


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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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


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## DAILY BRIEF

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\*Finland-USSR: The Soviet demand for assurances of continued Finnish neutrality, together with the implied threat that otherwise Moscow would call for military negotiations, seems designed primarily to guarantee President Kekkonen's re-election and to strengthen pro-Kekkonen supporters in parliament. Kekkonen has dissolved parliament and called for new elections next February in the hope of demonstrating widespread public endorsement for his policies and thereby satisfying the USSR. Kekkonen apparently feels that parliamentary elections in the near future, with the Finnish public in a state of apprehension, will endorse his policy of friendship with the USSR. The recent Soviet moves will also greatly strengthen Kekkonen's own re-election prospects in the presidential election already scheduled for January 1962.

In discussions with Finnish Foreign Minister Karjalainen in Moscow over the week end, Gromyko criticized the political

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situation in Finland as "unstable" and accused "a certain political grouping" of desiring a change in Finnish foreign policy--an obvious reference to Kekkonen's chief opponent in the presidential election. According to Finnish parliamentary sources, Gromyko also characterized the incumbent minority Agrarian government as too weak to guarantee current Finnish policy, although he did not demand the inclusion of Finnish Communists in a new government. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Yugoslavia: In a speech on 13 November, Tito reiterated his support for the Soviet stand on Germany and complained of Western pressure on Belgrade intended to change his foreign policies. He indicated that both Yugoslavia's and Moscow's policies are intended to prevent creation of a strong, independent Germany which might again threaten their security.

Tito endorsed Moscow's stand on the Soviet-Albanian dispute, but implied that Belgrade does not wish to become

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[REDACTED]

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[Redacted]

directly involved in this issue. He denied that his country has any expansionist designs on Albania but warned that Yugoslavia must be alert to the possibility of an Albanian provocation which would "trouble peace in the Balkans and cause conflicts to break out." [Redacted] Page 4)

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France-Algeria: There is further evidence that prospects for a negotiated Algerian settlement between Paris and the provisional Algerian government (PAG) are being adversely affected by the rebels' propaganda build-up of vice premier Ben Bella's hunger strike. The PAG cabinet apparently decided on 12 November that formal negotiations could not be scheduled until the hunger strike of Algerian prisoners in France ends. [Redacted]

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
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
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


Iran: [The Shah apparently has, for the time being, abandoned his plan to take personal control of the government and will permit Prime Minister Amini to continue. Amini has refused the Shah's request that he replace certain cabinet ministers and urged the Shah to permit his government time to carry out its reform program. The Shah agreed and on 11 November made one of his infrequent appearances at a cabinet meeting. Amini outlined his program at this meeting, and the Shah contented himself with a request for more rapid progress in carrying out economic and social reforms.]

[The Shah is likely, however, to intervene in governmental affairs whenever pressure builds up from the interests which oppose reforms but which constitute the Shah's main source of support.]

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


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Yugoslav Foreign Policy

In his speech, Tito blamed "certain capitalist circles and other reactionary-minded people" in the US for economic pressures on Yugoslavia "at a time when our country has been severely hit by a drought and when it is in a highly unpleasant situation." He insisted that Yugoslavia would not alter its foreign policies, no matter what the economic consequences, but he gave a rare expression of appreciation for past American aid and asked for its continuation on a credit, rather than grant, basis.

Tito took a fatalistic view of Yugoslavia's relations with the bloc, suggesting that Belgrade expects no change. Ambassador Kennan believes, however, that the Yugoslavs are disturbed because the bloc has not given greater support to Belgrade's current propaganda campaign against West Germany.

Tito expressed at length his preference for East over West Germany, primarily because the Ulbricht regime "shows no revenge-seeking tendencies." Belgrade has been committed to support of the East German regime since extending diplomatic recognition to Ulbricht in 1957 and as a result losing its diplomatic ties with Bonn. [redacted]

[redacted] recently claimed that Yugoslavia would be willing to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany, but only after extracting unspecified concessions from the Ulbricht regime.

Tito's speech indicated that closer cooperation among the non-aligned states remains the primary goal of Yugoslav foreign policy. The Yugoslav President called upon the uncommitted states to extend their collaboration into the economic sphere and to broaden the membership of the "non-aligned world." Belgrade claims, moreover, that it is having troubles with the Western powers because they are waging a general campaign against the states which participated in the Belgrade conference last September. [redacted]

[redacted]

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