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
8 February 1961



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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


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2. Congo: Kasavubu opposes enlarging the mandate of the UN forces in the Congo. (*Page i*)
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
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DAILY BRIEF

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Congo: [President Kasavubu and Foreign Minister Bomboko have expressed strong opposition to any plan which would enlarge the mandate of the UN force in the Congo. They reportedly believe that such a move would infringe on the Congo's sovereignty and feel that a UN attempt to neutralize the Congolese Army would interfere with their planned operation against Kivu Province, which Bomboko stated was imminent. At the UN, Soviet delegate Zorin]

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[redacted]

reiterated Moscow's position that elimination of Belgian influence and the release of Lumumba were prerequisites for a solution of the situation in the Congo. He opposed a neutralization of the troops supporting Lumumba until these conditions had been fulfilled. Stepped-up political and military activity in Leopoldville is coinciding with indications that Katanga may take a more strongly separatist line under the influence of Tshombé's new French military adviser, who stated on 4 February that he believed a unified Congo state is unrealizable. [redacted] (Backup, Page 1)

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India-USSR: New Delhi's determination to build up its airlift capability in the Himalayan frontier regions apparently has led Indian officials to arrange for the purchase of

[redacted] Soviet IL-14 (Crate) transports. [redacted]

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These twin-engine piston transports will apparently supplement the [redacted] C-119 "Flying Boxcars" and [redacted] AN-12 (Cub) turboprop transports purchased last year from the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively. Like the AN-12s, which are scheduled to arrive in India before April, the IL-14s are probably being purchased at bargain prices and for rupees rather than hard foreign currency. [redacted]

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USSR-Turkey: As part of Moscow's effort to induce the Turkish Government to adopt a friendlier policy toward the USSR, the Soviet ambassador has been [redacted] warning Turkish leaders that Soviet-American relations are improving very rapidly to a point where agreement might be reached which would leave Turkey "outside the club." The ambassador also delivered a note on 3 February inquiring if reports in the local [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[press that NATO IRBM bases are being constructed in Turkey are correct. The note reaffirmed the USSR's desire for "good neighborly relations" and warned against any steps that might draw Turkey into "dangerous ventures." Soviet diplomats employed similar tactics following Khrushchev's visit to the US in 1959, accusing smaller NATO countries, including Greece and Turkey, of being out of step with the "new trend" in East-West relations.]

[Turkish Foreign Minister Sarper has described Premier Gursel as "furious" at the Soviet ambassador's action but he also expressed some apprehension over the possible reaction to the latest Soviet moves by the "more naive" officials in the government.]

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CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION

The USIB has approved the following conclusions reached by its Special Berlin Subcommittee which reviewed the situation for the period 17 January 1961 through 6 February 1961.

1. We are currently in an interim period during which the USSR is intent on reaching an assessment of the new US administration and the possibilities of negotiating with the West on major issues. Therefore, for the next few months the USSR is unlikely to increase tensions over Berlin. However, should the Soviet leaders at any time during this period estimate that additional pressure would be calculated to bring the West more quickly to high-level negotiations with the USSR, they may increase the threat of unilateral action in an effort to expedite talks.

2. The East German control practices on the Berlin intersector boundary have not softened to the extent that West

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Germany had been led to expect as part of the price for reinstating the Interzonal Trade agreements. However, the West German Economic Ministry is "still not unhopeful" that action will occur soon in accord with earlier assurances.

3. There are indications that East Germany has begun on some of the necessary long-range moves in an effort to make its economy independent of Western imports and thereby deprive the West of this leverage in future negotiations over Berlin.

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The Situation in the Congo

[President Kasavubu and Foreign Minister Bomboko, in a conversation with the American chargé in Leopoldville on 6 February, expressed the belief that events are moving in their favor in the political and military fields and that a neutralization of the Congolese Army would reverse this trend. They also reportedly feel that the UN would use any additional powers to the disadvantage of their government and might eventually impose a trusteeship over the Congo. The chargé comments that Kasavubu is unlikely to consent to such a program so long as he feels time is on his side.]

[According to Bomboko, an attempt by the UN to bring the Congolese Army under its control would thwart the Leopoldville government's plans to mount a military operation against Kivu Province within ten days. Bomboko and Kasavubu apparently believe that their chances for regaining control of eastern Congo are fairly good as a result of disaffection among Gizenga's troops. At the same time, Kasavubu stated that Congolese officials were attempting to form a "provisional" government which could be installed immediately.]

[Hammaraskjold has scoffed at Western concern for Kasavubu's position, stating that the Congolese President "has no prestige." He continues to believe that a military solution to the Congolese situation is impossible, and he reportedly feels that Mobutu and Bomboko are too closely tied to Belgium to have any future in the Congo. Hammaraskjold feels that if they are removed, Kasavubu can be persuaded to form a constitutional government.]

[Soviet UN representative Zorin told Ambassador Stevenson on 6 February that the UN would not be able to deal with troops which are subject to colonial domination--presumably a reference to Mobutu's and Tshombé's forces--in the same manner as those which support the "legitimate government." He questioned whether the latter would lay down their arms until Lumumba is released and parliament is reconvened. Zorin also reiterated the Soviet charge that Hammaraskjold has failed to carry out previous Security Council mandates.]

[Colonel Roger Trinquier, the French officer who reportedly is to become the chief of Tshombé's Katanga armed forces,

[REDACTED] told a press conference on 4 February that a unified Congo state is unrealizable. Pressure from Trinquier, whom previous reports had linked with separatist members of Tshombé's government, may weaken Tshombé's willingness to maintain his present tenuous contacts with Leopoldville and make it even more difficult to bring Katanga into a federated Congo state.]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Indian Purchase of Soviet IL-14 Transports

[Objections by Indian military leaders to the purchase of Soviet equipment appear to have been overruled recently by economic factors, especially the gradually worsening foreign exchange position, coupled with New Delhi's desire to demonstrate its cordial relations with Moscow as a hedge against Peiping in the Sino-Indian border dispute. These same factors, plus the desire for a high-altitude capability, led New Delhi to seek MI-4 (Hound) helicopters from the Soviet Union in late 1960. The failure of the demonstrator on its first proving flights in the Ladakh area has apparently stalled further negotiations for helicopters.]

[The reported purchase of IL-14s reflects also the Defense Ministry's desire to relieve the mounting pressure on its fleet of aging C-47 (Dakota) transports, which have borne the brunt of New Delhi's logistic support of road-building crews and military forces in the sensitive and remote Indo-Tibetan frontier region.]

[The IL-14 is capable of operating at altitudes some 7,000-8,000 feet higher and carries about 2,000 pounds more cargo than the C-47. The USSR has substantial numbers of IL-14s in civil air service, but they are expected to be largely replaced by the newer, higher performance TU-124 and AN-24. Nearly 100 of these aircraft have been furnished by the bloc to non-bloc countries. The purchase of IL-14s will provide New Delhi with a stopgap aircraft until it decides on a more suitable C-47 replacement to be manufactured in India. The cabinet is now considering prototypes designed by Lockheed and AVRO, a British firm.]

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Soviet Attitude Toward Turkey

[Since the overthrow of the Menderes regime last May, the USSR has maintained a cautious but friendly attitude toward the Gursel government and sought to encourage the Turkish leaders to adopt a more independent foreign policy. Khrushchev invited General Gursel to make the trip to Moscow which had been scheduled for last July by his predecessor but Gursel refused. While expressing disappointment that the new regime was not going to return to Ataturk's policy of neutrality but was planning to remain in NATO and CENTO, Khrushchev indicated there was no reason why Soviet-Turkish relations could not be gradually improved.]

[Soviet officials on a number of occasions have offered Turkey economic aid, including credits of up to \$500,000,000. In a talk with Turkish Foreign Minister Sarper in New York last October, Khrushchev reiterated offers of Soviet assistance and asserted that Turkey's membership in Western alliances is not a major obstacle to better relations. He suggested that the two countries establish a demilitarized zone along their common frontier by withdrawing their forces "several hundred kilometers," and observed that the Black Sea could be turned into a "sea of peace." Shortly thereafter, the Soviet ambassador in Ankara told a key Turkish government figure that the USSR is willing to demonstrate its good will toward Turkey by reducing its Black Sea Fleet and naval installations in the area and by guaranteeing to respect the present Soviet-Turkish border.]

[Some members of the ruling military Committee of National Unity reportedly favor accepting economic aid from, and improving relations with, the Soviet bloc, but such action would run counter to popular feeling in Turkey. Both Gursel and Sarper are committed to maintenance of Turkey's close ties with the West.]

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