


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29 Sept 1962



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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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DAILY BRIEF

Sino-Soviet Relations: [The Soviet Consulate in Shanghai is "closing at once," [redacted]

[redacted] This follows recent press reports that Peiping asked Moscow to close all its consulates in China.]

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[A Foreign Ministry official in Moscow, however, has implied that the consulates are being closed at Soviet initiative. He told the US Embassy on 27 September that the need for consulates in China had diminished since the departure of Soviet workers and technicians.]

[Although the USSR will apparently continue to maintain trade offices in China, closure of the consulates is symptomatic of the growing estrangement between the two countries.]

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Communist China: The communiqué issued at the end of the Chinese Communist Party central committee plenum, held in Peiping from 24 to 27 September, indicated no significant improvement in the state of the economy. The gain in agriculture so far this year was described as "slight," and production increases were claimed for only certain industrial items.

The text of the communiqué reflects concern about discipline at various levels of the party; proposals for interchanging "leading cadres of party and governmental organizations" suggest that extensive personnel shifts in the party may be carried out.

Attacks in the communiqué on the "Tito clique" and on the "modern revisionists" indicate that the Chinese intend to stand firm in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and in particular to continue their opposition to Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement.

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DAILY BRIEF

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South Vietnam: [For the past month Saigon security officials have been rounding up opposition elements who advocate neutrality as a way to end the fighting in South Vietnam.]

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[While the proponents of neutrality are drawn largely from the intelligentsia and apparently have little influence in other circles, the government is anxious to head off any growth of support for this idea.]

[The Communist-sponsored National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam is attempting to drum up domestic and international support for a "neutralist solution," which the Communists see as preparing the way for their eventual assumption of power.]

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Finland: [Finnish officials have again raised with Britain the question of purchasing guided missiles.]

[Earlier this year Finland asked for British and Soviet agreement to a reinterpretation of the 1947 peace treaty banning these weapons. It also sought to buy some from the Soviet Union.]

[In late July, however, the Finnish Government abruptly informed Britain and the USSR that it was withdrawing its request for the missiles--apparently because of US opposition--"in order to remove any possible doubts as to its policy of neutrality." Helsinki asserted its right to acquire defensive missiles, but indicated that it had no intention of doing so at that time.]

[British Foreign Secretary Lord Home has told US officials that he will insist that London be advised of Finland's specific plans regarding missile purchases, including the number, the type, and the supplier. The British feel that once this information is received and assessed, they should agree to the Finnish request.]

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France-Guinea: [De Gaulle's attitude toward Guinea has "greatly softened," according to French Ambassador Pons, who returned to Conakry from Paris on 26 September.]

[Heretofore, De Gaulle has refused to sanction a rapprochement with the Touré regime, which in 1958 offended him personally when it rejected membership in his then new French-African Community. De Gaulle's reported change of heart presumably results in large part from Touré's efforts, following the Algerian settlement, to improve relations with the African territories which have remained close to France.]

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[Pons said he was awaiting instructions to inform Touré that the French are willing to offer technical assistance and to negotiate outstanding financial problems resulting from Guinea's break with the franc zone in 1960. Pons implied that France might even be willing to support the Guinea franc. Such support is probably Touré's primary immediate economic objective. It would contribute significantly to the restoration of substantial ties between Guinea and the West.]

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