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16 September 1959

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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16 SEPTEMBER 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Khrushchev may visit New Delhi on way home from Peiping to discuss Sino-Indian border dispute.

Khrushchev may offer to "close" agreements while visiting US but defer signing until a summit meeting.



II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iranian-Soviet rapprochement prospects.

Pakistani-Nepalese negotiations to establish diplomatic relations.

III. THE WEST

Cuba--Raul Castro endorses Latin American peoples' congress.




CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

16 September 1959

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DAILY BRIEF



I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-India: Soviet Premier Khrushchev, who plans to go to Peiping for the 1 October anniversary celebrations, has offered to visit New Delhi on his way home in connection with the Sino-Indian border dispute, [redacted]

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[redacted] Nehru apparently has informed Moscow that he welcomes the Soviet premier's proposal, while making it clear that India stands by the McMahon line and that only minor adjustments could be discussed. [redacted]

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Khrushchev visit: [redacted]

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[redacted] while in the United States Khrushchev will offer to "close" an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests, but prefers to defer actual signing of any agreements until a summit meeting. Khrushchev also reportedly believes a "limited face-saving agreement" is possible which will recognize Western rights to remain in West Berlin for "several years." [redacted]

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
NO

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[redacted] the USSR would not sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany or take any unilateral action on Berlin. Moscow reportedly believes, however, that peaceful co-existence on the basis of the status quo in Europe will ultimately result in Western recognition of East Germany and a "permanent solution" of the German and Berlin problems.) [redacted]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Iran-USSR: (There is increasing prospect that talks concerned with Iranian-Soviet rapprochement will be held. Iranian press comment on such a possibility has increased, and a) [redacted]

NO



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(Foreign Ministry official stated on 14 September that negotiations are expected to be reopened soon. Soviet Ambassador Pegov, who left Iran about six months ago, is now en route by train from Moscow and is scheduled to arrive in Tehran on 16 September. In any new talks, the Soviet Union would probably press for a pledge against "foreign bases" in Iran, while Iran would insist on an end to Soviet propaganda attacks on the Shah, and possibly consider accepting Soviet economic aid.)

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Pakistan-Nepal: Nepalese Prime Minister Koirala's announcement on 12 September that Pakistan and Nepal were negotiating the establishment of diplomatic relations is likely to cause concern in New Delhi. The Indian Government is deeply disturbed by its border dispute with Communist China and may fear diplomatic activities by its rival, Pakistan, in sensitive border regions India claims as its own special sphere of influence. New Delhi would almost certainly see a connection between Pakistani-Nepalese negotiations on diplomatic relations and President Ayub's campaign favoring joint Indo-Pakistani defense of the subcontinent against Communist China. India would find it difficult effectively to protest the establishment of diplomatic relations, however, in view of Nepal's recent expansion of relations with a number of other countries and the proximity of Pakistan.

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III. THE WEST

Cuba: (Raul Castro in a strongly anti-US speech on 11 September endorsed the calling of a Latin American people's congress. This may be the congress planned in Moscow at a special conference of delegates of the 18 Latin American Communist parties attending the 21st congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union last February. Identification with the Castro revolution rather than with a local Communist party would make the congress more attractive than otherwise to certain non-Communists and provide opportunities for Communist penetration of future hemispheric activities.)

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Proposed Khrushchev Visit to India

[redacted] Premier Khrushchev offered to visit India in connection with the Sino-Indian border dispute, [redacted] Khrushchev said if India had no objection he would go directly to New Delhi following his forthcoming visit to Peiping.

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The offer is in line with Moscow's appeal on 9 September for a peaceful settlement of the dispute based on mutual interests and "traditional friendship" between India and China. [redacted] Soviet spokesmen have indicated concern over the issue, and Khrushchev may have hoped that such an offer at this time would prevent a worsening of the situation which might embarrass him during his visit to the US. Khrushchev probably is also seeking a way out of the dilemma which the border dispute has posed for the USSR's relations with both countries.

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Nehru apparently has sent word to Moscow that he welcomes the Soviet premier's proposal, but made it clear that New Delhi stands by the McMahon line as the Sino-Indian frontier and that only minor modifications could be the subject of diplomatic discussions. Nehru probably regards Khrushchev's proposal as an opportunity for bringing about negotiations without loss of face by India. While he seems to feel Chinese objections could still bloc the Soviet leader's initiative, he probably hopes Khrushchev's personal influence will soften Peiping's unyielding attitude toward Sino-Indian problems. It is unlikely that Khrushchev would have approached India with this offer without first having obtained at least Peiping's agreement in principle.

The Chinese would probably expect the Soviet premier to confine himself to urging that Nehru accept Chou En-lai's call for return to the "status quo" which existed along the McMahon line before the Tibetan revolt. As a preliminary step to negotiations, Peiping would want Khrushchev to press for withdrawal of Indian troops from points on the McMahon line they occupied last spring. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Soviet-Iranian Relations Entering New Phase

(Soviet Ambassador Pegov, who left Iran six months ago following the abrupt breakdown in nonaggression talks, and the pro-Soviet Iranian ambassador to Moscow, Masud-Ansari, are returning to Tehran amid increasing official and unofficial speculation of renewed efforts to end the tension that has severely strained Soviet-Iranian relations during the past seven months. Pegov is scheduled to arrive in Tehran on 16 September. While some significant new development appears in prospect, its character remains unclear.)

(Ambassador Pegov's return apparently resulted from Ansari's recent interview with Khrushchev, who indicated that Pegov should return "as soon as possible" to present Soviet views to the Shah. Ansari is returning at his own request to report to the Shah on his talks. He recommended that no proposals be offered the USSR until Pegov's return to Tehran and Soviet propaganda attacks are halted. While Radio Moscow has greatly tempered its recent broadcasts to Iran, and has even offered "the hand of friendship," the Soviet-sponsored clandestine broadcasts to Iran are as vituperative as ever regarding the Shah and Prime Minister Eqbal.)

(According to Ansari, Khrushchev pointed to American military activities in Iran as threatening the southern borders of the USSR and warned that the USSR may be obliged to avail itself of the provisions of the treaty of 1921 and occupy Iran. Khrushchev asserted that the USSR only asked "that Iran should not join the American aggressors who want to encircle us..." He admitted there had been errors in Soviet policy toward Iran, but assured that everything possible was being done to redress the past. Khrushchev reportedly argued the advantages of neutrality for Iran, noting that Iran could bargain for many times as much American aid and at the same time get Russian assistance. He emphasized that Iran is more important to the USSR than any of the neutral countries in the area.)

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[REDACTED]
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(Khrushchev claimed that "our spies furnish us with very accurate information everywhere" and that he had documentary evidence of American pressure on Iran not to sign the nonaggression pact with the USSR last February and "precise information" of persons, even in the entourage of the Shah, who "want to benefit" from the present tension.)

(Meanwhile, Iranian officials are expressing considerable concern over the open and threatening tone of Khrushchev in his interview reported by Ansari. Eqbal inquired of Ambassador Wailes what the United States is prepared to do in the event of a Soviet paratroop invasion and has requested public assurances that the United States will defend Iran if attacked.)

(Iranian officials have offered assurances to the US ambassador that Iran will remain firm despite Soviet threats and blandishments. The Shah, however, influenced by neutralists among his advisers and attracted by the prospects of increased foreign assistance, may again consider the advantages of a nonaggression pact and become embroiled in serious negotiations with the USSR.)

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Pakistan and Nepal Negotiating to Establish Diplomatic Relations

Nepalese Prime Minister Koirala's announcement on 12 September that his country and Pakistan are negotiating regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations is likely to cause irritation in New Delhi and may wipe out some of the good will created by Prime Minister Nehru's talks with Pakistani President Ayub on 1 September.

Despite the fact that Nepal is recognized as an independent country, India considers it and the other Himalayan border states of Sikkim and Bhutan to lie within its own special sphere of influence. New Delhi has therefore attempted to keep foreign activity in Nepal to a minimum. It is especially sensitive at the present time, when it is taking military precautions and negotiating with both Nepal and Bhutan to prevent further Chinese incursions from Tibet into the subcontinent. In fact, Foreign Secretary Dutt has warned the American Embassy in New Delhi that any US move to establish diplomatic relations with Bhutan would be regarded as a "definitely unfriendly act."

India would find it difficult effectively to protest the establishment of diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Nepal, in view of Nepal's recent expansion of relations with a number of other countries and the proximity of Pakistan as a close South Asian neighbor. However, the Indian Government may press Nepal at least to limit its diplomatic contacts to accrediting its ambassador in New Delhi to Pakistan and the Pakistani high commissioner in New Delhi to Katmandu. Pakistan's interest in developing relations with Nepal at this time presumably derives from its desire to foster defense cooperation on the Indian subcontinent against Chinese Communist expansionism. The Pakistani Government has already approached Nepalese representatives to discuss this matter.

(Karachi's concern over Chinese Communist intentions along the Himalayan frontier is suggested by a reported move to strengthen its control over Pakistani territory bordering the Chinese province of Sinkiang. Five platoons of Northern Scouts have been sent to the border state of Hunza, which lies west of Ladakh on the Sinkiang border.)

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III. THE WEST

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Raul Castro Speech May Advance Soviet Strategy
In Latin America



(Raul Castro, whose influence in the Cuban Government headed by his brother is steadily increasing, in a speech on 11 September threw the prestige of the Cuban revolution behind a Latin American people's congress to be held some time during the next year. Such a congress appears to be part of the Communist plan of action in this hemisphere.)

(The Latin American delegates to the 21st Soviet party congress in Moscow resolved to hold a people's congress ostensibly dedicated to some popular cause which could be used to attract the sponsorship of popular Latin American leaders like Fidel Castro. The sponsors would be drawn into association with the Communists, who would remain in the background, guiding the congress in an "anti-imperialist," anti-US direction.)

(Considerable progress toward a congress was made during discussions by Communists and other Latin American leftists--including the Cuban minister of education--held in Santiago, Chile, in an effort to influence the American foreign ministers' meeting there in August. These elements agreed that a meeting of all democratic and representative groups and persons should be called to consider common Latin American problems and to oppose colonialism.)

(The congress may be planned to coincide with the Eleventh Inter-American Congress scheduled to be held in Quito, Ecuador, in February 1960. It could be used to detract from that meeting sponsored by the Organization of American States, a favorite target of Communist propaganda attacks as an instrument of "US imperialism.")


(Meanwhile, Ernesto Guevara, a pro-Communist leader of the Castro revolution, told a TV audience on 14 September that the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay made Cuba a target for nuclear attacks. An intensified campaign against US military bases and missions was another important tactic in the action program adopted in Moscow.)



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