


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11 October 1961

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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11 October 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN


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4. **Communist China:** Party leaders in at least five provinces replaced during past year. *(Page ii)*
5. **Afghanistan:** Moscow reported offering to facilitate transit of Afghan trade with nonbloc areas. *(Page iii)*

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7. **Turkey:** Comment on campaign for 15 October parliamentary elections. *(Page iv)*
8. **East Africa:** London's announcement of independence next year for Uganda will result in increased pressure from Kenya for similar treatment. *(Page iv)*

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


France-Algeria: De Gaulle will visit Rocher-Noir--the new administrative capital of Algeria located about 25 miles east of Algiers--at the end of this month, presumably in connection with the expected inauguration of a consultative assembly and provisional executive. Minister for Algerian Affairs Joxe visited Algeria on 7 October in search of members for the executive body, which will be charged with preparing a self-determination referendum, but the American consul general in Algiers as yet has no evidence as to his success.

*sh*

De Gaulle's last visit to Algeria in December 1960 touched off settler riots and the first major Moslem counterdemonstrations, all of which were forcibly repressed by security forces. While his proposed new visit would not take him into Algiers, the marked deterioration of relations between Europeans and Moslems in the major cities greatly increases the risk of serious mob violence during his trip and of another assassination attempt on him.

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Communist China: The replacement over the past year of party leaders in five provinces of Communist China is disclosed

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in Peiping's accounts of personalities appearing at National Day and other ceremonies. There may also have been changes in several other provinces where the local party bosses have not been reported as making appearances at recent functions. The Chinese Communist press has implicitly criticized some of these officials for overzealousness in implementing the regime's commune and leap forward policies, and their loss of favor may be a further indication of Peiping's commitment to a conservative economic program this year. Several of the replaced leaders were First Secretaries in areas where the Communists have been unsuccessful in curbing unrest among ethnic minorities. [redacted]

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Afghanistan-Pakistan-USSR: Apparently taking advantage of the impasse in Afghan-Pakistani relations, Moscow has reportedly offered to facilitate transit of Afghan trade with non-bloc areas, particularly Western Europe. This trade was disrupted by Kabul's closure of its border with Pakistan in early September. An Austrian official, discussing the problems Austrian businessmen have encountered in constructing a communications project in Afghanistan, recently told the US Embassy in Vienna that the USSR has responded favorably to an Afghan request that Soviet transportation charges on transit shipments be reduced. He said that some changes have also been made which apparently will enable Austrian shippers to insure their goods crossing the USSR.

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[redacted] Meanwhile, Pakistan has requested shippers in nonbloc nations to stop sending goods bound for Afghanistan to Pakistan until the present congestion of transit facilities is relieved. ]

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
11 Oct 61

DAILY BRIEF

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
Turkey: The campaign for the 15 October parliamentary elections has been orderly and generally restrained as a result of the restrictions the military regime has placed on the campaigners. The Republican People's party, favored by most of the military, is expected to win at least a plurality of the votes, but many Turks still favor the general views and policies of the former Democratic government of executed Premier Menderes. Younger military officers will be alert to oppose any tendency by a civilian government to make concessions to the pro-Democratic group. [redacted]

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
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East Africa: [redacted] London's announcement that its Uganda protectorate would receive independence on 9 October 1962 will inevitably sharpen factional disputes among African nationalists in both Uganda and Kenya, and will further complicate Britain's task of preparing these areas for independence. Kenyan nationalist pressure on London to set an early date for independence will be increased by the announcement regarding Uganda, even though a deadlock among Kenyan African politicians has stalemated their own constitutional talks with the British.



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


Backup, Page 8) (Map)

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### Chinese Communist Personnel Shake-up in Provinces

An article in the Peiping People's Daily last month attacked party leaders whose highhanded treatment of their subordinates "seriously affected the correct leadership of the party." This article quoted one published in Honan Province, where the party first secretary, Wu Chih-pu, was recently demoted to second secretary. One of the most ardent provincial-level supporters of the leap forward program, Wu was presumably among the party leaders who, the article said, did not take a realistic approach to how much could be accomplished--a reference possibly to his disregard of the limitations imposed by this year's serious drought in Honan. His retention as second secretary, however, suggests that Peiping does not regard his overzealousness as sufficient grounds for expulsion. In contrast, the party secretary of neighboring Shantung Province apparently lost all his offices after last year's disastrous crop failure.

The changes in Kansu and Tsinghai provinces and in the Kwangsi-Chuang Autonomous Region may be related to frictions between the Chinese and the ethnic minorities of those areas. In the Tibetan-inhabited province of Tsinghai particularly, the appointment of a former vice minister of public security as acting first secretary suggests the regime's concern over disorders. Kansu Province also has a long history of resistance by the ethnic minority to Chinese rule, and a purge of "Moslem nationalists" took place there in 1958. The former Kansu first secretary has been replaced by one of Peiping's leading experts on minority affairs.

Incomplete and often delayed regime reporting of personnel changes also makes it possible that some of the missing leaders may not have been fired but merely transferred. The change in secretaries in Kwangsi-Chuang Autonomous Region, for example, may be only a routine shift, since the

new first secretary there has long been the chief power in the provincial party apparatus.

Other provinces where the party first secretaries have not been reported as attending recent functions include Shansi, Kweichow, and Hopeh, and the Ningshia Hui Autonomous Region.

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Turkey

The Republican People's party (RPP), long an adversary of the former Menderes regime, is opposed by three smaller, less well organized parties which are seeking the votes of the remnants of Menderes' outlawed Democratic party (DP). The RPP is conducting a restrained campaign in order to appeal to the voters as a party standing for stability and the return to normal political conditions. Many may vote for the RPP in the belief that it will be far less vulnerable to continued military interference than a government run by any other party.

The military junta has the security situation under control and has required all parties to sign an agreement to avoid controversial matters, particularly the overthrow of Menderes. Osman Bolukbasi, leader of the small Republican Peasant Nation party (RPNP), has appealed to the DP remnants by extolling his refusal to sign the agreement and by accusing General Gumuspala, the leader of the stronger, more effective Justice party (JP), of not trying to prevent the execution of Menderes and two of his associates. In replying, Gumuspala has kept within bounds acceptable to the Committee of National Union, but lower level JP officials have been arrested for praising the Menderes era.

It appears that the CNU sees no threat from Bolukbasi, whose party's appeal is limited principally to uneducated voters. The CNU may be hoping that the effect of Bolukbasi's maneuvering will be to cut down the strength of the JP, which has a wide appeal and a better local organization than either the RPNP or the other rival for the pro-Menderes vote, the rather colorless New Turkey party. Such a weakening of the Justice party would improve the position of the RPP.

[The possibility cannot be discounted, however, that voters, angered at the execution of Menderes and disenchanted with military rule, might rally behind one of the minor parties sufficiently to force the RPP to form a coalition. Such a government ]

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[redacted] would probably be unstable, particularly after the CNU's re-  
pressive measures are lifted and present political antagonisms  
come to the surface. In this event, younger military officers  
might spark another coup rather than permit a group hostile to  
the military to exercise a degree of power. [redacted]


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### Political Trends in East Africa

[The opening of the Uganda constitutional talks on 18 September in London was the first occasion on which delegates from all parts of Uganda had joined to discuss constitutional arrangements. In his opening speech, the British colonial secretary indicated that within a year or two the Africans would have to take over full responsibility for their own affairs. He also referred to several of the more pressing constitutional problems facing the Ugandans, suggesting a federal relationship of the wealthy and politically powerful province of Buganda to Uganda with direct elections to the Buganda legislature, representation of Buganda in the Uganda legislature, and a firm guarantee for the position of the Kabaka (the ruling Buganda King).]

[During the conference there was continued disagreement over Buganda's status between the provincial representatives and other Uganda delegates. Those opposed to Buganda's aspirations included Chief Minister Benedicto Kiwanuka--leader of the Democratic party, which won a majority of the seats in last March's legislative elections. The conference ended in a tenuous compromise.]

[The announcement of dates for Uganda's political advance--self-government next April following elections, and independence in October--will encourage nationalists in Kenya, where Governor Renison on 8 October announced it was British policy to "keep Kenya constitutionally side by side with Uganda." In this broadcast Renison announced a breakdown in the talks between British officials and representatives of Kenya's two main nationalist parties. The governor added that neither KANU (Kenya African National Union), the party which represents the major Kikuyu and Luo tribal groups, nor KADU (Kenya African Democratic Union), which represents minor tribal elements but which forms the government at present, is satisfactory for bringing independence to Kenya. KADU has refused to give KANU parity in the government until assured that minority tribal rights]

[will be respected, while KANU, which claims to represent the majority of Kenya's 6,000,000 Africans, refuses to enter the government on KADU's terms. Leaders of both KANU and KADU are overshadowed by Jomo Kenyatta, who remains formally uncommitted to either party but is a major influence on the constitutional talks.]

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[redacted]

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The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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