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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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State Department review completed

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

22 December 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

OK Geneva Talks: The initial Soviet reaction to the failure of the technical experts to reach agreement on the most important problems of detecting underground nuclear explosions reflects Moscow's apparent concern that the United States and Britain may use this impasse to press for a limited treaty which would exclude underground tests from a permanent ban. In his final statement on 19 December before the Christmas recess, Soviet delegate Tsarapkin attempted to discount the disagreements and called on his Western colleagues to put aside "artificial difficulties" and accelerate the work of the political conference. Soviet spokesmen moved immediately to try to shift blame for the impasse to the United States. They challenged the correctness and objectivity of United States seismic data and insisted that the talks proved the accuracy of the 1958 report on a control system which the Western powers, in the light of new information, feel is no longer adequate. Moscow's first public reporting of the latest AEC underground experiments using conventional high explosives was clearly intended to leave the impression that the United States has resumed nuclear testing.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

OK India - Communist China: Nehru's flat rejection on 21 December of the claims made in Chou En-lai's letter of 17 December leaves the border dispute deadlocked. Nehru advanced no new proposals, noting that Chou had found his "practical" suggestions unacceptable and had merely reiterated Peiping's claims to extensive Indian territory. He maintained that China's claims were based on its recent intrusions. Nehru turned down Chou's invitation to meet on 26 December as premature as long as the Chinese and Indian viewpoints are still so far

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apart. He stressed again, however, that his policy was "to negotiate, negotiate, negotiate to the bitter end." [redacted]

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[redacted]

Morocco: Differences between Moroccan Premier Abdallah Ibrahim and the King apparently have been patched up for the time being. Friction had arisen over the arrest last week of two leaders of the leftist National Union of Popular Forces for having implicitly criticized the King. The American Ambassador in Rabat believes that a showdown now is desired neither by the palace nor by leftist supporters of Ibrahim and that tension once again is moderating. [redacted]

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III. THE WEST

Latin America: Brazil has requested Argentina's support for a meeting of Latin American chiefs of state at Brasilia during the city's dedication on 21 April as Brazil's new capital. [redacted] Brazil's objective was an "important declaration" on "Operation Pan America, President Kubitschek's proposal for a joint attack on underdevelopment in Latin America."

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[redacted] Kubitschek's interest in such a meeting is probably three-fold-- to raise Brazil's diplomatic prestige, to increase pressures on the United States for expanded technical and financial assistance to Latin America, and to help his party's chances in the October presidential elections. [redacted]

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(Page 4)

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR Moves to Offset Impasse in Geneva Technical Talks

Soviet spokesmen at Geneva have moved promptly to play down the importance of the areas of disagreement in the report of the technical working group on the underground test detection problem. At the same time, they are seeking to place blame for the impasse on the United States. At the final session of the political conference before the Christmas recess, Chief Soviet Delegate Tsarapkin stressed that the work of drafting a comprehensive test ban treaty should not be "drowned in the doubts, speculations, and arguments" raised by the experts. He called upon his Western colleagues to put aside "artificial difficulties" and accelerate the work of concluding a treaty.

Tsarapkin claimed that a treaty could be signed in two or three days "if those forces in the United States who want a speedy conclusion of a treaty prevail." He charged that agreement was blocked by the American experts at Geneva who "alleged that it is not possible to devise an effective control system" --in contradiction to evidence furnished by the Soviet experts.

The Soviet delegation apparently had hoped that some compromise formula could be worked out to avoid an impasse at the technical level which might sidetrack Moscow's tactics of clearing the way for focusing the negotiations on the Soviet proposal for solving the underground detection problem--an agreed number of annual on-site inspections. In the final stage of the technical talks, the chief Soviet expert sought to prevent the inclusion of disagreement in the final report to the political conference. He continued to the end his efforts to refute American seismic data and to contend that the talks had proved the complete accuracy of the report on a control system by the 1958 experts conference. In a bitter tirade at the 18 December session, he expressed doubt about the correctness and

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objectivity of the American data and charged that the "tendentious use of unilaterally acquired materials" was aimed at "undermining confidence in the control system."

Moscow appears concerned that the United States and Britain may use the failure to reach agreement on the most important aspects of the underground test detection problem to renew pressure for a limited treaty confined, at least at the outset, to banning atmospheric, high-altitude, and underwater tests. [Tsarapkin has privately indicated that in the event of disagreement in the technical talks, the USSR might consider a phased treaty, but stressed that the "crux of the matter" must be an obligation to halt all tests at the outset, regardless of the temporary nature of a ban on underground tests.] [redacted]

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Premier Khrushchev may believe the impasse at Geneva calls for a fresh Soviet initiative designed to place the Western powers on the defensive and focus the debate on terms favorable to the USSR. He may take the opportunity of a recess in the talks to address new letters to President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan appealing for a compromise settlement based on the concept of an annual quota of on-site inspections. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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III. THE WEST

Brazil Suggests Meeting of American Presidents in April 1960

Brazil has requested Argentina's support for a meeting of Latin American chiefs of state in Brasilia to mark the city's dedication on 21 April as Brazil's new capital and to issue an "important declaration" on "Operation Pan America" (OPA). President Kubitschek first proposed OPA in a letter to President Eisenhower in May 1958, calling for a reappraisal of hemisphere relations and a joint attack on underdevelopment.

Possibly in order to promote interest in such a meeting, the Brazilians are claiming that President Eisenhower will attend. Furthermore, Brazil is backing Ecuador's suggestion that the 11th Inter-American Conference scheduled for February 1960 at Quito be postponed, perhaps to improve chances for a meeting at Brasilia.

A high Argentine Foreign Ministry official has said Argentina is reluctant to join in any Brazilian gambit to put the United States "on the spot." He pointed out that when the Brazilian foreign minister visited Buenos Aires in November as part of Brazil's intensifying diplomatic campaign for OPA, President Frondizi had qualified his endorsement by emphasizing self-help.

Kubitschek stated on 16 December that OPA provided the opportunity of overcoming what he called US indifference toward Latin America. Although he emphasized that OPA was not intended as an effort to form a Latin American bloc hostile to the US, Kubitschek apparently hopes to enhance Brazil's leadership in the hemisphere and its importance in world affairs. At the same time, he probably wants to use OPA and a meeting at Brasilia to help his party's chances in the October presidential elections.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
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Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific

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