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17 February 1959



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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

17 February 1959

## DAILY BRIEF

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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USSR:

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*ok* [redacted] Soviet Marshal Malinovsky said that the USSR intends to retain a modern conventional armed force while simultaneously improving its nuclear capability. Malinovsky said he believed NATO was in error for having favored nuclear capability at the expense of conventional forces. He admitted the possibility of limited warfare, a departure from Moscow's usual propaganda position. [redacted]

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*ok.*  
India-Pakistan: New Delhi and Karachi apparently are adopting more conciliatory attitudes toward each other. High-level Pakistani and Indian officials will meet in Karachi on 23 February to attempt to settle some minor territorial disputes. Both capitals have expressed cautious optimism over prospects for agreement on the division of irrigation water derived from the major rivers which flow through both India and Pakistan. At present, Pakistan is pressing less hard than before for consideration of the Kashmir issue.

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*ok.*  
Australia-Indonesia: The joint communiqué issued on 15 February by Australian External Affairs Minister Casey and visiting Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio indicates an alteration of Australia's previous position that it would not tolerate any transfer of sovereignty by the Dutch of West New Guinea to Indonesia. Although Australia would prefer the status quo, the announcement states that it would not oppose any Dutch-Indonesian agreement for a transfer. The Dutch Government is not likely for the foreseeable future to agree to transfer sovereignty over West New Guinea to Indonesia, but it is possible that after the 12 March elections the Dutch may be more willing than before to consider some other disposition of the territory.

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*no*  
Ethiopia-UK: Ethiopia's relations with the UK appear to have deteriorated sharply over London's recently expressed nonopposition to an eventual association between Somalia and the British Somaliland Protectorate. Radio Moscow, echoing Ethiopia's controlled press, accuses London of plotting--with American support--to establish a Commonwealth-affiliated

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DAILY BRIEF

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Greater Somalia, unifying ethnic Somalis now distributed among Somalia, British and French Somaliland, northern Kenya, and southeastern Ethiopia.

[Redacted]

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### III. THE WEST

*ok*  
Italy: Premier Antonio Segni's all-Christian Democratic cabinet, which will probably meet its first parliamentary test in a few days, includes a number of prominent rightists and is expected to be invested with the vote of the Liberals, Monarchists, and neo-Fascists. No change in Italy's pro-NATO foreign policy is anticipated. In view of the differences between left and right in the cabinet and in parliament, little important domestic legislation is likely to be passed. This cabinet will be little more than a holding operation for the Christian Democrats. Unless they can reach an agreement on the future political course of the party at their April congress, national elections may be called.

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[Redacted]

*ok*  
Cuba: Fidel Castro's assumption of the prime ministership on 16 February will eliminate the duality of power which has delayed government decisions and actions. His move, however, does not as yet indicate he will forego his speech-making trips and wholeheartedly assume the responsibilities of governing. Certain of his pet projects, such as land reform, will probably receive increased attention. Cuban plotting against the regimes in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Haiti will probably continue.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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[REDACTED]

Malinovsky Comments on Soviet Strategy

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the USSR intends to retain a modern conventional capability while building up its nuclear strength. The defense minister implied that some military leaders had favored preparing a nuclear capability at the expense of conventional forces, but that the government Presidium had decided in favor of simultaneous development, which he personally approved. NATO, Malinovsky noted, had adopted the other course, and he considered this an error.]

[Significant improvement of the ground forces in the past several years bears out Malinovsky's statement. Probably related to this decision is Malinovsky's comment that limited wars, including a limited nuclear war, were quite possible and would require a large army trained with nuclear weapons. Soviet propaganda, however, consistently has played down the possibility of limited warfare, while Soviet military literature has indicated that the USSR sees future warfare in the form of large-scale campaigns on land extending over a long period, accompanied by powerful nuclear air and missile strikes.]

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[REDACTED] all agreed that nuclear weapons would be decisive in a general war but that other arms and weapons would continue to play a major role--a line both he and former Defense Minister Zhukov have expounded.]

[REDACTED]

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India and Pakistan Adopt Conciliatory Attitudes

Since the assumption of power by Pakistani President Ayub last October, both his government and the government of India apparently have made efforts to improve relations between the two countries. Ayub and his foreign minister have both expressed a desire for better relations, and Ayub broke recent custom by attending the independence day celebration at the Indian High Commission in Karachi last January. Nehru has several times publicly stated the need for moderation and understanding between India and Pakistan.

Top-level Indian and Pakistani officials will meet in Karachi on 23 February to continue the effort begun last year to settle minor territorial disputes along the Punjab and Bengal borders. A similar meeting in 1958 on East Pakistan frontier problems led to a conference in September between Nehru and Firoz Khan Noon, head of the Pakistani Government at that time. While the agreement they reached has been criticized in India and has not entirely ended recurrent border shooting incidents, it apparently is regarded by both governments as final.

Directives to cease inflammatory propaganda, recently issued by New Delhi and Karachi to radio stations in border areas, indicate a willingness to settle border problems. Pakistan is sending a trade delegation to New Delhi, which should also facilitate such an agreement.

[Redacted]

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While great obstacles still stand in the way of an over-all Indo-Pakistani settlement, the deliberate friendly gestures being made suggest that both countries now hope agreement on minor questions will pave the way for eventual negotiations on such major problems as Kashmir. Official quarters in both capitals have expressed cautious optimism over the possibility of agreement on the canal waters issue as a result of current mediation by the World Bank.

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[Redacted]


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Ethiopia's Relations With London Deteriorating



{ Ethiopian-British relations, long marked by suspicion and mistrust on the Ethiopian side, have been subjected to serious new strains as a result of London's recent policy statement indicating that Britain would not oppose an eventual association between the Italian trust territory of Somalia--scheduled to become independent in December 1960--and Britain's Somaliland protectorate. Ethiopian officials, sensing a threat to Ethiopia's traditional desire for hegemony over the East African Horn, reacted by accusing London of plotting--with American support--to establish a Greater Somalia affiliated with the British Commonwealth. Actually, London's statement was intended to undercut both Somali nationalism and UAR propoganda in the area and did not constitute support for the full union of the 2,500,000 ethnic Somalis now distributed in Somalia, British and French Somaliland, Kenya, and Ethiopia. }

{ Ethiopian Foreign Minister Deressa has emphasized his country's concern over the British position by indicating to the American ambassador in Addis Ababa that Ethiopia might abrogate its 1954 border agreement with the UK, close British consulates, and seal Ethiopia's border with the protectorate. Although the Ethiopians probably will not carry out these threats, they are apparently searching for and may take some type of anti-British action. }

{ In line with the Ethiopians' desire to appear as vigilant defenders of African interests who are unafraid to oppose the will even of great powers, the controlled press and radio of Addis Ababa has given unusually great publicity to the issue, directing unprecedented attacks against the United States as well as Britain. Its diatribes are already being exploited in Moscow radiobroadcasts. }

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
### III. THE WEST

#### Fidel Castro's Appointment as Cuban Prime Minister

Fidel Castro's acceptance of the office of prime minister in Cuba's provisional government will eliminate the duality of power which has hindered the functioning of the Urrutia administration. Although Castro will undoubtedly continue to dominate the government, his assumption of a high post does not necessarily indicate he will wholeheartedly accept the responsibilities of office. His performance since the ouster of Batista on 1 January suggests he is more interested in retaining his own popularity than in attending to the affairs of government. With emerging signs of discontent over the administration's failure to act decisively on economic and social problems, Castro may be tempted to continue his speech-making trips at home and possibly abroad. However, certain projects of particular interest to Castro, such as land and labor reform, will probably receive his attention.

There is no indication of a letup in the "campaign against dictatorships," although activities against the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Paraguay have apparently not yet progressed much beyond the planning stage. Plotting will undoubtedly continue, and members of the Castro movement will probably offer material aid to exile groups. The propaganda campaign continues unabated. The Cuban representative to the Organization of American States (OAS) announced on 16 February that Cuba would withdraw from the OAS unless representatives of "dictatorships" are expelled.

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