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4 November 1962

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

***USSR:** Voroshilov's 3 November Pravda article giving unqualified endorsement of Khrushchev's leadership was obviously written at Khrushchev's behest. Its defensive tone reflects Khrushchev's awareness that Soviet policy on Cuba has left him vulnerable to attack throughout the world Communist movement.

The Chinese Communists reportedly have already referred to Cuba as the "Soviet Munich." Khrushchev may feel compelled not only to answer this and any future Chinese criticism, but also to try to overwhelm in advance possible criticism inside the USSR. An effort of this kind is suggested by Voroshilov's implicit comparison of Lenin and Khrushchev and his emphasis on Lenin's intolerance of "ideological adversaries."

Voroshilov specifically praised Khrushchev's "exceptional self-control" in handling the Cuban crisis as preventing "a world catastrophe." He also endorsed Khrushchev's letters to President Kennedy as showing that the crisis "can be solved speedily by peaceful means" and that this will open the way for other measures to relax international tension.

Despite his repeated emphasis on the need for peace, Voroshilov asserted that the socialist camp has "everything necessary" to strike a retaliatory

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Despite his repeated emphasis on the need for peace, Voroshilov asserted that the socialist camp has "everything necessary" to strike a retaliatory

blow against an aggressor at any point on the globe. He said "our peacefulness is not a sign of weakness."

Voroshilov, who was denounced last year as a member of the Stalinist-oriented antiparty group, was probably chosen to write the article because no present member of the top leadership can claim personal association with Lenin and because he personified Khrushchev's magnanimity toward opponents who publicly confess their error.

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*USSR-Cuba: (A fourth delivery of IL-28s apparently was made to Cuba about 20 October, just a few days before the US quarantine measures were enacted.)

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This brings the number of these aircraft in Cuba to at least 37 and possibly as many as 41.

(So far there is no confirmation that this latest shipment was taken to San Julian airbase, where the others are located.)

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USSR-Satellites: Khrushchev may be informing all of the satellite leaders of steps the USSR intends to take in the near future in its attempts to cope with the Cuban affair.

Since 29 October he has held successive meetings with four of the East European party chiefs. Polish party leader Gomulka arrived in the Soviet capital yesterday, following visits by Czech President Novotny and East German boss Ulbricht and a one-day trip by Bulgarian party first secretary Todor Zhivkov. Janos Kadar of Hungary and Gheorghiu-Dej of Rumania presumably will arrive soon.

The suddenness and brevity of Zhivkov's trip points up the urgency which Moscow evidently attaches to the consultations. The Bulgarian first secretary presided over a plenum of his central committee in Sofia on 31 October and will open a Bulgarian party congress on 5 November. While it is possible that Khrushchev would feel the need to brief Zhivkov on the Cuban episode in any event, it is unlikely that he would have summoned the Bulgarian leader from other pressing business unless the action under consideration would have a major impact on the Bulgarian regime along with the other satellites.

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Bulgaria: Recent developments in the Bulgarian party suggest that first secretary Zhivkov may be expecting a Stalinist challenge at the party's eighth congress, which opens on 5 November.

Dissatisfaction over Soviet policies toward Cuba may have encouraged the Stalinists to reopen their attacks against Zhivkov's pro-Khrushchev leadership. His economic policies, which recently have led to rationing of basic foodstuffs in Sofia and probably elsewhere in the country, are also likely targets.

In what may have been an attempt to forestall a challenge, Zhivkov took the unusual step of convening the central committee on 31 October to approve the report he will deliver to the congress. The central committee also approved a "draft resolution" whereby the congress will accept the report as delivered.

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