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*DCS/P*

11 May 1961



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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

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5. Ghana: President Nkrumah replaces pro-Western finance minister. (*Page iii*)

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
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# Republic of the Congo



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Congo: [Hammar-skjold said on 9 May that contrary to fears in Katanga, the UN did not intend to use force to secure the withdrawal of Belgian military or political advisers from the Congo. He added, however, that any Belgians who fell into UN hands would be repatriated. Hammar-skjold now plans to keep Dayal in New York for about five weeks; thereafter, if relations between Leopoldville and the UN remain cordial, he will return Dayal to Leopoldville for a brief stay. Hammar-skjold said that Nkrumah is not pressing his threat to withdraw Ghana's troops from the Congo and expressed doubts that the Ghanaian President would do so.]


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According to the American Embassy in Brussels, Belgian Foreign Ministry officials regard the arrest of Tshombé, who is now being removed to Leopoldville under guard, as a stupid maneuver which might increase unrest in Katanga without facilitating a rapprochement between Leopoldville and Stanleyville. Brussels reportedly is attempting to keep itself disengaged from the public dispute over Tshombé, although it has told Congolese representatives in New York that it disapproves of Leopoldville action.

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Iran: [The Iranian Government has forbidden any further demonstrations, except at one specified public stadium where assemblies may be held "to express the people's demands" and stated it will take strong measures to maintain order. Crowds, including many students, have been in the streets, however, celebrating the collapse of Sharif-Emami's cabinet and hailing the government's announcement that the police officer responsible for killing a demonstrator last week would be prosecuted. The teachers' organization, which sparked the earlier demonstrations, appears willing to continue its strike for higher wages, although its leader, Mohammad Derakhshesh, appears undecided. He has been mentioned as a possible candidate for minister of education, a cabinet post not yet filled by Amini.]



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[\*Amini has told the American ambassador that he intends to draw up a new election law, to work for and with the Shah, and to ask for prompt US aid in carrying out major reforms.]

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[The Shah is still planning to leave for Europe next week]

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Ghana: [The replacement on 9 May of Ghana's pro-Western Minister of Finance Gbedemah by former Minister of Trade Goka--who is subservient to Nkrumah and has evidenced strong left-wing tendencies--will further strengthen the faction in Accra which favors closer ties with the Soviet bloc. In early May, President Nkrumah tightened his personal control over the governmental and party apparatus by ousting several experienced cabinet officials and bringing in younger and more radical figures. Nkrumah has taken personal responsibility for all financial matters, and the ouster of Gbedemah, who was the main contact point for Western economic groups, particularly in relation to the Volta River hydroelectric project, may lead to a further loss of confidence in the Ghana Government by private Western interests.]

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\*South Vietnam: The cabinet reorganization announced by President Diem on 10 May implements a long-postponed step first outlined last February and is intended to demonstrate Diem's determination to carry out reforms urged upon him to meet the growing Communist guerrilla and political threat. The action follows closely after two decrees which established a central intelligence organization and unified the military command; these were designed to increase the impact of American military aid and to meet the desires of some army officers for less political interference in operations.

*Ma*

The cabinet shuffle, aimed at providing greater coordination among related ministerial functions, elevates several capable government figures and suggests some effort to balance the preponderant influence of Diem's controversial brother Nhu. The appointments reach little beyond presently trusted circles, but appear to offer some appeasement to dissatisfied younger elements, particularly in the replacement of Foreign Minister Mau. The effectiveness of the reorganization, however, as well as of the military reforms, will depend primarily upon Diem's willingness to delegate authority and to curb political rivalries.

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
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
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**WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS**

- A. No change from last week.
- B. No change from last week.
- C. LAOS: Carried on Page i of Daily Brief.



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