

**TOP SECRET**

25X1



9 November 1960



25X1


Copy No. C 75

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 8  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.   
 DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S O  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
10 JUN 1980  
DATE: \_\_\_\_\_ REVIEWER:

25X1



25X1

State Dept. review completed

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005400080001-3

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005400080001-3

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

9 November 1960

## DAILY BRIEF

25X1

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

\*USSR-China: (After long and bitter wrangling during September and October in meetings preliminary to the world Communist conclave to begin on 10 November in Moscow, the Soviet and Chinese parties managed to arrive at some compromise formulas on certain aspects of their dispute but remained as far apart as ever on other issues, including some of the central ones. [redacted] 25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted] the Soviet party, represented by Suslov and Kozlov, traded personal insults with the Chinese delegation, headed by Teng Hsiao-ping, and both parties at times descended to "puerile but heated" exchanges. Most of the parties represented supported the Soviet views, but Albania continually and the Asian satellites frequently sided with the Chinese. At a banquet following the apparently inconclusive meetings, Khrushchev and Teng Hsiao-ping quarreled "violently" about the nature of Soviet leadership of the world Communist movement. [redacted] 25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted] (Page 1)

### II. ASIA-AFRICA

25X1

Republic of the Congo: The prospect for a full-dress UN debate on the Congo has brought a reiteration by Tshombé and Lumumba of their positions in the current political impasse. [In a 7 November memorandum passed to the American consul, Tshombé expressed the hope that Congolese and Katangan leaders would agree on a "new" formula for a political association--presumably a confederation--which would be "in conformity with the regional peculiarities" of the Congo area.] On the same day, Lumumba endorsed the UN role in the Congo and applauded the criticism of Brussels and the Mobutu government contained in the report of UN representative Dayal.

25X1



25X1

25X1



In contrast with the political lull in Leopoldville, the struggle in Orientale Province between pro- and anti-Lumumba elements continues unabated. [Congo Army elements reportedly threatened on 4 November to march on Stanleyville if pro-Mobutu officers were not released from detention.]



25X1


South Vietnam: The South Vietnamese Government's communique of 8 November charging an incursion into its territory by three regular North Vietnamese battalions from bases in Laos appears designed to dramatize its struggle against local Communist dissidence. The charges apparently refer to the previously reported attacks between 21 and 26 October against outposts near the Laotian border in the central highlands of South Vietnam. These attacks reportedly were carried out by bands of local tribesmen under Communist cadres who probably were infiltrated from North Vietnam. In implying that its charges may be brought before the International Control Commission, South Vietnam may hope to focus attention on North Vietnam's increasing activity aimed at the overthrow of the Diem government.

OK

25X1

25X1

Laos: Former Premier Phoui Sananikone, who has just returned to Laos after an absence of several months, is now in Luang Prabang assessing the situation with an eye to a




9 Nov 60



ii

25X1



25X1  
[reconciliation of divided non-Communist elements in Laos. Presumably he will consult with Premier Souvanna Phouma, who is at present on another fence-mending tour of the northern provinces. However, Phoui's fall from power last January was attended by a great deal of bitterness, the scars of which may limit his usefulness as a mediator.]  
(Page 4)

25X1

Indonesia: President Sukarno's choice of leaders for his new 610-member People's Congress, which he plans to convene on 10 November, advances his concept of "guided democracy" looking toward the amalgamation of all political elements. These leaders have been drawn from the major parties and include the Communist party secretary general as well as an army representative. The congress is expected to be another rubber-stamp body. Sukarno and the army will continue as the principal forces in the actual governing of the country.

OK

25X1

9 Nov 60

iii

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

Moscow and Peiping Fail to Resolve Disagreements

25X1

[REDACTED] an account of the conference in Moscow during September and October of bloc and nonbloc Communist parties which was called in an effort to resolve Sino-Soviet differences prior to the meeting of world Communist leaders that is to begin on 10 November. According to this account, the exchanges between the Soviet and Chinese representatives were extremely bitter, and a number of issues were left unsettled.]

[As a basis for discussion, the Soviet party had prepared a document setting forth issues in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Some 100 pages of amendments to this document reportedly were proposed during the conference.]

[The principal Chinese spokesman, Teng Hsiao-ping, "fiercely attacked" Soviet strategy for the world Communist movement. In particular, there was a "heated argument" about Soviet views on the noninevitability of war, with the Chinese insisting that the bloc should be willing to undertake and to support local wars. In the course of this discussion, Teng reportedly reaffirmed the Chinese position that Peiping should be given nuclear weapons and rejected the idea that the Soviet Union should have a controlling voice in the defenses of other bloc countries.]

[The Chinese further attacked the USSR for having withdrawn technicians from China. Moscow countered that the technicians had been withdrawn because Peiping had tried to indoctrinate them.]

[In the last of the discussions, Soviet spokesman Suslov criticized the Chinese at considerable length, both on substantive issues and for their derisive attitude toward the "right of a majority," i. e. those supporting the Soviet party. Suslov argued that the decisions supported by the majority should be made unanimous.]

[The delegates attempted, with only limited success, to work out the draft of a document that would presumably be the]

25X1

[REDACTED]

(basis of the communiqué to be released after the November meeting. China and the USSR are said to have reached agreement on wording to cover the issue of disarmament and to have arrived at compromise formulas on some other issues, such as the character of the present epoch and the relative dangers of revisionism and dogmatism. On other central issues in the dispute, however--especially questions related to war--not even superficial agreement could be reached. The Chinese delegation reportedly insisted that the only absolute guarantee against war was the victory of socialism.)

(During the discussions, the Albanians were the only outspoken supporters of the Chinese, although the representatives of all the Asian parties--except the Indian and possibly the Indonesian--supported Peiping at least in part. At a banquet following the meetings, Khrushchev and Teng Hsiao-ping quarreled "violently" about the nature of Soviet leadership of the world Communist movement.)

(It is doubtful that there is yet an agreed draft resolution to be issued at the end of the Moscow conclave beginning this week. Even if Moscow and Peiping do manage to paper over the dispute, this report provides additional evidence that serious disagreements will continue.)

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

The likelihood of a full-dress UN debate on the Congo has brought a reiteration by Tshombé and Lumumba of their respective positions. On 7 November, Lumumba endorsed the current UN role in the Congo and applauded the criticism of Brussels and the Mobutu government contained in the report of UN representative Dayal.

[Also on 7 November, Tshombé passed a memorandum to the American Consulate in Elisabethville expressing hope that Congolese and Katangan leaders would agree on a "new" formula for political association--presumably a confederation--which would be "in conformity with the regional peculiarities" of the Congo area. Tshombé has periodically indicated he would accept some form of political association with the Congo, provided it involved a sufficient degree of provincial autonomy.]

25X1

In contrast with the political lull in Leopoldville, the power struggle in Orientale Province between pro- and anti-Lumumba elements continues unabated. [A recent shipment of automobile parts from Czechoslovakia to Stanleyville was reported to include arms for pro-Lumumba forces there. Elements sympathetic to Lumumba, led by his leftist vice premier, Antoine Gizenga, have maintained the initiative in Orientale Province and have imprisoned or placed under house arrest numerous supporters of Colonel Mobutu.]

25X1

[ ] however, the Congo Army garrison at Watsa--in northeast Orientale Province--has threatened to march on Stanleyville if imprisoned army officers there are not released.]

25X1

25X1

Elsewhere, there are indications that many Congolese are sensitive to the need for a restoration of political stability. In two areas of Kivu Province--one of them a Lumumba stronghold--minor officials and businessmen recently spoke to an American official concerning the need for a restoration of popular confidence and for the return of Belgian employers. Several expressed apprehension concerning the effect of a return to power by Lumumba. [ ]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

The Situation in Laos

[Former Premier Phoui Sananikone, who has just returned to Laos after an absence of several months, is in Luang Prabang assessing the situation with an eye toward attempting to reconcile non-Communist elements in Laos. Phoui is a conservative, old-guard politician who shared the leadership of the probably now moribund Rally of the Lao People with Souvanna Phouma. In the past he took a somewhat harder line toward the Communist-dominated Pathet Lao than did Souvanna. Phoui could conceivably serve as a bridge between the various factions which have arisen since Captain Kong Le's August coup, although his usefulness may be impaired by bitterness stemming from the conflict with the King and General Phoumi's Committee for Defense of National Interests which led to Phoui's fall from power early last January.]

[Phoui will presumably consult in Luang Prabang with Souvanna Phouma, who is on another fence-mending tour of the northern provinces. Phoui has already concluded that it is necessary to encourage opposition to the Pathet Lao and Kong Le in Vientiane itself, rather than to rely solely on building up anti-Pathet forces in Luang Prabang and Savannakhet. Souvanna and his moderate supporters have for some time been trying to pursue such a policy, but with only marginal effect.]

[In a statement to the National Assembly on 7 November-- just prior to his departure for the north--Souvanna [REDACTED] [REDACTED] informed the deputies that nothing had been achieved in the nearly four weeks of talks with the Pathet Lao. He claimed the government had rejected Pathet demands for inclusion in a coalition government, while the Pathet Lao had stalled on the government's demand for a supervised cease-fire between opposing forces in the field. A Pathet Lao negotiator is said to have gone to Sam Neua to get a decision from Prince.]

{ Souphannouvong on the question of a cease-fire. Quinim Pholsena, Souvanna's extreme leftist minister of information, is also in Sam Neua for talks with Souphannouvong. }

{ At the same session, the assembly reportedly appointed a delegation to enter into negotiations with General Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee. The delegation reportedly will seek talks with Phoumi's representatives at some neutral site, since it fears it will be arrested if it goes to Savannakhet. The chances of success in this venture are highly uncertain, although a settlement worked out by the assembly might possibly be attractive to both Souvanna and Phoumi as a face-saving means of reaching a settlement without the necessity of a direct personal confrontation. }

25X1

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

"Guided Democracy" in Indonesia

President Sukarno's appointment of leaders of the 610-member People's Consultative Congress on 8 November completes the reorganization of the Indonesian legislature under the reinvoked 1945 constitution. His choice of the congressional leaders, drawn from the three major parties and the army with a nonparty leftist as acting chairman, is continued evidence that the president is still trying to integrate all political elements under "guided democracy."

The two-house legislature will be a rubber-stamp organization, as evidenced by activities of the Council of Representatives. The Communists control about 25 percent of the members of both houses. The organizational trappings of "guided democracy" also include the Supreme Advisory Council, which is expected to ensure political guidance, and the National Planning Board to provide economic direction. Yet to be formed is the National Front, a mass organization to function through a multilevel structure ranging from a central board in Djakarta to village organizations throughout the nation; as yet, only the central board has been appointed.

Sukarno's stated ambition is to create an administration unhampered by political dissension which can direct all its energies toward national fulfillment. He regards the various councils, all of which include Communists, as an important step toward his goal. In practice, the congress and councils are largely facades behind which Sukarno, assisted by the cabinet and the army, governs the country.

Although the army continues to obstruct the Communists in a fairly effective manner, it has failed to influence Sukarno against the Communist party or against the acceptance of large amounts of bloc aid. (The Indonesian cabinet is reported, as of 1 November, to have decided to proceed with a Soviet loan offer of over \$400,000,000 for naval equipment.)

25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

**THE PRESIDENT**

**The Vice President**

**Executive Offices of the White House**

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs  
Scientific Adviser to the President  
Director of the Budget  
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization  
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration  
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination  
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities  
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy  
Executive Secretary, National Security Council

**The Treasury Department**

The Secretary of the Treasury

**The Department of State**

The Secretary of State  
The Under Secretary of State  
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs  
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs  
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration  
The Counselor  
Director, International Cooperation Administration  
The Director of Intelligence and Research

**The Department of Defense**

The Secretary of Defense  
The Deputy Secretary of Defense  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs  
The Secretary of the Army  
The Secretary of the Navy  
The Secretary of the Air Force  
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Director, The Joint Staff  
Chief of Staff, United States Army  
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy  
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force  
Commandant, United States Marine Corps  
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations  
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff  
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army  
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy  
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force  
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe  
Commander in Chief, Pacific

**The Department of Commerce**

The Secretary of Commerce

**Federal Bureau of Investigation**

The Director

**Atomic Energy Commission**

The Chairman

**National Security Agency**

The Director

**National Indications Center**

The Director

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP87T00975A005400080001-3

**TOP SECRET**

Approved For Release 2003/03/27 : CIA-RDP87T00975A005400080001-3

**TOP SECRET**