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10 October 1960 25X1



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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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10 October 1960

## DAILY BRIEF

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### II. ASIA-AFRICA

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25X1 Burma: There are continued rumblings of discontent with U Nu's administration among senior officers in the Burmese Army. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] they are "waiting, planning, and will be ready" to take over again when the government "makes a mistake." These officers, who probably represent the military faction which argued against the surrender of power in the fall of 1959, feel that General Ne Win made a major error in turning the country back to the politicians after the February elections. [redacted] 25X1

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Laos: Renewed attempts by the Souvanna Phouma regime to arrange some form of truce with General Phoumi's Revolutionary Committee have been rebuffed. Souvanna Phouma has announced that his negotiations with the Pathet Lao are to begin 11 October. [redacted] 25X1

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DAILY BRIEF

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Discontent Continues in Burmese Army

Senior officers, apparently from among those who opposed General Ne Win's decision to return the government to U Nu, continue to be dissatisfied with the way Burma is being administered. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] they are "unhappy," too, with General Ne Win and are "waiting, planning, and will be ready" to take over when the government "makes a mistake." They appear to hope for popular support in case they take action. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] "The Burmese people realize things are getting bad and remember the good things the military government did for them."

With the exception of the boundary treaty with China, which was almost entirely an army venture, the Nu government has accomplished little in the six months in office, and administration has deteriorated markedly. Rangoon's leading newspaper recently observed that, unless there is a marked improvement in the government leadership, "Burma will have the distinction of having one of the best prime ministers and one of the worst administrations in the world." Discontent is not yet widespread, however, and both Prime Minister Nu and General Ne Win appear to retain their popularity. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Premier Souvanna Phouma has informed Ambassador Brown that his most recent attempt to arrive at some kind of concord with General Phoumi's Revolutionary Committee was rebuffed. Souvanna said he had sent a note to Savannakhet asking that the committee be dissolved on the basis of no reprisals. Phoumi had countered with the suggestion that both his committee and the Souvanna cabinet resign, after which the King could name a new government. Souvanna commented that Phoumi's reply put the two camps back to 30 August, when the King appointed the present government and Phoumi refused to participate.

Phoumi's determination to have nothing to do with the Souvanna regime may be strengthened by reports of a Meo tribal uprising, details of which are still fragmentary, in the Second Military Region, which has jurisdiction over Sam Neua and Xieng Khouang Provinces. This region was declared loyal to the Vientiane regime by a regional subcommander on 28 September following a revolt in the internal command structure which formerly had supported Phoumi. It is possible that Meo tribesmen have been armed by pro-Phoumi officers in the area in an attempt to redress the situation, or at least to cause further difficulties for the Vientiane regime.

Souvanna Phouma may be in for trouble from another quarter. General Ouane, armed forces commander, and some of his subordinates in Vientiane are reported to be considering plans for mounting a coup against the Souvanna government.

General Ouane stated on 9 October that he and other officers would carry out a coup if Souvanna's negotiations with the Pathet Lao, which now are scheduled to begin 11 October, do not "go well" for the royal government. Ouane has information that the Pathet Lao will demand, among other things, a reintegration of their civil functionaries and the regrouping of their forces in specified areas. The reasons for Ouane's reported change of attitude would appear to bring him considerably closer to an alignment, at least in political objectives, with Phoumi.

Meanwhile, there are reports of a sizable attack by Pathet Lao forces on a government post in Phong Saly Province of the First Military Region. A significant upsurge of Communist military activity there could be an additional persuasion for Ouane to take some action. The loyalty of the regional military commander and of his officers to the Vientiane regime has also been reported as wavering.

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