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


2 April 1962

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

***Berlin-USSR:** The Soviets have announced no flights in the Berlin air corridors for 2 April. This is the first time since they began their corridor flights on 8 February that the Soviets have failed to fly in the corridors for four consecutive days. The flights scheduled for 30 March were later cancelled, and no flights were announced for 31 March. Soviet flights in the air corridors have never been made on Sunday.

[Heavy pressure is being continued against the US Military Liaison Mission in Potsdam even though Soviet Marshal Konev has agreed to meet with General Clarke to discuss the future of the US and Soviet missions in East and West Germany respectively. Konev suggested on 31 March that they meet on 5 April at Soviet headquarters at Wuensdorf. Konev can be expected once again to reject protests over the harassment of US Military Liaison Mission personnel by the East German police and to repeat his charge that the Americans are at fault for not heeding "lawful" commands by the East Germans.]

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[The chief of the US Military Liaison Mission meanwhile has been under virtual house arrest in Potsdam, and on 31 March he was refused permission to proceed to Berlin. He was also told by the Soviets to have every pass-bearing member of the US Mission in East Germany return to the mission compound at Potsdam. These moves presumably were in part intended to ensure the presence of hostages for the safeguarding of Soviet Mission personnel in Frankfurt. Other developments in the continuing Communist effort to pressure the Allies into curtailing the activities of their military liaison missions is the reported detention by East German police of a British Military Liaison Mission vehicle near Dresden and the announcement by the official East German news agency that US]

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
Military Liaison Mission personnel will not be allowed to travel in East Germany without the express approval of the Soviet authorities

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In a move which could presage the imposition of new controls over travel to East Berlin by West Germans, East German customs officials refused on 1 April to permit West German tourist buses to enter East Berlin on the grounds that they had not received "new forms" for one-day visits. The US Mission in Berlin reports, however, it has learned that 30 April is the effective date for the new East German customs law

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


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Communist China: The virtual news blackout on daily proceedings at the National People's Congress suggests that the discussions are concerned with economic distress and popular disillusion on the mainland and probably also with Sino-Soviet relations. In contrast to past years, Peiping did not announce the agenda for this congress, which opened on 27 March. Diplomats and foreign correspondents have been barred from all proceedings, and so far no texts of speeches have been published. Behind the closed doors of the congress, the Chinese leaders are possibly being much more explicit and outspoken in their attacks on Khrushchev than they wish to be in public. [REDACTED]

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USSR-US: The Soviet press has begun a propaganda campaign which appears designed to show that President Kennedy is a champion of preventive nuclear war. This appears to be a new element in Moscow's current campaign to justify an eventual Soviet test resumption. A 31 March article in Pravda by its authoritative "Observer" and a 1 April article in Red Star distorted the recent statements by the President on possible US use of nuclear weapons and failed to acknowledge that the President's statements were based on a hypothetical situation in which Soviet conventional forces would be overrunning Western Europe. The Pravda article said the President's statements reaffirmed "the monstrous idea of preventive nuclear war." It went beyond Moscow's usual line--which consistently denounces the Pentagon and US "militarists," but generally stops short of implicating the President personally--and remarked that "it seems that the President is himself taking the position of the most belligerent part of the Pentagon brass."

Both articles present the USSR as being stronger militarily than the US and brandished the new "global" rocket,

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announced by Khrushchev on 16 March. Pravda elaborated Khrushchev's remarks on this rocket and claimed that it can carry a "multimegaton nuclear warhead."

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
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
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Congo: Adoula and Tshombé emerged from their 29 March negotiating session appearing highly pleased and on friendly terms, but the American ambassador in Leopoldville considers the situation still "mercurial." UN representative Gardiner has sent word to both participants that having exchanged broadsides in speeches and press releases, they ought to revert to their original agreement to maintain the private character of the talks. The American ambassador considers that Adoula's negotiating position has been weakened by the recent bank strike, the arrests of a prominent trade union leader and the editor of the principal newspaper, and the imminent prospect of a general strike.

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In Katanga, the absence of Tshombé is reported to have seriously affected the efficiency of the Elisabethville administration. Belgian advisers of Interior Minister Munongo, who privately talks of going underground and leading a maquis against the UN and CNA troops, are attempting to persuade him to keep Katanga's affairs in order. There are recurring reports that the Katanga air force is being reorganized under the guise of a civil airline with headquarters at Kolwezi and that mercenaries continue to circulate outside Elisabethville.

A six-member parliamentary commission will visit imprisoned former Vice Premier Gizenga today in the first move toward stripping the Stanleyville leader of his parliamentary immunity and bringing him to trial. The government does not expect to encounter serious difficulty in obtaining the votes needed to lift Gizenga's immunity.

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Algeria: French officials in Algeria are concerned about the provisional executive's security, which is considered precarious in the absence of an adequate number of reliable bodyguards. OAS commando action against the executive's headquarters at Rocher Noir is still possible and expected. Few OAS members were captured in the exhaustive military search of the Bab-el-Oued district, and most presumably fled before military encirclement was completed. The anger of the European settlers against the United States over the President's message to PAG premier Ben Khedda and the supplying of an airplane for Ben Bella appears overshadowed by the resentment toward De Gaulle and the French Government. However, Americans in Algeria have received threatening comments from local acquaintances, and, in the view of the US consul general, retaliation against the Consulate General would not be surprising.

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PAG vice premier Ben Bella, who arrived in Cairo on 31 March, intends to travel extensively in the Middle East and North Africa before returning to Morocco about mid-May. Because Ben Bella wishes to avoid becoming overidentified with either Tunisian President Bourguiba or Moroccan King Hassan II, he and the other members of the PAG reportedly will remain on the move until the provisional executive has completed its tasks in the fall.

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***Argentina:** Recognition of the precarious stability of President Guido's regime seems behind the cautious statements of support issued thus far by various political and military groups. Those issuing such statements, which have centered on approving the constitutional basis for the changeover from Frondizi, include the Supreme Court, the military commanders, and the People's Radical Civic Union, the major opposition group in Congress. Frondizi and his Intransigent Radical Civic Union (UCRI), which retains a majority in both houses of Congress until 1 May, urged Guido to accept the presidency in order to avoid a military junta. The UCRI has since threatened, however, to boycott the Congress unless Frondizi is released immediately from military detention.

Such action by the UCRI would in effect cancel the agreement between UCRI leaders and the military on proposed new legislation. This agreement, which Guido has endorsed, calls for laws to outlaw all totalitarian parties, though without naming the Peronistas or Communists who would be affected, to modify the basic labor law so as to reduce the political power of the General Confederation of Labor, and to change the electoral system to one of proportional representation. A special session of Congress is to be called shortly.

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[redacted] Guido will within 30 days issue a call for elections, but the UCRI hopes that actual balloting will be deferred until 1964. Although Guido resigned his UCRI membership upon taking office, the fact that he was a close supporter of Frondizi's political and economic policies is causing the military some uneasiness regarding him, and is probably one of the several reasons for disagreement among the military.

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[redacted]

Latin American press reaction to Frondizi's ouster has been unfavorable, but most governments are consulting each other before taking positions regarding recognition of the Guido government. Brazilian Foreign Minister Dantas, to whom President Goulart reportedly has delegated responsibility for foreign policy, has declared "premature" a 30 March communiqué by the Brazilian cabinet press secretary stating that no problem existed for Brazil regarding recognition. Venezuelan President Betancourt's campaign to persuade other countries not to recognize the results of a military coup has raised fears in Argentina that this could undermine the Guido government.

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[redacted]

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Communist China Fails to Publicize National People's
Congress Session

While Communist China in recent weeks has avoided direct polemics with the USSR, the Chinese authorities have continued to indoctrinate the mainland populace on the issues dividing Peiping and Moscow; the Chinese people have been told in discussion groups that China's present difficulties are the result of Soviet economic sanctions. Touring congress delegates led some of these discussions, and it seems likely that criticism of Khrushchev has been carried over into the current congress session.

Economic programs also loom large among likely subjects under discussion at this session. Any frank appraisal of the difficulties over the past two years would by itself be sufficient reason to close the congress to public view. The "leap forward" came to an end in 1960 amid indications of serious imbalances in industry, bad harvests, and a change in the status of Sino-Soviet economic relations. Although Peiping has not released economic data since then, the evidence is persuasive that industry has been in a protracted slump, and agriculture is admitted to have suffered a third bad year in succession.

The lack of policy statements in recent months, the diminution of editorial comment in the press, the failure to hold the National People's Congress in 1961, and the eleventh-hour decision to postpone the session beyond its originally scheduled opening date encouraged speculation about disagreements in the Chinese Communist leadership. Most of the regime's leaders, including Mao Tse-tung, however, appeared at the opening session of the congress. Those who did not attend include former Defense Minister Peng Te-huai, who lost his government position in 1959, and politburo members Chen Yun and Tan Chen-lin. The former was a critic of the radical economic policies of the "leap forward," while the latter was one of their most fervent exponents. Peiping is apparently anxious to quiet rumors that Mao has been ill. The foreign minister has denied reports of his poor health, and a picture of Mao greeting delegates has been published. [REDACTED]

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The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

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The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

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