hungarian revolt in 1956 when Moscow for the first time endorsed the idea of aerial inspection in central Europe. Khrushchev's letter, which is designed to appear responsive to American views regarding technical talks and the prevention of surprise attack, repeated long-standing Soviet proposals with respect to ground-control posts and aerial inspection zones in Europe and equal areas of the United States and the Soviet Union. [redacted]

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3 July 58

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet Tactics in Geneva Talks

At the opening session of the Geneva technical talks on 1 July, Y. K. Fedorov, the Soviet chairman, reiterated the line in the Soviet aide-memoire of 25 June that the conference would be useless unless it was agreed that its purpose was to "lead to" or "facilitate" the cessation of nuclear tests. He said that until such an "unequivocal" agreement could be reached, his delegation could not take up the technical issues. If the Western delegation agreed to this objective, Fedorov said his delegation would be willing to "spend any amount of time" necessary to reach agreement on controls.

If the Western delegation accepts the Soviet definition of the purpose of the talks, Moscow probably will claim that this commits the United States to a cessation of tests independent of other aspects of the disarmament problem. If, on the other hand, the West rejects the Soviet demands, Moscow probably believes it will be able to place the blame on the United States for a breakdown of the talks. With this end in view, Fedorov had earlier presented an outline of Soviet views on detection methods--obviously prepared for possible future publication--designed to show that the USSR is not hostile to inspection. He emphasized, however, the argument frequently repeated in Soviet propaganda that technical controls merely provide additional guarantees and are not essential for a cessation of tests.

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Gomulka's Position Seen Strengthened on Eve of Central Committee Plenum

The majority of the Polish party's central committee will probably rally behind First Secretary Gomulka at its forthcoming plenum, last reported to be scheduled for 7 or 8 July, [redacted] Gomulka is regarded in the party as the only leader capable of protecting Poland's present limited autonomy within the Soviet bloc and avoiding popular revolt at home. Gomulka's recent criticism of Nagy is probably understood in Warsaw as a reluctant effort to placate Moscow, while his silence in the face of other bloc endorsements of the executions suggests that he remains determined to fight for Polish national interests.

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At the July plenum, the central committee will presumably discuss Poland's position on the Yugoslav dispute and the Hungarian executions, as well as the theses for and the specific date of the long-expected third party congress which may be held in the fall. While opposition from the Stalinist wing of the party can be expected, the majority of Polish Communists are sufficiently anti-Soviet to rally behind Gomulka. Any formulations for the party congress which Gomulka may present to the plenum at this time would probably emphasize--as a show of orthodoxy--the necessity for maintaining the unity and solidarity of the socialist camp, but reiterate the principle of individual party sovereignty by way of justifying Poland's right to its own road to socialism. [redacted]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Lebanese Situation

Kamal Jumblatt's Druze forces appear to be engaged in an all-out attempt to push through to Beirut. One objective might be to resupply rebel forces besieged in the Basta Moslem quarter. Although the army has sent reinforcements to the Shemlan area, the brunt of the present fighting is being borne by gendarmerie and progovernment irregulars. Extremist opposition leader Saib Salam broadcast an "official" statement over mosque public address systems in the Basta stating that Jumblatt was on the outskirts of the city and ordering Salam's forces not to waste ammunition or to "move forward until the signal is given." Salam's manifesto probably has a twofold objective--to raise the morale of his followers and to put fear into any wavering government supporters.

Fighting in the Tripoli area has been severe, yet, despite many casualties, the rebels are said to be contemplating the setting up of a government. Already a "committee of five" is making decisions of a governmental nature in the Tripoli area. A "truce" in the Tripoli port area between rebels and the army may be an indication that the rebels there are tiring.

Presidential aspirants are beginning to show their interest in succeeding President Chamoun. Jawad Boulos, a Maronite scholar, has expressed his interest in the presidency and intimated to an American Embassy official that Chamoun might support his candidacy. Boulos indicated that he hopes for American backing.

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
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III. THE WEST

De Gaulle Plans Referendum in Tropical Africa on Federation With France

Premier de Gualle plans to announce on 14 July that a special referendum on direct federation with France will be held this fall in the 12 French African territories south of the Sahara. If the vote is favorable, Paris would negotiate a new statute with representatives of the African territories. The French-administered UN trust territories of Cameroun and Togo, which appear to be slated for independence, would not participate in the referendum.

Although the Africans wish to retain their economic and defense ties with France, they would be reluctant to accept any federation scheme which did not recognize their right to withdraw or to have eventual independence. The Africans may also oppose the plan for federal union in view of their preference for federation arrangements among the African territories, such as those existing in French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa. Such groupings could be granted a high degree of local autonomy and deal as equals with Paris on matters of mutual concern.

Houphouet-Boigny, the only African member of the De Gaulle cabinet, probably was the instigator of the proposed referendum. He disagrees with general African opinion that the present federations of West and Equatorial Africa should be strengthened, because he fears that his native Ivory Coast territory will be forced to support the seven poorer territories of French West Africa.

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