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6 February 1963



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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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
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DAILY BRIEF

***Cuba:** The chief of operations of the Cuban Army General Staff has been newly identified as Major Flavio Bravo, a leader of the pre-Castro Cuban Communist Party.


He was identified in this post for the first time in a Cuban broadcast of 1 February. According to the broadcast, he substituted for Raul Castro as the principal speaker at the graduation of some 1,000 students from the National Popular Defense School. Graduates of this school return to their civil jobs but remain part of the armed forces ready reserve, subject to immediate call to active duty.

There is no information as to how long Bravo has held this post. He was promoted to major in ceremonies on 8 January and has probably performed military functions for some time.

As long ago as April 1959, before Castro was openly allied with the veteran Cuban Communists, Bravo was a member of the party's military commission charged with enhancing the party's control over Castro's then disorganized military forces.

Since last March, Bravo has been a member of the 24-man national directorate of Castro's political machine.

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Bravo is the second member of the army general staff identified with the pre-Castro Communist Party. Joaquin Ordoqui, also a veteran Communist leader, has been chief of supply for more than a year.



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DAILY BRIEF

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Common Market: (Many European leaders are expressing increased interest in revitalizing the seven-nation Western European Union (WEU) as a mechanism for continuing contacts between Britain and the EEC countries.)

25X1 [redacted] (Macmillan and Fanfani agreed during their 1-3 February talks in Rome to ask the West German Government to call a WEU foreign ministers' meeting. Fanfani wants particularly to forestall De Gaulle's calling a conference of EEC chiefs of government to discuss European political union.)

(Bonn Foreign Ministry officials have indicated that they are considering reviving WEU and are looking into the possibility of new economic initiatives. Bonn also envisages having Britain unilaterally align its tariffs and agricultural policies with those of the EEC.)

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Britain - Bloc Trade: (The Macmillan government feels under strong pressure to enlarge its trade with the bloc following Britain's exclusion from the European Economic Community.)

(Foreign Secretary Lord Home has assured Special Ambassador Herter that [redacted]

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[redacted] East-West trade is a field in which Britain needs "sympathetic understanding" from the United States. Home said that British export of large-diameter pipe is one of the immediate issues.)

(The president of the Board of Trade reminded Herter of the depressed state of the shipbuilding industry, saying "I must find somebody to buy our ships. You won't buy them." He tentatively inquired what the US reaction would be to the UK's bartering ships for Soviet crude oil.)

(The USSR would seize on any British proposal to increase trade in items of strategic significance such as large-diameter steel pipe. Such increases would probably not go very far toward solving pressing British economic problems, however. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe now buy only about 3.6 percent of British exports and supply 4.2 percent of Britain's imports.)

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
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Congo: (Adoula is under increasing pressure to oust Tshombé from any position of authority in Katanga.)

(Members of the Lumumbist Party in Leopoldville are using Tshombé's continued tenure in office as a reason to criticize Adoula. The Lumumbists threaten to resume their attacks on his government when Parliament reconvenes, possibly in March.)

In Elisabethville, the US consul is concerned that scheduled changes in the strength of UN garrisons in Katanga may spread the UN force too thin to maintain order. Native communes in the Katangan capital are reported to be disturbed over threats from Katangan gendarmes, who say they will take reprisals after the UN is gone.



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Guinea-USSR: The Touré regime has prevented the Soviet Embassy in Conakry from forcibly repatriating a Soviet national, and a new crisis in Guinean-Soviet relations may be in the making.

Although Ambassador Degtyar intervened personally, the Guineans refused to let Soviet Embassy officials put a female Soviet teacher aboard the weekly Aeroflot flight. She had told airport authorities she was being compelled to leave against her will for "fraternizing with Guineans." The girl was placed under Guinean police protection. The incident reportedly was interpreted by many Guineans as a racial affront.

Guinea's Minister of Education told the US Ambassador on 2 February that two Soviet bodyguards involved in the incident had been arrested. He predicted that the affair would "cost the Russians dearly" and that Degtyar would probably be declared persona non grata.

Guinea's relations with Moscow have remained cool since December 1961 when Degtyar's predecessor was expelled on a charge of intervening in Guinea's internal affairs.

[Redacted]

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