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27 June 1960



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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

27 June 1960

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

East Germany: East German police have instituted a series of strong harassing actions against Western military liaison missions in East Germany. Since 9 June several incidents have occurred, with East German police forcing mission vehicles to stop, threatening mission personnel with loaded firearms, and engaging in acts of physical violence against them. The most serious of these incidents was the physical assault on the chief and other members of the British mission in an unrestricted area near Potsdam on 21 June. The three chiefs of the Western liaison missions believe that the deteriorating situation may result in further serious incidents, possibly involving even the loss of life. They also believe that the East German actions are being taken with the approval of high-level Soviet authorities.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Belgian Congo: The government formed by Congo Premier-designate Patrice Lumumba is "weak" and has a "strong leftist tinge," according to the consulate general in Leopoldville. Members of opposition parties named to the cabinet are described as little known and likely to be dominated by Lumumba. Among ten secretaries of state, however, five--including the secretary for economic coordination and planning--are Communist inclined. Meanwhile, a spokesman for the majority Conakat party in Katanga Province has expressed determination to secede.

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[Malaya: Prime Minister Abdul Rahman's recent public advocacy of UN membership for Communist China apparently results from his belief that the summit breakdown was solely the result of Chinese pressure on the Soviets, and that its membership would ease international tension. In addition, Rahman is said to believe that US policy toward Communist China will change as the result of French and British pressures. Rahman's views, however, do not represent a real softening of the Federation's anti-Communist orientation, and they specifically do not portend any early diplomatic recognition of Communist China by the Federation.

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
OK Philippines: President Garcia's veto of three major bills which he had demanded earlier from the Philippine Congress as part of his anticorruption and "Filipino first" drives, has raised a storm of protest within his own Nacionalista party and alienated many of his congressional supporters. The widespread belief that the President bowed to pressure from profiteering special interest has undermined the prestige accruing to Garcia from the Philippine

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reception of President Eisenhower and has given the opposition, looking toward next year's presidential election, some effective ammunition.



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DAILY BRIEF

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East German Police Harassing Western Military
Liaison Missions

East German police are conducting a series of harassing actions against the three Western military liaison missions accredited to the commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG). The three chiefs of the Western liaison missions, believe that the East German actions have been taken with high-level Soviet approval. Several incidents have occurred since 9 June and surveillance has been markedly stepped up: East German police have forced mission vehicles to stop, threatened mission personnel with loaded firearms, used insulting language toward Western officers, and engaged in acts of physical violence against members of the American and British missions. A letter of 16 June from the chief of the British mission to the commander of GSFG protesting the harassments remains unanswered.

The most serious incident occurred on 21 June when East German security police halted the chief of the British Military Liaison Mission, Brigadier Packard, in an unrestricted area near Potsdam. The East Germans struck Packard and another officer, injured an enlisted man, and seized at gun point all equipment in the British cars. When a Soviet liaison officer arrived several hours later, the East Germans refused to allow the British vehicles to follow his car as he had directed; only after the Soviet officer returned an hour later did the East Germans permit the British cars to proceed.

Since this incident, East German surveillance has been concentrated on British mission vehicles; French and American mission personnel have noted only one instance of being followed closely in the period 21-24 June.

On 20 May, while Khrushchev was in East Berlin, East German party boss Ulbricht launched a propaganda campaign that is

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still continuing against the Western military liaison missions. He claimed that East German security police had obtained maps and other intelligence material "from American officers" which proved that they were spying against East Germany.

The chiefs of the Western missions consider that the deteriorating situation may result in further serious incidents--possibly involving the loss of life. The harassments appear to be part of a coordinated effort to limit severely the activities of the missions, to force them to accept documentation indicating East German permission to travel, or to suspend travel entirely. Soviet military authorities sought to force the missions to accept such documentation last winter, with the explanation that East German police could then know that they were not to molest mission personnel.

Lumumba Moves to Consolidate Power in Congo

The government formed by Congo Premier-designate Patrice Lumumba is "weak" and has a "strong leftist tinge," according to the consulate general in Leopoldville. Members of opposition parties named to the cabinet are described as little known and likely to be dominated by Lumumba. The premier-designate allocated to himself the key post of defense minister, which carries with it control over the Congo's 24,000-man security force, whose Belgian officers are expected to remain after the Congo's independence on 30 June.


Among ten secretaries of state named by Lumumba, five--including the secretary for economic coordination and planning--are Communist inclined. Anti-Lumumba leaders continue to emphasize Lumumba's Communist contacts, and in conversation with US officials have deplored the failure of the United States to check "Communist forces" in the Congo. Available evidence indicates that Lumumba is a leftist-oriented "neutralist" who has accepted financial aid from Communist sources.

Leaders for the majority Conakat party in Katanga Province continue to threaten secession and have expressed dissatisfaction at the inability of the United States to offer armed support, if needed, to an independent Katanga state. A Conakat spokesman has indicated to American officials that Katanga is prepared to secede from the Congo on 30 June unless Conakat is granted three cabinet seats instead of the one offered by Lumumba and unless they are convinced that the Congo Government will not evolve into a "Lumumba dictatorship."

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Philippine President Blocks Anticorruption Measures

Philippine President Garcia's recent last-minute veto of three congressional acts he had requested in furtherance of his "antigraft" and "Filipino first" platforms has seriously embarrassed his Nacionalista party and further damaged his national stature. Violent criticism of the President's "weak and flimsy" reasons for vetoing the bills--a bill to strike at government corruption, a measure to tighten loopholes in Japanese reparations procurement, and a bill to curb alien monopolies in rice and corn distribution--is based on the widespread inference that Garcia has yielded to pressure from special interests, including local Chinese businessmen.

In the face of growing unpopularity, Garcia has been vigorously publicizing his determination to clean up his administration and to carry out a policy of constructive nationalism under the "Filipino first" slogan. He has further sought to soothe the irritations and alleged "grievances" against the United States in the hope of identifying himself with American favor. His recent actions, however, have tended to raise strong public doubts of his sincerity and to undermine the prestige accruing to his administration from the country's enthusiastic reception of President Eisenhower.

Garcia has thus offered new ammunition to the parties which will oppose him in next year's presidential election. The opposition may also benefit from the reopening of the rift between Garcia and other influential Nacionalista leaders which may affect his future ability to command majority support in Congress.

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