


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11 May 1960



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CENTRAL


INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 9
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HR 70-2
9 JUN 1980
DATE: _____ REVIEWER: 

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State Dept. review completed

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

11 May 1960

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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USSR: The USSR apparently plans a further series of moves for propaganda purposes in connection with the 1 May aircraft incident. Premier Khrushchev informed Ambassador Thompson privately on 9 May that the USSR still plans to take the plane incident to the UN Security Council, but he gave no indication of the timing of such a move. He also said that a press conference to produce the "evidence" would be held in Moscow, probably on 11 May.]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Algeria: The Algerian rebels, seeking to attract attention during the summit conference, may intensify their terrorism and sabotage in France [and move toward closer relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc.]

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OK

[A rebel mission in Communist Asia, meanwhile apparently hopes to set up a diplomatic mission in Peiping as well as to obtain Communist military aid.]

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OK Federation of Rhodesia-Nyasaland: [African nationalist disorders in the British protectorate of Northern Rhodesia have taken on racial overtones and resulted in mob violence in the copper mining area. The governor has called up police reservists after a week end of disturbances during which white persons and their property were attacked. The government should be able to contain the disorders, but in view of prevailing tension, such incidents are likely to recur.]

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III. THE WEST

OK Panama: The government has decided to withhold official returns of last Sunday's presidential election until 14 May. Opposition candidate Roberto Chiari is leading in the three-way race on the basis of early unofficial returns. His supporters may resort to force in an effort to counter any regime attempts to manipulate the final tally in favor of Ricardo Arias, the government candidate and pre-election favorite.

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11 May 60

DAILY BRIEF

ii

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Algerian Rebels May Time Terrorist Moves to Coincide With Summit

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Efforts by the Algerian rebels to attract attention during the summit conference may take the form of a terrorist campaign in France [and moves toward closer relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc.] Although in the past the rebels have attempted to launch military offensives in Algeria in concert with new moves in the diplomatic field, they probably feel that their forces in Algeria are not capable of a major offensive effort at this time.





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Recent rebel activity in France has been largely directed against the rival Algerian National Movement of Messali Hadj, and the rebels have not scored a major sabotage success since their attacks on various oil refineries in August 1958. They remain capable of increased terrorist activity, however, and their attempted assassination of the right-wing Algerian deputy Robert Abdesselam on 4 May suggests that such a campaign may be implemented.

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Meanwhile, a rebel mission to Communist Asia headed by Vice Premier Belkacem Krim has returned to Peiping after a side trip to Hanoi. [Recent rebel statements suggest that the rebels, as a result of their pique at continued Western support for De Gaulle's Algerian policy, hope to establish a diplomatic mission in Peiping which has already recognized the Algerian provisional government as well as to obtain arms there.]



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Security Problem in Northern Rhodesia

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
[The recent outbreak in Northern Rhodesia of African nationalist disorders and racial violence shows the seriousness of the deteriorating security situation in this British Protectorate, which along with self-governing Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, another protectorate, forms the largely self-governing Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.]

[African rioting began on 8 May after police broke up a rally of the leading nationalist group, the United National Independence party (UNIP). Several hundred Africans have been arrested following attacks on white persons and property at several urban centers throughout the copper mining region. The British governor has reinforced police forces in the copper belt, and the authorities should be able to control the situation. The increasing political and racial tension suggests, however, that further outbreaks can easily occur.]

[Recently there have been incidents in Northern Rhodesia which show the growing power of African political organization and increasing opposition to the present Federation with its white-settler control. In March a wave of politically motivated unrest in African secondary schools caused the governor to close several of them. Later in the month when British Colonial Secretary Macleod visited Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia's capital, he was greeted by a UNIP-sponsored demonstration which got out of hand and became vicious and anti-European. The incident apparently convinced Macleod of the depth of African resentment and inclined him to talk in terms of a faster political advance for the protectorate.]

[London faces a particularly difficult problem in Northern Rhodesia, because British efforts to appease African nationalists are likely to arouse opposition from the Federation's 300,000 white settlers. Few whites would agree to African control over the copper area. A sizable minority in the Federation would consider secession--and, with it, difficult relations with London--rather than accept such African control.]

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
III. THE WEST

Panama Delays Announcement of Election Results

Panamanian officials have described the 8 May presidential election as one of the most peaceful in recent years, but the government has decided to delay until 14 May publication of the official results. Supporters of opposition candidate Roberto F. Chiari, who leads the three-way presidential race on the basis of early returns, may use force in an attempt to counter any efforts by the regime to manipulate the final tally in favor of Ricardo Arias, the government-backed candidate and pre-election favorite.


Figures released by officials of the national election tribunal before the government blacked out official returns gave 63,242 votes to Chiari, 52,736 to Arias, and 41,717 to Victor Goytia--the candidate of a second opposition group--after an unofficial count of about 60 percent of the vote. Spokesmen for all three contenders have repeated their earlier predictions of victory for their candidates since the delay was announced.

Political tension during the latter stages of the pre-election campaign was increased by opposition denunciations of alleged irregularities in the voter registration program, and Chiari exhorted his followers to "defend in the streets," if it became necessary, the electoral triumph of his party. Unconfirmed reports of the existence of revolutionary plots against the regime have created further uneasiness in official circles.



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