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13 January 1959



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
# INTELLIGENCE

# BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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13 January 1959

### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

*ok*  
Surprise-attack talks: The Soviet proposal to reconvene the technical talks in Geneva on measures to prevent surprise attack reaffirms Moscow's 28 November omnibus plan which links this problem to disarmament measures. Moscow probably believes this action will make a favorable public contrast to Western insistence that the results of the previous sessions be evaluated before setting a specific date for reconvening. [redacted]

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#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

*ok*  
Japan: The refusal of major dissident leaders in the ruling Liberal-Democratic party to participate in the new cabinet and party executive line-up announced on 12 January has further weakened Prime Minister Kishi's position. The party and cabinet reshuffle is only a superficial resolution of intraparty strife, and pressure will be maintained on Kishi to accede further to dissident demands. [redacted]

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South Korea: [Police are subjecting the US Embassy in Seoul to close surveillance and are harassing its Korean visitors. The action may be designed to limit the embassy's knowledge of the repressive police measures now being taken against the opposition Democratic party. It may also be related to Rhee's reported belief that the US is providing financial support to the Democrats.]

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Sudan: [The Abboud government has not fulfilled its promises of providing more dynamic action on the major issues confronting the Sudan. No agreement with the UAR on Nile waters distribution is in sight, cotton marketing practices have not been reformed, and the cabinet's military members are unwilling to seek help from experienced civilians. Despite its apparent desire to maintain a pro-Western orientation, the government will be strongly tempted by aid offers carried by a Soviet trade delegation due to arrive on 22 January, especially if they would enable Abboud to claim significant progress on the Nile waters development problem.]

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DAILY BRIEF

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### New Soviet Note on Surprise-Attack Talks

The Soviet call to reconvene the technical conference in Geneva on measures to prevent surprise attack underlines Moscow's effort to place the onus on the West for the stalemate in the pre-Christmas sessions. The note charges that the Western rejection of the original Soviet proposal to reconvene on 5 January was responsible for delaying the search for a mutually satisfactory solution. Moscow probably believes that this bid to resume negotiations will contrast favorably with Western insistence that the results of previous sessions be evaluated before a specific date is set for reconvening.

Moscow has not changed its views on the scope of the talks. The note reaffirms its determination to introduce political considerations into the negotiations, and specifically states that the declaration introduced on 28 November by the Soviet delegate is still the Soviet position. The 28 November declaration, as amended by Moscow's so-called technical paper introduced on 12 December, would link the surprise-attack problem to politically motivated disarmament measures. Reiteration of this omnibus plan--previously rejected by the West--indicates that the USSR still does not desire serious negotiations.

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

Japanese Cabinet Reshuffle Fails to Stabilize  
Kishi's Position

The refusal of major dissident leaders in the ruling Liberal-Democratic party to accept any of the four cabinet vacancies filled on 12 January or to participate in the reshuffle of party executive posts has dealt a major blow to Prime Minister Kishi's leadership and makes his tenure as prime minister even more uncertain.

Dissident leader Mitsujiro Ishii, who contended unsuccessfully with Kishi for the prime ministership in 1957, at the last minute refused to accept the post of deputy prime minister in the cabinet line-up and thwarted Kishi's efforts to restore party balance. The ensuing appointment of subordinate leaders to fill the cabinet vacancies created when dissident leaders resigned late last month probably is only a temporary solution.

The reshuffle points up Kishi's diminishing control of the party and government. By withholding their participation, prominent dissident leaders are maintaining pressure on Kishi to meet their demands for a complete cabinet reshuffle and for a postponement of the party presidential election until the expiration of Kishi's term in March. The postponement could give the dissidents time in which to agree on a candidate to challenge Kishi for the top party post and the prime ministership.

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Sudanese Situation

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[The American Embassy in Khartoum believes that unless General Abboud's government in the Sudan can soon come up with some accomplishment demonstrating its superiority over the politicians it replaced, the stage may be set for still another army clique to attempt to seize power. The principal problems on which Abboud has failed to make significant progress are agreement with the UAR on the Nile waters, restoration of trade relations with the UAR, building the Roseires Dam to control the Nile inside the Sudan, solving the cotton surplus problem, and getting an over-all development program under way.]

[The government, which initially promised to move quickly to solve outstanding problems with the UAR, now appears pessimistic about the possibility of any agreement. Sudanese Foreign Minister Kheir has stated that UAR pressure on the Sudan is still at about the same level as before the Khartoum coup last November. UAR clandestine activity is likely to continue among the leaders of banned political parties and disgruntled junior army officers. Leaders of the National Unionist party late in December sought the cooperation of Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, the spiritual leader of the opposing Umma party, in pressing the army regime to allow the parties to function. While this initiative reportedly was rebuffed, efforts to revive political activity will multiply as jobless politicians resume agitating among their erstwhile constituents.]

[In the economic field, the British ambassador in Khartoum has reported that the Sudanese Government seems determined to maintain pricing practices which have resulted in very large cotton surpluses in previous years and which will place the Sudan in a particularly unfavorable position when British-UAR economic relations]

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return to a normal basis. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] the Soviet trade mission scheduled to arrive in Khartoum on 22 January may offer trade-aid deals difficult to resist. A Soviet offer related to Nile waters control projects would be particularly attractive. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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