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14 October 1959

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
# CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE

# BULLETIN



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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

14 October 1959

## DAILY BRIEF

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### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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**USSR:** Khrushchev's speeches during his recent tour of Siberia reflect concern that the Soviet people may come to believe that his US visit has so reduced world-wide tensions that they can expect a rapid improvement in living conditions. Nevertheless, the moderate tone of his speeches, the omission of references to Berlin and other potentially critical situations, and his assertion that the visit produced a warmer international climate, have presumably conveyed the impression that a new phase in US-Soviet relations is under way.

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*OK*

**USSR:** Soviet Kazakhstan is the latest target in Moscow's campaign against "bourgeois nationalism" in the minority republics. The appointment of former KGB first deputy chairman Konstantin Lunev as Kazakh secret police chief follows closely the publication of an article in the authoritative party journal Kommunist calling for new measures to combat Kazakh nationalism. Persistent unrest in the central Asian republic is allegedly being fostered by young intellectuals who object to Russian influence over their language and culture and who glorify the ancient Moslem traditions and customs. Moscow has accused some Kazakh officials of "putting the interests of Kazakhstan in opposition to those of the Soviet Union as a whole."

In recent months, similar tendencies have led to major personnel shake-ups in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaydzhan; shake-ups have also occurred in Belorussia and Moldavia.

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
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**II. ASIA-AFRICA**



Pakistan-Turkey-Iran: Karachi and Ankara are trying to arrange a meeting in early November between the Shah of Iran, Pakistani President Ayub, and Turkish President Bayar or Prime Minister Menderes. The Pakistanis and Turks are deeply concerned over Iran, which they regard as the weak link in CENTO. They feel the necessity of strengthening the Shah's confidence and sense of solidarity by stressing their determination to cooperate in building up CENTO to resist Soviet pressures and threats. They may also wish to discuss problems relating to Afghanistan and increasing Soviet activity there.

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DAILY BRIEF

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### III. THE WEST

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Venezuela: The broad political and labor support which quickly rallied to the Venezuelan Government after its arrests on 12 October of 40 persons for conspiratorial activity suggests that President Betancourt is not seriously threatened at this time. The arrests followed a series of bombings in Caracas beginning 9 October. The bombings came at a time when the public is uneasy over labor contract negotiations in the oil industry, uncertainty over the economic outlook, recent rumors of plotting by both civilian and military groups, and some friction among the three parties in the coalition.

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Khrushchev Cautions Soviet People Against Overoptimism Resulting From US Trip

The chief purpose of Khrushchev's five speeches during his recent tour of Siberia apparently has been to define the ideological and practical limits of current US-Soviet relations. Recent lectures and press articles by other members of the Khrushchev delegation to the US also seem to have had the same general purpose.

Khrushchev appears to be concerned lest the Soviet people get the impression that his visit has so reduced world-wide tensions that they now can expect a rapid and substantial improvement in living conditions. His injunctions about the need for hard work and his pessimistic remarks on price reductions and private ownership of automobiles make it clear that higher living standards will not be achieved easily. Similarly, his frequent reaffirmation of the superiority of "socialism" and references to "forces" at work in the US for continuing the cold war put the Soviet people on notice that the regime does not intend to make ideological compromises.

Khrushchev's speech in Krasnoyarsk, published on 11 October, is of particular interest. It is more tendentious in tone than his other recent statements and, for the first time since the US visit, omits favorable comment on President Eisenhower. Further, his reference to the "poison of bourgeois ideas" seems to preclude the possibility of a significant breakthrough on the exchange of press and radio information and may even presage a resumption of intensive Soviet jamming of the Voice of America.

However, the generally moderate tone of Khrushchev's speeches, the omission of references to Berlin and other potentially critical situations, and his admission that the visit produced a warmer international climate, have presumably conveyed the impression to the Soviet people that a new phase in US-Soviet relations is under way.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Pakistani and Turkish Leaders See Need to Reassure Shah  
Of Iran

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[Karachi and Ankara are trying to arrange a meeting between the Shah of Iran, Pakistani President Ayub, and Turkish President Bayar or Prime Minister Menderes in early November. The Pakistanis and Turks consider Iran the weak link in the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and feel the necessity of strengthening the Shah's confidence and sense of solidarity by stressing their determination to cooperate in building up CENTO's ability to resist Soviet pressures and threats. They probably fear that without periodic assurances the Shah may reopen negotiations with the USSR to obtain aid and bring about the cessation of hostile Soviet radio propaganda.]

[The Shah would probably be pleased with such a meeting, which would enhance his prestige both at home and abroad.]

[Both the Pakistani and Iranian governments wish to secure more military aid through CENTO and may discuss ways of coordinating their policies to this end. All three countries probably also want to discuss problems connected with Afghanistan. They have shown concern over the USSR's increasing activity in Afghanistan and apparently fear the development of a Soviet threat from that direction. Turkey is interested in expanding its military training assistance to Afghanistan, while Iran is concerned over Kabul's refusal to agree to Iranian demands regarding the division of waters of the Helmand River.]

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[Propaganda warfare between the two has reached a new intensity, and a by-product of the proposed meeting may be a sharpening of Afghanistan's sense of isolation from its two free-world neighbors, Iran and Pakistan, with whom relations are strained.]

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### III. THE WEST

#### Venezuelan Government Moves Against Conspirators

The Venezuelan Government on 12 October arrested 40 persons--allegedly followers of former dictator Perez--for conspiratorial activity. This move followed a series of bombings in Caracas which began on 9 October. They came at a time when the government is under pressure because of unrest over the negotiations for a new contract in the oil industry, rumors of plotting by civilian and military groups, some friction among the three parties in the coalition, and uncertainty over the economic outlook. However, the broad political and labor backing, including Communist, which quickly rallied to support President Betancourt suggests that the stability of his regime is not seriously threatened at this time. Moreover, plotting in the armed forces thus far probably has not succeeded in winning substantial military or civilian backing.

On the other hand, Betancourt is threatened with labor strife--which Communists might attempt to spread--in the event the oil workers' federation does not reach a satisfactory agreement with the oil industry, on which the government and economy are largely dependent. A prolonged strike against the oil companies accompanied by violence could serve as a pretext for an attempted military take-over of the government.

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