

**TOP SECRET**

25X1



15 Sept 62

25X1




Copy No. C

*E.D.8*

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



25X1

JCS, State Dept. reviews completed

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600120001-5

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600120001-5

15 September 1962

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. USSR: Khrushchev indicates new Soviet action in Berlin after US elections. (*Page i*)
2. USSR-Iran: Moscow is prepared to accept unilateral Iranian pledge banning foreign missile bases. (*Page ii*)

25X1

4. Belgium-Congo: Spaak believes that UN's Katanga reintegration plan is being pressed too rapidly. (*Page iii*)

25X1

7. India - Communist China: New Delhi is greatly concerned over recent Chinese Communist border intrusion in NEFA. (*Page iv*)
8. Nationalist China: Ten ranger-commando battalions are reportedly being trained for mainland action. (*Page v*)
9. Communist China: Peiping intensifies propaganda exploitation of recent U-2 episode. (*Page v*)

25X1

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

15 September 1962

### DAILY BRIEF

USSR: [Khrushchev's remarks to retiring West German Ambassador Kroll on 11 September support other recent indications that the USSR is planning some new initiative on Berlin following the US Congressional elections in November.]

[Kroll informed the US Embassy in Moscow that he had the impression that a series of Soviet actions leading to the signature of a separate peace treaty will begin shortly after the election. These maneuvers would follow a timetable which would permit recourse, if necessary, to the UN Security Council while the General Assembly is still in session.]

[Khrushchev said he was prepared to postpone action until November but implied that the USSR will soon begin to prepare public opinion for a separate treaty, all details of which have been completed. He repeated his standard line that the treaty will make the continuation of the Western occupation of Berlin impossible and said he would take the matter to the UN Security Council if Western reactions present a risk of war. Khrushchev also reiterated his belief that Western leaders are so anxious to avoid war that they will accommodate themselves to the new situation.]

25X1

25X1

USSR-Iran: [The Soviet ambassador informed the Shah on 12 September that the USSR is now prepared to accept a unilateral Iranian pledge, first offered in September 1959, to prohibit foreign missile bases of all kinds. Moscow apparently has dropped demands for an additional statement promising to ban all foreign military bases and troops.]

25X1

[The Soviet leaders probably believe that such a declaration would provide a valuable precedent for calling on other US allies to prevent the US from staging "aggressive actions," such as U-2 flights, from bases surrounding the USSR.]

[The Iranian declaration scheduled to be handed to the Soviet ambassador on 15 September was prepared after consultation with the American and British ambassadors. Tehran has hoped that such a declaration would lead to a softening of anti-Shah radio propaganda from the Soviet bloc.]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1 [ ]  
Belgium-Congo: Foreign Minister Spaak believes that the UN, without adequate consultation, is pressing ahead much too rapidly with its plan to reintegrate Katanga. He fears that in carrying out the plan, UN officials may make mistakes which will provide Tshombé with plausible pretexts for not cooperating.]

[Spaak particularly fears that "forceful action" by the UN at the present "most critical" period might precipitate a resumption of hostilities, which would be disastrous for UN and Western policy.]


25X1

[ ]

[ ]


25X1

COMMUNIST CHINA - INDIA BORDER AREA



25X1

25X1



25X1

25X1

India - Communist China: Indian Home Minister Shastri, acting as prime minister, has confirmed to Ambassador Galbraith that press reports of a recent Chinese intrusion in the North-East Frontier Agency are essentially accurate. He expressed great concern, saying that the Chinese would have to be "thrown out."

25X1

By emphasizing that no clash has taken place the government has opened itself to charges of weakness.

25X1

Nationalist China: [Nationalist special forces are reported to have begun training ten ranger-commando battalions to be ready for operations against the mainland by early March 1963.]

[These trainees, approximately 2,500 men, would double the special forces group now operationally ready. The trainees will probably be drawn from existing units outside the US military assistance program. These units include guerrillas who were returned from the Burma border area. The Nationalists still lack the logistic and airlift capability for a large-scale operation.]

25X1

Communist China: After a slow start, Peiping has intensified its domestic and foreign propaganda exploitation of the 9 September U-2 flight.

On 14 September the Chinese Government issued a formal protest over the incident, presumably in an effort to keep foreign attention focused on alleged US responsibility for the flight, and to show that Peiping is taking the most serious view possible of the episode. The protest has been accompanied by a salvo of documentary broadcasts from Peiping tracing US development and use of the U-2 for "spy" activities.

All Peiping newspapers continue to feature the incident and protest meetings are being held throughout the country, apparently in the hope that popular indignation can be used to rally the public's flagging support of the Peiping regime.

25X1

15 Sept 62

DAILY BRIEF

v

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600120001-5

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600120001-5

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600120001-5

**TOP SECRET**

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600120001-5

**TOP SECRET**

STAT

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600120001-5

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600120001-5