


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
21 April 1962

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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21 April 1962

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
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

21 April 1962

DAILY BRIEF

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**\*USSR-Berlin:** The USSR apparently continues to be interested in restoring normal relations between the Berlin commandants but recognizes that any settlement would involve an embarrassing backdown for the Ulbricht regime. In a 19 April meeting between US and Soviet political advisers, following Marshal Konev's overtures on 5 April, the Soviet representative urged that the US and Soviet commandants meet at Soviet headquarters in Karlshorst to resolve the impasse over East Germany's

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[refusal in December to permit General Watson's civilian aides to accompany him across the sector border unless they displayed identification.]

[The Soviet representative said he was authorized to guarantee that General Watson's party would not be subjected to East German demands for identification, but asked that no publicity be given this meeting and hinted that General Watson's party could use another sector crossing point besides Friedrichstrasse, the sole crossing point now reserved for members of the Allied military and diplomatic missions.]

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USSR - Communist China: A brief communiqué on the signing of the 1962 Sino-Soviet trade agreement on 20 April contains the customary references to "friendly and cordial" talks but does not suggest any improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. The communiqué fails to note any plans for increased trade or any form of Soviet aid such as last year's deferral of Chinese trade debts. No mention is made of deliveries of complete industrial installations, which, with accompanying Soviet technical assistance, were the most important part of past Soviet aid to China. Chinese exports of agricultural products--usually more than one third of Peiping's total exports to the USSR--are not mentioned in the communiqué for the second year, even though limited shipments continue. Sino-Soviet trade is expected to decline for the third consecutive year and probably will amount to less than \$1.1 billion, or about one half the peak level achieved in 1959.

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Congo: [Several key Congolese officials fear that in view of the generally adverse public reaction to Tshombé's "escape" from Leopoldville, the Adoula government must either resign or face a vote of confidence in parliament. Adoula's position has been weakened.]

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[The main threat to Adoula appears to be from some elements in the army and the parliament.]

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[redacted]  
[redacted] The Congolese upper house has already demanded an official explanation concerning Tshombé's departure. However, Adoula's parliamentary opponents are not united, and there is no obvious successor to the premiership. General Mobutu is exerting a moderating influence, and continues to support Adoula.

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France-Algeria: The arrest on 20 April of OAS leader Salan in Algeria and of the OAS commando chief in Oran will raise the morale of government security forces and severely damage OAS prestige. These arrests should help dispel the doubts of the provisional Algerian government (PAG) about the sincerity of renewed French expressions of determination to crush the OAS. The PAG claims to have informed the French on earlier occasions of Salan's whereabouts.

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There is considerable doubt, however, as to how much control Salan has exercised over European extremists in Oran and Algiers, and these elements now may launch a desperate campaign to incite Moslem retaliation or resort to scorched-earth tactics which could be particularly damaging in the Saharan oil fields. Unless French security forces retain the momentum implied in these arrests, increasing Moslem exasperation over indiscriminate killings and the economic privations resulting from the OAS terrorism could still endanger implementation of the Evian accords. [redacted] (Backup, Page 1)

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\*Czechoslovakia: The unique restraint in the handling of the arrest and trial of former Czechoslovak politburo member and Interior Minister Barak suggests that the Czech party may


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# RUANDA - URUNDI



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be faced with serious factional problems. Barak and his three alleged accomplices, arrested in early February, were sentenced on 20 April after a four-day closed trial before the senate of the High Military Tribunal in Prague. The lack of detail in the specific charges against Barak, the secrecy surrounding his trial, and the sensitive positions of his accomplices suggest the Novotny regime is glossing over matters which, if made public, would have serious affects on the party and possibly its leadership. Such publicity as has been accorded the case has been designed to portray Barak as a common criminal and has been devoid of political overtones.

Barak was sentenced to 15 years in prison, and his accomplices--his personal secretary and two intelligence officers apparently with high regime connections--were sentenced respectively to terms of ten years, three years, and ten months. Barak was stripped of his party and government posts on 6-7 February and was charged at that time with unspecified antiparty activities--now no longer mentioned--as well as misusing his high office for personal gain. The arrest of the popular Barak apparently caused fear and discontent throughout Czechoslovakia, particularly on the part of some party members. The affair is not yet closed; the Czech radio has reported that Barak has reserved the right of appeal.

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**Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

Capture of OAS Leader Salan

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Die-hard proponents of a French Algeria such as Jean Jacques Susini, who worked with Salan but appears to have directed semi-independent terrorist activity, will probably continue efforts to nullify De Gaulle's policies. Salan may be succeeded as OAS chief by ex-Colonel Yves Godard, a former director of the Sureté and an expert in clandestine warfare, who was his right-hand man, or by ex-General Paul Gardy, a former inspector general of the Foreign Legion. Another possibility is former French Premier Georges Bidault--who has been "missing" since 12 April and purportedly is chairman of a group formed for OAS activity in the metropole.


Although Salan was sentenced to death for his part in the April 1961 putsch, a retrial is mandatory because the trial was conducted in absentia. Speedy confirmation of the death penalty is almost certain. Whether De Gaulle will commute the sentence of either Salan or former deputy OAS commander ex-General Jouhaud will probably be determined by the extent of OAS terrorism in the immediate future.

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Ruanda-Urundi


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Brussels has insisted that it cannot continue to give Ruanda-Urundi financial aid or keep Belgian technicians in the area without adequate security protection.


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Belgian authorities have been unsuccessful in getting Urundi authorities to say whether they want retention of Belgian troops after independence.

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The UN commission has ended its meetings in Addis Ababa and is revisiting Ruanda-Urundi. It will leave about 10 May for



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Tangier, where it intends to write its final report. UN officials, however, will try to steer the commission to Geneva or to New York to write its report. [Redacted]

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