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18 September 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

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
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Republic of the Congo



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
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*Congo: [Despite repeated UN assertions of an incipient decline in the effectiveness of Katanga troops, UN troops apparently remain under severe pressure in both Elisabethville and Kamina. In Jadotville, where a cease-fire had been arranged, the Katanga forces have again become hostile, according to the UN chief of staff. A relief column destined for the Irish company holding Jadotville has not arrived. The UN chief of staff is also concerned about the situation in Albertville, where skirmishes occurred on 17 September.]

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[Secretary General Hammarskjold has left Leopoldville for Ndola in Northern Rhodesia for talks with Tshombé. A group of UN personnel arrived in Ndola last night and met with Tshombé and Lord Alport, the British High Commissioner in the Central African Federation, but Hammarskjold appears to have stopped en route. Hammarskjold asked for an effective cease-fire as a condition for peace talks and Tshombé agreed, but only if UN forces in Katanga returned to their bases there. Neither condition has been met.]

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DAILY BRIEF

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


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


Turkey: Official announcements of the execution of former Premier Menderes and two other former cabinet members have resulted in little overt reaction within Turkey. New orders have been sent to the security forces, which have already been alerted, to maintain strict vigilance. *OK*
The decision to reduce the number of death sentences to three from the 15 originally imposed by the court appears]

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to have been taken only after a prolonged and tense session of the Committee of National Union. Some of the younger officers believe that widespread executions should have been imposed to provide unquestionable moral justification for the armed forces' action in overthrowing the Menderes government during May 1960. Dissatisfaction with the junta leadership's action in commuting most of the death sentences may make some of the younger officers more inclined to cooperate with military elements who oppose civilian rule for the country.

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El Salvador: The governing three-man military Directorate is facing its most serious political crisis since it assumed power last January as the result of widespread opposition to its creation of a new official political party. The US Embassy reports that a 14 September public rally, staged by seven Salvadoran political parties which charged the Directorate with preparing to impose the next regime on the people, attracted an unusually large and responsive crowd. Recent announcements of the resignation or dismissal of several high government officials, plus rumors of the impending resignation of others, also suggest a split within the government over plans for the new party. The embassy regards a further increase in opposition efforts against the Directorate as likely.

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West Indies Federation: Trinidad's Premier Eric Williams may soon publicly call for his island's withdrawal from the West Indies Federation, according to US officials in Trinidad. He may also denounce the US - West Indies defense areas agreement concluded last February. While Williams, who faces local elections this fall, still shows some signs of wishing to reach an understanding, he accuses the United States of slighting Trinidad in conducting business with the federal government, and is bitter toward rival West Indies leaders for not agreeing to greater federal powers. Jamaica's continued membership in the federation is likely to be approved in a referendum to be held on 19 September.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Situation in the Congo

During Hammarskjold's stay in Leopoldville, he told Ambassador Gullion that he believed the Adoula government would be the "greatest winner" from the UN Katanga operation. He asserted that Adoula had been under great pressure from the Gizenga faction to bring Tshombé to heel. The secretary general said he believed that if this could be accomplished, Adoula, whom he characterized as the most purposeful, energetic, and capable African he knew with the possible exception of Nigerian Premier Balewa, would be master of the situation. Otherwise, according to one of Hammarskjold's aides, there was a danger that General Lundula in Stanleyville would take action against Katanga on his own account.

The UN officials expressed concern over the appointment of Egide Bocheley-Davidson as the chief Leopoldville representative in Katanga. However, they said he was presently under the control of the UN and they hoped he would remain so. Bocheley-Davidson has thus far been confined to Elisabethville airport by the fighting in Katanga.

A more accurate evaluation of the situation may be that provided by Arthur Doucy, a Belgian socialist called by the American Embassy in Brussels "one of the most knowledgeable Westerners" on Congo affairs. Doucy, who is a friend and adviser of Congolese Foreign Minister Bomboko and has known Adoula for ten years, told American officials that he fears the UN is unwittingly abetting a Gizenga takeover. He asserted that anti-Communist elements in the government, such as Bomboko and Sureté chief Nendaka, were being isolated through the appointment of Gizengist assistants, and that the dispatch of Bocheley-Davidson to Elisabethville was part of a Gizengist plan to take over Katanga after the UN had neutralized Tshombé and his associates.

According to Doucy's informants, the radical neutralists at the Belgrade conference worked to impress Adoula with the necessity of retaining Gizenga's support; as a result, Doucy feels that Adoula, who he says is not a particularly strong personality, would prefer to make concessions to Gizenga rather than put up a determined fight against Gizenga's efforts to gain control. Doucy stated that he fears the Gizenga bloc may take over from Adoula within three or four months.

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Opposition to New Government Party Increasing
In El Salvador

The National Conciliation party (PCN) was formally organized on 2 September with the support of the Directorate. The chief purposes of the new organization are to facilitate a smooth transition from the present interim regime to a permanent constitutional government and to ensure the continuation of the sorely needed socio-economic reform program launched by the Directorate. This presumably would be accomplished through the election of a majority of government-backed PCN candidates to the constituent assembly, which is to be chosen by direct popular vote in November. The assembly is to name a provisional president to fill out the ten remaining months in ousted President Lemus' term. A new chief executive is then to be elected to serve a regular six-year term.

The growing opposition to the Directorate and the PCN reflects the chagrin of the previously existing political parties that government endorsement was not granted to any one of them and their concern over the inroads in their membership already made by the new party. It also is an expression of the fears of many Salvadorans that the creation of a government party presages a return to the evils of one-party rule associated with the ousted Lemus administration and earlier regimes.

Dissension among the top civilian and military members of the government over the Directorate's plans for the PCN has weakened the government's position at the same time that widely based public opposition to the move has been mounting. Col. Francisco Sol, the minister of the interior under the Directorate, announced his resignation on 12 September ostensibly because of the pressure of "personal affairs," but a close relative informed the US Embassy that the real reasons for his action were his disagreement with the Directorate's electoral plans and his desire to dissociate himself from the political manipulations he believes are inevitable if the PCN is to win the coming elections. There are indications that Sol may agree to head a coalition of older political parties against the government party. Confirmation of reports that Minister of Defense Rodriguez Simo or other key officials are planning to resign shortly could seriously affect the stability of the regime and lead to open dissension within the ranks of the military. [REDACTED]

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West Indies Federation

[Williams has evidently had second thoughts since last June, when under Jamaica's threats of secession he agreed to Jamaica's demands for severely restricted federal powers. He now is bitterly critical of Jamaica's Premier Manley and British Colonial Secretary Macleod for imposing on Trinidad and the smaller islands a central government too weak to help them. The federation is scheduled to become independent on 31 March 1962.]

[Williams has also attacked the United States, as he was prone to do before a year-long period of good feeling during which the US - West Indies defense areas agreement was signed last February. The premier dislikes the United States' emphasis on the federal role in determining aid to Trinidad and especially resents not having full personal say on federal arrangements for facilities at the large US base at Chaguaramas, Trinidad. Williams has long been bitter over the obstacle to visiting the United States posed by an outstanding arrest warrant initiated by a former wife for unpaid alimony.]

[Even though the political opposition does not appear seriously to threaten his control in Trinidad, in this pre-election period Williams is especially sensitive to his rivals' charges that the US base agreement fails to take sufficient account of Trinidad's interests. The British Colonial Office thinks Williams' truculence may subside after the elections expected in late October but doubts that he will call the legislature to grant final approval of the federation before January, when a conference will be held in London on Britain's future economic aid to the new nation.]

[If secessionist sentiment defeats the Jamaican referendum despite Premier Manley's vigorous campaigning, or if Trinidad leaves the federation, Williams probably expects that Trinidad could lead a smaller but more cohesive federation to early independence, with Jamaica attaining independence separately. This would require renegotiation of the US base agreement, and, since the principal facility is on Trinidad, Williams would again be the dominant local figure to deal with.]

[Redacted]

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