

TOP SECRET

25X1



27 October 1961 25X1



Copy No. *ED 8*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



25X1



State Dept. review completed

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000260001-6

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000260001-6

27 October 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN


CONTENTS

25X1



- 3. Laos: Moscow again urges Ambassador Harriman to expedite Laos settlement. *(Page ii)*
- 4. Albania: Demonstrations held in support of Hoxha's defiance of Moscow. *(Page iii)*
- 5. Communist China - Albania: Peiping radio reiterates support for Tirana regime. *(Page iv)*
- 6. Dominican Republic: Opposition groups moving toward a coalition with regime. *(Page iv)*

25X1



25X6



25X1

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

25X1

25X1



25X1

***USSR-Laos:** [The USSR has informed Ambassador Harriman in Geneva that it hopes the US "will take a realistic position" and "use its influence" with the Boun Oum government to give Souvanna a free hand in choosing the eight neutralist members of a coalition Lao government. On 25 October, Soviet delegate Pushkin read a statement to Harriman protesting Boun Oum's

No

27 Oct 61

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1



[] demand that Souvanna choose at least four of the eight neutralists from Vientiane, claiming this could lead to a breakdown of the Geneva talks and to a "renewed outbreak of military action."

25X1

[] Pushkin affirmed that the USSR still sought a "most rapid solution" in Laos and that in seeking this the Soviet Government was "operating on the basis of statements by President Kennedy." Moscow is probably concerned over Boun Oum's latest rejection of Souvanna's proposal for a meeting of the three princes in Xieng Khouang and may feel that Phoumi is again stalling on the formation of a coalition government. Moscow may suspect that Phoumi sees the present situation in South Vietnam as offering new possibilities for an eventual military solution in Laos. []

25X1
25X1

Albania-Bloc: The Albanian regime is attempting to stimulate public support of Enver Hoxha's defiance of Khrushchev's attacks on the Albanian Workers (Communist) party leadership. Shortly after publishing the party's statement on 20 October, Radio Tirana began reading telegrams allegedly received from all parts of the country voicing support of Hoxha and indignation toward Khrushchev. Meetings have been organized throughout the country, and the Italian Legation in Tirana commented that the demonstrations there seemed to have some element of spontaneity, reflecting long-standing anti-Soviet feelings. According to press reports emanating from Belgrade, Albanian police had to intervene to protect the Soviet Embassy from "hostile demonstrations." []

o/c

25X1
25X1

[] the Soviet ambassador there, Yosef Shifin, was "very angry" about the Albanian reaction to the Khrushchev speech. Shifin told [] "We will show Albania."

25X1
25X1
25X1

Tirana has not yet carried out its threat to publish documents which would demonstrate Soviet culpability in the Soviet-Albanian dispute. []

25X1

27 Oct 61

DAILY BRIEF

iii

[]
25X1

Communist China - Bloc: Further evidence of continuing Chinese support for the Albanian leadership in its dispute with Khrushchev is contained in a 25 October broadcast from Peiping which twice alluded to Peiping's confidence in the "leadership of the Workers party headed by comrade Enver Hoxha." On 26 October, Peiping's People's Daily for the first time publicized the full details of the charges against Albania made by Khrushchev and delegates from other Communist parties, along with the reply of the Albanian central committee. The publication of these statements contrasts with Chou En-lai's exhortation at the Soviet party congress against airing such issues and may reflect a developing view in Peiping that further efforts to cover up the dispute would be futile.

OK

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Dominican Republic: Prospects for creation of a coalition government are somewhat improved as a result of signs that opposition groups may withdraw their stipulation that General Ramfis Trujillo must first step down as head of the armed forces. Leaders of the Dominican Revolutionary party (PRD), one of the three major democratically oriented opposition groups, told the American consul general on 24 October that their party was now disposed to negotiate on a coalition regime on the basis of Ramfis' remaining "at the pleasure of the coalition government itself." Recognition by opposition leaders that Ramfis has a positive role to play in the coming months in maintaining control of the restive armed forces may lead to acceptance of his role for a limited period.

25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

(Backup, Page 4)

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

27 Oct 61

DAILY BRIEF

iv

25X1

[Redacted]

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Peiping Preparing Response to Khrushchev

The airing of the intrabloc dispute in People's Daily at this time may be intended to inform the party rank and file of the situation prior to the appearance of an official party statement. The Chinese response is probably being hammered out in politburo sessions in Peiping following the return of Chou En-lai from Moscow. Chou was met at Peiping airport by Mao Tse-tung and seven other politburo members. This unusual greeting appears to be a deliberate move to show approval for Chou's stand at the congress and to demonstrate the solidarity of the Chinese leadership in the face of the Soviet challenge.

The Chinese delegation to the CPSU congress, meanwhile, is touring Leningrad, probably awaiting the outcome of the politburo deliberations or the return of Chou. Pravda staff members claim that the Chinese premier is expected back in Moscow after his consultations.

In contrast to their treatment of previous CPSU congresses, the Chinese have given little press and radio coverage to the current meeting and have balanced against it reports of Albanian achievement. Before leaving Moscow, Chou laid a wreath on Stalin's tomb bearing the inscription "the great Marxist-Leninist," in contrast to the Chinese premier's earlier criticism of Khrushchev for his lack of a "serious Marxist-Leninist attitude" in publicizing the differences with Albania. On 26 October, Peiping quoted the assurance given by the head of a Chinese delegation now in Albania that Communist China would stand as a "comrade-in-arms" with Tirana "under all conditions." [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

[redacted]

25X1

25X1

Dominican Opposition Considers Coalition Government

President Balaguer has repeatedly stated, most recently in an address to the nation on 23 October, that he considers participation by the opposition in a coalition government the crucial next step in his liberalization program. Coalition negotiations, which broke down earlier this month, may shortly be resumed. In the earlier negotiations the National Civic Union (UCN) had given the President a detailed list of conditions for its participation, which were then publicized. The President called the UCN attitude "intransigent" and its demand for General Ramfis Trujillo's departure "inadmissible." He did, however, indicate that other UCN conditions might be negotiable. The forced departure of Generals Arismendi and Hector Trujillo and other members of the family on 24 and 25 October met an important UCN demand. The 14 of June party (PCJ) had flatly refused to negotiate, while the Dominican Revolutionary party (PRD) felt obliged to halt its confidential talks with the government when the impression got around that it was "selling out" to the regime.

The largest opposition group is the UCN, whose leaders told the US consul general on 23 October that they still oppose entering the government as long as Ramfis remains. It claims a membership of 250,000 and has the backing of the majority of the country's professional and business people. Its president, Dr. Viriato A. Fiallo, has a record of opposition to the Trujillo dictatorship from its inception in 1930 and is respected by all segments of the opposition. He first became prominent as an active opponent of the 12-year US military occupation which ended in 1924. A strong nationalist, he is not basically anti-US, although he and a number of other UCN leaders feel the US was responsible for Trujillo's rise to power and some still harbor suspicions of present US intentions.

The PCJ was originally intended to be the political arm of the UCN, which was to be a broad nonpartisan movement. Several PCJ directors are also UCN leaders, but the PCJ also contains elements apparently inclined to the extreme left, and the

25X1

25X1

gulf between the two groups in the PCJ has been growing in recent months. Some of the most uncompromising and vengeful oppositionists, many of them victims of Trujillo brutalities, are aligned with the PCJ. The wife of Manuel Tavaréz Justo, PCJ president, and her two sisters were tortured and killed by the Trujillo police last December. The PCJ, probably the smallest of the opposition groups, is believed strong among the student element. It takes its name from the date 14 June 1959 when an unsuccessful Cuban-supported invasion force landed in the Dominican Republic. Pro-Castro elements, however, now are generally identified with the recently outlawed Dominican Popular Movement.

The PRD, perhaps the most politically astute opposition group, is oriented toward and receives regular guidance from such Latin American reformist leaders as Venezuelan President Betancourt and ex-President Figueres of Costa Rica. PRD President Juan Bosch arrived in the Dominican Republic on 20 October after decades in exile. He had been preceded by three other former exiles who, in three months of political organization aimed particularly at the urban working class, have built a significant political base.

25X6

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000260001-6

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000260001-6

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000260001-6

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000260001-6

TOP SECRET