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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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State Dept. review completed

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
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## DAILY BRIEF

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\*USSR--22nd Party Congress: The net effect of the cumulative and coupled denunciations of the "antiparty group" and the

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Albanian leaders by speaker after speaker at the 22nd party congress is to suspend Albania's membership in the Communist bloc until its leaders demonstrate the proper contrition or are replaced. Ulbricht's accusation in his speech on 20 October that Albania had "grossly violated. . . joint decisions of the Warsaw Pact" suggests that Albania may be formally expelled from that body. The Albanians were not represented in the last Warsaw Pact meeting on 8 September and had sent such a low-level delegate to the preceding meeting in August that his presence was taken as an insult. Ulbricht, who was presiding, reportedly ousted him.

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The European satellites, Mongolia, and Western Communist parties have allied themselves with the Soviet Union in the attack on Albania. North Korea's Kim Il-sung and North Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh, however, carefully avoided commitments to either side in their speeches to the congress, as did the Indian and Indonesian delegates.

The Soviet attack on Albania is an implicit criticism of the policies and leaders of Communist China, and the groupings within the Communist camp that developed during the earlier phase of the Sino-Soviet dispute in 1959-60 are reappearing. Moscow may still hope, however, that it can preserve some facade of friendship for China while continuing its attack on Albania; Khrushchev and Party Secretary Kozlov saw Chou off at the airport when he left Moscow for Peiping. Chou's departure probably reflects a decision of Communist China's leaders to hold top-level consultations on developments at the Soviet party congress. Prior to his departure, Chou made a pointed gesture of Peiping's disagreement with Moscow by laying a wreath on Stalin's grave with a legend which described the former Soviet leader as "the great Marxist-Leninist" [redacted]

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**\*Dominican Republic:** The situation in the Dominican Republic continues tense as sporadic rioting by revolution-minded youths shows no sign of letting up. The government postponed the deportation of leaders of the pro-Castro Popular Democratic Movement (MPD) since, according to an aide of General Ramfis Trujillo, only some MPD leaders were caught and others are in hiding. What purported to be pro-Communist, pro-Castro demonstrations by the MPD on 22 October were widely recognized by the public as staged by the government for its own purposes.

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
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General Arismendi Trujillo has left the country, and Hector and other members of the Trujillo family plan to leave tomorrow. Their forced departure is the first step in the program agreed to by Ramfis to divest his family of the sources of its economic, political, and military power. An aide of Ramfis informed the consul general on 20 October, however, that Arismendi Trujillo intends to wait in the French West Indies until convinced that his departure has contributed to an improved international position for the Dominican Government. According to his aide, Ramfis wanted the US Government to know that he has placed himself in a "most difficult position"; that Arismendi and Hector have friends, especially in the armed forces; and that it is vitally important for the US to support Ramfis' efforts.

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
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
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Egypt: In the aftermath of the Syrian coup, Nasir is taking steps to eliminate the base in Egypt for any rightist coup and to dramatize his determination to press ahead with his socialist revolution. An extensive security screening and a shake-up of the Egyptian officer corps appears to be under way. Antigovernment leaflets have reportedly been circulated in the armed forces, and there have been persistent rumors of coup or assassination plotting by some officers. [redacted] Nasir has ordered the arrest of potential dissidents in the military and of a substantial number of "reactionaries." The government has announced that it has arrested 40 wealthy civilians and has taken custody of the property of 167 other "reactionary capitalists."

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omatic relations with Thailand on 23 October with moves to strengthen its ties with the Communist bloc, as it has during past disputes with both Thailand and South Vietnam. This would

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reverse the recent trend in which, under the threat of Communist expansion in Laos and South Vietnam, Prince Sihanouk has appeared prepared to cooperate more closely with the West. The Cambodian parliament, charging Thai Prime Minister Sarit with aggressive intentions, has warned that, in the event of fighting, Phnom Penh would "apply immediately our law of neutrality which authorizes us to ask the aid of friendly powers, natural adversaries of our aggressors." [redacted]

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Cambodia-Thailand Break May Strengthen Cambodia-  
Bloc Ties

Cambodia's relations with Thailand and South Vietnam have never been good. In 1956, charging both these neighbors with harboring hostile intentions against Cambodia, Sihanouk embarked his country on close political and economic relations with the Communist bloc. In July 1958, angered over a boundary dispute with Saigon, Sihanouk granted diplomatic recognition to Peiping; later that year he temporarily suspended Phnom Penh's relations with Bangkok in the heat of a press war between the two nations. In early 1959, Sihanouk invoked Peiping's moral support in quashing a coup plot against him which was abetted by Thailand and South Vietnam. Thus far, however, he has held back from such strong ties with the bloc as military aid agreements.

The current spate of charges and counter-charges between Thai Premier Sarit and Prince Sihanouk reflects the tensions created by the Communist gains in Laos and South Vietnam. The November 1960 agreement between Cambodia and Thailand to abandon their propaganda campaigns against one another has been increasingly ignored. In a major address on 20 October in Bangkok Sarit charged Sihanouk, without specifically naming him, with "treachery to Southeast Asian nations" and with planning to make his country the jumping-off point for Communist attacks. Prince Sihanouk, using this attack as the basis for breaking off relations, accused Sarit of "getting ready to throw us into the arms of the socialist camp against our will," but added that this would be "preferable to the conquest of our country by Thais and South Vietnamese." [REDACTED]

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